Order is the lifeblood of civilization. It is the fundamental instrument that separates us from the uncivilized barbarians of our all-too recent past. Inherent to the role of the civil order is the rule of law, a powerful, independent and uncorrupted judiciary with the legitimacy to arbitrate and enforce its will. I have nothing to say in particular to the establishment of the rule of law. Western democracy was shown remarkable resilience in this end since the early 1700's and I believe that all cultures around the world should attempt to adopt similar measures, whether they be inherited from British Common Law or Napoleonic code. I would make the suggestion that my ideas are more compatible with civil law, or the Napoleonic code, being that chronimism attempts to evaluate each man on an individual basis, without the benefit of what has come before them (as civil law judges each man without the benefit of legal precedent); however, it is far from a catastrophe if a society which adopts my economic system has a different legal framework. Even theocratic legality such as sharia or ecclesiastical law can be warped to fit my designs. The purposes of this chapter is not to suggest how to create the rule of law (as is it my assumption that any society so backwards as to not have this already cannot possibly be evolved enough to accept my philosophies), but identify how to compensate officers of the court, how these officers should interact with the military branch of government and how the justice system should be subsidized by the people.

Although in the traditional division of powers as set out by Montesquieu and his contemporaries the creation, enforcement and interpretation of laws are each distributed to the legislative, executive and judicial branches, a chronimistic society requires a more horizontally integrated approach. Because the powers of the post-modern state, whether chronimistic or not, are more economic than regulatory, it no longer becomes necessary to divide these powers as prudently as in the past. After all, without a chequebook to pay their forces, even a man with total control of every legal facet of the state would have no ability to subjugate others to his will. Because the chronimistic state is divided amongst Regulations, Services, Defence, and Justice, it is vitally important that all members of Justice (the creators, enforcers, and interpreters of the law) work in tandem so that they as a department have enough power to balance with the other departments. Please note that government policy and legal policy are considered very separate issues in a chronimistic setting. Whereas in western parliaments it is often the same house that finances government operations, goes to war, and writes new societal regulations, it is not so under my system. The issues of governance will be discussed and acted upon by the four department heads. Should they need to make changes to any of their mandates, each department will be charged with their own reformation process. For changes to Services and Defence, each chronimistic society may create their own review process. Regulations and Justice, however, will have their own process that I will describe here and in chapter seven.

Primarily, the act of criminal law making won't be initiated without three of the four department heads agreeing to undertake it. After this, the Chief Justice will ask each regional bar association to appoint a solicitor, barrister, attorney, litigator, counsellor or magistrate to The House of Law. Ideally, these appointees will be elected by the bar association, but should they be chosen logically by their performance and not their popularity, this is also acceptable. The House of Law will be charged with first voting whether or not change in the law is necessary and if so, will be given the responsibility of writing it up. The process of drafting, reading and interrogating the bill will be left to the discretion of the society involved. Once passed by The House of Law, it must be accepted by three of the four heads and signed by the Chief Justice. If the heads of Regulations, Services and Defence agree with the contents of the bill, but the Chief Justice does not, it still will not pass and will return to The House of Law for amendment. If this process continues three times, the bill will not be passed in its entirety, but instead each individual clause will be voted on by the four heads of the departments and each clause that is unanimously approved will be made law whilst everything else is tossed out, assuming that over two-thirds of the total clauses of the bill are approved. The executive branch will not be allowed to be petulant and then mine for the few points they desire. Such processes are wasteful and repulsive.

Once a bill is made law it will be enforced by a dedicated police force to be managed by a Chief Justice appointee and paid by the Justice treasury. Although meant to maintain peace and order, the police must also provide a reasonable deterrent to any ambitions of Defence. They must have the manpower and the militarization necessary to prevent or reverse any coup d'état that the armed forces of the state may attempt. Therefore, whereas the military will be staffed with imbeciles and plebeians who could not get work elsewhere and would starve where it not for the good graces of the state, it is important for the police to be administered by the most professional and competent of employees: men and women capable of obeying orders, keeping composure under fire and maintaining a tactful relationship to their stationed community. It is important that the police be trusted by the people so that in the event of political turmoil, the community will choose to rally to their side and not support the militaristic pretenders. That being said, in pursuit of stable government and absolute order, the police must not overstep the bounds of liberty by maintaining a surveillance state in any fashion, whether it be through espionage, wiretapping, secret policing, communication monitoring or meta-data collection. The citizens of a chronimistic society must be able to communicate freely, easily and candidly without fear of invasion or molestation. Moreover, the freedom of speech and assembly must be respected in all situations and cannot be revoked upon any suspicion. It is possible to monitor and surveil the military because they are the real concern to peace and security; however, it is never acceptable to do this en masse to the regular citizenry. The powers of the police should be used to keep criminal individuals and troublesome military figures in check, not the public at large.

The resolution of disputes whether criminal or civil will still be handled by judges as they are today; however, the judges, although officially members of the department of Justice, must be more independent as they will oversee the conduct of every department. As such, judicial councils made up of magistrates will determine the salary of their members and will discipline their benches as necessary. They will also appoint lawyers to fill vacant seats in the judiciary. All appointments will be made for life or until resignation. No individual or group may appoint a justice or force one's resignation with the exception of the judicial council. This being said, their pay will be extracted from the treasurer of the department of Justice and as such the council cannot demand salaries or expenditures that the department is unwilling to award. Theoretically, should the court get out of hand, the treasury section of the Justice can choose to completely dry up all funds to the court; however, it is important to note that the treasury can only provide lump sum payments to the judicial council as whole and it is that organization that distributed the salaries. Therefore, the department of Justice can punish all judges at once or none at all. This will be the only outside check on the power of the judiciary.

If a law is struck down as being unconstitutional by the highest court of a chronimistic nation, the law must either be rewritten or eliminated. This will be left up to the discretion of the four heads. So long as three of the four, including the Chief Justice, agree, the law can be struck from the record. However, if there is no such agreement, the law must be rewritten within a year to allow for constitutionality. The bar associations will once again call the House of Law into session. First, the House may vote as the heads did to completely dismember the law or to rewrite it. Should the vote be in favour of abolition, the law will cease. Should the vote be in favour of a rewrite, the same process for law writing as described above will take place only if three versions of the bill fail to be ratified by both the House of Law and the heads, the judicial council will amend the bill to its taste. Should the Chief Justice sign this bill, it will be made law. Should he refuse, the original law that was struck down by the courts will be eliminated from the record and no law will replace it.

A policeman fills a rather peculiar position in a chronimistic society. Without law and order, which he provides, it is clearly impossible for civilization to survive, and yet his product is nearly impossible to measure in time as a blue collar worker would or in expertise as a white collar would. It is difficult to measure the productivity of individual peace officers in the same methods I have described, and attempts by modern jurisdictions to do so, such as setting quotas on traffic tickets and arrests, only serve to artificially inflate the delinquency rate. So, what is a policeman's worth to his society?

Theoretically, the perfect police officer's performance is impossible to measure. This is due to the fact that if the police undergo their duties to absolute completion, there would be no crime nor injustice. Everyone in the society would be protected. Instead, it appears that we as a people believe we most need police officers when they are least effective. It is the police failures (high crime rates, acts of terrorism, rampant vigilantism) that make us most aware of our need for policing. This certainly provides no impetus for the powers of law and order to do their jobs with absolute efficiency. After all, should crime increase, their department will be better funded and should crime cease to exist, their department will go with it. This is the dichotomy which made Victorian society suspicious of policing when it was first introduced to London in the early nineteenth century. An industry should never have complete control over its own existence.

In compliance with the overarching directive that no man may consume more than he produces, it is clear that peace needs to be treated as a commodity, a luxurious one, but one with definite value. Instead of the police "erasing a negative" as Ayn Rand theorized, they need to be seen as adding something to the economy. It is impossible for business to exist in an unstable environment after all. That being said, such an ideal can easily establish the police as running a protection racket, keeping criminals at bay until the businesses stop paying and then letting them hop the fences and destroy those behind on their debts.

In order to provide an impetus for police officers to do their duties to the absolute of their abilities, it's important to pay them based on how well they prevent crime, not necessarily on how well they deal with it when it occurs. Thus, each police officer will start with a baseline salary which can only be reduced if their area of influence becomes less orderly but will increase if their area is maintained properly, allowing for a promotion. Therefore, there will be two multipliers applied to the time a policeman spends on the job. First, he will be given the standard white collar multiplier, adjusted to suit his position. It will comprise of total training hours plus the officer's total working hours in the recertification period divided by the total working hours in the average recertification period. This will then be multiplied by the percentage of the civilian population in their area of concern (i.e. their district, "beat", or patrol area) who are not known criminals. This number will be determined by an outside officer and will not count those people from the region currently serving sentences. So, if every known criminal in the area has been caught, the multiplier would be one. Thus, if an officer has trained for 1000 hours and can work for 5000 hours without recertification in an average 3000 hour recertification period, their first multiplier will be two. Then, if they cover a neighbourhood of one thousand people, ten of which are known criminals, their second multiplier will be 0.99. Together that means that for every hour of work the officer is on the job, he is compensated for 1.98 hours of work. As an officer is promoted, their training and recertification time will increase as well as the size of their jurisdiction, thus providing the opportunity for greater pay with greater liability. This would cover every officer in the employ of the police with the exception of the detectives and Internal Affairs agents. Detectives would be given the same first multiplier, but instead of being penalized for the number of known criminals, their second multiplier would be based on the number of convictions versus acquittals or unsolved crimes in their cases. Internal Affairs agents would have their salaries regulated by the Chief Justice's office, and they would also be answerable to that office.

Courts are always challenging to finance, and their expansion is difficult to justify. After all, in the ideal society, they would completely unnecessary because there would be no disputes or crimes to adjudicate. Thus, it is possible to make the argument that those courts which needed more funding were doing their jobs the worst whereas the courts that had little traffic and weren't filled to bursting and didn't beg for tax dollars were performing better. This problem is not limited to justice, but extends to all departments of the civil administration. The power of the bureaucrat is determined by the size of his bureaucracy, providing incentive to expand the inefficiencies of government and perpetuate the problems they are supposed fix instead of reducing costs and staff. However, that being said, in the case of the courts it is difficult to find a direct correlation between the aptitude of the magistrate and the use of his bench. Poor judges are not necessarily busier than astute ones and so if the administration penalized those courts cursed with an unruly public, it will serve only to perpetuate judicial backlog not prevent it. Thus, it is crucial to discover a system of court compensation that will not empty the public purse but will still provide the highest level of judicial prudence and afford all citizens their right to a trial in reasonable time.

The purpose of serving jail sentences for crimes is for criminals to repay their debt to society. Although this is symbolically relevant, it is fiscally crippling for the state. Not only does the court undergo huge expense to prosecute and sentence such miscreants, but the state must spend unimaginable sums in feeding, clothing and imprisoning someone. When a person commits a crime, they do owe a debt to society, but forcing a convict into prison does nothing to service that debt. A more financially amicable way to punish criminals, then, would be to determine the exact monetary value of each offence to society and have a criminal repay that.

This may raise the ethical question of the rich blatantly getting away with murder, so to speak, but more importantly it should settle the moral quandary of what to do with a productive criminal. After all, under the current system, if a brilliant man kills his fellow, society loses both the victim and the brilliant mind of he responsible by locking him away. If the criminal in question were able to pay a fine equal to the value his victim would have been to society, his work could continue to be of benefit to society and his debt would be paid. The court would still have the discretion of forcing mental treatment if it were needed, and those found legally insane would not be required to make any payments as punishments. For those who were not insane, on top of the cost to victims and society, a convicted person would have to make recompense for the resources used to arrest, guard and convict him both in the police and in the court.

Switching from penal to financial punition will not simply make it easier to fund the system of law and order, but will change the entire relationship between criminal and court. In a chronimistic system, he who is most evolved survives, regardless of whether or not he obeys the rules of society. If a person is intelligent enough to create a business which can make a profit whilst compensating for the owner's or the business' illegal activity, then that person should be rewarded. Creating unbreakable laws only forces once creative people to box their thinking around often arbitrary social constructs. Having laws with financial penalties allows people the option of breaking them if necessary, but being that they will repay their debt to society, nothing is harmed overall. It keeps options open and affords the abilities of the creative thinkers to realistically consider all possibilities. On the other hand, it protects society from gorging itself to death with Tough on Crime witch hunts and character assassinations of its most powerful figures. It is the role of the justice system to maintain order, but in a chronimistic society it must also maintain productivity.

Being that a convict must compensate the court for the time spent to conduct his case, he has incentive to admit guilt and pay the fine instead of dragging out proceedings and their associated costs. This should reduce judicial backlog in and of itself but will also transition the court from being a body concerned with the publicly expensive prosecution of criminals to the privately expensive arbitration of civil disputes. Ultimately then, it might become unnecessary for prosecutors to exist at all, eliminating an enormous and perpetually expanding government expense.

The most challenging part of integrating this new penal system would be the calculation of each crime's cost to society. First, in the case of murder, the convicted must pay back exactly what the person would have been contributed to society in the course of their lifetime. This would be calculated by multiplying the current salary of the victim by the average lifespan of a human being in their field. For an unemployed person, their productivity would simply be determined by the raw number of working hours left between their actual time of death and their expected time of death. In order to prevent entrepreneurs from killing off industrial competitors, a special clause would be put in place for those who murder someone in the same field as one's self. Instead of using the victim's current salary solely, the convict would have to pay the combined total of their own and the victim's pay multiplied by the remaining lifespan of the deceased. This would account for the possibility of the victim one day overtaking the perpetrator in business, had he survived that long. Also, in the case of all deaths, the convicted would have to compensate anyone financially reliant on the victim, most probably offspring of the deceased. For theft or fraud, the payment would be the price of replacing what was stolen, multiplied by two (one payment to the court, the other to the victim). For assaults both sexual and asexual in nature, the cost would be the healthcare of the victim in addition to whatever punitive damages were awarded by the court for pain and suffering again paid twice to court and victim. For other crimes, the costs would be left to the discretion of the justice or the civil administration should they feel it necessary to regulate such penalties.

Naturally, it's not illogical to imagine that most crimes would be perpetrated by the poor, and so it might be impossible for such individuals to repay the costs of their sins with labour alone. That is perfectly acceptable, as their lives will also suffice. A debt to society would take a literal form, with scheduled payments and rates of interest for those with low life expectancy. For the unemployed, they could be put into government work camps where they would serve as slave labour: cleaning sewers or digging Northern roads by hand or something within those confines. And, should the convicted choose not to undergo the long, harsh servitude of their debt, the option of suicide would also be open to them, expunging the world of their presence and the need to prosecute them ever again. And so, with one foul swoop, not only would law and order be fulfilled, but it would be fulfilled cheaply.