banking and financial market

I have continually strived to improve this textbook with each new edition, and the

Seventh Edition of The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets is no

exception. The text has undergone a major revision, but it retains the basic hallmarks

that have made it the best-selling textbook on money and banking in the past

six editions:

• A unifying, analytic framework that uses a few basic economic principles to

organize students’ thinking about the structure of financial markets, the foreign

exchange markets, financial institution management, and the role of monetary

policy in the economy

• A careful, step-by-step development of models (an approach found in the best

principles of economics textbooks), which makes it easier for students to learn

• The complete integration of an international perspective throughout the text

• A thoroughly up-to-date treatment of the latest developments in monetary theory

• Special features called “Following the Financial News” and “Reading the Wall

Street Journal” to encourage reading of a financial newspaper

• An applications-oriented perspective with numerous applications and specialtopic

boxes that increase students’ interest by showing them how to apply theory

to real-world examples

What’s New in the Seventh Edition

In addition to the expected updating of all data through the end of 2002 whenever

possible, there is major new material in every part of the text. Indeed, this revision

is one of the most substantial that I have ever done.

With the wide swings in the stock prices in recent years, students of money and

banking have become increasingly interested in what drives the stock market. As a

result, I have expanded the discussion of this market by describing simple valuation

methods for stocks and examining recent developments in the stock market

and the link between monetary policy and stock prices. I have combined this material

with the discussion of the theory of rational expectations and efficient capital

markets to create a new Chapter 7, “The Stock Market, the Theory of Rational

Expectations, and the Efficient Market Hypothesis.”

Expanded

Coverage of the

Stock Market

xxix

PREFACE

In light of continuing changes in financial markets and institutions, I have added

the following new material to keep the text current:

• Extensive discussion of recent corporate scandals and the collapse of Enron,

including their impact on the economy (Chapters 6, 7, 11, and 26)

• Discussion of the role of venture capitalists in the high-tech sector (Chapter 8)

• Examination of how information technology is influencing bank consolidation,

and analysis of whether clicks will dominate bricks in the banking industry

(Chapter 10)

• New material on the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision and where the Basel

Accord is heading (Chapter 11)

• Discussion of the spread of deposit insurance throughout the world (Chapter 11)

• Perspective on the growing concerns about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

(Chapter 12)

• A new type of special-interest box, the E-Finance box, which relates how

changes in technology have affected the conduct of business in banking and

financial markets. The placement of these boxes throughout the text helps to

demonstrate the impact of technology across a broad range of areas in finance.

The growing importance of the global economy has encouraged me to add more

new material with an international perspective:

• Extensive discussion of recent developments in Argentina (Chapters 1, 8, 11,

20, and 21)

• Analysis of how central banks set overnight interest rates in other countries

(Chapter 17)

• Discussion of how the euro has fared in its first four years (Chapter 19)

• Additional treatment of recent events in the Japanese economy (Chapters 11

and 26)

Drawing on my continuing involvement with central banks around the world, I

have added new material to keep the discussion of monetary theory and policy

current:

• New boxes on Fed watching and Federal Reserve transparency (Chapters 14

and 18)

• Discussion of the changes (implemented in 2003) in the way the Fed administers

the discount window (Chapter 17)

• An updated discussion of the market for reserves and how the channel/corridor

system for setting interest rates works (Chapter 17)

• Discussion of how the recent corporate scandals have hindered the recovery of

the economy from the 2001–2002 recession (Chapter 25)

The incredible advances in electronic (computer and telecommunications) technology

in recent years have had a major impact on the financial system. This Seventh

Edition reflects these developments by adding many new features with an electronic

focus.

Web Enhancement. The Seventh Edition embraces the exploding world of information

now available over the World Wide Web. There are few areas where the Internet

E-Focus

New Material on

Monetary Theory

and Policy

Increased

International

Perspective

New Material on

Financial

Institutions

xxx Preface

has been as valuable as in the realm of money, banking, and financial markets. Data

that were once difficult and tedious to collect are now readily available. To help students

appreciate what they can access online, I have added a number of new features:

1. Web Exercises. This edition adds all-new end-of-chapter Web Exercises.

These require that students collect information from online sources or use

online resources to enhance their learning experience. The Web Exercises are

relatively quick and easy to complete, while still accomplishing the goal of

familiarizing students with online sources of data.

2. Web Sources. Much of the data used to create the many tables and charts were

collected from online sources. Wherever a Web URL is available, it is exactly

reported as the source. The interested student or instructor can use this URL to

see what has happened since the chart or table was created.

3. Marginal Web References. In addition to listing the sources of data used to

create the charts and graphs, I have also included in the margin URLs to Web

sites that provide information or data that supplement the text. These references

include a brief description of what students will find at the site.

Interested students can use these sites to extend their study, and instructors can

draw from them to supplement their lecture notes. Because the URLs for Web

sources and references do sometimes change, the Mishkin Companion Web

Site at www.aw.com/mishkin will provide the new URLs when they are needed.

E-Finance Boxes. To illustrate how electronic technology has increasingly permeated

financial markets and institutions, I have included the all-new E-Finance

boxes, described earlier, to show the ongoing real-world impact of this remarkable

development.

As textbooks go into later editions, they often grow in length. Over the years, I have

resisted this tendency, and in this edition have made even greater efforts to streamline

the book. Despite the addition of a lot of new material, the book is substantially

shorter. Moreover, at the suggestion of reviewers, I have moved the discussion of

rational expectations and efficient markets earlier in the book, to Chapter 7. I have

also shifted the material on the foreign exchange market and the determination of

exchange rates to Chapter 19 so that it comes immediately before the chapter on

the international financial system, allowing this material to be taught together.

The Web site for this book, www.aw.com/mishkin, has allowed me to produce a

large amount of new material for the book without lengthening the text, because we

have placed this material in appendices on the Web site. The appendices include:

Chapter 2: Financial Market Instruments

Chapter 4: Measuring Interest-Rate Risk: Duration

Chapter 5: Models of Asset Pricing

Chapter 5: Applying the Asset Market Approach to a Commodity Market:

The Case of Gold

Chapter 9: Duration Gap Analysis

Chapter 9: Measuring Bank Performance

Chapter 11: Evaluating FDICIA and Other Proposed Reforms of the Bank

Regulatory System

Appendices on

the Web

Streamlined

Coverage and

Organization

Preface xxxi

Chapter 15: The Fed’s Balance Sheet and the Monetary Base

Chapter 16: The M2 Money Multiplier

Chapter 16: Explaining the Behavior of the Currency Ratio

Chapter 22: A Mathematical Treatment of the Baumol-Tobin and Tobin Mean

Variance Model

Chapter 22: Empirical Evidence on the Demand for Money

Chapter 24: Algebra of the ISLM Model

Chapter 25: Aggregate Supply and the Phillips Curve

Instructors can either use these appendices in class to supplement the material in

the textbook, or recommend them to students who want to expand their knowledge

of the money and banking field.

Flexibility

In using previous editions, adopters, reviewers, and survey respondents have continually

praised this text’s flexibility. There are as many ways to teach money, banking,

and financial markets as there are instructors. To satisfy the diverse needs of

instructors, the text achieves flexibility as follows:

• Core chapters provide the basic analysis used throughout the book, and other

chapters or sections of chapters can be used or omitted according to instructor

preferences. For example, Chapter 2 introduces the financial system and basic

concepts such as transaction costs, adverse selection, and moral hazard. After

covering Chapter 2, the instructor may decide to give more detailed coverage

of financial structure by assigning Chapter 8, or may choose to skip Chapter 8

and take any of a number of different paths through the book.

• The text also allows instructors to cover the most important issues in monetary

theory and policy without having to use the ISLM model in Chapters 23 and

24, while more complete treatments of monetary theory make use of the ISLM

chapters.

• The internationalization of the text through marked international sections within

chapters, as well as through complete separate chapters on the foreign exchange

market and the international monetary system, is comprehensive yet flexible.

Although many instructors will teach all the international material, others will

not. Instructors who want less emphasis on international topics can easily skip

Chapter 19 on the foreign exchange market and Chapter 20 on the international

financial system and monetary policy. The international sections within chapters

are self-contained and can be omitted with little loss of continuity.

To illustrate how this book can be used for courses with varying emphases, several

course outlines are suggested for a semester teaching schedule. More detailed

information about how the text can be used flexibly in your course is available in

the Instructor’s Manual.

• General Money and Banking Course: Chapters 1–5, 9–11, 14, 17, 18, 25, 27,

with a choice of 6 of the remaining 15 chapters.

• General Money and Banking Course with an International Emphasis: Chapters 1–5,

9–11, 14, 17–20, 25, 27 with a choice of 4 of the remaining 13 chapters.

xxxii Preface

• Financial Markets and Institutions Course: Chapters 1–13, with a choice of 6 of

the remaining 15 chapters.

• Monetary Theory and Policy Course: Chapters 1–5, 14, 15, 17, 18, 21, 25–28,

with a choice of 5 of the remaining 14 chapters.

Pedagogical Aids

In teaching theory or its applications, a textbook must be a solid motivational tool.

To this end, I have incorporated a wide variety of pedagogical features to make the

material easy to learn:

1. Previews at the beginning of each chapter tell students where the chapter is

heading, why specific topics are important, and how they relate to other topics

in the book.

2. Applications, numbering more than 50, demonstrate how the analysis in the

book can be used to explain many important real-world situations. A special set

of applications, called “Reading the Wall Street Journal,” shows students how to

read daily columns in this leading financial newspaper.

3. “Following the Financial News” boxes introduce students to relevant news

articles and data that are reported daily in the press, and explain how to read

them.

4. “Inside the Fed” boxes give students a feel for what is important in the operation

and structure of the Federal Reserve System.

5. Global boxes include interesting material with an international focus.

6. E-Finance boxes relate how changes in technology have affected financial markets

or institutions.

7. Special-interest boxes highlight dramatic historical episodes, interesting

ideas, and intriguing facts related to the subject matter.

8. Study Guides are highlighted statements scattered throughout the text that

provide hints to the student on how to think about or approach a topic.

9. Summary tables provide a useful study aid in reviewing material.

10. Key statements are important points set in boldface italic type so that students

can easily find them for later reference.

11. Graphs with captions, numbering more than 150, help students clearly

understand the interrelationship of the variables plotted and the principles of

analysis.

12. Summary at the end of each chapter lists the main points covered.

13. Key terms are important words or phrases, boldfaced when they are defined

for the first time and listed by page number at the end of the chapter.

14. End-of-chapter questions and problems, numbering more than 400, help

students learn the subject matter by applying economic concepts, including a

special class of problems that students find particularly relevant, under the

heading “Using Economic Analysis to Predict the Future.”

15. Web Exercises encourage students to collect information from online sources

or use online resources to enhance their learning experience.

16. Web sources report the Web URL source of the data used to create the many

tables and charts.

Preface xxxiii

17. Marginal Web references point the student to Web sites that provide information

or data that supplement the text material.

18. Glossary at the back of the book provides definitions of all the key terms.

19. Answers section at the back of the book provides solutions to half of the questions

and problems (marked by *).

An Easier Way to Teach Money, Banking, and Financial Markets

The demands for good teaching have increased dramatically in recent years. To

meet these demands, I have provided the instructor with supplementary materials,

unlike those available with any competing text, that should make teaching this

course substantially easier.

This book comes with not only full-color Microsoft PowerPoint electronic

transparencies of all the figures and tables but also full-color overhead transparencies.

Furthermore, the Instructor’s Manual contains transparency masters of the lecture

notes, perforated so that they can be easily detached for use in class.

The lecture notes are comprehensive and outline all the major points covered

in the text. They have been class-tested successfully—they are in fact the notes that

I use in class—and they should help other instructors prepare their lectures as they

have helped me. Some instructors might use these lecture notes as their own class

notes and prefer to teach with a blackboard. But for those who prefer to teach with

visual aids, the PowerPoint presentation and the full-color transparencies of the figures

and tables afford the flexibility to take this approach.

I am also aware that many instructors want to make variations in their lectures

that depart somewhat from material covered in the text. For their convenience, the

entire set of lecture notes has been put on the Instructor’s Resource CD-ROM using

Microsoft Word. Instructors can modify the lecture notes as they see fit for their own

use, for class handouts, or for transparencies to be used with an overhead projector.

The Instructor’s Resource CD-ROM also offers the entire contents of the

Instructor’s Manual, which includes chapter outlines, overviews, and teaching tips;

answers to the end-of-chapter problems that are not included in the text. Using this

handy feature, instructors can prepare student handouts such as solutions to problem

sets made up of end-of-chapter problems, the outline of the lecture that day, or

essay discussion questions for homework. I have used handouts of this type in my

teaching and have found them to be very effective. Instructors have my permission

and are encouraged to photocopy all of the materials on the CD-ROM and use them

as they see fit in class.

Supplements Program to Accompany the Seventh Edition

The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets, Seventh Edition, includes

the most comprehensive program of supplements of any money, banking, and

financial markets textbook. These items are available to qualified domestic adopters,

but in some cases may not be available to international adopters.

1. Instructor’s Resource Manual, a print supplement prepared by me and offering

conventional elements such as sample course outlines, chapter outlines, and

For the Professor

xxxiv Preface

answers to questions and problems in the text. In addition, the manual contains

my Lecture Notes, numbering more than 300, in transparency master format;

these notes comprehensively outline the major points covered in the textbook.

2. Instructor’s Resource CD-ROM, which conveniently holds the MS Word files

to the Instructor’s Manual, the Computerized Test Bank, and the MS PowerPoint

Lecture Presentation.

3. Full-Color Transparencies, numbering more than 150, for all of the figures,

tables, and summary tables.

4. PowerPoint Electronic Lecture Presentation, numbering more than 300

images, which include all the book’s figures and tables in full color, plus the lecture

notes. Available on the Instructor’s Resource CD-ROM.

5. Printed Test Bank by James Butkiewicz of the University of Delaware, comprising

more than 4,500 multiple-choice and essay test items, many with graphs.

6. Computerized Test Bank, allowing the instructor to produce exams efficiently.

This product consists of the multiple-choice and essay questions in the printed

Test Bank and offers editing capabilities. It is available in Macintosh and Windows

versions on the Instructor’s Resource CD-ROM.

1. Study Guide and Workbook, prepared by Erick Eschker of Humboldt State

University, John McArthur of Wofford College, and me, which includes chapter

synopses and completions, exercises, self-tests, and answers to the exercises

and self-tests.

2. Readings in Money, Banking, and Financial Markets, edited by James W.

Eaton of Bridgewater College and me, updated annually, with over half the articles

new each year to enable instructors to keep the content of their course current

throughout the life of an edition of the text. The readings are available

within MyEconLab (see next section).

Course Management with MyEconLab

Every student who buys a new textbook receives a prepaid subscription to

MyEconLab. New to the Seventh Edition of The Economics of Money, Banking, and

Financial Markets, MyEconLab delivers rich online content and innovative learning

tools to your classroom. Instructors who use MyEconLab gain access to powerful

communication and assessment tools, and their students receive access to the additional

learning resources described next.

MyEconLab delivers the content and tools your students need to succeed within

Addison-Wesley’s innovative CourseCompass system. Students whose instructors

use MyEconLab gain access to a variety of resources:

• The complete textbook online, in PDF format, with animated graphs that help

students master the key concepts

• MathXL for Economics—a powerful tutorial to refresh students on the basics

of creating and interpreting graphs; solving applied problems using graphs; calculating

ratios and percentages; performing calculations; calculating average,

median, and mode; and finding areas

• Research Navigator™—a one-stop research tool, with extensive help on the entire

research process, including evaluating sources, drafting, and documentation, as

Students and

MyEconLab

For the Student

Preface xxxv

well as access to a variety of scholarly journals and publications, a complete

year of search for full-text articles from the New York Times, and a “Best of the

Web” Link Library of peer-reviewed Web sites

• eThemes of the Times—thematically related articles from the New York Times,

accompanied by critical-thinking questions

• Readings on Money, Banking, and Financial Markets—edited by James W. Eaton

of Bridgewater College and me and updated annually, with a focus on articles

from Federal Reserve publications and economics and finance journals

• Additional study resources such as self-testing quizzes for each chapter, a

weekly current events feature, online glossary term flashcards, and additional

articles and supplemental materials

The Student Access Kit that arrives bundled with all new books walks students

step-by-step through the registration process.

With MyEconLab, instructors can customize existing content and add their own.

They can manage, create, and assign tests to students, choosing from our Test Bank,

or upload tests they’ve written themselves. MyEconLab also includes advanced

tracking features that record students’ usage and performance and a Gradebook feature

to see students’ test results. Please refer to the Instructor Quick Start Guide or

contact your Addison-Wesley sales representative to set up MyEconLab for your

course.

Acknowledgments

As always in so large a project, there are many people to thank. My gratitude goes

to Victoria Warneck, economics editor at Addison Wesley; Sylvia Mallory, Executive

Development Manager; and Jane Tufts, the best development editor in the business.

I also have been assisted by comments from my colleagues at Columbia and from

my students.

In addition, I have been guided by the thoughtful commentary of outside

reviewers and correspondents, especially Jim Eaton. Their feedback has made this

a better book. In particular, I thank the following:

Burton Abrams, University of Delaware

Francis W. Ahking, University of Connecticut

Mohammed Akacem, Metropolitan State College of Denver

Harjit K. Arora, Le Moyne College

Stacie Beck, University of Delaware

Gerry Bialka, University of North Florida

Daniel K. Biederman, University of North Dakota

John Bishop, East Carolina University

Daniel Blake, California State University, Northridge

Robert Boatler, Texas Christian University

Henning Bohn, University of California, Santa Barbara

Michael W. Brandl, University of Texas at Austin

Oscar T. Brookins, Northeastern University

William Walter Brown, California State University, Northridge

Instructors and

MyEconLab

xxxvi Preface

James L. Butkiewicz, University of Delaware

Colleen M. Callahan, Lehigh University

Ray Canterbery, Florida State University

Sergio Castello, University of Mobile

Jen-Chi Cheng, Wichita State University

Patrick Crowley, Middlebury College

Sarah E. Culver, University of Alabama, Birmingham

Maria Davis, San Antonio College

Ranjit S. Dighe, State University of New York, Oswego

Richard Douglas, Bowling Green University

Donald H. Dutkowsky, Syracuse University

Richard Eichhorn, Colorado State University

Paul Emberton, Southwest Texas State University

Erick Eschker, Humboldt State University

Robert Eyler, Sonoma State University

L. S. Fan, Colorado State University

Sasan Fayazmanesh, California State University, Fresno

Dennis Fixler, George Washington University

Gary Fleming, Roanoke College

Grant D. Forsyth, Eastern Washington University

James Gale, Michigan Technological University

Stuart M. Glosser, University of Wisconsin, Whitewater

Fred C. Graham, American University

Jo Anna Gray, University of Oregon

David Gulley, Bentley College

Daniel Haak, Stanford University

Larbi Hammami, McGill University

Bassan Harik, Western Michigan University

J. C. Hartline, Rutgers University

Scott E. Hein, Texas Tech University

Robert Stanley Herren, North Dakota State University

Jane Himarios, University of Texas, Arlington

Dar-Yeh Hwang, National Taiwan University

Jayvanth Ishwaran, Stephen F. Austin State University

Jonatan Jelen, Queens College and City College of CUNY

U Jin Jhun, State University of New York, Oswego

Frederick L. Joutz, George Washington University

Bryce Kanago, University of Northern Iowa

Magda Kandil, International Monetary Fund

George G. Kaufman, Loyola University Chicago

Richard H. Keehn, University of Wisconsin, Parkside

Elizabeth Sawyer Kelly, University of Wisconsin, Madison

Jim Lee, Fort Hays State University

Robert Leeson, University of Western Ontario

Tony Lima, California State University, Hayward

Bernard Malamud, University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Marvin Margolis, Millersville University

Stephen McCafferty, Ohio State University

James McCown, Ohio State University

Preface xxxvii

Cheryl McGaughey, Angelo State University

W. Douglas McMillin, Louisiana State University

William Merrill, Iowa State University

Carrie Meyer, George Mason University

Stephen M. Miller, University of Connecticut

Masoud Moghaddam, Saint Cloud State University

Thomas S. Mondschean, DePaul University

Clair Morris, U.S. Naval Academy

Jon Nadenichek, California State University, Northridge

John Nader, Grand Valley State University

Leonce Ndikumana, University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Ray Nelson, Brigham Young University

Inder P. Nijhawan, Fayetteville State University

Nick Noble, Miami University of Ohio

Dennis O’Toole, Virginia Commonwealth University

Mark J. Perry, University of Michigan, Flint

Chung Pham, University of New Mexico

Marvin M. Phaup, George Washington University

Ganga P. Ramdas, Lincoln University

Ronald A. Ratti, University of Missouri, Columbia

Hans Rau, Ball State University

Prosper Raynold, Miami University

Javier Reyes, Texas A&M University

Jack Russ, San Diego State University

Robert S. Rycroft, Mary Washington College

Lynn Schneider, Auburn University, Montgomery

Walter Schwarm, Colorado State University

Harinder Singh, Grand Valley State University

Larry Taylor, Lehigh University

Leigh Tesfatsion, Iowa State University

Frederick D. Thum, University of Texas, Austin

Robert Tokle, Idaho State University

C. Van Marrewijk, Erasmus University

Christopher J. Waller, Indiana University

Maurice Weinrobe, Clark University

James R. Wible, University of New Hampshire

Philip R. Wiest, George Mason University

William Wilkes, Athens State University

Thomas Williams, William Paterson University

Laura Wolff, Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville

Robert Wright, University of Virginia

Ben T. Yu, California State University, Northridge

Ky H. Yuhn, Florida Atlantic University

Jeffrey Zimmerman, Methodist College

Finally, I want to thank my wife, Sally; my son, Matthew; and my daughter,

Laura, who provide me with a warm and happy environment that enables me to do

my work, and my father, Sydney, now deceased, who a long time ago put me on the

path that led to this book.

Frederic S. Mishkin

xxxviii Preface

P a r t I

Introduction

PREVIEW On the evening news you have just heard that the Federal Reserve is raising the federal

funds rate by of a percentage point. What effect might this have on the interest

rate of an automobile loan when you finance your purchase of a sleek new sports car?

Does it mean that a house will be more or less affordable in the future? Will it make

it easier or harder for you to get a job next year?

This book provides answers to these and other questions by examining how

financial markets (such as those for bonds, stocks, and foreign exchange) and financial

institutions (banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and other institutions)

work and by exploring the role of money in the economy. Financial markets and institutions

not only affect your everyday life but also involve huge flows of funds (trillions

of dollars) throughout our economy, which in turn affect business profits, the

production of goods and services, and even the economic well-being of countries

other than the United States. What happens to financial markets, financial institutions,

and money is of great concern to our politicians and can even have a major

impact on our elections. The study of money, banking, and financial markets will

reward you with an understanding of many exciting issues. In this chapter we provide

a road map of the book by outlining these issues and exploring why they are worth

studying.

Why Study Financial Markets?

Part II of this book focuses on financial markets, markets in which funds are transferred

from people who have an excess of available funds to people who have a shortage.

Financial markets such as bond and stock markets are crucial to promoting

greater economic efficiency by channeling funds from people who do not have a productive

use for them to those who do. Indeed, well-functioning financial markets are

a key factor in producing high economic growth, and poorly performing financial

markets are one reason that many countries in the world remain desperately poor.

Activities in financial markets also have direct effects on personal wealth, the behavior

of businesses and consumers, and the cyclical performance of the economy.

A security (also called a financial instrument) is a claim on the issuer’s future income

or assets (any financial claim or piece of property that is subject to ownership). A

bond is a debt security that promises to make payments periodically for a specified

The Bond Market

and Interest

Rates

12

3

Chap ter

Why Study Money, Banking,

and Financial Markets?

1

period of time.1 The bond market is especially important to economic activity because

it enables corporations or governments to borrow to finance their activities and

because it is where interest rates are determined. An interest rate is the cost of borrowing

or the price paid for the rental of funds (usually expressed as a percentage of

the rental of $100 per year). There are many interest rates in the economy—mortgage

interest rates, car loan rates, and interest rates on many different types of bonds.

Interest rates are important on a number of levels. On a personal level, high interest

rates could deter you from buying a house or a car because the cost of financing

it would be high. Conversely, high interest rates could encourage you to save because

you can earn more interest income by putting aside some of your earnings as savings.

On a more general level, interest rates have an impact on the overall health of the

economy because they affect not only consumers’ willingness to spend or save but

also businesses’ investment decisions. High interest rates, for example, might cause a

corporation to postpone building a new plant that would ensure more jobs.

Because changes in interest rates have important effects on individuals, financial

institutions, businesses, and the overall economy, it is important to explain fluctuations

in interest rates that have been substantial over the past twenty years. For example,

the interest rate on three-month Treasury bills peaked at over 16% in 1981. This

interest rate then fell to 3% in late 1992 and 1993, rose to above 5% in the mid to

late 1990s, and then fell to a low of below 2% in the early 2000s.

Because different interest rates have a tendency to move in unison, economists

frequently lump interest rates together and refer to “the” interest rate. As Figure 1

4 PA RT I Introduction

1The definition of bond used throughout this book is the broad one in common use by academics, which covers

short- as well as long-term debt instruments. However, some practitioners in financial markets use the word bond

to describe only specific long-term debt instruments such as corporate bonds or U.S. Treasury bonds.

FIGURE 1 Interest Rates on Selected Bonds, 1950–2002

Sources: Federal Reserve Bulletin; www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/data.htm.

0

5

10

15

20

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Interest Rate (%)

U.S. Government

Long-Term Bonds

Corporate Baa Bonds

Three-Month

Treasury Bills

www.federalreserve

.gov/releases/

Daily, weekly, monthly,

quarterly, and annual releases

and historical data for selected

interest rates, foreign exchange

rates, and so on.

shows, however, interest rates on several types of bonds can differ substantially. The

interest rate on three-month Treasury bills, for example, fluctuates more than the other

interest rates and is lower, on average. The interest rate on Baa (medium-quality) corporate

bonds is higher, on average, than the other interest rates, and the spread

between it and the other rates became larger in the 1970s.

In Chapter 2 we study the role of bond markets in the economy, and in Chapters

4 through 6 we examine what an interest rate is, how the common movements in

interest rates come about, and why the interest rates on different bonds vary.

A common stock (typically just called a stock) represents a share of ownership in a

corporation. It is a security that is a claim on the earnings and assets of the corporation.

Issuing stock and selling it to the public is a way for corporations to raise funds

to finance their activities. The stock market, in which claims on the earnings of corporations

(shares of stock) are traded, is the most widely followed financial market in

America (that’s why it is often called simply “the market”). A big swing in the prices

of shares in the stock market is always a big story on the evening news. People often

speculate on where the market is heading and get very excited when they can brag

about their latest “big killing,” but they become depressed when they suffer a big loss.

The attention the market receives can probably be best explained by one simple fact:

It is a place where people can get rich—or poor—quickly.

As Figure 2 indicates, stock prices have been extremely volatile. After the market

rose in the 1980s, on “Black Monday,” October 19, 1987, it experienced the worst

one-day drop in its entire history, with the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) falling

by 22%. From then until 2000, the stock market experienced one of the great bull

markets in its history, with the Dow climbing to a peak of over 11,000. With the collapse

of the high-tech bubble in 2000, the stock market fell sharply, dropping by over

30% by 2002. These considerable fluctuations in stock prices affect the size of people’s

wealth and as a result may affect their willingness to spend.

The stock market is also an important factor in business investment decisions,

because the price of shares affects the amount of funds that can be raised by selling

newly issued stock to finance investment spending. A higher price for a firm’s shares

means that it can raise a larger amount of funds, which can be used to buy production

facilities and equipment.

In Chapter 2 we examine the role that the stock market plays in the financial system,

and we return to the issue of how stock prices behave and respond to information

in the marketplace in Chapter 7.

For funds to be transferred from one country to another, they have to be converted

from the currency in the country of origin (say, dollars) into the currency of the country

they are going to (say, euros). The foreign exchange market is where this conversion

takes place, and so it is instrumental in moving funds between countries. It is

also important because it is where the foreign exchange rate, the price of one country’s

currency in terms of another’s, is determined.

Figure 3 shows the exchange rate for the U.S. dollar from 1970 to 2002 (measured

as the value of the American dollar in terms of a basket of major foreign currencies).

The fluctuations in prices in this market have also been substantial: The

dollar weakened considerably from 1971 to 1973, rose slightly in value until 1976,

and then reached a low point in the 1978–1980 period. From 1980 to early 1985, the

dollar appreciated dramatically in value, but since then it has fallen substantially.

The Foreign

Exchange Market

The Stock Market

C H A P T E R 1 Why Study Money, Banking, and Financial Markets? 5

http://stockcharts.com/charts

/historical/

Historical charts of various

stock indexes over differing

time periods.

What have these fluctuations in the exchange rate meant to the American public

and businesses? A change in the exchange rate has a direct effect on American consumers

because it affects the cost of imports. In 2001 when the euro was worth

around 85 cents, 100 euros of European goods (say, French wine) cost $85. When the

dollar subsequently weakened, raising the cost of a euro near $1, the same 100 euros

of wine now cost $100. Thus a weaker dollar leads to more expensive foreign goods,

makes vacationing abroad more expensive, and raises the cost of indulging your

desire for imported delicacies. When the value of the dollar drops, Americans will

decrease their purchases of foreign goods and increase their consumption of domestic

goods (such as travel in the United States or American-made wine).

Conversely, a strong dollar means that U.S. goods exported abroad will cost more

in foreign countries, and hence foreigners will buy fewer of them. Exports of steel, for

example, declined sharply when the dollar strengthened in the 1980–1985 and

6 PA RT I Introduction

FIGURE 2 Stock Prices as Measured by the Dow Jones Industrial Average, 1950–2002

Source: Dow Jones Indexes: http://finance.yahoo.com/?u.

0

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

Dow Jones

Industrial Average

1995–2001 periods. A strong dollar benefited American consumers by making foreign

goods cheaper but hurt American businesses and eliminated some jobs by cutting

both domestic and foreign sales of their products. The decline in the value of the

dollar from 1985 to 1995 and 2001 to 2002 had the opposite effect: It made foreign

goods more expensive, but made American businesses more competitive. Fluctuations

in the foreign exchange markets have major consequences for the American economy.

In Chapter 19 we study how exchange rates are determined in the foreign

exchange market in which dollars are bought and sold for foreign currencies.

Why Study Banking and Financial Institutions?

Part III of this book focuses on financial institutions and the business of banking.

Banks and other financial institutions are what make financial markets work. Without

them, financial markets would not be able to move funds from people who save to

people who have productive investment opportunities. They thus also have important

effects on the performance of the economy as a whole.

The financial system is complex, comprising many different types of private sector

financial institutions, including banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, finance

companies, and investment banks, all of which are heavily regulated by the government.

If an individual wanted to make a loan to IBM or General Motors, for example,

he or she would not go directly to the president of the company and offer a loan.

Instead, he or she would lend to such companies indirectly through financial intermediaries,

institutions that borrow funds from people who have saved and in turn

make loans to others.

Why are financial intermediaries so crucial to well-functioning financial markets?

Why do they extend credit to one party but not to another? Why do they usually write

Structure of

the Financial

System

C H A P T E R 1 Why Study Money, Banking, and Financial Markets? 7

FIGURE 3 Exchange Rate of the U.S. Dollar, 1970–2002

Source: Federal Reserve: www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/summary.

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

75

90

105

120

135

150

Index

(March 1973 = 100)

complicated legal documents when they extend loans? Why are they the most heavily

regulated businesses in the economy?

We answer these questions in Chapter 8 by developing a coherent framework for

analyzing financial structure in the United States and in the rest of the world.

Banks are financial institutions that accept deposits and make loans. Included under

the term banks are firms such as commercial banks, savings and loan associations,

mutual savings banks, and credit unions. Banks are the financial intermediaries that

the average person interacts with most frequently. A person who needs a loan to buy

a house or a car usually obtains it from a local bank. Most Americans keep a large proportion

of their financial wealth in banks in the form of checking accounts, savings

accounts, or other types of bank deposits. Because banks are the largest financial

intermediaries in our economy, they deserve the most careful study. However, banks

are not the only important financial institutions. Indeed, in recent years, other financial

institutions such as insurance companies, finance companies, pension funds,

mutual funds, and investment banks have been growing at the expense of banks, and

so we need to study them as well.

In Chapter 9, we examine how banks and other financial institutions manage

their assets and liabilities to make profits. In Chapter 10, we extend the economic

analysis in Chapter 8 to understand why bank regulation takes the form it does and

what can go wrong in the regulatory process. In Chapters 11 and 12, we look at the

banking industry and at nonbank financial institutions; we examine how the competitive

environment has changed in these industries and learn why some financial

institutions have been growing at the expense of others. Because the economic environment

for banks and other financial institutions has become increasingly risky,

these institutions must find ways to manage risk. How they manage risk with financial

derivatives is the topic of Chapter 13.

In the good old days, when you took cash out of the bank or wanted to check your

account balance, you got to say hello to the friendly human teller. Nowadays you are

more likely to interact with an automatic teller machine when withdrawing cash, and

you can get your account balance from your home computer. To see why these

options have been developed, in Chapter 10 we study why and how financial innovation

takes place, with particular emphasis on how the dramatic improvements in

information technology have led to new means of delivering financial services electronically,

in what has become known as e-finance. We also study financial innovation,

because it shows us how creative thinking on the part of financial institutions

can lead to higher profits. By seeing how and why financial institutions have been creative

in the past, we obtain a better grasp of how they may be creative in the future.

This knowledge provides us with useful clues about how the financial system may

change over time and will help keep our knowledge about banks and other financial

institutions from becoming obsolete.

Why Study Money and Monetary Policy?

Money, also referred to as the money supply, is defined as anything that is generally

accepted in payment for goods or services or in the repayment of debts. Money is linked

Financial

Innovation

Banks and Other

Financial

Institutions

8 PA RT I Introduction

to changes in economic variables that affect all of us and are important to the health of

the economy. The final two parts of the book examine the role of money in the economy.

In 1981–1982, total production of goods and services (called aggregate output) in

the U.S. economy fell and the unemployment rate (the percentage of the available

labor force unemployed) rose to over 10%. After 1982, the economy began to expand

rapidly, and by 1989 the unemployment rate had declined to 5%. In 1990, the eightyear

expansion came to an end, with the unemployment rate rising above 7%. The

economy bottomed out in 1991, and the subsequent recovery was the longest in U.S.

history, with the unemployment rate falling to around 4%. A mild economic downturn

then began in March 2001, with unemployment rising to 6%.

Why did the economy expand from 1982 to 1990, contract in 1990 to 1991,

boom again from 1991 to 2001, and then contract again in 2001? Evidence suggests

that money plays an important role in generating business cycles, the upward and

downward movement of aggregate output produced in the economy. Business cycles

affect all of us in immediate and important ways. When output is rising, for example,

it is easier to find a good job; when output is falling, finding a good job might be difficult.

Figure 4 shows the movements of the rate of money growth over the

1950–2002 period, with the shaded areas representing recessions, periods of declining

aggregate output. What we see is that the rate of money growth has declined

before every recession. Indeed, every recession since the beginning of the twentieth

century has been preceded by a decline in the rate of money growth, indicating that

Money and

Business Cycles

C H A P T E R 1 Why Study Money, Banking, and Financial Markets? 9

FIGURE 4 Money Growth (M2 Annual Rate) and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1950–2002

Note: Shaded areas represent recessions.

Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, p. A4, Table 1.10; www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/hist/h6hist1.txt.

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

15

10

5

0

Money

Growth Rate

(%)

Money Growth

Rate (M2)

2005

www.federalreserve.gov

General information, monetary

policy, banking system,

research, and economic data of

the Federal Reserve.

changes in money might also be a driving force behind business cycle fluctuations.

However, not every decline in the rate of money growth is followed by a recession.

We explore how money might affect aggregate output in Chapters 22 through 28,

where we study monetary theory, the theory that relates changes in the quantity of

money to changes in aggregate economic activity and the price level.

Thirty years ago, the movie you might have paid $9 to see last week would have set

you back only a dollar or two. In fact, for $9 you could probably have had dinner,

seen the movie, and bought yourself a big bucket of hot buttered popcorn. As shown

in Figure 5, which illustrates the movement of average prices in the U.S. economy

from 1950 to 2002, the prices of most items are quite a bit higher now than they were

then. The average price of goods and services in an economy is called the aggregate

price level, or, more simply, the price level (a more precise definition is found in the

appendix to this chapter). From 1950 to 2002, the price level has increased more than

sixfold. Inflation, a continual increase in the price level, affects individuals, businesses,

and the government. Inflation is generally regarded as an important problem

to be solved and has often been a primary concern of politicians and policymakers.

To solve the inflation problem, we need to know something about its causes.

Money and

Inflation

10 PA RT I Introduction

FIGURE 5 Aggregate Price Level and the Money Supply in the United States, 1950–2002

Sources: www.stls.frb.org/fred/data/gdp/gdpdef; www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/hist/h6hist10.txt.

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Aggregate Price Level

(GDP Deflator)

Money Supply

(M2)

175

200

225

Index (1987= 100)

www.newsengin.com

/neFreeTools.nsf/CPIcalc

?OpenView

Calculator lets you compute

how buying power has changed

since 1913.

What explains inflation? One clue to answering this question is found in Figure 5,

which plots the money supply and the price level. As we can see, the price level and

the money supply generally move closely together. These data seem to indicate that a

continuing increase in the money supply might be an important factor in causing the

continuing increase in the price level that we call inflation.

Further evidence that inflation may be tied to continuing increases in the money

supply is found in Figure 6. For a number of countries, it plots the average inflation

rate (the rate of change of the price level, usually measured as a percentage change per

year) over the ten-year period 1992–2002 against the average rate of money growth

over the same period. As you can see, there is a positive association between inflation

and the growth rate of the money supply: The countries with the highest inflation rates

are also the ones with the highest money growth rates. Belarus, Brazil, Romania, and

Russia, for example, experienced very high inflation during this period, and their rates

of money growth were high. By contrast, the United Kingdom and the United States

had very low inflation rates over the same period, and their rates of money growth have

been low. Such evidence led Milton Friedman, a Nobel laureate in economics, to make

the famous statement, “Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.”2

We look at money’s role in creating inflation by studying in detail the relationship

between changes in the quantity of money and changes in the price level in Chapter 27.

C H A P T E R 1 Why Study Money, Banking, and Financial Markets? 11

FIGURE 6 Average Inflation Rate Versus Average Rate of Money Growth for Selected Countries, 1992–2002

Source: International Financial Statistics.

20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

220

Average

Inflation Rate (%)

Average Money Growth Rate (%)

0

United States

Uruguay

Peru

Argentina

Brazil

Belarus

Romania

United Kingdom

Venezuela

Mexico

Ecuador

Colombia

Chile

Russia

2Milton Friedman, Dollars and Deficits (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 39.

In addition to other factors, money plays an important role in interest-rate fluctuations,

which are of great concern to businesses and consumers. Figure 7 shows the

changes in the interest rate on long-term Treasury bonds and the rate of money

growth. As the money growth rate rose in the 1960s and 1970s, the long-term bond

rate rose with it. However, the relationship between money growth and interest rates

has been less clear-cut since 1980. We analyze the relationship between money and

interest rates when we examine the behavior of interest rates in Chapter 5.

Because money can affect many economic variables that are important to the wellbeing

of our economy, politicians and policymakers throughout the world care about

the conduct of monetary policy, the management of money and interest rates. The

organization responsible for the conduct of a nation’s monetary policy is the central

bank. The United States’ central bank is the Federal Reserve System (also called

simply the Fed). In Chapters 14–18 and 21, we study how central banks like the

Federal Reserve System can affect the quantity of money in the economy and then

look at how monetary policy is actually conducted in the United States and elsewhere.

Fiscal policy involves decisions about government spending and taxation. A budget

deficit is the excess of government expenditures over tax revenues for a particular

time period, typically a year, while a budget surplus arises when tax revenues exceed

government expenditures. The government must finance any deficit by borrowing,

while a budget surplus leads to a lower government debt burden. As Figure 8 shows,

the budget deficit, relative to the size of our economy, peaked in 1983 at 6% of

national output (as calculated by the gross domestic product, or GDP, a measure of

Fiscal Policy and

Monetary Policy

Conduct of

Monetary Policy

Money and

Interest Rates

12 PA RT I Introduction

FIGURE 7 Money Growth (M2 Annual Rate) and Interest Rates (Long-Term U.S. Treasury Bonds), 1950–2002

Sources: Federal Reserve Bulletin, p. A4, Table 1.10; www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/hist/h6hist1.txt.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Money

Growth Rate

(% annual rate)

Interest

Rate (%)

Money Growth Rate (M2)

Interest Rate

1995 2000 2005

aggregate output described in the appendix to this chapter). Since then, the budget

deficit at first declined to less than 3% of GDP, rose again to over 5% by 1989, and

fell subsequently, leading to budget surpluses from 1999 to 2001. In the aftermath of

the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the budget has swung back again into

deficit. What to do about budget deficits and surpluses has been the subject of legislation

and bitter battles between the president and Congress in recent years.

You may have heard statements in newspapers or on TV that budget surpluses are

a good thing while deficits are undesirable. We explore the accuracy of such claims in

Chapters 8 and 21 by seeing how budget deficits might lead to a financial crisis as

they did in Argentina in 2001. In Chapter 27, we examine why deficits might result

in a higher rate of money growth, a higher rate of inflation, and higher interest rates.

How We Will Study Money, Banking, and Financial Markets

This textbook stresses the economic way of thinking by developing a unifying framework

to study money, banking, and financial markets. This analytic framework uses

a few basic economic concepts to organize your thinking about the determination of

asset prices, the structure of financial markets, bank management, and the role of

money in the economy. It encompasses the following basic concepts:

• A simplified approach to the demand for assets

• The concept of equilibrium

• Basic supply and demand to explain behavior in financial markets

• The search for profits

C H A P T E R 1 Why Study Money, Banking, and Financial Markets? 13

FIGURE 8 Government Budget Surplus or Deficit as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 1950–2002

Source: http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2003/spreadsheets.html.

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

1

2

3

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Percent of GDP

Deficit

Surplus

www.kowaldesign

.com/budget/

This site reports the current

Federal budget deficit or

surplus and how it has changed

since the 1950s. It also reports

how the federal budget is spent.

www.brillig.com/debt_clock/

National Debt clock. This site

reports the exact national debt

at each point in time.

• An approach to financial structure based on transaction costs and asymmetric

information

• Aggregate supply and demand analysis

The unifying framework used in this book will keep your knowledge from

becoming obsolete and make the material more interesting. It will enable you to learn

what really matters without having to memorize a mass of dull facts that you will forget

soon after the final exam. This framework will also provide you with the tools to

understand trends in the financial marketplace and in variables such as interest rates,

exchange rates, inflation, and aggregate output.

To help you understand and apply the unifying analytic framework, simple models

are constructed in which the variables held constant are carefully delineated, each

step in the derivation of the model is clearly and carefully laid out, and the models

are then used to explain various phenomena by focusing on changes in one variable

at a time, holding all other variables constant.

To reinforce the models’ usefulness, this text uses case studies, applications, and

special-interest boxes to present evidence that supports or casts doubts on the theories

being discussed. This exposure to real-life events and data should dissuade you

from thinking that all economists make abstract assumptions and develop theories

that have little to do with actual behavior.

To function better in the real world outside the classroom, you must have the

tools to follow the financial news that appears in leading financial publications such

as the Wall Street Journal. To help and encourage you to read the financial section of

the newspaper, this book contains two special features. The first is a set of special

boxed inserts titled “Following the Financial News” that contain actual columns and

data from the Wall Street Journal that typically appear daily or periodically. These

boxes give you the detailed information and definitions you need to evaluate the data

being presented. The second feature is a set of special applications titled “Reading the

Wall Street Journal” that expand on the “Following the Financial News” boxes. These

applications show you how the analytic framework in the book can be used directly

to make sense of the daily columns in the United States’ leading financial newspaper.

In addition to these applications, this book also contains nearly 400 end-of-chapter

problems that ask you to apply the analytic concepts you have learned to other realworld

issues. Particularly relevant is a special class of problems headed “Predicting the

Future.” So that you can work on many of these problems on your own, answers to

half of them are found at the end of the book. These give you an opportunity to

review and apply many of the important financial concepts and tools presented

throughout the book.

The World Wide Web has become an extremely valuable and convenient resource for

financial research. We emphasize the importance of this tool in several ways. First,

wherever we utilize the Web to find information to build the charts and tables that

appear throughout the text, we include the source site’s URL. These sites often contain

additional information and are updated frequently. Second, in the margin of the

text, we have included the URLs of sites related to the material being discussed. Visit

these sites to further explore a topic you find of particular interest. Finally, we have

added Web exercises to the end of each chapter. These exercises prompt you to visit

sites related to the chapter and to work with real-time data and information.

Web site URLs are subject to frequent change. We have tried to select stable sites, but

we realize that even government URLs change. The publisher’s web site (www.aw.com

/mishkin) will maintain an updated list of current URLs for your reference.

Exploring the Web

14 PA RT I Introduction

A sample Web exercise has been included in this chapter. This is an especially

important example, since it demonstrates how to export data from a web site into

Microsoft® Excel for further analysis. We suggest you work through this problem on

your own so that you will be able to perform this activity when prompted in subsequent

Web exercises.

You have been hired by Risky Ventures, Inc., as a consultant to help them analyze interest rate

trends. They are initially interested in determining the historical relationship between longand

short-term interest rates. The biggest task you must immediately undertake is collecting

market interest-rate data. You know the best source of this information is the Web.

1. You decide that your best indicator of long-term interest rates is the 30-year U.S. Treasury

note. Your first task is to gather historical data. Go to www.federalreserve.gov/releases/ and

click “H.15 Selected Interest Rates, Historical data.” The site should look like Figure 9.

a. Click on “Historical data.” Scroll down to “U.S. Government securities/Treasury

constant maturities/30 year.” Scroll over to the right and click on “annual.”

C H A P T E R 1 Why Study Money, Banking, and Financial Markets? 15

Web Exercises

FIGURE 9 Federal Reserve Board Web Site

b. While you have located an accurate source of historical interest rate data, getting it

onto a spreadsheet will be very tedious. You recall that Excel will let you convert text

data into columns. Begin by highlighting the two columns of data (the year and rate).

Right-click on the mouse and choose COPY. Now open Excel and put the cursor in a

cell. Click PASTE. Now choose DATA from the tool bar and click on TEXT TO COLUMNS.

Follow the wizard (Figure 10), checking the fixed-width option. The list of interest

rates should now have the year in one column and the interest rate in the next column.

Label your columns.

Repeat the above steps to collect the 1-year interest rate series. Put it in the column

next to the 30-year series. Be sure to line up the years correctly and delete any years

that are not included in both series.

c. You now want to analyze the interest rates by graphing them. Again highlight the two

columns of data you just created in Excel. Click on the charts icon on the tool bar (or

INSERT/CHART). Select scatter diagram and choose any type of scatter diagram that

connects the dots. Let the Excel wizard take you through the steps of completing the

graph. (See Figure 11.)

16 PA RT I Introduction

FIGURE 10 Excel Spreadsheet with Interest Rate Data

Concluding Remarks

The topic of money, banking, and financial markets is an exciting field that directly

affects your life—interest rates influence earnings on your savings and the payments

on loans you may seek on a car or a house, and monetary policy may affect your job

prospects and the prices of goods in the future. Your study of money, banking, and

financial markets will introduce you to many of the controversies about the conduct

of economic policy that are currently the subject of hot debate in the political arena

and will help you gain a clearer understanding of economic phenomena you frequently

hear about in the news media. The knowledge you gain will stay with you

and benefit you long after the course is done.

C H A P T E R 1 Why Study Money, Banking, and Financial Markets? 17

Summary

1. Activities in financial markets have direct effects on

individuals’ wealth, the behavior of businesses, and the

efficiency of our economy. Three financial markets

deserve particular attention: the bond market (where

interest rates are determined), the stock market (which

has a major effect on people’s wealth and on firms’

investment decisions), and the foreign exchange market

(because fluctuations in the foreign exchange rate have

major consequences for the American economy).

FIGURE 11 Excel Graph of Interest Rate Data

18 PA RT I Introduction

Key Terms

aggregate income (appendix), p. 20

aggregate output, p. 9

aggregate price level, p. 10

asset, p. 3

banks, p. 8

bond, p. 3

budget deficit, p. 12

budget surplus, p. 12

business cycles, p. 9

central bank, p. 12

common stock, p. 5

e-finance, p. 8

Federal Reserve System (the Fed), p. 12

financial intermediaries, p. 7

financial markets, p. 3

fiscal policy, p. 12

foreign exchange market, p. 5

foreign exchange rate, p. 5

gross domestic product (appendix),

p. 12, 20

inflation, p. 10

inflation rate, p. 11

interest rate, p. 4

monetary policy, p. 12

monetary theory, p. 10

money (money supply), p. 8

recession, p. 9

security, p. 3

stock, p. 5

unemployment rate, p. 9

Questions and Problems

Questions marked with an asterisk are answered at the end

of the book in an appendix, “Answers to Selected Questions

and Problems.”

1. Has the inflation rate in the United States increased or

decreased in the past few years? What about interest

rates?

*2. If history repeats itself and we see a decline in the rate

of money growth, what might you expect to happen to:

a. real output

b. the inflation rate, and

c. interest rates?

3. When was the most recent recession?

*4. When interest rates fall, how might you change your

economic behavior?

5. Can you think of any financial innovation in the past

ten years that has affected you personally? Has it made

you better off or worse off? Why?

*6. Is everybody worse off when interest rates rise?

7. What is the basic activity of banks?

*8. Why are financial markets important to the health of

the economy?

9. What is the typical relationship between interest rates

on three-month Treasury bills, long-term Treasury

bonds, and Baa corporate bonds?

*10. What effect might a fall in stock prices have on business

investment?

11. What effect might a rise in stock prices have on consumers’

decisions to spend?

2. Banks and other financial institutions channel funds

from people who might not put them to productive use

to people who can do so and thus play a crucial role in

improving the efficiency of the economy.

3. Money appears to be a major influence on inflation,

business cycles, and interest rates. Because these

economic variables are so important to the health of the

economy, we need to understand how monetary policy

is and should be conducted. We also need to study

government fiscal policy because it can be an influential

factor in the conduct of monetary policy.

4. This textbook stresses the economic way of thinking by

developing a unifying analytic framework for the study

of money, banking, and financial markets using a

few basic economic principles. This textbook also

emphasizes the interaction of theoretical analysis and

empirical data.

QUIZ

C H A P T E R 1 Why Study Money, Banking, and Financial Markets? 19

*12. How does a fall in the value of the pound sterling

affect British consumers?

13. How does an increase in the value of the pound sterling

affect American businesses?

*14. Looking at Figure 3, in what years would you have

chosen to visit the Grand Canyon in Arizona rather

than the Tower of London?

15. When the dollar is worth more in relation to currencies

of other countries, are you more likely to buy

American-made or foreign-made jeans? Are U.S. companies

that manufacture jeans happier when the dollar

is strong or when it is weak? What about an American

company that is in the business of importing jeans

into the United States?

Web Exercises

1. In this exercise we are going to practice collecting data

from the Web and graphing it using Excel. Use the

example in the text as a guide. Go to www.forecasts.org

/data/index.htm, click on “stock indices” at the top of

the page then choose the U.S. Stock indices –

monthly option. Finally, choose the Dow Jones

Industrial Average option.

a. Using the method presented in this chapter, move

the data into an Excel spreadsheet.

b. Using the data from a, prepare a graph. Use the

graphing wizard to properly label your axes.

2. In Web Exercise 1 you collected and graphed the Dow

Jones Industrial Average. This same site reports forecast

values of the DJIA. Go to www.forecasts.org

/data/index.htm and click on “FFC Home” at the top

of the page. Click on the Dow Jones Industrial link

under Forecasts in the far left column.

a. What is the Dow forecast to be in 3 months?

b. What percentage increase is forecast for the next

three months?

20

Because these terms are used so frequently throughout the text, we need to have a

clear understanding of the definitions of aggregate output, income, the price level, and

the inflation rate.

Aggregate Output and Income

The most commonly reported measure of aggregate output, the gross domestic

product (GDP), is the market value of all final goods and services produced in a

country during the course of the year. This measure excludes two sets of items that at

first glance you might think would be included. Purchases of goods that have been

produced in the past, whether a Rembrandt painting or a house built 20 years ago,

are not counted as part of GDP, nor are purchases of stocks or bonds. None of these

enter into GDP because they are not goods and services produced during the course

of the year. Intermediate goods, which are used up in producing final goods and services,

such as the sugar in a candy bar or the energy used to produce steel, are also not

counted separately as part of GDP. Because the value of the final goods already

includes the value of the intermediate goods, to count them separately would be to

count them twice.

Aggregate income, the total income of factors of production (land, labor, and capital)

from producing goods and services in the economy during the course of the year,

is best thought of as being equal to aggregate output. Because the payments for final

goods and services must eventually flow back to the owners of the factors of production

as income, income payments must equal payments for final goods and services.

For example, if the economy has an aggregate output of $10 trillion, total income payments

in the economy (aggregate income) are also $10 trillion.

Real Versus Nominal Magnitudes

When the total value of final goods and services is calculated using current prices, the

resulting GDP measure is referred to as nominal GDP. The word nominal indicates that

values are measured using current prices. If all prices doubled but actual production

of goods and services remained the same, nominal GDP would double even though

appendix

to chapter

Defining Aggregate Output, Income,

the Price Level, and the Inflation Rate

1

people would not enjoy the benefits of twice as many goods and services. As a result,

nominal variables can be misleading measures of economic well-being.

A more reliable measure of economic well-being expresses values in terms of

prices for an arbitrary base year, currently 1996. GDP measured with constant prices

is referred to as real GDP, the word real indicating that values are measured in terms

of fixed prices. Real variables thus measure the quantities of goods and services and

do not change because prices have changed, but rather only if actual quantities have

changed.

A brief example will make the distinction clearer. Suppose that you have a nominal

income of $30,000 in 2004 and that your nominal income was $15,000 in 1996.

If all prices doubled between 1996 and 2004, are you better off? The answer is no:

Although your income has doubled, your $30,000 buys you only the same amount

of goods because prices have also doubled. A real income measure indicates that your

income in terms of the goods it can buy is the same. Measured in 1996 prices, the

$30,000 of nominal income in 2004 turns out to be only $15,000 of real income.

Because your real income is actually the same in the two years, you are no better or

worse off in 2004 than you were in 1996.

Because real variables measure quantities in terms of real goods and services, they

are typically of more interest than nominal variables. In this text, discussion of aggregate

output or aggregate income always refers to real measures (such as real GDP).

Aggregate Price Level

In this chapter, we defined the aggregate price level as a measure of average prices in

the economy. Three measures of the aggregate price level are commonly encountered

in economic data. The first is the GDP deflator, which is defined as nominal GDP

divided by real GDP. Thus if 2004 nominal GDP is $10 trillion but 2004 real GDP in

1996 prices is $9 trillion,

The GDP deflator equation indicates that, on average, prices have risen 11 percent

since 1996. Typically, measures of the price level are presented in the form of a

price index, which expresses the price level for the base year (in our example, 1996)

as 100. Thus the GDP deflator for 2004 would be 111.

Another popular measure of the aggregate price level (which officials in the Fed

frequently focus on) is the PCE deflator, which is similar to the GDP deflator and is

defined as nominal personal consumption expenditures (PCE) divided by real PCE.

The measure of the aggregate price level that is most frequently reported in the press

is the consumer price index (CPI). The CPI is measured by pricing a “basket” list of goods

and services bought by a typical urban household. If over the course of the year, the

cost of this basket of goods and services rises from $500 to $600, the CPI has risen by

20 percent. The CPI is also expressed as a price index with the base year equal to 100.

The CPI, the PCE deflator, and the GDP deflator measures of the price level can

be used to convert or deflate a nominal magnitude into a real magnitude. This is

accomplished by dividing the nominal magnitude by the price index. In our example,

GDP deflator

$10 trillion

$9 trillion

1.11

C H A P T E R 1 Why Study Money, Banking, and Financial Markets? 21

in which the GDP deflator for 2004 is 1.11 (expressed as an index value of 111), real

GDP for 2004 equals

which corresponds to the real GDP figure for 2004 mentioned earlier.

Growth Rates and the Inflation Rate

The media often talk about the economy’s growth rate, and particularly the growth

rate of real GDP. A growth rate is defined as the percentage change in a variable,1 i.e.,

where t indicates today and t 1 a year earlier.

For example, if real GDP grew from $9 trillion in 2004 to $9.5 trillion in 2005,

then the GDP growth rate for 2005 would be 5.6%:

The inflation rate is defined as the growth rate of the aggregate price level. Thus

if the GDP deflator rose from 111 in 2004 to 113 in 2005, the inflation rate using the

GDP deflator would be 1.8%:

inflation rate

113 111

111

100 1.8%

GDP growth rate

$9.5 trillion $9 trillion

$9 trillion

100 5.6%

growth rate

xt xt1

xt1

100

$10 trillion

1.11

$9 trillion in 1996 prices

22 PA RT I Introduction

1If the growth rate is for a period less than one year, it is usually reported on an annualized basis; that is, it is converted

to the growth rate over a year’s time, assuming that the growth rate remains constant. For GDP, which is

reported quarterly, the annualized growth rate would be approximately four times the percentage change in GDP

from the previous quarter. For example, if GDP rose % from the first quarter of 2004 to the second quarter of

2004, then the annualized GDP growth rate for the second quarter of 2004 would be reported as 2% ( 4 %).

(A more accurate calculation would be 2.02%, because a precise quarterly growth rate should be compounded

on a quarterly basis.)

12

1

2

PREVIEW Inez the Inventor has designed a low-cost robot that cleans house (even does windows),

washes the car, and mows the lawn, but she has no funds to put her wonderful

invention into production. Walter the Widower has plenty of savings, which he

and his wife accumulated over the years. If we could get Inez and Walter together so

that Walter could provide funds to Inez, Inez’s robot would see the light of day, and

the economy would be better off: We would have cleaner houses, shinier cars, and

more beautiful lawns.

Financial markets (bond and stock markets) and financial intermediaries (banks,

insurance companies, pension funds) have the basic function of getting people like

Inez and Walter together by moving funds from those who have a surplus of funds

(Walter) to those who have a shortage of funds (Inez). More realistically, when IBM

invents a better computer, it may need funds to bring it to market. Similarly, when a

local government needs to build a road or a school, it may need more funds than local

property taxes provide. Well-functioning financial markets and financial intermediaries

are crucial to economic health.

To study the effects of financial markets and financial intermediaries on the economy,

we need to acquire an understanding of their general structure and operation.

In this chapter, we learn about the major financial intermediaries and the instruments

that are traded in financial markets as well as how these markets are regulated.

This chapter presents an overview of the fascinating study of financial markets

and institutions. We return to a more detailed treatment of the regulation, structure,

and evolution of the financial system in Chapters 8 through 13.

Function of Financial Markets

Financial markets perform the essential economic function of channeling funds from

households, firms, and governments that have saved surplus funds by spending less

than their income to those that have a shortage of funds because they wish to spend

more than their income. This function is shown schematically in Figure 1. Those who

have saved and are lending funds, the lender-savers, are at the left, and those who

must borrow funds to finance their spending, the borrower-spenders, are at the right.

The principal lender-savers are households, but business enterprises and the government

(particularly state and local government), as well as foreigners and their governments,

sometimes also find themselves with excess funds and so lend them out.

23

Chap ter

An Overview of the

Financial System

2

The most important borrower-spenders are businesses and the government (particularly

the federal government), but households and foreigners also borrow to finance

their purchases of cars, furniture, and houses. The arrows show that funds flow from

lender-savers to borrower-spenders via two routes.

In direct finance (the route at the bottom of Figure 1), borrowers borrow funds

directly from lenders in financial markets by selling them securities (also called financial

instruments), which are claims on the borrower’s future income or assets.

Securities are assets for the person who buys them but liabilities (IOUs or debts) for

the individual or firm that sells (issues) them. For example, if General Motors needs

to borrow funds to pay for a new factory to manufacture electric cars, it might borrow

the funds from savers by selling them bonds, debt securities that promise to make

payments periodically for a specified period of time.

Why is this channeling of funds from savers to spenders so important to the economy?

The answer is that the people who save are frequently not the same people who

have profitable investment opportunities available to them, the entrepreneurs. Let’s

first think about this on a personal level. Suppose that you have saved $1,000 this

year, but no borrowing or lending is possible because there are no financial markets.

If you do not have an investment opportunity that will permit you to earn income

with your savings, you will just hold on to the $1,000 and will earn no interest.

However, Carl the Carpenter has a productive use for your $1,000: He can use it to

24 PA RT I Introduction

FIGURE 1 Interest Rates on Selected Bonds, 1950–2002

Sources: Federal Reserve Bulletin; www.frb.fed.us/releases/.

FIGURE 1 Flows of Funds Through the Financial System

INDIRECT FINANCE

Financial

Intermediaries

FUNDS

FUNDS FUNDS

Financial

Markets

Borrower-Spenders

1. Business firms

2. Government

3. Households

4. Foreigners

Lender-Savers

1. Households

2. Business firms

3. Government

4. Foreigners

DIRECT FINANCE

FUNDS FUNDS

purchase a new tool that will shorten the time it takes him to build a house, thereby

earning an extra $200 per year. If you could get in touch with Carl, you could lend

him the $1,000 at a rental fee (interest) of $100 per year, and both of you would be

better off. You would earn $100 per year on your $1,000, instead of the zero amount

that you would earn otherwise, while Carl would earn $100 more income per year

(the $200 extra earnings per year minus the $100 rental fee for the use of the funds).

In the absence of financial markets, you and Carl the Carpenter might never get

together. Without financial markets, it is hard to transfer funds from a person who has

no investment opportunities to one who has them; you would both be stuck with the

status quo, and both of you would be worse off. Financial markets are thus essential

to promoting economic efficiency.

The existence of financial markets is also beneficial even if someone borrows for

a purpose other than increasing production in a business. Say that you are recently

married, have a good job, and want to buy a house. You earn a good salary, but

because you have just started to work, you have not yet saved much. Over time, you

would have no problem saving enough to buy the house of your dreams, but by then

you would be too old to get full enjoyment from it. Without financial markets, you

are stuck; you cannot buy the house and must continue to live in your tiny apartment.

If a financial market were set up so that people who had built up savings could

lend you the funds to buy the house, you would be more than happy to pay them some

interest in order to own a home while you are still young enough to enjoy it. Then,

over time, you would pay back your loan. The overall outcome would be such that you

would be better off, as would the persons who made you the loan. They would now

earn some interest, whereas they would not if the financial market did not exist.

Now we can see why financial markets have such an important function in the

economy. They allow funds to move from people who lack productive investment

opportunities to people who have such opportunities. Thus financial markets are critical

for producing an efficient allocation of capital, which contributes to higher production

and efficiency for the overall economy. Indeed, as we will explore in Chapter

8, when financial markets break down during financial crises, as they have in Mexico,

East Asia, and Argentina in recent years, severe economic hardship results, which can

even lead to dangerous political instability.

Well-functioning financial markets also directly improve the well-being of consumers

by allowing them to time their purchases better. They provide funds to young

people to buy what they need and can eventually afford without forcing them to wait

until they have saved up the entire purchase price. Financial markets that are operating

efficiently improve the economic welfare of everyone in the society.

Structure of Financial Markets

Now that we understand the basic function of financial markets, let’s look at their

structure. The following descriptions of several categorizations of financial markets

illustrate essential features of these markets.

A firm or an individual can obtain funds in a financial market in two ways. The most

common method is to issue a debt instrument, such as a bond or a mortgage, which

is a contractual agreement by the borrower to pay the holder of the instrument fixed

Debt and Equity

Markets

C H A P T E R 2 An Overview of the Financial System 25

dollar amounts at regular intervals (interest and principal payments) until a specified

date (the maturity date), when a final payment is made. The maturity of a debt

instrument is the number of years (term) until that instrument’s expiration date. A

debt instrument is short-term if its maturity is less than a year and long-term if its

maturity is ten years or longer. Debt instruments with a maturity between one and ten

years are said to be intermediate-term.

The second method of raising funds is by issuing equities, such as common

stock, which are claims to share in the net income (income after expenses and taxes)

and the assets of a business. If you own one share of common stock in a company that

has issued one million shares, you are entitled to 1 one-millionth of the firm’s net

income and 1 one-millionth of the firm’s assets. Equities often make periodic payments

(dividends) to their holders and are considered long-term securities because

they have no maturity date. In addition, owning stock means that you own a portion

of the firm and thus have the right to vote on issues important to the firm and to elect

its directors.

The main disadvantage of owning a corporation’s equities rather than its debt is

that an equity holder is a residual claimant; that is, the corporation must pay all its

debt holders before it pays its equity holders. The advantage of holding equities is that

equity holders benefit directly from any increases in the corporation’s profitability or

asset value because equities confer ownership rights on the equity holders. Debt holders

do not share in this benefit, because their dollar payments are fixed. We examine

the pros and cons of debt versus equity instruments in more detail in Chapter 8,

which provides an economic analysis of financial structure.

The total value of equities in the United States has typically fluctuated between

$1 and $20 trillion since the early 1970s, depending on the prices of shares. Although

the average person is more aware of the stock market than any other financial market,

the size of the debt market is often larger than the size of the equities market: The

value of debt instruments was $20 trillion at the end of 2002 while the value of equities

was $11 trillion at the end of 2002.

A primary market is a financial market in which new issues of a security, such as a

bond or a stock, are sold to initial buyers by the corporation or government agency

borrowing the funds. A secondary market is a financial market in which securities

that have been previously issued (and are thus secondhand) can be resold.

The primary markets for securities are not well known to the public because the

selling of securities to initial buyers often takes place behind closed doors. An important

financial institution that assists in the initial sale of securities in the primary market

is the investment bank. It does this by underwriting securities: It guarantees a

price for a corporation’s securities and then sells them to the public.

The New York and American stock exchanges and NASDAQ, in which previously

issued stocks are traded, are the best-known examples of secondary markets, although

the bond markets, in which previously issued bonds of major corporations and the

U.S. government are bought and sold, actually have a larger trading volume. Other

examples of secondary markets are foreign exchange markets, futures markets, and

options markets. Securities brokers and dealers are crucial to a well-functioning secondary

market. Brokers are agents of investors who match buyers with sellers of securities;

dealers link buyers and sellers by buying and selling securities at stated prices.

When an individual buys a security in the secondary market, the person who has

sold the security receives money in exchange for the security, but the corporation that

Primary and

Secondary

Markets

26 PA RT I Introduction

www.nyse.com

New York Stock Exchange.

Find listed companies, quotes,

company historical data, realtime

market indices, and more.

http://stockcharts.com/def

/servlet/Favorites.CServlet

?obj=msummary&cmd=show

&disp=SXA

This site contains

historical stock market index

charts for many countries

around the world.

issued the security acquires no new funds. A corporation acquires new funds only

when its securities are first sold in the primary market. Nonetheless, secondary markets

serve two important functions. First, they make it easier and quicker to sell these

financial instruments to raise cash; that is, they make the financial instruments more

liquid. The increased liquidity of these instruments then makes them more desirable

and thus easier for the issuing firm to sell in the primary market. Second, they determine

the price of the security that the issuing firm sells in the primary market. The

investors that buy securities in the primary market will pay the issuing corporation

no more than the price they think the secondary market will set for this security. The

higher the security’s price in the secondary market, the higher will be the price that

the issuing firm will receive for a new security in the primary market, and hence the

greater the amount of financial capital it can raise. Conditions in the secondary market

are therefore the most relevant to corporations issuing securities. It is for this reason

that books like this one, that deal with financial markets, focus on the behavior

of secondary markets rather than primary markets.

Secondary markets can be organized in two ways. One is to organize exchanges,

where buyers and sellers of securities (or their agents or brokers) meet in one central

location to conduct trades. The New York and American stock exchanges for stocks

and the Chicago Board of Trade for commodities (wheat, corn, silver, and other raw

materials) are examples of organized exchanges.

The other method of organizing a secondary market is to have an over-thecounter

(OTC) market, in which dealers at different locations who have an inventory

of securities stand ready to buy and sell securities “over the counter” to anyone

who comes to them and is willing to accept their prices. Because over-the-counter

dealers are in computer contact and know the prices set by one another, the OTC

market is very competitive and not very different from a market with an organized

exchange.

Many common stocks are traded over-the-counter, although a majority of the

largest corporations have their shares traded at organized stock exchanges such as the

New York Stock Exchange. The U.S. government bond market, with a larger trading

volume than the New York Stock Exchange, is set up as an over-the-counter market.

Forty or so dealers establish a “market” in these securities by standing ready to buy

and sell U.S. government bonds. Other over-the-counter markets include those that

trade other types of financial instruments such as negotiable certificates of deposit,

federal funds, banker’s acceptances, and foreign exchange.

Another way of distinguishing between markets is on the basis of the maturity of the

securities traded in each market. The money market is a financial market in which

only short-term debt instruments (generally those with original maturity of less than

one year) are traded; the capital market is the market in which longer-term debt

(generally those with original maturity of one year or greater) and equity instruments

are traded. Money market securities are usually more widely traded than longer-term

securities and so tend to be more liquid. In addition, as we will see in Chapter 4,

short-term securities have smaller fluctuations in prices than long-term securities,

making them safer investments. As a result, corporations and banks actively use the

money market to earn interest on surplus funds that they expect to have only temporarily.

Capital market securities, such as stocks and long-term bonds, are often

Money and

Capital Markets

Exchanges and

Over-the-Counter

Markets

C H A P T E R 2 An Overview of the Financial System 27

www.nasdaq.com

Detailed market and security

information for the NASDAQ

OTC stock exchange.

held by financial intermediaries such as insurance companies and pension funds,

which have little uncertainty about the amount of funds they will have available in

the future.1

Internationalization of Financial Markets

The growing internationalization of financial markets has become an important trend.

Before the 1980s, U.S. financial markets were much larger than financial markets outside

the United States, but in recent years the dominance of U.S. markets has been

disappearing. The extraordinary growth of foreign financial markets has been the

result of both large increases in the pool of savings in foreign countries such as Japan

and the deregulation of foreign financial markets, which has enabled them to expand

their activities. American corporations and banks are now more likely to tap international

capital markets to raise needed funds, and American investors often seek

investment opportunities abroad. Similarly, foreign corporations and banks raise

funds from Americans, and foreigners have become important investors in the United

States. A look at international bond markets and world stock markets will give us a

picture of how this globalization of financial markets is taking place.

The traditional instruments in the international bond market are known as foreign

bonds. Foreign bonds are sold in a foreign country and are denominated in that

country’s currency. For example, if the German automaker Porsche sells a bond in the

United States denominated in U.S. dollars, it is classified as a foreign bond. Foreign

bonds have been an important instrument in the international capital market for centuries.

In fact, a large percentage of U.S. railroads built in the nineteenth century were

financed by sales of foreign bonds in Britain.

A more recent innovation in the international bond market is the Eurobond, a

bond denominated in a currency other than that of the country in which it is sold—

for example, a bond denominated in U.S. dollars sold in London. Currently, over 80

percent of the new issues in the international bond market are Eurobonds, and the

market for these securities has grown very rapidly. As a result, the Eurobond market

is now larger than the U.S. corporate bond market.

A variant of the Eurobond is Eurocurrencies, which are foreign currencies

deposited in banks outside the home country. The most important of the Eurocurrencies

are Eurodollars, which are U.S. dollars deposited in foreign banks outside

the United States or in foreign branches of U.S. banks. Because these short-term

deposits earn interest, they are similar to short-term Eurobonds. American banks borrow

Eurodollar deposits from other banks or from their own foreign branches, and

Eurodollars are now an important source of funds for American banks (over $190 billion

outstanding).

Note that the new currency, the euro, can create some confusion about the terms

Eurobond, Eurocurrencies, and Eurodollars. A bond denominated in euros is called a

International

Bond Market,

Eurobonds, and

Eurocurrencies

28 PA RT I Introduction

1If you would like more detail about the different types of money and capital market instruments, you can find

this information in an appendix to this chapter, which can be found on this book’s web site at www.aw.com/mishkin.

Eurobond only if it is sold outside the countries that have adopted the euro. In fact, most

Eurobonds are not denominated in euros but are instead denominated in U.S. dollars.

Similarly, Eurodollars have nothing to do with euros, but are instead U.S. dollars

deposited in banks outside the United States.

Until recently, the U.S. stock market was by far the largest in the world, but foreign

stock markets have been growing in importance. Now the United States is not always

number one: In the mid-1980s, the value of stocks traded in Japan at times exceeded

the value of stocks traded in the United States. The increased interest in foreign stocks

has prompted the development in the United States of mutual funds specializing in

trading in foreign stock markets. American investors now pay attention not only to

the Dow Jones Industrial Average but also to stock price indexes for foreign stock

markets such as the Nikkei 225 Average (Tokyo) and the Financial Times–Stock

Exchange 100-Share Index (London).

The internationalization of financial markets is having profound effects on the

United States. Foreigners, particularly the Japanese, are not only providing funds to

corporations in the United States, but are also helping finance the federal government.

Without these foreign funds, the U.S. economy would have grown far less rapidly in

the last twenty years. The internationalization of financial markets is also leading the

way to a more integrated world economy in which flows of goods and technology

between countries are more commonplace. In later chapters, we will encounter many

examples of the important roles that international factors play in our economy.

Function of Financial Intermediaries

As shown in Figure 1 (p. 24), funds can move from lenders to borrowers by a second

route, called indirect finance because it involves a financial intermediary that stands

between the lender-savers and the borrower-spenders and helps transfer funds from one

to the other. A financial intermediary does this by borrowing funds from the lendersavers

and then using these funds to make loans to borrower-spenders. For example, a

bank might acquire funds by issuing a liability to the public (an asset for the public) in

the form of savings deposits. It might then use the funds to acquire an asset by making

a loan to General Motors or by buying a GM bond in the financial market. The ultimate

result is that funds have been transferred from the public (the lender-savers) to GM (the

borrower-spender) with the help of the financial intermediary (the bank).

The process of indirect finance using financial intermediaries, called financial

intermediation, is the primary route for moving funds from lenders to borrowers.

Indeed, although the media focus much of their attention on securities markets, particularly

the stock market, financial intermediaries are a far more important source of

financing for corporations than securities markets are. This is true not only for the

United States but for other industrialized countries as well (see Box 1). Why are financial

intermediaries and indirect finance so important in financial markets? To answer

this question, we need to understand the role of transaction costs, risk sharing, and

information costs in financial markets.

Transaction costs, the time and money spent in carrying out financial transactions,

are a major problem for people who have excess funds to lend. As we have seen, Carl

the Carpenter needs $1,000 for his new tool, and you know that it is an excellent

Transaction Costs

World Stock

Markets

C H A P T E R 2 An Overview of the Financial System 29

http://quote.yahoo.com/m2?u

Major world stock indices, with

charts, news, and components.

investment opportunity. You have the cash and would like to lend him the money, but

to protect your investment, you have to hire a lawyer to write up the loan contract

that specifies how much interest Carl will pay you, when he will make these interest

payments, and when he will repay you the $1,000. Obtaining the contract will cost

you $500. When you figure in this transaction cost for making the loan, you realize

that you can’t earn enough from the deal (you spend $500 to make perhaps $100)

and reluctantly tell Carl that he will have to look elsewhere.

This example illustrates that small savers like you or potential borrowers like Carl

might be frozen out of financial markets and thus be unable to benefit from them. Can

anyone come to the rescue? Financial intermediaries can.

Financial intermediaries can substantially reduce transaction costs because they

have developed expertise in lowering them; because their large size allows them to

take advantage of economies of scale, the reduction in transaction costs per dollar of

transactions as the size (scale) of transactions increases. For example, a bank knows

30 PA RT I Introduction

Source: Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, January 21, 2003, p. C6.

Following the Financial News

Foreign stock market indexes are published

daily in the Wall Street Journal next

to the “World Markets” column, which

reports developments in foreign stock

markets.

The first column identifies the country

of the foreign stock exchange followed

by the market index; for example,

the circled entry is for the Nikkei 225

Average in Japan. The second column,

“CLOSE,” gives the closing value of the

index, which was 8558.82 for the Nikkei

225 Average on January 20, 2003. The

“NET CHG” column indicates the

change in the index from the previous

trading day, 131.43, and the “% CHG”

column indicates the percentage change

in the index, 1.51%. The “YTD NET

CHG” column indicates the change in

the index from the beginning of the year

(year to date), 20.13, and the “YTD %

CHG” column indicates the percentage

change in the index from the beginning

of the year, 0.23%.

Foreign Stock Market Indexes

International Stock Market Indexes

1/20/03 NET % YTD YTD

COUNTRY INDEX CLOSE CHG CHG NET CHG % CHG

Argentina Merval 575.74 1.46 0.25 50.79 9.68

Australia All Ordinaries 3028.20 3.50 0.12 52.70 1.77

Belgium Bel–20 1944.77 14.75 0.75 80.27 3.96

Brazil Sao Paulo Bovespa 11648.38 27.32 0.23 379.91 3.37

Canada Toronto 300 Composite 6740.37 15.55 0.23 125.83 1.90

Chile Santiago IPSA 1017.96 5.05 0.50 17.96 1.80

China Dow Jones China 88 127.54 0.09 0.07 9.33 7.89

China Dow Jones Shanghai 181.24 0.26 0.14 13.30 7.92

China Dow Jones Shenzhen 170.61 0.68 0.40 13.16 8.36

Europe DJ STOXX (Euro) 198.30 2.63 1.31 3.42 1.70

Europe DJ STOXX 50 2337.76 44.76 1.88 69.75 2.90

Euro Zone DJ Euro STOXX 205.29 2.39 1.15 0.65 0.32

Euro Zone DJ Euro STOXX 50 2352.81 37.55 1.57 33.60 1.41

France Paris CAC 40 3020.07 36.86 1.21 43.84 1.43

Germany Frankfurt Xetra DAX 2893.55 25.27 0.87 0.92 0.03

Hong Kong Hang Seng 9552.02 62.57 0.65 230.73 2.48

India Bombay Sensex 3341.89 28.50 0.85 35.39 1.05

Israel Tel Aviv 25 311.62 1.87 0.60 22.29 6.68

Italy Milan MIBtel 17339.00 199.00 1.13 146.00 0.84

Japan Tokyo Nikkei 225 8558.82 131.43 1.51 20.13 0.23

Japan Tokyo Nikkei 300 166.81 1.58 0.94 1.36 0.82

Japan Tokyo Topix Index 853.90 5.35 0.62 10.61 1.26

Mexico I.P.C. All-Share 6161.12 43.34 0.70 34.03 0.56

Netherlands Amsterdam AEX 313.04 5.55 1.74 9.69 3.00

Singapore Straits Times 1363.19 3.64 0.27 22.16 1.65

South Africa Johannesburg All Share 9485.48 2.94 0.03 208.26 2.24

South Korea KOSPI 634.50 1.96 0.31 6.95 1.11

Spain IBEX 35 6390.80 67.40 1.04 353.90 5.86

Sweden SX All Share 155.40 1.56 1.01 5.83 3.90

Switzerland Zurich Swiss Market 4679.70 73.90 1.55 48.90 1.06

Taiwan Weighted 4951.03 43.25 0.88 498.58 11.20

U.K. London FTSE 100-share 3778.60 42.00 1.10 161.80 4.11

U.K. London FTSE 250-share 4312.50 9.20 0.21 6.80 0.16

how to find a good lawyer to produce an airtight loan contract, and this contract can

be used over and over again in its loan transactions, thus lowering the legal cost per

transaction. Instead of a loan contract (which may not be all that well written) costing

$500, a bank can hire a topflight lawyer for $5,000 to draw up an airtight loan

contract that can be used for 2,000 loans at a cost of $2.50 per loan. At a cost of $2.50

per loan, it now becomes profitable for the financial intermediary to lend Carl the

$1,000.

Because financial intermediaries are able to reduce transaction costs substantially,

they make it possible for you to provide funds indirectly to people like Carl with productive

investment opportunities. In addition, a financial intermediary’s low transaction

costs mean that it can provide its customers with liquidity services, services that

make it easier for customers to conduct transactions. For example, banks provide

depositors with checking accounts that enable them to pay their bills easily. In addition,

depositors can earn interest on checking and savings accounts and yet still convert

them into goods and services whenever necessary.

Another benefit made possible by the low transaction costs of financial institutions is

that they can help reduce the exposure of investors to risk; that is, uncertainty about

the returns investors will earn on assets. Financial intermediaries do this through the

process known as risk sharing: they create and sell assets with risk characteristics

that people are comfortable with, and the intermediaries then use the funds they

acquire by selling these assets to purchase other assets that may have far more risk.

Risk Sharing

C H A P T E R 2 An Overview of the Financial System 31

Box 1: Global

The Importance of Financial Intermediaries to Securities Markets: An International Comparison

Patterns of financing corporations differ across countries,

but one key fact emerges. Studies of the major

developed countries, including the United States,

Canada, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, Germany, and

France, show that when businesses go looking for

funds to finance their activities, they usually obtain

them indirectly through financial intermediaries and

not directly from securities markets.* Even in the

United States and Canada, which have the most

developed securities markets in the world, loans from

financial intermediaries are far more important for

corporate finance than securities markets are. The

countries that have made the least use of securities

markets are Germany and Japan; in these two countries,

financing from financial intermediaries has been

almost ten times greater than that from securities

markets. However, with the deregulation of Japanese

securities markets in recent years, the share of corporate

financing by financial intermediaries has been

declining relative to the use of securities markets.

Although the dominance of financial intermediaries

over securities markets is clear in all countries,

the relative importance of bond versus stock markets

differs widely across countries. In the United States, the

bond market is far more important as a source of corporate

finance: On average, the amount of new financing

raised using bonds is ten times the amount using

stocks. By contrast, countries such as France and

Italy make use of equities markets more than the

bond market to raise capital.

*See, for example, Colin Mayer, “Financial Systems, Corporate Finance, and Economic Development,” in Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and

Investment, ed. R. Glenn Hubbard (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 307–332.

Low transaction costs allow financial intermediaries to do risk sharing at low cost,

enabling them to earn a profit on the spread between the returns they earn on risky

assets and the payments they make on the assets they have sold. This process of risk

sharing is also sometimes referred to as asset transformation, because in a sense,

risky assets are turned into safer assets for investors.

Financial intermediaries also promote risk sharing by helping individuals to diversify

and thereby lower the amount of risk to which they are exposed. Diversification

entails investing in a collection (portfolio) of assets whose returns do not always move

together, with the result that overall risk is lower than for individual assets.

(Diversification is just another name for the old adage that “you shouldn’t put all your

eggs in one basket.”) Low transaction costs allow financial intermediaries to do this by

pooling a collection of assets into a new asset and then selling it to individuals.

The presence of transaction costs in financial markets explains, in part, why financial

intermediaries and indirect finance play such an important role in financial markets.

An additional reason is that in financial markets, one party often does not know

enough about the other party to make accurate decisions. This inequality is called

asymmetric information. For example, a borrower who takes out a loan usually has

better information about the potential returns and risk associated with the investment

projects for which the funds are earmarked than the lender does. Lack of information

creates problems in the financial system on two fronts: before the transaction is

entered into and after.2

Adverse selection is the problem created by asymmetric information before the

transaction occurs. Adverse selection in financial markets occurs when the potential

borrowers who are the most likely to produce an undesirable (adverse) outcome—the

bad credit risks—are the ones who most actively seek out a loan and are thus most

likely to be selected. Because adverse selection makes it more likely that loans might

be made to bad credit risks, lenders may decide not to make any loans even though

there are good credit risks in the marketplace.

To understand why adverse selection occurs, suppose that you have two aunts to

whom you might make a loan—Aunt Louise and Aunt Sheila. Aunt Louise is a conservative

type who borrows only when she has an investment she is quite sure will

pay off. Aunt Sheila, by contrast, is an inveterate gambler who has just come across a

get-rich-quick scheme that will make her a millionaire if she can just borrow $1,000

to invest in it. Unfortunately, as with most get-rich-quick schemes, there is a high

probability that the investment won’t pay off and that Aunt Sheila will lose the

$1,000.

Which of your aunts is more likely to call you to ask for a loan? Aunt Sheila, of

course, because she has so much to gain if the investment pays off. You, however,

would not want to make a loan to her because there is a high probability that her

investment will turn sour and she will be unable to pay you back.

If you knew both your aunts very well—that is, if your information were not

asymmetric—you wouldn’t have a problem, because you would know that Aunt

Sheila is a bad risk and so you would not lend to her. Suppose, though, that you don’t

Asymmetric

Information:

Adverse Selection

and Moral Hazard

32 PA RT I Introduction

2Asymmetric information and the adverse selection and moral hazard concepts are also crucial problems for the

insurance industry (see Chapter 12).

know your aunts well. You are more likely to lend to Aunt Sheila than to Aunt Louise

because Aunt Sheila would be hounding you for the loan. Because of the possibility

of adverse selection, you might decide not to lend to either of your aunts, even though

there are times when Aunt Louise, who is an excellent credit risk, might need a loan

for a worthwhile investment.

Moral hazard is the problem created by asymmetric information after the transaction

occurs. Moral hazard in financial markets is the risk (hazard) that the borrower

might engage in activities that are undesirable (immoral) from the lender’s point of

view, because they make it less likely that the loan will be paid back. Because moral

hazard lowers the probability that the loan will be repaid, lenders may decide that

they would rather not make a loan.

As an example of moral hazard, suppose that you made a $1,000 loan to another

relative, Uncle Melvin, who needs the money to purchase a word processor so he can

set up a business typing students’ term papers. Once you have made the loan, however,

Uncle Melvin is more likely to slip off to the track and play the horses. If he bets

on a 20-to-1 long shot and wins with your money, he is able to pay you back your

$1,000 and live high off the hog with the remaining $19,000. But if he loses, as is

likely, you don’t get paid back, and all he has lost is his reputation as a reliable,

upstanding uncle. Uncle Melvin therefore has an incentive to go to the track because

his gains ($19,000) if he bets correctly are much greater than the cost to him (his reputation)

if he bets incorrectly. If you knew what Uncle Melvin was up to, you would

prevent him from going to the track, and he would not be able to increase the moral

hazard. However, because it is hard for you to keep informed about his whereabouts—

that is, because information is asymmetric—there is a good chance that

Uncle Melvin will go to the track and you will not get paid back. The risk of moral

hazard might therefore discourage you from making the $1,000 loan to Uncle Melvin,

even if you were sure that you would be paid back if he used it to set up his business.

Study Guide Because the concepts of adverse selection and moral hazard are extremely useful in

understanding the behavior we examine in this and many of the later chapters (and

in life in general), you must understand them fully. One way to distinguish between

them is to remember that adverse selection is a problem of asymmetric information

before entering into a transaction, whereas moral hazard is a problem of asymmetric

information after the transaction has occurred. A helpful way to nail down these concepts

is to think of other examples, for financial or other types of transactions, in

which adverse selection or moral hazard plays a role. Several problems at the end of

the chapter provide additional examples of situations involving adverse selection and

moral hazard.

The problems created by adverse selection and moral hazard are an important

impediment to well-functioning financial markets. Again, financial intermediaries can

alleviate these problems.

With financial intermediaries in the economy, small savers can provide their funds

to the financial markets by lending these funds to a trustworthy intermediary—say, the

Honest John Bank—which in turn lends the funds out either by making loans or by

buying securities such as stocks or bonds. Successful financial intermediaries have

higher earnings on their investments than small savers, because they are better

C H A P T E R 2 An Overview of the Financial System 33

equipped than individuals to screen out bad credit risks from good ones, thereby

reducing losses due to adverse selection. In addition, financial intermediaries have high

earnings because they develop expertise in monitoring the parties they lend to, thus

reducing losses due to moral hazard. The result is that financial intermediaries can

afford to pay lender-savers interest or provide substantial services and still earn a profit.

As we have seen, financial intermediaries play an important role in the economy

because they provide liquidity services, promote risk sharing, and solve information

problems. The success of financial intermediaries in performing this role is evidenced

by the fact that most Americans invest their savings with them and obtain loans from

them. Financial intermediaries play a key role in improving economic efficiency

because they help financial markets channel funds from lender-savers to people with

productive investment opportunities. Without a well-functioning set of financial

intermediaries, it is very hard for an economy to reach its full potential. We will

explore further the role of financial intermediaries in the economy in Part III.

Financial Intermediaries

We have seen why financial intermediaries play such an important role in the economy.

Now we look at the principal financial intermediaries themselves and how they

perform the intermediation function. They fall into three categories: depository institutions

(banks), contractual savings institutions, and investment intermediaries. Table

1 provides a guide to the discussion of the financial intermediaries that fit into these

three categories by describing their primary liabilities (sources of funds) and assets

(uses of funds). The relative size of these intermediaries in the United States is indicated

in Table 2, which lists the amount of their assets at the end of 1970, 1980, 1990,

and 2002.

Depository institutions (for simplicity, we refer to these as banks throughout this text)

are financial intermediaries that accept deposits from individuals and institutions and

make loans. The study of money and banking focuses special attention on this group

of financial institutions, because they are involved in the creation of deposits, an

important component of the money supply. These institutions include commercial

banks and the so-called thrift institutions (thrifts): savings and loan associations,

mutual savings banks, and credit unions.

Commercial Banks. These financial intermediaries raise funds primarily by issuing

checkable deposits (deposits on which checks can be written), savings deposits

(deposits that are payable on demand but do not allow their owner to write checks),

and time deposits (deposits with fixed terms to maturity). They then use these funds

to make commercial, consumer, and mortgage loans and to buy U.S. government

securities and municipal bonds. There are slightly fewer than 8,000 commercial

banks in the United States, and as a group, they are the largest financial intermediary

and have the most diversified portfolios (collections) of assets.

Savings and Loan Associations (S&Ls) and Mutual Savings Banks. These depository institutions,

of which there are approximately 1,500, obtain funds primarily through savings

deposits (often called shares) and time and checkable deposits. In the past, these insti-

Depository

Institutions

34 PA RT I Introduction

tutions were constrained in their activities and mostly made mortgage loans for residential

housing. Over time, these restrictions have been loosened so that the distinction

between these depository institutions and commercial banks has blurred. These intermediaries

have become more alike and are now more competitive with each other.

Credit Unions. These financial institutions, numbering about 9,500, are very small

cooperative lending institutions organized around a particular group: union members,

employees of a particular firm, and so forth. They acquire funds from deposits

called shares and primarily make consumer loans.

Contractual savings institutions, such as insurance companies and pension funds, are

financial intermediaries that acquire funds at periodic intervals on a contractual basis.

Because they can predict with reasonable accuracy how much they will have to pay

Contractual

Savings

Institutions

C H A P T E R 2 An Overview of the Financial System 35

Primary Liabilities Primary Assets

Type of Intermediary (Sources of Funds) (Uses of Funds)

Depository institutions (banks)

Commercial banks Deposits Business and consumer

loans, mortgages, U.S.

government securities

and municipal bonds

Savings and loan associations Deposits Mortgages

Mutual savings banks Deposits Mortgages

Credit unions Deposits Consumer loans

Contractual savings institutions

Life insurance companies Premiums from policies Corporate bonds and

mortgages

Fire and casualty insurance Premiums from policies Municipal bonds,

companies corporate bonds and

stock, U.S. government

securities

Pension funds, government Employer and employee Corporate bonds and stock

retirement funds contributions

Investment intermediaries

Finance companies Commercial paper, Consumer and business

stocks, bonds loans

Mutual funds Shares Stocks, bonds

Money market mutual funds Shares Money market instruments

Table 1 Primary Assets and Liabilities of Financial Intermediaries

out in benefits in the coming years, they do not have to worry as much as depository

institutions about losing funds. As a result, the liquidity of assets is not as important

a consideration for them as it is for depository institutions, and they tend to invest

their funds primarily in long-term securities such as corporate bonds, stocks, and

mortgages.

Life Insurance Companies. Life insurance companies insure people against financial

hazards following a death and sell annuities (annual income payments upon retirement).

They acquire funds from the premiums that people pay to keep their policies

in force and use them mainly to buy corporate bonds and mortgages. They also purchase

stocks, but are restricted in the amount that they can hold. Currently, with $3.3

trillion in assets, they are among the largest of the contractual savings institutions.

Fire and Casualty Insurance Companies. These companies insure their policyholders

against loss from theft, fire, and accidents. They are very much like life insurance

companies, receiving funds through premiums for their policies, but they have a

greater possibility of loss of funds if major disasters occur. For this reason, they use

their funds to buy more liquid assets than life insurance companies do. Their largest

holding of assets is municipal bonds; they also hold corporate bonds and stocks and

U.S. government securities.

36 PA RT I Introduction

Value of Assets

($ billions, end of year)

Type of Intermediary 1970 1980 1990 2002

Depository institutions (banks)

Commercial banks 517 1,481 3,334 7,161

Savings and loan associations

and mutual savings banks 250 792 1,365 1,338

Credit unions 18 67 215 553

Contractual savings institutions

Life insurance companies 201 464 1,367 3,269

Fire and casualty insurance companies 50 182 533 894

Pension funds (private) 112 504 1,629 3,531

State and local government retirement funds 60 197 737 1,895

Investment intermediaries

Finance companies 64 205 610 1,165

Mutual funds 47 70 654 3,419

Money market mutual funds 0 76 498 2,106

Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts: www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Z1/LevelTables.

Table 2 Principal Financial Intermediaries and Value of Their Assets

Pension Funds and Government Retirement Funds. Private pension funds and state and

local retirement funds provide retirement income in the form of annuities to employees

who are covered by a pension plan. Funds are acquired by contributions from

employers or from employees, who either have a contribution automatically deducted

from their paychecks or contribute voluntarily. The largest asset holdings of pension

funds are corporate bonds and stocks. The establishment of pension funds has been

actively encouraged by the federal government, both through legislation requiring

pension plans and through tax incentives to encourage contributions.

This category of financial intermediaries includes finance companies, mutual funds,

and money market mutual funds.

Finance Companies. Finance companies raise funds by selling commercial paper (a

short-term debt instrument) and by issuing stocks and bonds. They lend these funds

to consumers, who make purchases of such items as furniture, automobiles, and

home improvements, and to small businesses. Some finance companies are organized

by a parent corporation to help sell its product. For example, Ford Motor Credit

Company makes loans to consumers who purchase Ford automobiles.

Mutual Funds. These financial intermediaries acquire funds by selling shares to many

individuals and use the proceeds to purchase diversified portfolios of stocks and

bonds. Mutual funds allow shareholders to pool their resources so that they can take

advantage of lower transaction costs when buying large blocks of stocks or bonds. In

addition, mutual funds allow shareholders to hold more diversified portfolios than

they otherwise would. Shareholders can sell (redeem) shares at any time, but the

value of these shares will be determined by the value of the mutual fund’s holdings of

securities. Because these fluctuate greatly, the value of mutual fund shares will too;

therefore, investments in mutual funds can be risky.

Money Market Mutual Funds. These relatively new financial institutions have the characteristics

of a mutual fund but also function to some extent as a depository institution

because they offer deposit-type accounts. Like most mutual funds, they sell shares to

acquire funds that are then used to buy money market instruments that are both safe

and very liquid. The interest on these assets is then paid out to the shareholders.

A key feature of these funds is that shareholders can write checks against the

value of their shareholdings. In effect, shares in a money market mutual fund function

like checking account deposits that pay interest. Money market mutual funds

have experienced extraordinary growth since 1971, when they first appeared. By

2002, their assets had climbed to nearly $2.1 trillion.

Regulation of the Financial System

The financial system is among the most heavily regulated sectors of the American

economy. The government regulates financial markets for two main reasons: to

increase the information available to investors and to ensure the soundness of the

financial system. We will examine how these two reasons have led to the present regulatory

environment. As a study aid, the principal regulatory agencies of the U.S.

financial system are listed in Table 3.

Investment

Intermediaries

C H A P T E R 2 An Overview of the Financial System 37

38 PA RT I Introduction

Table 3 Principal Regulatory Agencies of the U.S. Financial System

Regulatory Agency

Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC)

Commodities Futures

Trading Commission

(CFTC)

Office of the Comptroller

of the Currency

National Credit Union

Administration (NCUA)

State banking and

insurance commissions

Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation (FDIC)

Federal Reserve System

Office of Thrift Supervision

Subject of Regulation

Organized exchanges

and financial markets

Futures market

exchanges

Federally chartered

commercial banks

Federally chartered

credit unions

State-chartered

depository institutions

Commercial banks,

mutual savings banks,

savings and loan

associations

All depository institutions

Savings and loan associations

Nature of Regulations

Requires disclosure of

information, restricts insider

trading

Regulates procedures for trading

in futures markets

Charters and examines the

books of federally chartered

commercial banks and

imposes restrictions on assets

they can hold

Charters and examines the

books of federally chartered

credit unions and imposes

restrictions on assets they can

hold

Charters and examines the

books of state-chartered

banks and insurance

companies, imposes

restrictions on assets they can

hold, and imposes restrictions

on branching

Provides insurance of up to

$100,000 for each depositor

at a bank, examines the books

of insured banks, and

imposes restrictions on assets

they can hold

Examines the books of

commercial banks that are

members of the system, sets

reserve requirements for all

banks

Examines the books of savings

and loan associations,

imposes restrictions on assets

they can hold

Asymmetric information in financial markets means that investors may be subject to

adverse selection and moral hazard problems that may hinder the efficient operation

of financial markets. Risky firms or outright crooks may be the most eager to sell securities

to unwary investors, and the resulting adverse selection problem may keep

investors out of financial markets. Furthermore, once an investor has bought a security,

thereby lending money to a firm, the borrower may have incentives to engage in

risky activities or to commit outright fraud. The presence of this moral hazard problem

may also keep investors away from financial markets. Government regulation can

reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems in financial markets and increase

their efficiency by increasing the amount of information available to investors.

As a result of the stock market crash in 1929 and revelations of widespread fraud

in the aftermath, political demands for regulation culminated in the Securities Act of

1933 and the establishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The

SEC requires corporations issuing securities to disclose certain information about their

sales, assets, and earnings to the public and restricts trading by the largest stockholders

(known as insiders) in the corporation. By requiring disclosure of this information and

by discouraging insider trading, which could be used to manipulate security prices, the

SEC hopes that investors will be better informed and be protected from some of the

abuses in financial markets that occurred before 1933. Indeed, in recent years, the SEC

has been particularly active in prosecuting people involved in insider trading.

Asymmetric information can also lead to widespread collapse of financial intermediaries,

referred to as a financial panic. Because providers of funds to financial intermediaries

may not be able to assess whether the institutions holding their funds are

sound, if they have doubts about the overall health of financial intermediaries, they

may want to pull their funds out of both sound and unsound institutions. The possible

outcome is a financial panic that produces large losses for the public and causes

serious damage to the economy. To protect the public and the economy from financial

panics, the government has implemented six types of regulations.

Restrictions on Entry. State banking and insurance commissions, as well as the Office

of the Comptroller of the Currency (an agency of the federal government), have created

very tight regulations governing who is allowed to set up a financial intermediary.

Individuals or groups that want to establish a financial intermediary, such as a

bank or an insurance company, must obtain a charter from the state or the federal

government. Only if they are upstanding citizens with impeccable credentials and a

large amount of initial funds will they be given a charter.

Disclosure. There are stringent reporting requirements for financial intermediaries.

Their bookkeeping must follow certain strict principles, their books are subject to

periodic inspection, and they must make certain information available to the public.

Restrictions on Assets and Activities. There are restrictions on what financial intermediaries

are allowed to do and what assets they can hold. Before you put your funds

into a bank or some other such institution, you would want to know that your funds

are safe and that the bank or other financial intermediary will be able to meet its obligations

to you. One way of doing this is to restrict the financial intermediary from

engaging in certain risky activities. Legislation passed in 1933 (repealed in 1999) separated

commercial banking from the securities industry so that banks could not

engage in risky ventures associated with this industry. Another way is to restrict financial

Ensuring the

Soundness of

Financial

Intermediaries

Increasing

Information

Available to

Investors

C H A P T E R 2 An Overview of the Financial System 39

www.sec.gov

The United States Securities and

Exchange Commission home

page. It contains vast SEC

resources, laws and regulations,

investor information, and

litigation.

intermediaries from holding certain risky assets, or at least from holding a greater

quantity of these risky assets than is prudent. For example, commercial banks and

other depository institutions are not allowed to hold common stock because stock

prices experience substantial fluctuations. Insurance companies are allowed to hold

common stock, but their holdings cannot exceed a certain fraction of their total assets.

Deposit Insurance. The government can insure people’s deposits so that they do not

suffer any financial loss if the financial intermediary that holds these deposits should

fail. The most important government agency that provides this type of insurance is

the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which insures each depositor at a

commercial bank or mutual savings bank up to a loss of $100,000 per account. All

commercial and mutual savings banks, with a few minor exceptions, are contributers

to the FDIC’s Bank Insurance Fund, which is used to pay off depositors in the case of

a bank’s failure. The FDIC was created in 1934 after the massive bank failures of

1930–1933, in which the savings of many depositors at commercial banks were

wiped out. Similar government agencies exist for other depository institutions: The

Savings Association Insurance Fund (part of the FDIC) provides deposit insurance for

savings and loan associations, and the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund

(NCUSIF) does the same for credit unions.

Limits on Competition. Politicians have often declared that unbridled competition

among financial intermediaries promotes failures that will harm the public. Although

the evidence that competition does this is extremely weak, it has not stopped the state

and federal governments from imposing many restrictive regulations. First are the

restrictions on the opening of additional locations (branches). In the past, banks were

not allowed to open up branches in other states, and in some states, banks were

restricted from opening additional locations.

Restrictions on Interest Rates. Competition has also been inhibited by regulations

that impose restrictions on interest rates that can be paid on deposits. For decades

after 1933, banks were prohibited from paying interest on checking accounts. In

addition, until 1986, the Federal Reserve System had the power under Regulation Q

to set maximum interest rates that banks could pay on savings deposits. These regulations

were instituted because of the widespread belief that unrestricted interest-rate

competition helped encourage bank failures during the Great Depression. Later evidence

does not seem to support this view, and restrictions like Regulation Q have

been abolished.

In later chapters, we will look more closely at government regulation of financial

markets and will see whether it has improved the functioning of financial markets.

Not surprisingly, given the similarity of the economic system here and in Japan,

Canada, and the nations of Western Europe, financial regulation in these countries is

similar to financial regulation in the United States. The provision of information is

improved by requiring corporations issuing securities to report details about assets and

liabilities, earnings, and sales of stock, and by prohibiting insider trading. The soundness

of intermediaries is ensured by licensing, periodic inspection of financial intermediaries’

books, and the provision of deposit insurance (although its coverage is

smaller than in the United States and its existence is often intentionally not advertised).

The major differences between financial regulation in the United States and

abroad relate to bank regulation. In the past, the United States was the only industrialized

country to subject banks to restrictions on branching, which limited banks’ size

Financial

Regulation Abroad

40 PA RT I Introduction

and restricted them to certain geographic regions. (These restrictions were abolished

by legislation in 1994.) U.S. banks are also the most restricted in the range of assets

they may hold. Banks abroad frequently hold shares in commercial firms; in Japan

and Germany, those stakes can be sizable.

C H A P T E R 2 An Overview of the Financial System 41

Summary

1. The basic function of financial markets is to channel

funds from savers who have an excess of funds to

spenders who have a shortage of funds. Financial

markets can do this either through direct finance, in

which borrowers borrow funds directly from lenders by

selling them securities, or through indirect finance,

which involves a financial intermediary that stands

between the lender-savers and the borrower-spenders

and helps transfer funds from one to the other. This

channeling of funds improves the economic welfare of

everyone in the society, because it allows funds to move

from people who have no productive investment

opportunities to those who have such opportunities,

thereby contributing to increased efficiency in the

economy. In addition, channeling of funds directly

benefits consumers by allowing them to make

purchases when they need them most.

2. Financial markets can be classified as debt and equity

markets, primary and secondary markets, exchanges

and over-the-counter markets, and money and capital

markets.

3. An important trend in recent years is the growing

internationalization of financial markets. Eurobonds,

which are denominated in a currency other than that of

the country in which they are sold, are now the

dominant security in the international bond market and

have surpassed U.S. corporate bonds as a source of new

funds. Eurodollars, which are U.S. dollars deposited in

foreign banks, are an important source of funds for

American banks.

4. Financial intermediaries are financial institutions that

acquire funds by issuing liabilities and in turn use those

funds to acquire assets by purchasing securities or

making loans. Financial intermediaries play an

important role in the financial system, because they

reduce transaction costs, allow risk sharing, and solve

problems created by adverse selection and moral

hazard. As a result, financial intermediaries allow small

savers and borrowers to benefit from the existence of

financial markets, thereby increasing the efficiency of

the economy.

5. The principal financial intermediaries fall into three

categories: (a) banks—commercial banks, savings and

loan associations, mutual savings banks, and credit

unions; (b) contractual savings institutions—life

insurance companies, fire and casualty insurance

companies, and pension funds; and (c) investment

intermediaries—finance companies, mutual funds, and

money market mutual funds.

6. The government regulates financial markets and

financial intermediaries for two main reasons: to

increase the information available to investors and to

ensure the soundness of the financial system.

Regulations include requiring disclosure of information

to the public, restrictions on who can set up a financial

intermediary, restrictions on what assets financial

intermediaries can hold, the provision of deposit

insurance, reserve requirements, and the setting of

maximum interest rates that can be paid on checking

accounts and savings deposits.

Key Terms

asset transformation, p. 32

adverse selection, p. 32

asymmetric information, p. 32

brokers, p. 26

capital market, p. 27

dealers, p. 26

diversification, p. 32

dividends, p. 26

economies of scale, p. 30

42 PA RT I Introduction

equities, p. 26

Eurobond, p. 28

Eurocurrencies, p. 28

Eurodollars, p. 28

exchanges, p. 27

financial intermediation, p. 29

financial panic, p. 39

foreign bonds, p. 28

intermediate-term, p. 26

investment bank, p. 26

liabilities, p. 24

liquid, p. 27

liquidity services, p. 31

long-term, p. 26

maturity, p. 26

money market, p. 27

moral hazard, p. 33

over-the-counter (OTC) market, p. 27

portfolio, p. 32

primary market, p. 26

risk, p. 31

risk sharing, p. 31

secondary market, p. 26

short-term, p. 26

thrift institutions (thrifts), p. 34

transaction costs, p. 29

underwriting, p. 26

Questions and Problems

Questions marked with an asterisk are answered at the end

of the book in an appendix, “Answers to Selected Questions

and Problems.”

*1. Why is a share of IBM common stock an asset for its

owner and a liability for IBM?

2. If I can buy a car today for $5,000 and it is worth

$10,000 in extra income next year to me because it

enables me to get a job as a traveling anvil seller,

should I take out a loan from Larry the Loan Shark at

a 90% interest rate if no one else will give me a loan?

Will I be better or worse off as a result of taking out

this loan? Can you make a case for legalizing loansharking?

*3. Some economists suspect that one of the reasons that

economies in developing countries grow so slowly is

that they do not have well-developed financial markets.

Does this argument make sense?

4. The U.S. economy borrowed heavily from the British

in the nineteenth century to build a railroad system.

What was the principal debt instrument used? Why

did this make both countries better off?

*5. “Because corporations do not actually raise any funds

in secondary markets, they are less important to the

economy than primary markets.” Comment.

6. If you suspect that a company will go bankrupt next

year, which would you rather hold, bonds issued by

the company or equities issued by the company?

Why?

*7. How can the adverse selection problem explain why

you are more likely to make a loan to a family member

than to a stranger?

8. Think of one example in which you have had to deal

with the adverse selection problem.

*9. Why do loan sharks worry less about moral hazard in

connection with their borrowers than some other

lenders do?

10. If you are an employer, what kinds of moral hazard

problems might you worry about with your employees?

*11. If there were no asymmetry in the information that a

borrower and a lender had, could there still be a

moral hazard problem?

12. “In a world without information and transaction costs,

financial intermediaries would not exist.” Is this statement

true, false, or uncertain? Explain your answer.

*13. Why might you be willing to make a loan to your

neighbor by putting funds in a savings account earning

a 5% interest rate at the bank and having the bank

lend her the funds at a 10% interest rate rather than

lend her the funds yourself?

14. How does risk sharing benefit both financial intermediaries

and private investors?

*15. Discuss some of the manifestations of the globalization

of world capital markets.

QUIZ

1. One of the single best sources of information about

financial institutions is the U.S. Flow of Funds report

produced by the Federal Reserve. This document contains

data on most financial intermediaries. Go to

www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Z1/. Go to the most

current release. You may have to load Acrobat Reader

if your computer does not already have it. The site has

a link for a free patch. Go to the Level Tables and

answer the following.

a. What percent of assets do commercial banks hold

in loans? What percent of assets are held in mortgage

loans?

b. What percent of assets do Savings and Loans hold

in mortgage loans?

c. What percent of assets do credit unions hold in

mortgage loans and in consumer loans?

2. The most famous financial market in the world is the

New York Stock Exchange. Go to www.nyse.com.

a. What is the mission of the NYSE?

b. Firms must pay a fee to list their shares for sale on

the NYSE. What would be the fee for a firm with 5

million shares common outstanding?

C H A P T E R 2 An Overview of the Financial System 43

Web Exercises

Here we examine the securities (instruments) traded in financial markets. We first

focus on the instruments traded in the money market and then turn to those traded

in the capital market.

Because of their short terms to maturity, the debt instruments traded in the money

market undergo the least price fluctuations and so are the least risky investments. The

money market has undergone great changes in the past three decades, with the

amount of some financial instruments growing at a far more rapid rate than others.

The principal money market instruments are listed in Table 1 along with the

amount outstanding at the end of 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2002.

United States Treasury Bills. These short-term debt instruments of the U.S. government

are issued in 3-, 6-, and 12-month maturities to finance the federal government.

They pay a set amount at maturity and have no interest payments, but they effectively

pay interest by initially selling at a discount, that is, at a price lower than the set

amount paid at maturity. For instance, you might pay $9,000 in May 2004 for a oneyear

Treasury Bill that can be redeemed in May 2005 for $10,000.

U.S. Treasury bills are the most liquid of all the money market instruments,

because they are the most actively traded. They are also the safest of all money market

instruments, because there is almost no possibility of default, a situation in which

the party issuing the debt instrument (the federal government, in this case) is unable

to make interest payments or pay off the amount owed when the instrument matures.

The federal government is always able to meet its debt obligations, because it can raise

taxes or issue currency (paper money or coins) to pay off its debts. Treasury bills are

held mainly by banks, although small amounts are held by households, corporations,

and other financial intermediaries.

Negotiable Bank Certificates of Deposit. A certificate of deposit (CD) is a debt instrument,

sold by a bank to depositors, that pays annual interest of a given amount and at

maturity, pays back the original purchase price. Before 1961, CDs were nonnegotiable;

that is, they could not be sold to someone else and could not be redeemed from the

bank before maturity without paying a substantial penalty. In 1961, to make CDs more

liquid and more attractive to investors, Citibank introduced the first negotiable CD in

large denominations (over $100,000) that could be resold in a secondary market. This

instrument is now issued by almost all the major commercial banks and has been

extremely successful, with the amount outstanding currently around $1.2 trillion. CDs

Money Market

Instruments

1

Financial Market Instruments

appendix

to chapter 2

are an extremely important source of funds for commercial banks, from corporations,

money market mutual funds, charitable institutions, and government agencies.

Commercial Paper. Commercial paper is a short-term debt instrument issued by large

banks and well-known corporations, such as General Motors and AT&T. Before the

1960s, corporations usually borrowed their short-term funds from banks, but since

then they have come to rely more heavily on selling commercial paper to other financial

intermediaries and corporations for their immediate borrowing needs; in other

words, they engage in direct finance. Growth of the commercial paper market has

been substantial: The amount of commercial paper outstanding has increased by over

3,900% (from $33 billion to $1.3 trillion) in the period 1970–2002. We discuss why

the commercial paper market has had such tremendous growth in Chapter 10.

Banker’s Acceptances. These money market instruments are created in the course of

carrying out international trade and have been in use for hundreds of years. A banker’s

acceptance is a bank draft (a promise of payment similar to a check) issued by a firm,

payable at some future date, and guaranteed for a fee by the bank that stamps it

“accepted.” The firm issuing the instrument is required to deposit the required funds

into its account to cover the draft. If the firm fails to do so, the bank’s guarantee means

that it is obligated to make good on the draft. The advantage to the firm is that the

draft is more likely to be accepted when purchasing goods abroad, because the foreign

exporter knows that even if the company purchasing the goods goes bankrupt,

the bank draft will still be paid off. These “accepted” drafts are often resold in a secondary

market at a discount and are therefore similar in function to Treasury bills.

Typically, they are held by many of the same parties that hold Treasury bills, and the

amount outstanding has experienced limited growth, rising by 28% ($7 billion to $9

billion) from 1970 to 2002.

2 Appendix to Chapter 2

Amount Outstanding

($ billions, end of year)

Type of Instrument 1970 1980 1990 2002

U.S. Treasury bills 81 216 527 888

Negotiable bank certificates of

deposit (large denominations) 55 317 543 1,177

Commercial paper 33 122 557 1,321

Banker’s acceptances 7 42 52 9

Repurchase agreements 3 57 144 470

Federal funds* 16 18 61 29

Eurodollars 2 55 92 213

*Figures after 1970 are for large banks only.

Sources: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts; Federal Reserve Bulletin; Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1945–1970; Annual Statistical

Digest, 1971–1975; Economic Report of the President. www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1

Table 1 Principal Money Market Instruments

Repurchase Agreements. Repurchase agreements, or repos, are effectively short-term

loans (usually with a maturity of less than two weeks) in which Treasury bills serve as

collateral, an asset that the lender receives if the borrower does not pay back the loan.

Repos are made as follows: A large corporation, such as General Motors, may have

some idle funds in its bank account, say $1 million, which it would like to lend for a

week. GM uses this excess $1 million to buy Treasury bills from a bank, which agrees

Financial Market Instruments 3

Source: Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, June 4, 2003, p. C14.

Following the Financial News

The Wall Street Journal publishes daily a listing of interest

rates on many different financial instruments in its

“Money Rates” column. (See “Today’s Contents” on

page 1 of the Journal for the location.)

The four interest rates in the “Money Rates” column

that are discussed most frequently in the media

are these:

• Prime rate: The base interest rate on corporate

bank loans, an indicator of the cost of business

borrowing from banks

• Federal funds rate: The interest rate charged on

overnight loans in the federal funds market, a sensitive

indicator of the cost to banks of borrowing

funds from other banks and the stance of monetary

policy

• Treasury bill rate: The interest rate on U.S. Treasury

bills, an indicator of general interest-rate movements

• Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation rates:

Interest rates on “Freddie Mac”–guaranteed mortgages,

an indicator of the cost of financing residential

housing purchases

Money Market Rates

Wednesday, June 3, 2003

The key U.S., and foreign annual interest rates below are a guide to general

levels but don’t always represent actual transactions.

PRIME RATE: 4.25% (effective 11/07/02).

DISCOUNT RATE: 2.25% (effective 01/09/03).

FEDERAL FUNDS: 1.250% high, 1.000% low, 1.125% near closing bid,

1.188% offered. Effective rate: 1.22%. Source: Prebon Yamane (USA) Inc.

Federal-funds target rate: 1.250% (effective 11/06/02).

CALL MONEY: 3.00% (effective 11/07/02).

COMMERCIAL PAPER: Placed directly by General Electric Capital Corp.:

1.05% 30 to 35 days; 1.24% 36 to 43 days; 1.23% 44 to 70 days; 1.21%

71 to 99 days; 1.19% 100 to 113 days; 1.05% 114 to 122 days; 1.19%

123 to 143 days; 1.17% 144 to 270 days.

EURO COMMERCIAL PAPER: Placed directly by General Electric Capital

Corp.: 2.25% 30 days; 2.20% two months; 2.19% three months; 2.15% four

months; 2.14% five months; 2.13% six months.

DEALER COMMERCIAL PAPER: High-grade unsecured notes sold through

dealers by major corporations: 1.21% 30 days; 1.20% 60 days; 1.19% 90

days.

CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT: 1.26% one month; 1.21% three months;

1.18% six months.

BANKERS ACCEPTANCE: 1.25% 30 days; 1.22% 60 days; 1.19% 90 days;

1.17% 120 days; 1.16% 150 days; 1.14% 180 days; Source: Prebon

Yamane (USA) Inc.

LONDON INTERBANK OFFERED RATES (LIBOR): 1.31875% one month;

1.2800% three months; 1.2300% six months; 1.2300% one year. Effective

rate for contracts entered into two days from date appearing at top of this

column.

EURO INTERBANK OFFERED RATES (EURIBOR): 2.319% one month; 2.235%

three months; 2.179% six months; 2.122% one year. Source: Reuters.

FOREIGN PRIME RATES: Canada 5.00%; European Central Bank 2.50%;

Japan 1.375%; Switzerland 2.25%; Britain 3.75%

TREASURY BILLS: Results of the Monday, June 2, 2003, auction of shortterm

U.S. government bills, sold at a discount from face value in units of

$1,000 to $1 million: 1.110% 13 weeks; 1.095% 26 weeks. Tuesday, June

3, 2003 auction: 1.140% 4 weeks.

OVERNIGHT REPURCHASE RATE: 1.22%. Source: Garban Intercapital

FREDDIE MAC: Posted yields on 30-year mortgage commitments. Delivery

within 30 days 4.68%, 60 days 4.80%, standard conventional fixed-rate

mortgages: 2.875%, 2% rate capped one-year adjustable rate mortgages.

FANNIE MAE: Posted yields on 30 year mortgage commitments (priced at

par) for delivery within 30 days 4.78%, 60 days 4.87% standard conventional

fixed-rate mortgages; 3.00% 6/2 rate capped one-year adjustable rate

mortgages. Constant Maturity Debt Index: 1.193% three months; 1.119% six

months; 1.187% one year

MERRILL LYNCH READY ASSETS TRUST: 0.78%.

CONSUMER PRICE INDEX: April 183.8, up 2.2% from a year ago. Bureau of

Labor Statistics.

MONEY RATES

to repurchase them the next week at a price slightly above GM’s purchase price. The

effect of this agreement is that GM makes a loan of $1 million to the bank and holds

$1 million of the bank’s Treasury bills until the bank repurchases the bills to pay off

the loan. Repurchase agreements are a fairly recent innovation in financial markets,

having been introduced in 1969. They are now an important source of bank funds

(over $400 billion). The most important lenders in this market are large corporations.

Federal (Fed) Funds. These are typically overnight loans between banks of their

deposits at the Federal Reserve. The federal funds designation is somewhat confusing,

because these loans are not made by the federal government or by the Federal

Reserve, but rather by banks to other banks. One reason why a bank might borrow

in the federal funds market is that it might find it does not have enough deposits at

the Fed to meet the amount required by regulators. It can then borrow these deposits

from another bank, which transfers them to the borrowing bank using the Fed’s wire

transfer system. This market is very sensitive to the credit needs of the banks, so the

interest rate on these loans, called the federal funds rate, is a closely watched barometer

of the tightness of credit market conditions in the banking system and the stance

of monetary policy; when it is high, it indicates that the banks are strapped for funds,

whereas when it is low, banks’ credit needs are low.

Capital market instruments are debt and equity instruments with maturities of greater

than one year. They have far wider price fluctuations than money market instruments

and are considered to be fairly risky investments. The principal capital market instruments

are listed in Table 2, which shows the amount outstanding at the end of 1970,

1980, 1990, and 2002.

Capital Market

Instruments

4 Appendix to Chapter 2

Amount Outstanding

($ billions, end of year)

Type of Instrument 1970 1980 1990 2002

Corporate stocks (market value) 906 1,601 4,146 11,734

Residential mortgages 355 1,106 2,886 6,930

Corporate bonds 167 366 1,008 2,699

U.S. government securities 160 407 1,653 2,169

(marketable long-term)

U.S. government agency securities 51 193 435 2,305

State and local government bonds 146 310 870 1,442

Bank commercial loans 152 459 818 1,345

Consumer loans 134 355 813 1,757

Commercial and farm mortgages 116 352 829 1,461

Sources: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts; Federal Reserve Bulletin; Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1941–1970. http://www.

federalreserve.gov/releases/z1

Table 2 Principal Capital Market Instruments

Stocks. Stocks are equity claims on the net income and assets of a corporation. Their

value of $11 trillion at the end of 2002 exceeds that of any other type of security in

the capital market. The amount of new stock issues in any given year is typically quite

small—less than 1% of the total value of shares outstanding. Individuals hold around

half of the value of stocks; the rest are held by pension funds, mutual funds, and

insurance companies.

Mortgages. Mortgages are loans to households or firms to purchase housing, land, or

other real structures, where the structure or land itself serves as collateral for the

loans. The mortgage market is the largest debt market in the United States, with the

amount of residential mortgages (used to purchase residential housing) outstanding

more than quadruple the amount of commercial and farm mortgages. Savings and

loan associations and mutual savings banks have been the primary lenders in the residential

mortgage market, although commercial banks have started to enter this market

more aggressively. The majority of commercial and farm mortgages are made by

commercial banks and life insurance companies. The federal government plays an

active role in the mortgage market via the three government agencies—the Federal

National Mortgage Association (FNMA, “Fannie Mae”), the Government National

Mortgage Association (GNMA, “Ginnie Mae”), and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage

Corporation (FHLMC, “Freddie Mac”)—that provide funds to the mortgage market

by selling bonds and using the proceeds to buy mortgages. An important development

in the residential mortgage market in recent years is the mortgage-backed security

(see Box 1).

Financial Market Instruments 5

Box 1

Mortgage-Backed Securities

A major change in the residential mortgage market in

recent years has been the creation of an active secondary

market for mortgages. Because mortgages

have different terms and interest rates, they were not

sufficiently liquid to trade as securities on secondary

markets. To stimulate mortgage lending, in 1970 the

Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA,

called “Ginnie Mae”) developed the concept of a passthrough

mortgage-backed security when it began a program

in which it guaranteed interest and principal

payments on bundles of standardized mortgages.

Under this program, private financial institutions

such as savings and loans and commercial banks were

now able to gather a group of GNMA-guaranteed

mortgages into a bundle of, say, $1 million and then

sell this bundle as a security to a third party (usually

a large institutional investor such as a pension fund).

When individuals make their mortgage payments on

the GNMA-guaranteed mortgage to the financial

institution, the financial institution passes the payments

through to the owner of the security by sending

a check for the total of all the payments. Because

GNMA guarantees the payments, these pass-through

securities have a very low default risk and are very

popular, with amounts outstanding exceeding $500

billion.

Mortgage-backed securities are issued not only by

the government agencies, but also by private financial

institutions. Indeed, mortgage-backed securities have

been so successful that they have completely transformed

the residential mortgage market. Throughout

the 1970s, over 80% of residential mortgages were

owned outright by savings and loans, mutual savings

banks, and commercial banks. Now only one-third

are owned outright by these institutions, with twothirds

held as mortgage-backed securities.

Corporate Bonds. These are long-term bonds issued by corporations with very strong

credit ratings. The typical corporate bond sends the holder an interest payment twice

a year and pays off the face value when the bond matures. Some corporate bonds,

called convertible bonds, have the additional feature of allowing the holder to convert

them into a specified number of shares of stock at any time up to the maturity date.

This feature makes these convertible bonds more desirable to prospective purchasers

than bonds without it, and allows the corporation to reduce its interest payments,

because these bonds can increase in value if the price of the stock appreciates sufficiently.

Because the outstanding amount of both convertible and nonconvertible

bonds for any given corporation is small, they are not nearly as liquid as other securities

such as U.S. government bonds.

Although the size of the corporate bond market is substantially smaller than that

of the stock market, with the amount of corporate bonds outstanding less than onefourth

that of stocks, the volume of new corporate bonds issued each year is substantially

greater than the volume of new stock issues. Thus the behavior of the

corporate bond market is probably far more important to a firm’s financing decisions

than the behavior of the stock market. The principal buyers of corporate bonds are

life insurance companies; pension funds and households are other large holders.

U.S. Government Securities. These long-term debt instruments are issued by the U.S.

Treasury to finance the deficits of the federal government. Because they are the most

widely traded bonds in the United States (the volume of transactions on average

exceeds $100 billion daily), they are the most liquid security traded in the capital

market. They are held by the Federal Reserve, banks, households, and foreigners.

U.S. Government Agency Securities. These are long-term bonds issued by various government

agencies such as Ginnie Mae, the Federal Farm Credit Bank, and the

Tennessee Valley Authority to finance such items as mortgages, farm loans, or powergenerating

equipment. Many of these securities are guaranteed by the federal government.

They function much like U.S. government bonds and are held by similar

parties.

State and Local Government Bonds. State and local bonds, also called municipal bonds,

are long-term debt instruments issued by state and local governments to finance

expenditures on schools, roads, and other large programs. An important feature of

these bonds is that their interest payments are exempt from federal income tax and

generally from state taxes in the issuing state. Commercial banks, with their high

income tax rate, are the biggest buyers of these securities, owning over half the total

amount outstanding. The next biggest group of holders consists of wealthy individuals

in high income brackets, followed by insurance companies.

Consumer and Bank Commercial Loans. These are loans to consumers and businesses

made principally by banks, but—in the case of consumer loans—also by finance companies.

There are often no secondary markets in these loans, which makes them the

least liquid of the capital market instruments listed in Table 2. However, secondary

markets have been rapidly developing.

6 Appendix to Chapter 2

44

PREVIEW If you had lived in America before the Revolutionary War, your money might have

consisted primarily of Spanish doubloons (silver coins that were also called pieces of

eight). Before the Civil War, the principal forms of money in the United States were

not only gold and silver coins but also paper notes, called banknotes, issued by private

banks. Today, you use not only coins and dollar bills issued by the government as

money, but also checks written on accounts held at banks. Money has been different

things at different times; however, it has always been important to people and to the

economy.

To understand the effects of money on the economy, we must understand exactly

what money is. In this chapter, we develop precise definitions by exploring the functions

of money, looking at why and how it promotes economic efficiency, tracing how

its forms have evolved over time, and examining how money is currently measured.

Meaning of Money

As the word money is used in everyday conversation, it can mean many things, but to

economists, it has a very specific meaning. To avoid confusion, we must clarify how

economists’ use of the word money differs from conventional usage.

Economists define money (also referred to as the money supply) as anything that is

generally accepted in payment for goods or services or in the repayment of debts.

Currency, consisting of dollar bills and coins, clearly fits this definition and is one type

of money. When most people talk about money, they’re talking about currency (paper

money and coins). If, for example, someone comes up to you and says, “Your money

or your life,” you should quickly hand over all your currency rather than ask, “What

exactly do you mean by ‘money’?”

To define money merely as currency is much too narrow for economists. Because

checks are also accepted as payment for purchases, checking account deposits are

considered money as well. An even broader definition of money is often needed,

because other items such as savings deposits can in effect function as money if they

can be quickly and easily converted into currency or checking account deposits. As

you can see, there is no single, precise definition of money or the money supply, even

for economists.

Chap ter

3 What Is Money?

To complicate matters further, the word money is frequently used synonymously

with wealth. When people say, “Joe is rich—he has an awful lot of money,” they probably

mean that Joe has not only a lot of currency and a high balance in his checking

account but has also stocks, bonds, four cars, three houses, and a yacht. Thus while

“currency” is too narrow a definition of money, this other popular usage is much too

broad. Economists make a distinction between money in the form of currency,

demand deposits, and other items that are used to make purchases and wealth, the

total collection of pieces of property that serve to store value. Wealth includes not

only money but also other assets such as bonds, common stock, art, land, furniture,

cars, and houses.

People also use the word money to describe what economists call income, as in the

sentence “Sheila would be a wonderful catch; she has a good job and earns a lot of

money.” Income is a flow of earnings per unit of time. Money, by contrast, is a stock:

It is a certain amount at a given point in time. If someone tells you that he has an

income of $1,000, you cannot tell whether he earned a lot or a little without knowing

whether this $1,000 is earned per year, per month, or even per day. But if someone

tells you that she has $1,000 in her pocket, you know exactly how much this is.

Keep in mind that the money discussed in this book refers to anything that is generally

accepted in payment for goods and services or in the repayment of debts and is

distinct from income and wealth.

Functions of Money

Whether money is shells or rocks or gold or paper, it has three primary functions in

any economy: as a medium of exchange, as a unit of account, and as a store of value.

Of the three functions, its function as a medium of exchange is what distinguishes

money from other assets such as stocks, bonds, and houses.

In almost all market transactions in our economy, money in the form of currency or

checks is a medium of exchange; it is used to pay for goods and services. The use of

money as a medium of exchange promotes economic efficiency by minimizing the

time spent in exchanging goods and services. To see why, let’s look at a barter economy,

one without money, in which goods and services are exchanged directly for other

goods and services.

Take the case of Ellen the Economics Professor, who can do just one thing well:

give brilliant economics lectures. In a barter economy, if Ellen wants to eat, she must

find a farmer who not only produces the food she likes but also wants to learn economics.

As you might expect, this search will be difficult and time-consuming, and

Ellen might spend more time looking for such an economics-hungry farmer than she

will teaching. It is even possible that she will have to quit lecturing and go into farming

herself. Even so, she may still starve to death.

The time spent trying to exchange goods or services is called a transaction cost. In

a barter economy, transaction costs are high because people have to satisfy a “double

coincidence of wants”—they have to find someone who has a good or service they

want and who also wants the good or service they have to offer.

Medium of

Exchange

C H A P T E R 3 What Is Money? 45

Let’s see what happens if we introduce money into Ellen the Economics

Professor’s world. Ellen can teach anyone who is willing to pay money to hear her lecture.

She can then go to any farmer (or his representative at the supermarket) and buy

the food she needs with the money she has been paid. The problem of the double

coincidence of wants is avoided, and Ellen saves a lot of time, which she may spend

doing what she does best: teaching.

As this example shows, money promotes economic efficiency by eliminating

much of the time spent exchanging goods and services. It also promotes efficiency by

allowing people to specialize in what they do best. Money is therefore essential in an

economy: It is a lubricant that allows the economy to run more smoothly by lowering

transaction costs, thereby encouraging specialization and the division of labor.

The need for money is so strong that almost every society beyond the most primitive

invents it. For a commodity to function effectively as money, it has to meet several

criteria: (1) It must be easily standardized, making it simple to ascertain its value;

(2) it must be widely accepted; (3) it must be divisible, so that it is easy to “make

change”; (4) it must be easy to carry; and (5) it must not deteriorate quickly. Forms

of money that have satisfied these criteria have taken many unusual forms throughout

human history, ranging from wampum (strings of beads) used by Native

Americans, to tobacco and whiskey, used by the early American colonists, to cigarettes,

used in prisoner-of-war camps during World War II.1 The diversity of forms of

money that have been developed over the years is as much a testament to the inventiveness

of the human race as the development of tools and language.

The second role of money is to provide a unit of account; that is, it is used to measure

value in the economy. We measure the value of goods and services in terms of money,

just as we measure weight in terms of pounds or distance in terms of miles. To see why

this function is important, let’s look again at a barter economy where money does not

perform this function. If the economy has only three goods—say, peaches, economics

lectures, and movies—then we need to know only three prices to tell us how to

exchange one for another: the price of peaches in terms of economics lectures (that is,

how many economics lectures you have to pay for a peach), the price of peaches in

terms of movies, and the price of economics lectures in terms of movies. If there were

ten goods, we would need to know 45 prices in order to exchange one good for another;

with 100 goods, we would need 4,950 prices; and with 1,000 goods, 499,500 prices.2

Imagine how hard it would be in a barter economy to shop at a supermarket with

1,000 different items on its shelves, having to decide whether chicken or fish is a better

buy if the price of a pound of chicken were quoted as 4 pounds of butter and the

price of a pound of fish as 8 pounds of tomatoes. To make it possible to compare

Unit of Account

46 PA RT I Introduction

1An extremely entertaining article on the development of money in a prisoner-of-war camp during

World War II is R. A. Radford, “The Economic Organization of a P.O.W. Camp,” Economica 12 (November

1945): 189–201.

2The formula for telling us the number of prices we need when we have N goods is the same formula that tells

us the number of pairs when there are N items. It is

In the case of ten goods, for example, we would need

10(10 1)

2

90

2

45

N(N 1)

2

prices, the tag on each item would have to list up to 999 different prices, and the time

spent reading them would result in very high transaction costs.

The solution to the problem is to introduce money into the economy and have all

prices quoted in terms of units of that money, enabling us to quote the price of economics

lectures, peaches, and movies in terms of, say, dollars. If there were only three

goods in the economy, this would not be a great advantage over the barter system,

because we would still need three prices to conduct transactions. But for ten goods

we now need only ten prices; for 100 goods, 100 prices; and so on. At the 1,000-good

supermarket, there are now only 1,000 prices to look at, not 499,500!

We can see that using money as a unit of account reduces transaction costs in an

economy by reducing the number of prices that need to be considered. The benefits

of this function of money grow as the economy becomes more complex.

Money also functions as a store of value; it is a repository of purchasing power over

time. A store of value is used to save purchasing power from the time income is

received until the time it is spent. This function of money is useful, because most of

us do not want to spend our income immediately upon receiving it, but rather prefer

to wait until we have the time or the desire to shop.

Money is not unique as a store of value; any asset—whether money, stocks,

bonds, land, houses, art, or jewelry—can be used to store wealth. Many such assets

have advantages over money as a store of value: They often pay the owner a higher

interest rate than money, experience price appreciation, and deliver services such as

providing a roof over one’s head. If these assets are a more desirable store of value than

money, why do people hold money at all?

The answer to this question relates to the important economic concept of

liquidity, the relative ease and speed with which an asset can be converted into a

medium of exchange. Liquidity is highly desirable. Money is the most liquid asset of

all because it is the medium of exchange; it does not have to be converted into anything

else in order to make purchases. Other assets involve transaction costs when

they are converted into money. When you sell your house, for example, you have to

pay a brokerage commission (usually 5% to 7% of the sales price), and if you need

cash immediately to pay some pressing bills, you might have to settle for a lower price

in order to sell the house quickly. Because money is the most liquid asset, people are

willing to hold it even if it is not the most attractive store of value.

How good a store of value money is depends on the price level, because its value

is fixed in terms of the price level. A doubling of all prices, for example, means that

the value of money has dropped by half; conversely, a halving of all prices means that

the value of money has doubled. During inflation, when the price level is increasing

rapidly, money loses value rapidly, and people will be more reluctant to hold their

wealth in this form. This is especially true during periods of extreme inflation, known

as hyperinflation, in which the inflation rate exceeds 50% per month.

Hyperinflation occurred in Germany after World War I, with inflation rates sometimes

exceeding 1,000% per month. By the end of the hyperinflation in 1923, the

price level had risen to more than 30 billion times what it had been just two years

before. The quantity of money needed to purchase even the most basic items became

excessive. There are stories, for example, that near the end of the hyperinflation, a

wheelbarrow of cash would be required to pay for a loaf of bread. Money was losing

its value so rapidly that workers were paid and given time off several times during the

day to spend their wages before the money became worthless. No one wanted to hold

Store of Value

C H A P T E R 3 What Is Money? 47

on to money, and so the use of money to carry out transactions declined and barter

became more and more dominant. Transaction costs skyrocketed, and as we would

expect, output in the economy fell sharply.

Evolution of the Payments System

We can obtain a better picture of the functions of money and the forms it has taken

over time by looking at the evolution of the payments system, the method of conducting

transactions in the economy. The payments system has been evolving over

centuries, and with it the form of money. At one point, precious metals such as gold

were used as the principal means of payment and were the main form of money. Later,

paper assets such as checks and currency began to be used in the payments system

and viewed as money. Where the payments system is heading has an important bearing

on how money will be defined in the future.

To obtain perspective on where the payments system is heading, it is worth exploring

how it has evolved. For any object to function as money, it must be universally acceptable;

everyone must be willing to take it in payment for goods and services. An object

that clearly has value to everyone is a likely candidate to serve as money, and a natural

choice is a precious metal such as gold or silver. Money made up of precious metals

or another valuable commodity is called commodity money, and from ancient

times until several hundred years ago, commodity money functioned as the medium

of exchange in all but the most primitive societies. The problem with a payments system

based exclusively on precious metals is that such a form of money is very heavy

and is hard to transport from one place to another. Imagine the holes you’d wear in

your pockets if you had to buy things only with coins! Indeed, for large purchases

such as a house, you’d have to rent a truck to transport the money payment.

The next development in the payments system was paper currency (pieces of paper

that function as a medium of exchange). Initially, paper currency carried a guarantee

that it was convertible into coins or into a quantity of precious metal. However, currency

has evolved into fiat money, paper currency decreed by governments as legal

tender (meaning that legally it must be accepted as payment for debts) but not convertible

into coins or precious metal. Paper currency has the advantage of being much

lighter than coins or precious metal, but it can be accepted as a medium of exchange

only if there is some trust in the authorities who issue it and if printing has reached a

sufficiently advanced stage that counterfeiting is extremely difficult. Because paper

currency has evolved into a legal arrangement, countries can change the currency that

they use at will. Indeed, this is currently a hot topic of debate in Europe, which has

adopted a unified currency (see Box 1).

Major drawbacks of paper currency and coins are that they are easily stolen and

can be expensive to transport in large amounts because of their bulk. To combat this

problem, another step in the evolution of the payments system occurred with the

development of modern banking: the invention of checks.

A check is an instruction from you to your bank to transfer money from your account

to someone else’s account when she deposits the check. Checks allow transactions to

Checks

Fiat Money

Commodity

Money

48 PA RT I Introduction

www.federalreserve

.gov/paymentsys.htm

This site reports on the Federal

Reserve’s policies regarding

payments systems.

take place without the need to carry around large amounts of currency. The introduction

of checks was a major innovation that improved the efficiency of the payments

system. Frequently, payments made back and forth cancel each other; without checks,

this would involve the movement of a lot of currency. With checks, payments that cancel

each other can be settled by canceling the checks, and no currency need be moved.

The use of checks thus reduces the transportation costs associated with the payments

system and improves economic efficiency. Another advantage of checks is that they can

be written for any amount up to the balance in the account, making transactions for

large amounts much easier. Checks are also advantageous in that loss from theft is

greatly reduced, and because they provide convenient receipts for purchases.

There are, however, two problems with a payments system based on checks. First,

it takes time to get checks from one place to another, a particularly serious problem

if you are paying someone in a different location who needs to be paid quickly. In

addition, if you have a checking account, you know that it usually takes several business

days before a bank will allow you to make use of the funds from a check you

have deposited. If your need for cash is urgent, this feature of paying by check can be

C H A P T E R 3 What Is Money? 49

Box 1: Global

Birth of the Euro: Will It Benefit Europe?

As part of the December 1991 Maastricht Treaty on

European Union, the European Economic Commission

outlined a plan to achieve the creation of a single

European currency starting in 1999. Despite concerns,

the new common currency—the euro—came

into existence right on schedule in January 1999,

with 11 of the 15 European Union countries participating

in the monetary union: Austria, Belgium,

Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg,

the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Denmark,

Sweden, and the United Kingdom chose not to participate

initially, and Greece failed to meet the economic

criteria specified by the Maastricht Treaty

(such as having a budget deficit less than 3% of GDP

and total government debt less than 60% of GDP) but

was able to join later.

Starting January 1, 1999, the exchange rates of

countries entering the monetary union were fixed permanently

to the euro (which became a unit of account),

the European Central Bank took over monetary policy

from the individual national central banks, and the

governments of the member countries began to issue

debt in euros. In early 2002, euro notes and coins

began to circulate and by June 2002, the old national

currencies were phased out completely, so that only

euros could be used in the member countries.

Advocates of monetary union point out the advantages

that the single currency has in eliminating the

transaction costs incurred in exchanging one currency

for another. In addition, the use of a single currency

may promote further integration of the European

economies and enhance competition. Skeptics who

think that monetary union may be bad for Europe

suggest that because labor will not be very mobile

across national boundaries and because fiscal transfers

(i.e., tax income from one region being spent on

another) from better-performing regions to worseperforming

regions will not take place as occurs in the

United States, a single currency may lead to some

regions of Europe being depressed for substantial

periods of time while other regions are booming.

Whether the euro will be good for the economies

of Europe and increase their GDP is an open question.

However, the motive behind monetary union was

probably more political than economic. European

monetary union may encourage political union, producing

a unified Europe that can play a stronger economic

and political role on the world stage.

frustrating. Second, all the paper shuffling required to process checks is costly; it is

estimated that it currently costs over $10 billion per year to process all the checks

written in the United States.

The development of inexpensive computers and the spread of the Internet now make

it cheap to pay bills electronically. In the past, you had to pay your bills by mailing a

check, but now banks provide a web site in which you just log on, make a few clicks,

and thereby transmit your payment electronically. Not only do you save the cost of

the stamp, but paying bills becomes (almost) a pleasure, requiring little effort.

Electronic payment systems provided by banks now even spare you the step of logging

on to pay the bill. Instead, recurring bills can be automatically deducted from

your bank account. Estimated cost savings when a bill is paid electronically rather

than by a check exceed one dollar. Electronic payment is thus becoming far more

common in the United States, but Americans lag considerably behind Europeans, particularly

Scandinavians, in their use of electronic payments (see Box 2).

Electronic

Payment

50 PA RT I Introduction

Why Are Scandinavians So Far Ahead of Americans in Using Electronic Payments?

Americans are the biggest users of checks in the

world. Close to 100 billion checks are written every

year in the United States, and over three-quarters of

noncash transactions are conducted with paper. In

contrast, in most countries of Europe, more than

two-thirds of noncash transactions are electronic,

with Finland and Sweden having the greatest proportion

of online banking customers of any countries in

the world. Indeed, if you were Finnish or Swedish,

instead of writing a check, you would be far more

likely to pay your bills online, using a personal computer

or even a mobile phone. Why do Europeans

and especially Scandinavians so far outpace Americans

in the use of electronic payments?

First, Europeans got used to making payments

without checks even before the advent of the personal

computer. Europeans have long made use of so-called

giro payments, in which banks and post offices transfer

funds for customers to pay bills. Second,

Europeans—and particularly Scandinavians—are

much greater users of mobile phones and the Internet

than are Americans. Finland has the highest per capita

use of mobile phones in the world, and Finland and

Sweden lead the world in the percentage of the population

that accesses the Internet. Maybe these usage

patterns stem from the low population densities of

these countries and the cold and dark winters that

keep Scandinavians inside at their PCs. For their part,

Scandinavians would rather take the view that their

high-tech culture is the product of their good education

systems and the resulting high degree of computer

literacy, the presence of top technology

companies such as Finland’s Nokia and Sweden’s

Ericsson, and government policies promoting the

increased use of personal computers, such as Sweden’s

tax incentives for companies to provide their employees

with home computers. The wired populations of

Finland and Sweden are (percentage-wise) the biggest

users of online banking in the world.

Americans are clearly behind the curve in their use

of electronic payments, which has imposed a high

cost on the U.S. economy. Switching from checks to

electronic payments might save the U.S. economy

tens of billions of dollars per year, according to some

estimates. Indeed, the U.S. federal government is trying

to switch all its payments to electronic ones by

directly depositing them into bank accounts, in order

to reduce its expenses. Can Americans be weaned

from paper checks and fully embrace the world of

high-tech electronic payments?

Box 2: E-Finance

Electronic payments technology can not only substitute for checks, but can substitute

for cash, as well, in the form of electronic money (or e-money), money that exists

only in electronic form. The first form of e-money was the debit card. Debit cards,

which look like credit cards, enable consumers to purchase goods and services by

electronically transferring funds directly from their bank accounts to a merchant’s

account. Debit cards are used in many of the same places that accept credit cards and

are now often becoming faster to use than cash. At most supermarkets, for example,

you can swipe your debit card through the card reader at the checkout station, press

a button, and the amount of your purchases is deducted from your bank account.

Most banks and companies such as Visa and MasterCard issue debit cards, and your

ATM card typically can function as a debit card.

A more advanced form of e-money is the stored-value card. The simplest form of

stored-value card is purchased for a preset dollar amount that the consumer pays up

front, like a prepaid phone card. The more sophisticated stored-value card is known

as a smart card. It contains a computer chip that allows it to be loaded with digital

cash from the owner’s bank account whenever needed. Smart cards can be loaded

from ATM machines, personal computers with a smart card reader, or specially

equipped telephones.

A third form of electronic money is often referred to as e-cash, which is used on

the Internet to purchase goods or services. A consumer gets e-cash by setting up an

account with a bank that has links to the Internet and then has the e-cash transferred

to her PC. When she wants to buy something with e-cash, she surfs to a store on the

Web and clicks the “buy” option for a particular item, whereupon the e-cash is automatically

transferred from her computer to the merchant’s computer. The merchant

can then have the funds transferred from the consumer’s bank account to his before

the goods are shipped.

Given the convenience of e-money, you might think that we would move quickly

to the cashless society in which all payments were made electronically. However, this

hasn’t happened, as discussed in Box 3.

Measuring Money

The definition of money as anything that is generally accepted in payment for goods

and services tells us that money is defined by people’s behavior. What makes an asset

money is that people believe it will be accepted by others when making payment. As

we have seen, many different assets have performed this role over the centuries, ranging

from gold to paper currency to checking accounts. For that reason, this behavioral

definition does not tell us exactly what assets in our economy should be considered

money. To measure money, we need a precise definition that tells us exactly what

assets should be included.

The Federal Reserve System (the Fed), the central banking authority responsible for

monetary policy in the United States, has conducted many studies on how to measure

money. The problem of measuring money has recently become especially crucial

because extensive financial innovation has produced new types of assets that might

properly belong in a measure of money. Since 1980, the Fed has modified its measures

of money several times and has settled on the following measures of the money

The Federal

Reserve’s

Monetary

Aggregates

E-Money

C H A P T E R 3 What Is Money? 51

supply, which are also referred to as monetary aggregates (see Table 1 and the

Following the Financial News box).

The narrowest measure of money that the Fed reports is M1, which includes currency,

checking account deposits, and traveler’s checks. These assets are clearly

money, because they can be used directly as a medium of exchange. Until the mid-

1970s, only commercial banks were permitted to establish checking accounts, and

they were not allowed to pay interest on them. With the financial innovation that has

occurred (discussed more extensively in Chapter 9), regulations have changed so that

other types of banks, such as savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks,

and credit unions, can also offer checking accounts. In addition, banking institutions

can offer other checkable deposits, such as NOW (negotiated order of withdrawal)

accounts and ATS (automatic transfer from savings) accounts, that do pay interest on

their balances. Table 1 lists the assets included in the measures of the monetary aggregates;

both demand deposits (checking accounts that pay no interest) and these other

checkable deposits are included in the M1 measure.

The M2 monetary aggregate adds to M1 other assets that have check-writing features

(money market deposit accounts and money market mutual fund shares) and

other assets (savings deposits, small-denomination time deposits and repurchase

agreements) that are extremely liquid, because they can be turned into cash quickly

at very little cost.

52 PA RT I Introduction

Are We Headed for a Cashless Society?

Predictions of a cashless society have been around for

decades, but they have not come to fruition. For

example, Business Week predicted in 1975 that electronic

means of payment “would soon revolutionize

the very concept of money itself,” only to reverse

itself several years later. Pilot projects in recent years

with smart cards to convert consumers to the use of

e-money have not been a success. Mondex, one of the

widely touted, early stored-value cards that was

launched in Britain in 1995, is only used on a few

British university campuses. In Germany and

Belgium, millions of people carry bank cards with

computer chips embedded in them that enable them

to make use of e-money, but very few use them. Why

has the movement to a cashless society been so slow

in coming?

Although e-money might be more convenient and

may be more efficient than a payments system based

on paper, several factors work against the disappearance

of the paper system. First, it is very expensive to

set up the computer, card reader, and telecommunications

networks necessary to make electronic money

the dominant form of payment. Second, electronic

means of payment raise security and privacy concerns.

We often hear media reports that an unauthorized

hacker has been able to access a computer

database and to alter information stored there.

Because this is not an uncommon occurrence,

unscrupulous persons might be able to access bank

accounts in electronic payments systems and steal

funds by moving them from someone else’s accounts

into their own. The prevention of this type of fraud is

no easy task, and a whole new field of computer science

has developed to cope with security issues. A

further concern is that the use of electronic means of

payment leaves an electronic trail that contains a large

amount of personal data on buying habits. There are

worries that government, employers, and marketers

might be able to access these data, thereby encroaching

on our privacy.

The conclusion from this discussion is that

although the use of e-money will surely increase in

the future, to paraphrase Mark Twain, “the reports of

cash’s death are greatly exaggerated.”

Box 3: E-Finance

www.federalreserve

.gov/releases/h6/Current/

The Federal Reserve reports the

current levels of M1, M2, and

M3 on its web site.

The M3 monetary aggregate adds to M2 somewhat less liquid assets such as largedenomination

time deposits and repurchase agreements, Eurodollars, and institutional

money market mutual fund shares.

Because we cannot be sure which of the monetary aggregates is the true measure of

money, it is logical to wonder if their movements closely parallel one another. If they do,

then using one monetary aggregate to predict future economic performance and to conduct

policy will be the same as using another, and it does not matter much that we are

not sure of the appropriate definition of money for a given policy decision. However, if

the monetary aggregates do not move together, then what one monetary aggregate tells

us is happening to the money supply might be quite different from what another monetary

aggregate would tell us. The conflicting stories might present a confusing picture

that would make it hard for policymakers to decide on the right course of action.

Figure 1 plots the growth rates M1, M2, and M3 from 1960 to 2002. The growth

rates of these three monetary aggregates do tend to move together; the timing of their

rise and fall is roughly similar until the 1990s, and they all show a higher growth rate

on average in the 1970s than in the 1960s.

Yet some glaring discrepancies exist in the movements of these aggregates.

According to M1, the growth rate of money did not accelerate between 1968, when it

C H A P T E R 3 What Is Money? 53

Value as of December 2002

($billions)

M1 Currency 626.5

Traveler’s checks 7.7

Demand deposits 290.7

Other checkable deposits 281.2

Total M1 1,206.1

M2 M1

Small-denomination time deposits and repurchase agreements 1,332.3

Savings deposits and money market deposit accounts 2,340.4

Money market mutual fund shares (noninstitutional) 923.7

Total M2 5,802.5

M3 M2

Large-denomination time deposits and repurchase agreements 1,105.2

Money market mutual fund shares (institutional) 767.7

Repurchase agreements 511.7

Eurodollars 341.1

Total M3 8,528.2

Source: www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/hist.

Note: The Travelers checks item includes only traveler’s checks issued by non-banks, while traveler’s checks issued by banks are included

in the Demand deposits item, which also includes checkable deposits to businesses and which also do not pay interest.

Table 1 Measures of the Monetary Aggregates

54 PA RT I Introduction

Source: Wall Street Journal, Friday, January 3, 2003, p. C10.

F E D E R A L R E S E R V E DATA

MONETARY AGGREGATES

(daily average in billions)

1 Week Ended:

Dec. 23 Dec. 16

Money supply (M1) sa . . . 1227.1 1210.1

Money supply (M1) nsa . . . 1256.0 1214.9

Money supply (M2) sa . . . 5822.7 5811.3

Money supply (M2) nsa . . . 5834.5 5853.9

Money supply (M3) sa . . . 8542.8 8549.2

Money supply (M3) nsa . . . 8572.6 8623.0

4 Weeks Ended:

Dec. 23 Nov. 25

Money supply (M1) sa . . . 1218.3 1197.5

Money supply (M1) nsa . . . 1230.9 1195.9

Money supply (M2) sa . . . 5815.5 5795.8

Money supply (M2) nsa . . . 5835.7 5780.7

Money supply (M3) sa . . . 8543.4 8465.4

Money supply (M3) nsa . . . 8578.1 8440.5

Month

Nov. Oct.

Money supply (M1) sa . . . 1200.7 1199.6

Money supply (M2) sa . . . 5800.7 5753.8

Money supply (M3) sa . . . 8485.2 8348.4

nsa-Not seasonally adjusted

sa-Seasonally adjusted.

Following the Financial News

Data for the Federal Reserve’s monetary aggregates (M1,

M2, and M3) are published every Friday. In the Wall

Street Journal, the data are found in the “Federal Reserve

Data” column, an example of which is presented here.

The third entry indicates that the money supply

(M2) averaged $5,822.7 billion for the week ending

December 23, 2002. The notation “sa” for this entry

indicates that the data are seasonally adjusted; that is,

seasonal movements, such as those associated with

Christmas shopping, have been removed from the

data. The notation “nsa” indicates that the data have

not been seasonally adjusted.

The Monetary Aggregates

FIGURE 1 Growth Rates of the Three Money Aggregates, 1960–2002

Sources: Federal Reserve Bulletin, p. A4, Table 1.10, various issues; Citibase databank; www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/hist/h6hist1.txt.

-5

0

-10

Annual

Growth Rate (%)

5

10

15

20

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

M3 M2 M1

was in the 6–7% range, and 1971, when it was at a similar level. In the same period,

the M2 and M3 measures tell a different story; they show a marked acceleration from

the 8–10% range to the 12–15% range. Similarly, while the growth rate of M1 actually

increased from 1989 to 1992, the growth rates of M2 and M3 in this same period

instead showed a downward trend. Furthermore, from 1992 to 1998, the growth rate

of M1 fell sharply while the growth rates of M2 and M3 rose substantially; from 1998

to 2002, M1 growth generally remained well below M2 and M3 growth. Thus, the different

measures of money tell a very different story about the course of monetary policy

in recent years.

From the data in Figure 1, you can see that obtaining a single precise, correct measure

of money does seem to matter and that it does make a difference which monetary

aggregate policymakers and economists choose as the true measure of money.

How Reliable Are the Money Data?

The difficulties of measuring money arise not only because it is hard to decide what

is the best definition of money, but also because the Fed frequently later revises earlier

estimates of the monetary aggregates by large amounts. There are two reasons why

the Fed revises its figures. First, because small depository institutions need to report

the amounts of their deposits only infrequently, the Fed has to estimate these amounts

until these institutions provide the actual figures at some future date. Second, the

adjustment of the data for seasonal variation is revised substantially as more data

become available. To see why this happens, let’s look at an example of the seasonal

variation of the money data around Christmas-time. The monetary aggregates always

rise around Christmas because of increased spending during the holiday season; the

rise is greater in some years than in others. This means that the factor that adjusts the

data for the seasonal variation due to Christmas must be estimated from several years

of data, and the estimates of this seasonal factor become more precise only as more

data become available. When the data on the monetary aggregates are revised, the seasonal

adjustments often change dramatically from the initial calculation.

Table 2 shows how severe a problem these data revisions can be. It provides the

rates of money growth from one-month periods calculated from initial estimates of

the M2 monetary aggregate, along with the rates of money growth calculated from a

major revision of the M2 numbers published in February 2003. As the table shows,

for one-month periods the initial versus the revised data can give a different picture

of what is happening to monetary policy. For January 2003, for example, the initial

data indicated that the growth rate of M2 at an annual rate was 2.2%, whereas the

revised data indicate a much higher growth rate of 5.4%.

A distinctive characteristic shown in Table 2 is that the differences between the

initial and revised M2 series tend to cancel out. You can see this by looking at the last

row of the table, which shows the average rate of M2 growth for the two series and

the average difference between them. The average M2 growth for the initial calculation

of M2 is 6.5%, and the revised number is 6.5%, a difference of 0.0%. The conclusion

we can draw is that the initial data on the monetary aggregates reported by

the Fed are not a reliable guide to what is happening to short-run movements in the

money supply, such as the one-month growth rates. However, the initial money data

are reasonably reliable for longer periods, such as a year. The moral is that we probably

should not pay much attention to short-run movements in the money supply

numbers, but should be concerned only with longer-run movements.

C H A P T E R 3 What Is Money? 55

56 PA RT I Introduction

Initial Revised Difference

Period Rate Rate (Revised Rate – Initial Rate)

January 2.2 5.4 3.2

February 6.8 8.7 1.9

March –1.4 0.2 1.6

April –4.0 –2.6 1.4

May 14.8 15.4 0.6

June 7.6 7.1 –0.5

July 13.6 11.0 –2.6

August 9.9 8.6 –1.3

September 5.1 5.7 0.6

October 10.9 8.3 –2.6

November 10.2 8.0 –2.2

December 2.8 2.8 0.0

Average 6.5 6.5 0.0

Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.6: www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6.

Table 2 Growth Rate of M2: Initial and Revised Series, 2002

(percent, compounded annual rate)

Summary

1. To economists, the word money has a different meaning

from income or wealth. Money is anything that is

generally accepted as payment for goods or services or

in the repayment of debts.

2. Money serves three primary functions: as a medium of

exchange, as a unit of account, and as a store of value.

Money as a medium of exchange avoids the problem of

double coincidence of wants that arises in a barter

economy by lowering transaction costs and

encouraging specialization and the division of labor.

Money as a unit of account reduces the number of

prices needed in the economy, which also reduces

transaction costs. Money also functions as a store of

value, but performs this role poorly if it is rapidly losing

value due to inflation.

3. The payments system has evolved over time. Until several

hundred years ago, the payments system in all but the

most primitive societies was based primarily on precious

metals. The introduction of paper currency lowered the

cost of transporting money. The next major advance was

the introduction of checks, which lowered transaction

costs still further. We are currently moving toward an

electronic payments system in which paper is eliminated

and all transactions are handled by computers. Despite

the potential efficiency of such a system, obstacles are

slowing the movement to the checkless society and the

development of new forms of electronic money.

4. The Federal Reserve System has defined three different

measures of the money supply—M1, M2, and M3.

These measures are not equivalent and do not always

move together, so they cannot be used interchangeably

by policymakers. Obtaining the precise, correct

measure of money does seem to matter and has

implications for the conduct of monetary policy.

5. Another problem in the measurement of money is that

the data are not always as accurate as we would like.

C H A P T E R 3 What Is Money? 57

Substantial revisions in the data do occur; they indicate

that initially released money data are not a reliable

guide to short-run (say, month-to-month) movements

in the money supply, although they are more reliable

over longer periods of time, such as a year.

Key Terms

commodity money, p. 48

currency, p. 44

e-cash, p. 51

electronic money (e-money), p. 51

fiat money, p. 48

hyperinflation, p. 47

income, p. 45

liquidity, p. 47

M1, p. 52

M2, p. 52

M3, p. 53

medium of exchange, p. 45

monetary aggregates, p. 52

payments system, p. 48

smart card, p. 51

store of value, p. 47

unit of account, p. 46

wealth, p. 45

Questions and Problems

Questions marked with an asterisk are answered at the end

of the book in an appendix, “Answers to Selected Questions

and Problems.”

1. Which of the following three expressions uses the

economists’ definition of money?

a. “How much money did you earn last week?”

b. “When I go to the store, I always make sure that I

have enough money.”

c. “The love of money is the root of all evil.”

*2. There are three goods produced in an economy by

three individuals:

Good Producer

Apples Orchard owner

Bananas Banana grower

Chocolate Chocolatier

If the orchard owner likes only bananas, the banana

grower likes only chocolate, and the chocolatier likes

only apples, will any trade between these three persons

take place in a barter economy? How will introducing

money into the economy benefit these three

producers?

3. Why did cavemen not need money?

*4. Why were people in the United States in the nineteenth

century sometimes willing to be paid by check

rather than with gold, even though they knew that

there was a possibility that the check might bounce?

5. In ancient Greece, why was gold a more likely candidate

for use as money than wine was?

*6. Was money a better store of value in the United States

in the 1950s than it was in the 1970s? Why or why

not? In which period would you have been more willing

to hold money?

7. Would you be willing to give up your checkbook and

instead use an electronic means of payment if it were

made available? Why or why not?

8. Rank the following assets from most liquid to least liquid:

a. Checking account deposits

b. Houses

c. Currency

d. Washing machines

e. Savings deposits

f. Common stock

*9. Why have some economists described money during a

hyperinflation as a “hot potato” that is quickly passed

from one person to another?

10. In Brazil, a country that was undergoing a rapid inflation

before 1994, many transactions were conducted

in dollars rather than in reals, the domestic currency.

Why?

QUIZ

*11. Suppose that a researcher discovers that a measure of

the total amount of debt in the U.S. economy over the

past 20 years was a better predictor of inflation and

the business cycle than M1, M2, or M3. Does this discovery

mean that we should define money as equal to

the total amount of debt in the economy?

12. Look up the M1, M2, and M3 numbers in the Federal

Reserve Bulletin for the most recent one-year period.

Have their growth rates been similar? What implications

do their growth rates have for the conduct of

monetary policy?

*13. Which of the Federal Reserve’s measures of the monetary

aggregates, M1, M2, or M3, is composed of the

most liquid assets? Which is the largest measure?

14. For each of the following assets, indicate which of the

monetary aggregates (M1, M2, M3) includes them:

a. Currency

b. Money market mutual funds

c. Eurodollars

d. Small-denomination time deposits

e. Large-denomination repurchase agreements

f. Checkable deposits

*15. Why are revisions of monetary aggregates less of a

problem for measuring long-run movements of the

money supply than they are for measuring short-run

movements?

58 PA RT I Introduction

Web Exercises

1. Go to www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/Current/.

a. What has been the growth rate in M1, M2, and M3

over the last 12 months?

b. From what you know about the state of the economy,

does this seem expansionary or restrictive?

2. Go to www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsys.htm and

select one topic on which the Federal Reserve has a

written policy. Write a one-paragraph summary of this

policy.

P a r t I I

Financial

Markets

PREVIEW Interest rates are among the most closely watched variables in the economy. Their

movements are reported almost daily by the news media, because they directly affect

our everyday lives and have important consequences for the health of the economy.

They affect personal decisions such as whether to consume or save, whether to buy a

house, and whether to purchase bonds or put funds into a savings account. Interest

rates also affect the economic decisions of businesses and households, such as

whether to use their funds to invest in new equipment for factories or to save their

money in a bank.

Before we can go on with the study of money, banking, and financial markets, we

must understand exactly what the phrase interest rates means. In this chapter, we see

that a concept known as the yield to maturity is the most accurate measure of interest

rates; the yield to maturity is what economists mean when they use the term interest

rate. We discuss how the yield to maturity is measured and examine alternative (but

less accurate) ways in which interest rates are quoted. We’ll also see that a bond’s

interest rate does not necessarily indicate how good an investment the bond is

because what it earns (its rate of return) does not necessarily equal its interest rate.

Finally, we explore the distinction between real interest rates, which are adjusted for

inflation, and nominal interest rates, which are not.

Although learning definitions is not always the most exciting of pursuits, it is

important to read carefully and understand the concepts presented in this chapter.

Not only are they continually used throughout the remainder of this text, but a firm

grasp of these terms will give you a clearer understanding of the role that interest rates

play in your life as well as in the general economy.

Measuring Interest Rates

Different debt instruments have very different streams of payment with very different

timing. Thus we first need to understand how we can compare the value of one kind

of debt instrument with another before we see how interest rates are measured. To do

this, we make use of the concept of present value.

The concept of present value (or present discounted value) is based on the commonsense

notion that a dollar paid to you one year from now is less valuable to you than

a dollar paid to you today: This notion is true because you can deposit a dollar in a

Present Value

61

Chap ter

4 Understanding Interest Rates

www.bloomberg.com

/markets/

Under “Rates & Bonds,” you

can access information on key

interest rates, U.S. Treasuries,

Government bonds, and

municipal bonds.

savings account that earns interest and have more than a dollar in one year.

Economists use a more formal definition, as explained in this section.

Let’s look at the simplest kind of debt instrument, which we will call a simple

loan. In this loan, the lender provides the borrower with an amount of funds (called

the principal) that must be repaid to the lender at the maturity date, along with an

additional payment for the interest. For example, if you made your friend, Jane, a simple

loan of $100 for one year, you would require her to repay the principal of $100

in one year’s time along with an additional payment for interest; say, $10. In the case

of a simple loan like this one, the interest payment divided by the amount of the loan

is a natural and sensible way to measure the interest rate. This measure of the socalled

simple interest rate, i, is:

If you make this $100 loan, at the end of the year you would have $110, which

can be rewritten as:

$100 (1 0.10) $110

If you then lent out the $110, at the end of the second year you would have:

$110 (1 0.10) $121

or, equivalently,

$100 (1 0.10) (1 0.10) $100 (1 0.10)2 $121

Continuing with the loan again, you would have at the end of the third year:

$121 (1 0.10) $100 (1 0.10)3 $133

Generalizing, we can see that at the end of n years, your $100 would turn into:

$100 (1 i )n

The amounts you would have at the end of each year by making the $100 loan today

can be seen in the following timeline:

This timeline immediately tells you that you are just as happy having $100 today

as having $110 a year from now (of course, as long as you are sure that Jane will pay

you back). Or that you are just as happy having $100 today as having $121 two years

from now, or $133 three years from now or $100 (1 0.10)n, n years from now.

The timeline tells us that we can also work backward from future amounts to the present:

for example, $133 $100 (1 0.10)3 three years from now is worth $100

today, so that:

The process of calculating today’s value of dollars received in the future, as we have

done above, is called discounting the future. We can generalize this process by writing

$100

$133

(1 0.10)3

$100 (1 0.10)n

Year

Today

0

$100 $110

Year

1

$121

Year

2

$133

Year

3

i

$10

$100

0.10 10%

62 PA RT I I Financial Markets

today’s (present) value of $100 as PV, the future value of $133 as FV, and replacing

0.10 (the 10% interest rate) by i. This leads to the following formula:

(1)

Intuitively, what Equation 1 tells us is that if you are promised $1 for certain ten

years from now, this dollar would not be as valuable to you as $1 is today because if

you had the $1 today, you could invest it and end up with more than $1 in ten years.

The concept of present value is extremely useful, because it allows us to figure

out today’s value (price) of a credit market instrument at a given simple interest rate

i by just adding up the individual present values of all the future payments received.

This information allows us to compare the value of two instruments with very different

timing of their payments.

As an example of how the present value concept can be used, let’s assume that

you just hit the $20 million jackpot in the New York State Lottery, which promises

you a payment of $1 million for the next twenty years. You are clearly excited, but

have you really won $20 million? No, not in the present value sense. In today’s dollars,

that $20 million is worth a lot less. If we assume an interest rate of 10% as in the

earlier examples, the first payment of $1 million is clearly worth $1 million today, but

the next payment next year is only worth $1 million/(1 0.10) $909,090, a lot less

than $1 million. The following year the payment is worth $1 million/(1 0.10)2

$826,446 in today’s dollars, and so on. When you add all these up, they come to $9.4

million. You are still pretty excited (who wouldn’t be?), but because you understand

the concept of present value, you recognize that you are the victim of false advertising.

You didn’t really win $20 million, but instead won less than half as much.

In terms of the timing of their payments, there are four basic types of credit market

instruments.

1. A simple loan, which we have already discussed, in which the lender provides

the borrower with an amount of funds, which must be repaid to the lender at the

maturity date along with an additional payment for the interest. Many money market

instruments are of this type: for example, commercial loans to businesses.

2. A fixed-payment loan (which is also called a fully amortized loan) in which the

lender provides the borrower with an amount of funds, which must be repaid by making

the same payment every period (such as a month), consisting of part of the principal

and interest for a set number of years. For example, if you borrowed $1,000, a

fixed-payment loan might require you to pay $126 every year for 25 years. Installment

loans (such as auto loans) and mortgages are frequently of the fixed-payment type.

3. A coupon bond pays the owner of the bond a fixed interest payment (coupon

payment) every year until the maturity date, when a specified final amount (face

value or par value) is repaid. The coupon payment is so named because the bondholder

used to obtain payment by clipping a coupon off the bond and sending it to

the bond issuer, who then sent the payment to the holder. Nowadays, it is no longer

necessary to send in coupons to receive these payments. A coupon bond with $1,000

face value, for example, might pay you a coupon payment of $100 per year for ten

years, and at the maturity date repay you the face value amount of $1,000. (The face

value of a bond is usually in $1,000 increments.)

A coupon bond is identified by three pieces of information. First is the corporation

or government agency that issues the bond. Second is the maturity date of the

Four Types of

Credit Market

Instruments

PV

FV

(1 i )n

C H A P T E R 4 Understanding Interest Rates 63

bond. Third is the bond’s coupon rate, the dollar amount of the yearly coupon payment

expressed as a percentage of the face value of the bond. In our example, the

coupon bond has a yearly coupon payment of $100 and a face value of $1,000. The

coupon rate is then $100/$1,000 0.10, or 10%. Capital market instruments such

as U.S. Treasury bonds and notes and corporate bonds are examples of coupon bonds.

4. A discount bond (also called a zero-coupon bond) is bought at a price below

its face value (at a discount), and the face value is repaid at the maturity date. Unlike

a coupon bond, a discount bond does not make any interest payments; it just pays off

the face value. For example, a discount bond with a face value of $1,000 might be

bought for $900; in a year’s time the owner would be repaid the face value of $1,000.

U.S. Treasury bills, U.S. savings bonds, and long-term zero-coupon bonds are examples

of discount bonds.

These four types of instruments require payments at different times: Simple loans

and discount bonds make payment only at their maturity dates, whereas fixed-payment

loans and coupon bonds have payments periodically until maturity. How would you

decide which of these instruments provides you with more income? They all seem so

different because they make payments at different times. To solve this problem, we use

the concept of present value, explained earlier, to provide us with a procedure for

measuring interest rates on these different types of instruments.

Of the several common ways of calculating interest rates, the most important is the

yield to maturity, the interest rate that equates the present value of payments

received from a debt instrument with its value today.1 Because the concept behind the

calculation of the yield to maturity makes good economic sense, economists consider

it the most accurate measure of interest rates.

To understand the yield to maturity better, we now look at how it is calculated

for the four types of credit market instruments.

Simple Loan. Using the concept of present value, the yield to maturity on a simple

loan is easy to calculate. For the one-year loan we discussed, today’s value is $100,

and the payments in one year’s time would be $110 (the repayment of $100 plus the

interest payment of $10). We can use this information to solve for the yield to maturity

i by recognizing that the present value of the future payments must equal today’s

value of a loan. Making today’s value of the loan ($100) equal to the present value of

the $110 payment in a year (using Equation 1) gives us:

Solving for i,

This calculation of the yield to maturity should look familiar, because it equals

the interest payment of $10 divided by the loan amount of $100; that is, it equals the

simple interest rate on the loan. An important point to recognize is that for simple

loans, the simple interest rate equals the yield to maturity. Hence the same term i is used

to denote both the yield to maturity and the simple interest rate.

i

$110 $100

$100

$10

$100

0.10 10%

$100

$110

1 i

Yield to Maturity

64 PA RT I I Financial Markets

1In other contexts, it is also called the internal rate of return.

Study Guide The key to understanding the calculation of the yield to maturity is equating today’s

value of the debt instrument with the present value of all of its future payments. The

best way to learn this principle is to apply it to other specific examples of the four types

of credit market instruments in addition to those we discuss here. See if you can develop

the equations that would allow you to solve for the yield to maturity in each case.

Fixed-Payment Loan. Recall that this type of loan has the same payment every period

throughout the life of the loan. On a fixed-rate mortgage, for example, the borrower

makes the same payment to the bank every month until the maturity date, when the

loan will be completely paid off. To calculate the yield to maturity for a fixed-payment

loan, we follow the same strategy we used for the simple loan—we equate today’s

value of the loan with its present value. Because the fixed-payment loan involves more

than one payment, the present value of the fixed-payment loan is calculated as the

sum of the present values of all payments (using Equation 1).

In the case of our earlier example, the loan is $1,000 and the yearly payment is

$126 for the next 25 years. The present value is calculated as follows: At the end of

one year, there is a $126 payment with a PV of $126/(1 i); at the end of two years,

there is another $126 payment with a PV of $126/(1 i)2; and so on until at the end

of the twenty-fifth year, the last payment of $126 with a PV of $126/(1 i)25 is made.

Making today’s value of the loan ($1,000) equal to the sum of the present values of all

the yearly payments gives us:

More generally, for any fixed-payment loan,

(2)

where LV loan value

FP fixed yearly payment

n number of years until maturity

For a fixed-payment loan amount, the fixed yearly payment and the number of

years until maturity are known quantities, and only the yield to maturity is not. So we

can solve this equation for the yield to maturity i. Because this calculation is not easy,

many pocket calculators have programs that allow you to find i given the loan’s numbers

for LV, FP, and n. For example, in the case of the 25-year loan with yearly payments

of $126, the yield to maturity that solves Equation 2 is 12%. Real estate brokers always

have a pocket calculator that can solve such equations so that they can immediately tell

the prospective house buyer exactly what the yearly (or monthly) payments will be if

the house purchase is financed by taking out a mortgage.2

Coupon Bond. To calculate the yield to maturity for a coupon bond, follow the same

strategy used for the fixed-payment loan: Equate today’s value of the bond with its

present value. Because coupon bonds also have more than one payment, the present

LV

FP

1 i

FP

(1 i )2

FP

(1 i )3 . . .

FP

(1 i )n

$1,000

$126

1 i

$126

(1 i )2

$126

(1 i )3 . . .

$126

(1 i )25

C H A P T E R 4 Understanding Interest Rates 65

2The calculation with a pocket calculator programmed for this purpose requires simply that you enter

the value of the loan LV, the number of years to maturity n, and the interest rate i and then run the program.

value of the bond is calculated as the sum of the present values of all the coupon payments

plus the present value of the final payment of the face value of the bond.

The present value of a $1,000-face-value bond with ten years to maturity and

yearly coupon payments of $100 (a 10% coupon rate) can be calculated as follows:

At the end of one year, there is a $100 coupon payment with a PV of $100/(1 i );

at the end of the second year, there is another $100 coupon payment with a PV of

$100/(1 i )2; and so on until at maturity, there is a $100 coupon payment with a

PV of $100/(1 i )10 plus the repayment of the $1,000 face value with a PV of

$1,000/(1 i )10. Setting today’s value of the bond (its current price, denoted by P)

equal to the sum of the present values of all the payments for this bond gives:

More generally, for any coupon bond,3

(3)

where P price of coupon bond

C yearly coupon payment

F face value of the bond

n years to maturity date

In Equation 3, the coupon payment, the face value, the years to maturity, and the

price of the bond are known quantities, and only the yield to maturity is not. Hence

we can solve this equation for the yield to maturity i. Just as in the case of the fixedpayment

loan, this calculation is not easy, so business-oriented pocket calculators

have built-in programs that solve this equation for you.4

Let’s look at some examples of the solution for the yield to maturity on our 10%-

coupon-rate bond that matures in ten years. If the purchase price of the bond is

$1,000, then either using a pocket calculator with the built-in program or looking at

a bond table, we will find that the yield to maturity is 10 percent. If the price is $900,

we find that the yield to maturity is 11.75%. Table 1 shows the yields to maturity calculated

for several bond prices.

P

C

1 i

C

(1 i )2

C

(1 i )3 . . .

C

(1 i )n

F

(1 i )n

P

$100

1 i

$100

(1 i )2

$100

(1 i )3 . . .

$100

(1 i )10

$1,000

(1 i )10

66 PA RT I I Financial Markets

3Most coupon bonds actually make coupon payments on a semiannual basis rather than once a year as assumed

here. The effect on the calculations is only very slight and will be ignored here.

4The calculation of a bond’s yield to maturity with the programmed pocket calculator requires simply that you

enter the amount of the yearly coupon payment C, the face value F, the number of years to maturity n, and the

price of the bond P and then run the program.

Price of Bond ($) Yield to Maturity (%)

1,200 7.13

1,100 8.48

1,000 10.00

900 11.75

800 13.81

Table 1 Yields to Maturity on a 10%-Coupon-Rate Bond Maturing in Ten

Years (Face Value = $1,000)

Three interesting facts are illustrated by Table 1:

1. When the coupon bond is priced at its face value, the yield to maturity equals the

coupon rate.

2. The price of a coupon bond and the yield to maturity are negatively related; that

is, as the yield to maturity rises, the price of the bond falls. As the yield to maturity

falls, the price of the bond rises.

3. The yield to maturity is greater than the coupon rate when the bond price is

below its face value.

These three facts are true for any coupon bond and are really not surprising if you

think about the reasoning behind the calculation of the yield to maturity. When you

put $1,000 in a bank account with an interest rate of 10%, you can take out $100 every

year and you will be left with the $1,000 at the end of ten years. This is similar to buying

the $1,000 bond with a 10% coupon rate analyzed in Table 1, which pays a $100

coupon payment every year and then repays $1,000 at the end of ten years. If the bond

is purchased at the par value of $1,000, its yield to maturity must equal 10%, which

is also equal to the coupon rate of 10%. The same reasoning applied to any coupon

bond demonstrates that if the coupon bond is purchased at its par value, the yield to

maturity and the coupon rate must be equal.

It is straightforward to show that the bond price and the yield to maturity are negatively

related. As i, the yield to maturity, rises, all denominators in the bond price formula

must necessarily rise. Hence a rise in the interest rate as measured by the yield

to maturity means that the price of the bond must fall. Another way to explain why

the bond price falls when the interest rises is that a higher interest rate implies that

the future coupon payments and final payment are worth less when discounted back

to the present; hence the price of the bond must be lower.

There is one special case of a coupon bond that is worth discussing because its

yield to maturity is particularly easy to calculate. This bond is called a consol or a perpetuity;

it is a perpetual bond with no maturity date and no repayment of principal

that makes fixed coupon payments of $C forever. Consols were first sold by the

British Treasury during the Napoleonic Wars and are still traded today; they are quite

rare, however, in American capital markets. The formula in Equation 3 for the price

of the consol P simplifies to the following:5

P (4)

C

C H A P T E R 4 Understanding Interest Rates 67

5The bond price formula for a consol is:

which can be written as:

in which x 1/(1 i). The formula for an infinite sum is:

and so:

which by suitable algebraic manipulation becomes:

P C 1 i

i

C

P C 1

1 x

1 C c 1

1 1(1 i )

1 d

1 x x 2 x 3 . . .

1

1 x

for x 1

P C (x x 2 x 3 . . . )

P

C

1 i

C

(1 i )2

C

(1 i )3 . . .

where P = price of the consol

C = yearly payment

One nice feature of consols is that you can immediately see that as i goes up, the

price of the bond falls. For example, if a consol pays $100 per year forever and the

interest rate is 10%, its price will be $1,000 $100/0.10. If the interest rate rises to

20%, its price will fall to $500 $100/0.20. We can also rewrite this formula as

(5)

We see then that it is also easy to calculate the yield to maturity for the consol

(despite the fact that it never matures). For example, with a consol that pays $100

yearly and has a price of $2,000, the yield to maturity is easily calculated to be 5%

( $100/$2,000).

Discount Bond. The yield-to-maturity calculation for a discount bond is similar to

that for the simple loan. Let us consider a discount bond such as a one-year U.S.

Treasury bill, which pays off a face value of $1,000 in one year’s time. If the current

purchase price of this bill is $900, then equating this price to the present value of the

$1,000 received in one year, using Equation 1, gives:

and solving for i,

More generally, for any one-year discount bond, the yield to maturity can be written

as:

(6)

where F face value of the discount bond

P current price of the discount bond

In other words, the yield to maturity equals the increase in price over the year

F – P divided by the initial price P. In normal circumstances, investors earn positive

returns from holding these securities and so they sell at a discount, meaning that the

current price of the bond is below the face value. Therefore, F – P should be positive,

and the yield to maturity should be positive as well. However, this is not always the

case, as recent extraordinary events in Japan indicate (see Box 1).

An important feature of this equation is that it indicates that for a discount bond,

the yield to maturity is negatively related to the current bond price. This is the same

conclusion that we reached for a coupon bond. For example, Equation 6 shows that

a rise in the bond price from $900 to $950 means that the bond will have a smaller

i

F P

P

i

$1,000 $900

$900

0.111 11.1%

$900i $1,000 $900

$900 $900i $1,000

(1 i ) $900 $1,000

$900

$1,000

1 i

i

C

P

68 PA RT I I Financial Markets

increase in its price at maturity, and the yield to maturity falls from 11.1 to 5.3%.

Similarly, a fall in the yield to maturity means that the price of the discount bond has

risen.

Summary. The concept of present value tells you that a dollar in the future is not as

valuable to you as a dollar today because you can earn interest on this dollar.

Specifically, a dollar received n years from now is worth only $1/(1 i )n today. The

present value of a set of future payments on a debt instrument equals the sum of the

present values of each of the future payments. The yield to maturity for an instrument

is the interest rate that equates the present value of the future payments on that instrument

to its value today. Because the procedure for calculating the yield to maturity is

based on sound economic principles, this is the measure that economists think most

accurately describes the interest rate.

Our calculations of the yield to maturity for a variety of bonds reveal the important

fact that current bond prices and interest rates are negatively related: When the

interest rate rises, the price of the bond falls, and vice versa.

Other Measures of Interest Rates

The yield to maturity is the most accurate measure of interest rates; this is what economists

mean when they use the term interest rate. Unless otherwise specified, the

terms interest rate and yield to maturity are used synonymously in this book. However,

because the yield to maturity is sometimes difficult to calculate, other, less accurate

C H A P T E R 4 Understanding Interest Rates 69

Box 1: Global

Negative T-Bill Rates? Japan Shows the Way

We normally assume that interest rates must always

be positive. Negative interest rates would imply that

you are willing to pay more for a bond today than

you will receive for it in the future (as our formula for

yield to maturity on a discount bond demonstrates).

Negative interest rates therefore seem like an impossibility

because you would do better by holding cash

that has the same value in the future as it does today.

The Japanese have demonstrated that this reasoning

is not quite correct. In November 1998, interest rates

on Japanese six-month Treasury bills became negative,

yielding an interest rate of –0.004%, with investors

paying more for the bills than their face value. This is

an extremely unusual event—no other country in the

world has seen negative interest rates during the last

fifty years. How could this happen?

As we will see in Chapter 5, the weakness of the

Japanese economy and a negative inflation rate drove

Japanese interest rates to low levels, but these two

factors can’t explain the negative rates. The answer is

that large investors found it more convenient to hold

these six-month bills as a store of value rather than

holding cash because the bills are denominated in

larger amounts and can be stored electronically. For

that reason, some investors were willing to hold

them, despite their negative rates, even though in

monetary terms the investors would be better off

holding cash. Clearly, the convenience of T-bills goes

only so far, and thus their interest rates can go only a

little bit below zero.

www.teachmefinance.com

A review of the key

financial concepts: time value

of money, annuities,

perpetuities, and so on.

measures of interest rates have come into common use in bond markets. You will frequently

encounter two of these measures—the current yield and the yield on a discount

basis—when reading the newspaper, and it is important for you to understand what

they mean and how they differ from the more accurate measure of interest rates, the

yield to maturity.

The current yield is an approximation of the yield to maturity on coupon bonds that is

often reported, because in contrast to the yield to maturity, it is easily calculated. It is

defined as the yearly coupon payment divided by the price of the security,

(7)

where ic current yield

P price of the coupon bond

C yearly coupon payment

This formula is identical to the formula in Equation 5, which describes the calculation

of the yield to maturity for a consol. Hence, for a consol, the current yield is

an exact measure of the yield to maturity. When a coupon bond has a long term to

maturity (say, 20 years or more), it is very much like a consol, which pays coupon payments

forever. Thus you would expect the current yield to be a rather close approximation

of the yield to maturity for a long-term coupon bond, and you can safely use

the current-yield calculation instead of calculating the yield to maturity with a financial

calculator. However, as the time to maturity of the coupon bond shortens (say, it

becomes less than five years), it behaves less and less like a consol and so the approximation

afforded by the current yield becomes worse and worse.

We have also seen that when the bond price equals the par value of the bond, the

yield to maturity is equal to the coupon rate (the coupon payment divided by the par

value of the bond). Because the current yield equals the coupon payment divided by the

bond price, the current yield is also equal to the coupon rate when the bond price is at

par. This logic leads us to the conclusion that when the bond price is at par, the current

yield equals the yield to maturity. This means that the closer the bond price is to the

bond’s par value, the better the current yield will approximate the yield to maturity.

The current yield is negatively related to the price of the bond. In the case

of our 10%-coupon-rate bond, when the price rises from $1,000 to $1,100, the current

yield falls from 10% ( $100/$1,000) to 9.09% ( $100/$1,100). As Table 1

indicates, the yield to maturity is also negatively related to the price of the bond; when

the price rises from $1,000 to $1,100, the yield to maturity falls from 10 to 8.48%.

In this we see an important fact: The current yield and the yield to maturity always

move together; a rise in the current yield always signals that the yield to maturity has

also risen.

The general characteristics of the current yield (the yearly coupon payment

divided by the bond price) can be summarized as follows: The current yield better

approximates the yield to maturity when the bond’s price is nearer to the bond’s par

value and the maturity of the bond is longer. It becomes a worse approximation when

the bond’s price is further from the bond’s par value and the bond’s maturity is shorter.

Regardless of whether the current yield is a good approximation of the yield to maturity,

a change in the current yield always signals a change in the same direction of the

yield to maturity.

ic

C

P

Current Yield

70 PA RT I I Financial Markets

Before the advent of calculators and computers, dealers in U.S. Treasury bills found it

difficult to calculate interest rates as a yield to maturity. Instead, they quoted the interest

rate on bills as a yield on a discount basis (or discount yield), and they still do

so today. Formally, the yield on a discount basis is defined by the following formula:

(8)

where idb yield on a discount basis

F face value of the discount bond

P purchase price of the discount bond

This method for calculating interest rates has two peculiarities. First, it uses the

percentage gain on the face value of the bill (F P)/F rather than the percentage gain

on the purchase price of the bill (F P)/P used in calculating the yield to maturity.

Second, it puts the yield on an annual basis by considering the year to be 360 days

long rather than 365 days.

Because of these peculiarities, the discount yield understates the interest rate on

bills as measured by the yield to maturity. On our one-year bill, which is selling for

$900 and has a face value of $1,000, the yield on a discount basis would be as follows:

whereas the yield to maturity for this bill, which we calculated before, is 11.1%. The

discount yield understates the yield to maturity by a factor of over 10%. A little more

than 1% ([365 360]/360 0.014 1.4%) can be attributed to the understatement

of the length of the year: When the bill has one year to maturity, the second term on

the right-hand side of the formula is 360/365 0.986 rather than 1.0, as it should be.

The more serious source of the understatement, however, is the use of the percentage

gain on the face value rather than on the purchase price. Because, by definition,

the purchase price of a discount bond is always less than the face value, the

percentage gain on the face value is necessarily smaller than the percentage gain on

the purchase price. The greater the difference between the purchase price and the face

value of the discount bond, the more the discount yield understates the yield to maturity.

Because the difference between the purchase price and the face value gets larger

as maturity gets longer, we can draw the following conclusion about the relationship

of the yield on a discount basis to the yield to maturity: The yield on a discount basis

always understates the yield to maturity, and this understatement becomes more

severe the longer the maturity of the discount bond.

Another important feature of the discount yield is that, like the yield to maturity,

it is negatively related to the price of the bond. For example, when the price of

the bond rises from $900 to $950, the formula indicates that the yield on a discount

basis declines from 9.9 to 4.9%. At the same time, the yield to maturity declines from

11.1 to 5.3%. Here we see another important factor about the relationship of yield

on a discount basis to yield to maturity: They always move together. That is, a rise in

the discount yield always means that the yield to maturity has risen, and a decline in the

discount yield means that the yield to maturity has declined as well.

The characteristics of the yield on a discount basis can be summarized as follows:

Yield on a discount basis understates the more accurate measure of the interest rate,

the yield to maturity; and the longer the maturity of the discount bond, the greater

idb

$1,000 $900

$1,000

360

365

0.099 9.9%

idb

F P

F

360

days to maturity

Yield on a

Discount Basis

C H A P T E R 4 Understanding Interest Rates 71

this understatement becomes. Even though the discount yield is a somewhat misleading

measure of the interest rates, a change in the discount yield always indicates

a change in the same direction for the yield to maturity.

72 PA RT I I Financial Markets

Application Reading the Wall Street Journal: The Bond Page

Now that we understand the different interest-rate definitions, let’s apply our

knowledge and take a look at what kind of information appears on the bond

page of a typical newspaper, in this case the Wall Street Journal. The

“Following the Financial News” box contains the Journal’s listing for three

different types of bonds on Wednesday, January 23, 2003. Panel (a) contains

the information on U.S. Treasury bonds and notes. Both are coupon bonds,

the only difference being their time to maturity from when they were originally

issued: Notes have a time to maturity of less than ten years; bonds have

a time to maturity of more than ten years.

The information found in the “Rate” and “Maturity” columns identifies

the bond by coupon rate and maturity date. For example, T-bond 1 has a

coupon rate of 4.75%, indicating that it pays out $47.50 per year on a

$1,000-face-value bond and matures in January 2003. In bond market parlance,

it is referred to as the Treasury’s 4 s of 2003. The next three columns

tell us about the bond’s price. By convention, all prices in the bond market

are quoted per $100 of face value. Furthermore, the numbers after the colon

represent thirty-seconds (x/32, or 32nds). In the case of T-bond 1, the first

price of 100:02 represents 100 100.0625, or an actual price of $1000.62

for a $1,000-face-value bond. The bid price tells you what price you will

receive if you sell the bond, and the asked price tells you what you must pay

for the bond. (You might want to think of the bid price as the “wholesale”

price and the asked price as the “retail” price.) The “Chg.” column indicates

how much the bid price has changed in 32nds (in this case, no change) from

the previous trading day.

Notice that for all the bonds and notes, the asked price is more than the bid

price. Can you guess why this is so? The difference between the two (the spread )

provides the bond dealer who trades these securities with a profit. For T-bond 1,

the dealer who buys it at 100 , and sells it for 100 , makes a profit of . This

profit is what enables the dealer to make a living and provide the service of

allowing you to buy and sell bonds at will.

The “Ask Yld.” column provides the yield to maturity, which is 0.43% for

T-bond 1. It is calculated with the method described earlier in this chapter

using the asked price as the price of the bond. The asked price is used in the

calculation because the yield to maturity is most relevant to a person who is

going to buy and hold the security and thus earn the yield. The person selling

the security is not going to be holding it and hence is less concerned with

the yield.

The figure for the current yield is not usually included in the newspaper’s

quotations for Treasury securities, but it has been added in panel (a) to give

you some real-world examples of how well the current yield approximates

1

32

3

32

2

32

2

32

3

4

C H A P T E R 4 Understanding Interest Rates 73

Following the Financial News

Bond prices and interest rates are published daily. In

the Wall Street Journal, they can be found in the

“NYSE/AMEX Bonds” and “Treasury/Agency Issues”

section of the paper. Three basic formats for quoting

bond prices and yields are illustrated here.

Bond Prices and Interest Rates

TREASURY BILLS

GOVT. BONDS & NOTES

Maturity Ask

Rate Mo/Yr Bid Asked Chg. Yld.

4.750 Jan 03n 100:02 100:03 . . . 0.43

5.500 Jan 03n 100:02 100:03 —1 0.46

5.750 Aug 03n 102:17 102:18 . . . 0.16

11.125 Aug 03 105:16 105:17 —1 1.22

5.250 Feb 29 103:17 103:18 23 5.00

3.875 Apr 29i 122:03 122:04 2 2.69

6.125 Aug 29 116:10 116:11 24 5.00

5.375 Feb 31 107:27 107:28 24 4.86

T-bond 1

T-bond 2

T-bond 3

T-bond 4

Current Yield 4.75%

Current Yield 10.55%

Current Yield 5.07%

Current Yield 4.98%

(a) Treasury bonds

and notes

(b) Treasury bills

Source: Wall Street Journal, Thursday, January 23, 2003, p. C11.

Days

to Ask

Maturity Mat. Bid Asked Chg. Yld.

May 01 03 98 1.14 1.13 –0.02 1.15

May 08 03 105 1.14 1.13 –0.03 1.15

May 15 03 112 1.15 1.14 –0.02 1.16

May 22 03 119 1.15 1.14 –0.02 1.16

May 29 03 126 1.15 1.14 –0.01 1.16

Jun 05 03 133 1.15 1.14 –0.02 1.16

Jun 12 03 140 1.16 1.15 –0.01 1.17

Jun 19 03 147 1.15 1.14 –0.02 1.16

Jun 26 03 154 1.15 1.14 –0.01 1.16

Jul 03 03 161 1.15 1.14 –0.02 1.16

Jul 10 03 168 1.16 1.15 –0.02 1.17

Jul 17 03 175 1.16 1.15 –0.03 1.17

Jul 24 03 182 1.17 1.16 . . . 1.18

Representative Over-the-Counter quotation based on transactions of $1

million or more.

Treasury bond, note and bill quotes are as of mid-afternoon. Colons

in bid-and-asked quotes represent 32nds; 101:01 means 101 1/32. Net

changes in 32nds. n-Treasury note. i-Inflation-Indexed issue. Treasury bill

quotes in hundredths, quoted on terms of a rate of discount. Days to

maturity calculated from settlement date. All yields are to maturity and

based on the asked quote. Latest 13-week and 26-week bills are boldfaced.

For bonds callable prior to maturity, yields are computed to the

earliest call date for issues quoted above par and to the maturity date

for issues below par. *When issued.

Source: eSpeed/Cantor Fitzgerald

U.S. Treasury strips as of 3 p.m. Eastern time, also based on

transactions of $1 million or more. Colons in bid and asked quotes represent

32nds; 99:01 means 99 1/32. Net changes in 32nds. Yields

calculated on the asked quotation. ci-stripped coupon interest. bp-

Treasury bond, stripped principal. np-Treasury note, stripped principal.

For bonds callable prior to maturity, yields are computed to the earliest

call date for issues quoted above par and to the maturity date for

issues below par.

Source: Bear, Stearns & Co. via Street Software Technology, Inc.

Days

to Ask

Maturity Mat. Bid Asked Chg. Yld.

Jan 30 03 7 1.15 1.14 –0.01 1.16

Feb 06 03 14 1.14 1.13 –0.01 1.15

Feb 13 03 21 1.14 1.13 –0.01 1.15

Feb 20 03 28 1.14 1.13 . . . 1.15

Feb 27 03 35 1.13 1.12 –0.01 1.14

Mar 06 03 42 1.13 1.12 . . . 1.14

Mar 13 03 49 1.13 1.12 –0.01 1.14

Mar 20 03 56 1.12 1.11 –0.01 1.13

Mar 27 03 63 1.13 1.12 –0.01 1.14

Apr 03 03 70 1.13 1.12 –0.01 1.14

Apr 10 03 77 1.12 1.11 –0.03 1.13

Apr 17 03 84 1.14 1.13 –0.01 1.15

Apr 24 03 91 1.15 1.14 . . . 1.16

(c) New York Stock

Exchange bonds

NEW YORK BONDS

CORPORATION BONDS

Cur Net

Bonds Yld Vol Close Chg.

AT&T 55/804 5.5 238 101.63 . . .

AT&T 63/804 6.2 60 102.63 –0.13

AT&T 71/204 7.2 101 103.63 –0.13

AT&T 81/824 8.0 109 101 0.38

ATT 8.35s25 8.3 60 101 0.50

AT&T 61/229 7.5 190 87.25 0.13

AT&T 85/831 8.4 138 102.75 0.88

Bond 1

Bond 2

Yield to Maturity 3.68%

Yield to Maturity 8.40%

TREASURY BONDS, NOTES AND BILLS

January 22, 2003

74 PA RT I I Financial Markets

the yield to maturity. Our previous discussion provided us with some rules

for deciding when the current yield is likely to be a good approximation and

when it is not.

T-bonds 3 and 4 mature in around 30 years, meaning that their characteristics

are like those of a consol. The current yields should then be a good

approximation of the yields to maturity, and they are: The current yields are

within two-tenths of a percentage point of the values for the yields to maturity.

This approximation is reasonable even for T-bond 4, which has a price

about 7% above its face value.

Now let’s take a look at T-bonds 1 and 2, which have a much shorter

time to maturity. The price of T-bond 1 differs by less than 1% from the par

value, and look how poor an approximation the current yield is for the

yield to maturity; it overstates the yield to maturity by more than 4 percentage

points. The approximation for T-bond 2 is even worse, with the

overstatement over 9 percentage points. This bears out what we learned

earlier about the current yield: It can be a very misleading guide to the

value of the yield to maturity for a short-term bond if the bond price is not

extremely close to par.

Two other categories of bonds are reported much like the Treasury

bonds and notes in the newspaper. Government agency and miscellaneous

securities include securities issued by U.S. government agencies such as the

Government National Mortgage Association, which makes loans to savings

and loan institutions, and international agencies such as the World Bank.

Tax-exempt bonds are the other category reported in a manner similar to

panel (a), except that yield-to-maturity calculations are not usually provided.

Tax-exempt bonds include bonds issued by local government and public

authorities whose interest payments are exempt from federal income taxes.

Panel (b) quotes yields on U.S. Treasury bills, which, as we have seen,

are discount bonds. Since there is no coupon, these securities are identified

solely by their maturity dates, which you can see in the first column. The

next column, “Days to Mat.,” provides the number of days to maturity of the

bill. Dealers in these markets always refer to prices by quoting the yield on a

discount basis. The “Bid” column gives the discount yield for people selling

the bills to dealers, and the “Asked” column gives the discount yield for people

buying the bills from dealers. As with bonds and notes, the dealers’ profits

are made by the asked price being higher than the bid price, leading to the

asked discount yield being lower than the bid discount yield.

The “Chg.” column indicates how much the asked discount yield

changed from the previous day. When financial analysts talk about changes

in the yield, they frequently describe the changes in terms of basis points,

which are hundredths of a percentage point. For example, a financial analyst

would describe the 0.01 change in the asked discount yield for the

February 13, 2003, T-bill by saying that it had fallen by 1 basis point.

As we learned earlier, the yield on a discount basis understates the

yield to maturity, which is reported in the column of panel (b) headed “Ask

Yld.” This is evident from a comparison of the “Ask Yld.” and “Asked”

columns. As we would also expect from our discussion of the calculation of

yields on a discount basis, the understatement grows as the maturity of the

bill lengthens.

The Distinction Between

Interest Rates and Returns

Many people think that the interest rate on a bond tells them all they need to know

about how well off they are as a result of owning it. If Irving the Investor thinks he is

better off when he owns a long-term bond yielding a 10% interest rate and the interest

rate rises to 20%, he will have a rude awakening: As we will shortly see, if he has

to sell the bond, Irving has lost his shirt! How well a person does by holding a bond

or any other security over a particular time period is accurately measured by the

return, or, in more precise terminology, the rate of return. For any security, the rate

of return is defined as the payments to the owner plus the change in its value,

expressed as a fraction of its purchase price. To make this definition clearer, let us see

what the return would look like for a $1,000-face-value coupon bond with a coupon

rate of 10% that is bought for $1,000, held for one year, and then sold for $1,200. The

payments to the owner are the yearly coupon payments of $100, and the change in its

value is $1,200 $1,000 $200. Adding these together and expressing them as a

fraction of the purchase price of $1,000 gives us the one-year holding-period return

for this bond:

You may have noticed something quite surprising about the return that we have

just calculated: It equals 30%, yet as Table 1 indicates, initially the yield to maturity

was only 10 percent. This demonstrates that the return on a bond will not necessarily

equal the interest rate on that bond. We now see that the distinction between

interest rate and return can be important, although for many securities the two may

be closely related.

$100 $200

$1,000

$300

$1,000

0.30 30%

C H A P T E R 4 Understanding Interest Rates 75

Panel (c) has quotations for corporate bonds traded on the New York

Stock Exchange. Corporate bonds traded on the American Stock Exchange

are reported in like manner. The first column identifies the bond by indicating

the corporation that issued it. The bonds we are looking at have all been

issued by American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T). The next column tells

the coupon rate and the maturity date (5 and 2004 for Bond 1). The “Cur.

Yld.” column reports the current yield (5.5), and “Vol.” gives the volume of

trading in that bond (238 bonds of $1,000 face value traded that day). The

“Close” price is the last traded price that day per $100 of face value. The price

of 101.63 represents $1016.30 for a $1,000-face-value bond. The “Net Chg.”

is the change in the closing price from the previous trading day.

The yield to maturity is also given for two bonds. This information is

not usually provided in the newspaper, but it is included here because it

shows how misleading the current yield can be for a bond with a short maturity

such as the 5 s, of 2004. The current yield of 5.5% is a misleading measure

of the interest rate because the yield to maturity is actually 3.68 percent.

By contrast, for the 8 s, of 2031, with nearly 30 years to maturity, the current

yield and the yield to maturity are exactly equal.

58

58

5

8

Study Guide The concept of return discussed here is extremely important because it is used continually

throughout the book. Make sure that you understand how a return is calculated

and why it can differ from the interest rate. This understanding will make the

material presented later in the book easier to follow.

More generally, the return on a bond held from time t to time t 1 can be written

as:

(9)

where RET return from holding the bond from time t to time t 1

Pt price of the bond at time t

Pt1 price of the bond at time t 1

C coupon payment

A convenient way to rewrite the return formula in Equation 9 is to recognize that

it can be split into two separate terms:

The first term is the current yield ic (the coupon payment over the purchase price):

The second term is the rate of capital gain, or the change in the bond’s price relative

to the initial purchase price:

where g rate of capital gain. Equation 9 can then be rewritten as:

(10)

which shows that the return on a bond is the current yield ic plus the rate of capital

gain g. This rewritten formula illustrates the point we just discovered. Even for a bond

for which the current yield ic is an accurate measure of the yield to maturity, the return

can differ substantially from the interest rate. Returns will differ from the interest rate,

especially if there are sizable fluctuations in the price of the bond that produce substantial

capital gains or losses.

To explore this point even further, let’s look at what happens to the returns on

bonds of different maturities when interest rates rise. Table 2 calculates the one-year

return on several 10%-coupon-rate bonds all purchased at par when interest rates on

RET ic g

Pt1 Pt

Pt

g

C

Pt

ic

RET

C

Pt

Pt1 Pt

Pt

RET

C Pt1 Pt

Pt

76 PA RT I I Financial Markets

all these bonds rise from 10 to 20%. Several key findings in this table are generally

true of all bonds:

• The only bond whose return equals the initial yield to maturity is one whose time

to maturity is the same as the holding period (see the last bond in Table 2).

• A rise in interest rates is associated with a fall in bond prices, resulting in capital

losses on bonds whose terms to maturity are longer than the holding period.

• The more distant a bond’s maturity, the greater the size of the percentage price

change associated with an interest-rate change.

• The more distant a bond’s maturity, the lower the rate of return that occurs as a

result of the increase in the interest rate.

• Even though a bond has a substantial initial interest rate, its return can turn out

to be negative if interest rates rise.

At first it frequently puzzles students (as it puzzles poor Irving the Investor) that

a rise in interest rates can mean that a bond has been a poor investment. The trick to

understanding this is to recognize that a rise in the interest rate means that the price

of a bond has fallen. A rise in interest rates therefore means that a capital loss has

occurred, and if this loss is large enough, the bond can be a poor investment indeed.

For example, we see in Table 2 that the bond that has 30 years to maturity when purchased

has a capital loss of 49.7% when the interest rate rises from 10 to 20%. This

loss is so large that it exceeds the current yield of 10%, resulting in a negative return

(loss) of 39.7%. If Irving does not sell the bond, his capital loss is often referred to

as a “paper loss.” This is a loss nonetheless because if he had not bought this bond

and had instead put his money in the bank, he would now be able to buy more bonds

at their lower price than he presently owns.

C H A P T E R 4 Understanding Interest Rates 77

(1)

Years to (2) (4) (5) (6)

Maturity Initial (3) Price Rate of Rate of

When Current Initial Next Capital Return

Bond Is Yield Price Year* Gain (2 + 5)

Purchased (%) ($) ($) (%) (%)

30 10 1,000 503 49.7 39.7

20 10 1,000 516 48.4 38.4

10 10 1,000 597 40.3 30.3

5 10 1,000 741 25.9 15.9

2 10 1,000 917 8.3 1.7

1 10 1,000 1,000 0.0 10.0

*Calculated using Equation 3.

Table 2 One-Year Returns on Different-Maturity 10%-Coupon-Rate

Bonds When Interest Rates Rise from 10% to 20%

The finding that the prices of longer-maturity bonds respond more dramatically to

changes in interest rates helps explain an important fact about the behavior of bond markets:

Prices and returns for long-term bonds are more volatile than those for shorterterm

bonds. Price changes of 20% and 20% within a year, with corresponding

variations in returns, are common for bonds more than 20 years away from maturity.

We now see that changes in interest rates make investments in long-term bonds

quite risky. Indeed, the riskiness of an asset’s return that results from interest-rate

changes is so important that it has been given a special name, interest-rate risk.6

Dealing with interest-rate risk is a major concern of managers of financial institutions

and investors, as we will see in later chapters (see also Box 2).

Although long-term debt instruments have substantial interest-rate risk, shortterm

debt instruments do not. Indeed, bonds with a maturity that is as short as the

holding period have no interest-rate risk.7We see this for the coupon bond at the bottom

of Table 2, which has no uncertainty about the rate of return because it equals

the yield to maturity, which is known at the time the bond is purchased. The key to

understanding why there is no interest-rate risk for any bond whose time to maturity

matches the holding period is to recognize that (in this case) the price at the end of

the holding period is already fixed at the face value. The change in interest rates can

then have no effect on the price at the end of the holding period for these bonds, and

the return will therefore be equal to the yield to maturity known at the time the bond

is purchased.8

Maturity and the

Volatility of Bond

Returns: Interest-

Rate Risk

78 PA RT I I Financial Markets

6Interest-rate risk can be quantitatively measured using the concept of duration. This concept and how it is

calculated is discussed in an appendix to this chapter, which can be found on this book’s web site at

www.aw.com/mishkin.

7The statement that there is no interest-rate risk for any bond whose time to maturity matches the holding period

is literally true only for discount bonds and zero-coupon bonds that make no intermediate cash payments before

the holding period is over. A coupon bond that makes an intermediate cash payment before the holding period

is over requires that this payment be reinvested. Because the interest rate at which this payment can be reinvested

is uncertain, there is some uncertainty about the return on this coupon bond even when the time to maturity

equals the holding period. However, the riskiness of the return on a coupon bond from reinvesting the coupon

payments is typically quite small, and so the basic point that a coupon bond with a time to maturity equaling the

holding period has very little risk still holds true.

8In the text, we are assuming that all holding periods are short and equal to the maturity on short-term bonds and

are thus not subject to interest-rate risk. However, if an investor’s holding period is longer than the term to maturity

of the bond, the investor is exposed to a type of interest-rate risk called reinvestment risk. Reinvestment risk occurs

because the proceeds from the short-term bond need to be reinvested at a future interest rate that is uncertain.

To understand reinvestment risk, suppose that Irving the Investor has a holding period of two years and

decides to purchase a $1,000 one-year bond at face value and will then purchase another one at the end of the

first year. If the initial interest rate is 10%, Irving will have $1,100 at the end of the year. If the interest rate rises

to 20%, as in Table 2, Irving will find that buying $1,100 worth of another one-year bond will leave him at the

end of the second year with $1,100 (1 0.20) $1,320. Thus Irving’s two-year return will be

($1,320 $1,000)/1,000 0.32 32%, which equals 14.9% at an annual rate. In this case, Irving has earned

more by buying the one-year bonds than if he had initially purchased the two-year bond with an interest rate of

10%. Thus when Irving has a holding period that is longer than the term to maturity of the bonds he purchases,

he benefits from a rise in interest rates. Conversely, if interest rates fall to 5%, Irving will have only $1,155 at the

end of two years: $1,100 (1 0.05). Thus his two-year return will be ($1,155 $1,000)/1,000 0.155

15.5%, which is 7.2 percent at an annual rate. With a holding period greater than the term to maturity of the

bond, Irving now loses from a fall in interest rates.

We have thus seen that when the holding period is longer than the term to maturity of a bond, the return is

uncertain because the future interest rate when reinvestment occurs is also uncertain—in short, there is reinvestment

risk. We also see that if the holding period is longer than the term to maturity of the bond, the investor

benefits from a rise in interest rates and is hurt by a fall in interest rates.

The return on a bond, which tells you how good an investment it has been over the

holding period, is equal to the yield to maturity in only one special case: when the

holding period and the maturity of the bond are identical. Bonds whose term to

maturity is longer than the holding period are subject to interest-rate risk: Changes

in interest rates lead to capital gains and losses that produce substantial differences

between the return and the yield to maturity known at the time the bond is purchased.

Interest-rate risk is especially important for long-term bonds, where the capital

gains and losses can be substantial. This is why long-term bonds are not

considered to be safe assets with a sure return over short holding periods.

The Distinction Between Real and

Nominal Interest Rates

So far in our discussion of interest rates, we have ignored the effects of inflation on the

cost of borrowing. What we have up to now been calling the interest rate makes no

allowance for inflation, and it is more precisely referred to as the nominal interest rate,

which is distinguished from the real interest rate, the interest rate that is adjusted by

subtracting expected changes in the price level (inflation) so that it more accurately

reflects the true cost of borrowing.9 The real interest rate is more accurately defined by

the Fisher equation, named for Irving Fisher, one of the great monetary economists of the

Summary

C H A P T E R 4 Understanding Interest Rates 79

Box 2

Helping Investors to Select Desired Interest-Rate Risk

Because many investors want to know how much

interest-rate risk they are exposed to, some mutual

fund companies try to educate investors about the perils

of interest-rate risk, as well as to offer investment

alternatives that match their investors’ preferences.

Vanguard Group, for example, offers eight separate

high-grade bond mutual funds. In its prospectus,

Vanguard separates the funds by the average maturity

of the bonds they hold and demonstrates the effect of

interest-rate changes by computing the percentage

change in bond value resulting from a 1% increase

and decrease in interest rates. Three of the bond funds

invest in bonds with average maturities of one to three

years, which Vanguard rates as having the lowest

interest-rate risk. Three other funds hold bonds with

average maturities of five to ten years, which Vanguard

rates as having medium interest-rate risk. Two funds

hold long-term bonds with maturities of 15 to 30

years, which Vanguard rates as having high interestrate

risk.

By providing this information, Vanguard hopes to

increase its market share in the sales of bond funds.

Not surprisingly, Vanguard is one of the most successful

mutual fund companies in the business.

9The real interest rate defined in the text is more precisely referred to as the ex ante real interest rate because it is

adjusted for expected changes in the price level. This is the real interest rate that is most important to economic

decisions, and typically it is what economists mean when they make reference to the “real” interest rate. The interest

rate that is adjusted for actual changes in the price level is called the ex post real interest rate. It describes how

well a lender has done in real terms after the fact.

www.martincapital.com

/charts.htm

Go to charts of real versus

nominal rates to view 30 years of

nominal interest rates compared

to real rates for the 30-year

T-bond and 90-day T-bill.

twentieth century. The Fisher equation states that the nominal interest rate i equals

the real interest rate ir plus the expected rate of inflation e:10

(11)

Rearranging terms, we find that the real interest rate equals the nominal interest rate

minus the expected inflation rate:

(12)

To see why this definition makes sense, let us first consider a situation in which

you have made a one-year simple loan with a 5% interest rate (i 5%) and you

expect the price level to rise by 3% over the course of the year (e 3%). As a result

of making the loan, at the end of the year you will have 2% more in real terms, that

is, in terms of real goods and services you can buy. In this case, the interest rate you

have earned in terms of real goods and services is 2%; that is,

as indicated by the Fisher definition.

Now what if the interest rate rises to 8%, but you expect the inflation rate to be

10% over the course of the year? Although you will have 8% more dollars at the end

of the year, you will be paying 10% more for goods; the result is that you will be able

to buy 2% fewer goods at the end of the year and you are 2% worse off in real terms.

This is also exactly what the Fisher definition tells us, because:

ir 8% 10% 2%

As a lender, you are clearly less eager to make a loan in this case, because in

terms of real goods and services you have actually earned a negative interest rate of

2%. By contrast, as the borrower, you fare quite well because at the end of the year,

the amounts you will have to pay back will be worth 2% less in terms of goods and

services—you as the borrower will be ahead by 2% in real terms. When the real interest

rate is low, there are greater incentives to borrow and fewer incentives to lend.

A similar distinction can be made between nominal returns and real returns.

Nominal returns, which do not allow for inflation, are what we have been referring to

as simply “returns.” When inflation is subtracted from a nominal return, we have the

real return, which indicates the amount of extra goods and services that can be purchased

as a result of holding the security.

The distinction between real and nominal interest rates is important because the

real interest rate, which reflects the real cost of borrowing, is likely to be a better indicator

of the incentives to borrow and lend. It appears to be a better guide to how peoir

5% 3% 2%

ir i e

i ir e

80 PA RT I I Financial Markets

10A more precise formulation of the Fisher equation is:

because:

and subtracting 1 from both sides gives us the first equation. For small values of ir and e, the term

ir e is so small that we ignore it, as in the text.

1 i (1 ir )(1 e ) 1 ir e (ir e )

i ir e (ir e )

ple will be affected by what is happening in credit markets. Figure 1, which presents

estimates from 1953 to 2002 of the real and nominal interest rates on three-month

U.S. Treasury bills, shows us that nominal and real rates often do not move together.

(This is also true for nominal and real interest rates in the rest of the world.) In particular,

when nominal rates in the United States were high in the 1970s, real rates

were actually extremely low—often negative. By the standard of nominal interest

rates, you would have thought that credit market conditions were tight in this period,

because it was expensive to borrow. However, the estimates of the real rates indicate

that you would have been mistaken. In real terms, the cost of borrowing was actually

quite low.11

C H A P T E R 4 Understanding Interest Rates 81

F I G U R E 1 Real and Nominal Interest Rates (Three-Month Treasury Bill), 1953–2002

Sources: Nominal rates from www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15. The real rate is constructed using the procedure outlined in Frederic S. Mishkin, “The Real

Interest Rate: An Empirical Investigation,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 15 (1981): 151–200. This procedure involves estimating expected

inflation as a function of past interest rates, inflation, and time trends and then subtracting the expected inflation measure from the nominal interest rate.

16

12

8

4

0

–4

1955 1960 1970 1990 2000

Interest Rate (%)

1965 1975 1980 1985 1995

Estimated Real Rate

Nominal Rate

11Because most interest income in the United States is subject to federal income taxes, the true earnings in real

terms from holding a debt instrument are not reflected by the real interest rate defined by the Fisher equation but

rather by the after-tax real interest rate, which equals the nominal interest rate after income tax payments have been

subtracted, minus the expected inflation rate. For a person facing a 30% tax rate, the after-tax interest rate earned

on a bond yielding 10% is only 7% because 30% of the interest income must be paid to the Internal Revenue

Service. Thus the after-tax real interest rate on this bond when expected inflation is 5% equals 2% ( 7% 5%).

More generally, the after-tax real interest rate can be expressed as:

where the income tax rate.

This formula for the after-tax real interest rate also provides a better measure of the effective cost of borrowing

for many corporations and homeowners in the United States because in calculating income taxes, they can deduct

i (1 ) e

Until recently, real interest rates in the United States were not observable; only

nominal rates were reported. This all changed when, in January 1997, the U.S.

Treasury began to issue indexed bonds, whose interest and principal payments are

adjusted for changes in the price level (see Box 3).

82 PA RT I I Financial Markets

Box 3

With TIPS, Real Interest Rates Have Become Observable in the United States

When the U.S. Treasury decided to issue TIPS

(Treasury Inflation Protection Securities), in January

1997, a version of indexed Treasury coupon bonds,

it was somewhat late in the game. Other countries

such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and

Sweden had already beaten the United States to the

punch. (In September 1998, the U.S. Treasury also

began issuing the Series I savings bond, which provides

inflation protection for small investors.)

These indexed securities have successfully

acquired a niche in the bond market, enabling governments

to raise more funds. In addition, because

their interest and principal payments are adjusted for

changes in the price level, the interest rate on these

bonds provides a direct measure of a real interest rate.

These indexed bonds are very useful to policymakers,

especially monetary policymakers, because by subtracting

their interest rate from a nominal interest rate

on a nonindexed bond, they generate more insight

into expected inflation, a valuable piece of information.

For example, on January 22, 2003, the interest

rate on the ten-year Treasury bond was 3.84%, while

that on the ten-year TIPS was 2.19%. Thus, the

implied expected inflation rate for the next ten years,

derived from the difference between these two rates,

was 1.65%. The private sector finds the information

provided by TIPS very useful: Many commercial and

investment banks routinely publish the expected U.S.

inflation rates derived from these bonds.

Summary

1. The yield to maturity, which is the measure that most

accurately reflects the interest rate, is the interest rate

that equates the present value of future payments of a

debt instrument with its value today. Application of this

principle reveals that bond prices and interest rates are

negatively related: When the interest rate rises, the

price of the bond must fall, and vice versa.

2. Two less accurate measures of interest rates are

commonly used to quote interest rates on coupon and

discount bonds. The current yield, which equals the

coupon payment divided by the price of a coupon

bond, is a less accurate measure of the yield to maturity

the shorter the maturity of the bond and the greater the

gap between the price and the par value. The yield on a

discount basis (also called the discount yield) understates

the yield to maturity on a discount bond, and the

understatement worsens with the distance from

maturity of the discount security. Even though these

interest payments on loans from their income. Thus if you face a 30% tax rate and take out a mortgage loan with

a 10% interest rate, you are able to deduct the 10% interest payment and thus lower your taxes by 30% of this

amount. Your after-tax nominal cost of borrowing is then 7% (10% minus 30% of the 10% interest payment), and

when the expected inflation rate is 5%, the effective cost of borrowing in real terms is again 2% ( 7% 5%).

As the example (and the formula) indicates, after-tax real interest rates are always below the real interest rate

defined by the Fisher equation. For a further discussion of measures of after-tax real interest rates, see Frederic

S. Mishkin, “The Real Interest Rate: An Empirical Investigation,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public

Policy 15 (1981): 151–200.

C H A P T E R 4 Understanding Interest Rates 83

measures are misleading guides to the size of the

interest rate, a change in them always signals a change

in the same direction for the yield to maturity.

3. The return on a security, which tells you how well you

have done by holding this security over a stated period

of time, can differ substantially from the interest rate as

measured by the yield to maturity. Long-term bond

prices have substantial fluctuations when interest rates

change and thus bear interest-rate risk. The resulting

capital gains and losses can be large, which is why longterm

bonds are not considered to be safe assets with a

sure return.

4. The real interest rate is defined as the nominal interest

rate minus the expected rate of inflation. It is a better

measure of the incentives to borrow and lend than the

nominal interest rate, and it is a more accurate indicator

of the tightness of credit market conditions than the

nominal interest rate.

Key Terms

basis point, p. 74

consol or perpetuity, p. 67

coupon bond, p. 63

coupon rate, p. 64

current yield, p. 70

discount bond (zero-coupon bond),

p. 64

face value (par value), p. 63

fixed-payment loan (fully amortized

loan), p. 63

indexed bond, p. 82

interest-rate risk, p. 78

nominal interest rate, p. 79

present discounted value, p. 61

present value, p. 61

rate of capital gain, p. 76

real interest rate, p. 79

real terms, p. 80

return (rate of return), p. 75

simple loan, p. 62

yield on a discount basis (discount

yield), p. 71

yield to maturity, p. 64

Questions and Problems

Questions marked with an asterisk are answered at the end

of the book in an appendix, “Answers to Selected Questions

and Problems.”

*1. Would a dollar tomorrow be worth more to you today

when the interest rate is 20% or when it is 10%?

2. You have just won $20 million in the state lottery,

which promises to pay you $1 million (tax free) every

year for the next 20 years. Have you really won $20

million?

*3. If the interest rate is 10%, what is the present value of

a security that pays you $1,100 next year, $1,210 the

year after, and $1,331 the year after that?

4. If the security in Problem 3 sold for $3,500, is the

yield to maturity greater or less than 10%? Why?

*5. Write down the formula that is used to calculate the

yield to maturity on a 20-year 10% coupon bond with

$1,000 face value that sells for $2,000.

6. What is the yield to maturity on a $1,000-face-value

discount bond maturing in one year that sells for

$800?

*7. What is the yield to maturity on a simple loan for $1

million that requires a repayment of $2 million in five

years’ time?

8. To pay for college, you have just taken out a $1,000

government loan that makes you pay $126 per year

for 25 years. However, you don’t have to start making

these payments until you graduate from college two

years from now. Why is the yield to maturity necessarily

less than 12%, the yield to maturity on a normal

$1,000 fixed-payment loan in which you pay $126

per year for 25 years?

*9. Which $1,000 bond has the higher yield to maturity, a

20-year bond selling for $800 with a current yield of

15% or a one-year bond selling for $800 with a current

yield of 5%?

QUIZ

84 PA RT I I Financial Markets

10. Pick five U.S. Treasury bonds from the bond page of

the newspaper, and calculate the current yield. Note

when the current yield is a good approximation of the

yield to maturity.

*11. You are offered two bonds, a one-year U.S. Treasury

bond with a yield to maturity of 9% and a one-year

U.S. Treasury bill with a yield on a discount basis of

8.9%. Which would you rather own?

12. If there is a decline in interest rates, which would you

rather be holding, long-term bonds or short-term

bonds? Why? Which type of bond has the greater

interest-rate risk?

*13. Francine the Financial Adviser has just given you the

following advice: “Long-term bonds are a great investment

because their interest rate is over 20%.” Is

Francine necessarily right?

14. If mortgage rates rise from 5% to 10% but the

expected rate of increase in housing prices rises from

2% to 9%, are people more or less likely to buy

houses?

*15. Interest rates were lower in the mid-1980s than they

were in the late 1970s, yet many economists have

commented that real interest rates were actually much

higher in the mid-1980s than in the late 1970s. Does

this make sense? Do you think that these economists

are right?

Web Exercises

1. Investigate the data available from the Federal Reserve

at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/. Answer the following

questions:

a. What is the difference in the interest rates on commercial

paper for financial firms when compared to

nonfinancial firms?

b. What was the interest rate on the one-month

Eurodollar at the end of 2002?

c. What is the most recent interest rate report for the

30-year Treasury note?

2. Figure 1 in the text shows the estimated real and

nominal rates for three-month treasury bills. Go to

www.martincapital.com/charts.htm and click on

“interest rates and yields,” then on “real interest rates.”

a. Compare the three-month real rate to the longterm

real rate. Which is greater?

b. Compare the short-term nominal rate to the longterm

nominal rate. Which appears most volatile?

3. In this chapter we have discussed long-term bonds as

if there were only one type, coupon bonds. In fact

there are also long-term discount bonds. A discount

bond is sold at a low price and the whole return

comes in the form of a price appreciation. You can easily

compute the current price of a discount bond using

the financial calculator at http://app.ny.frb.org/sbr/.

To compute the redemption values for savings

bonds, fill in the information at the site and click on

the Compute Values button. A maximum of five years

of data will be displayed for each computation.

In our discussion of interest-rate risk, we saw that when interest rates change, a bond

with a longer term to maturity has a larger change in its price and hence more interestrate

risk than a bond with a shorter term to maturity. Although this is a useful general

fact, in order to measure interest-rate risk, the manager of a financial institution

needs more precise information on the actual capital gain or loss that occurs when the

interest rate changes by a certain amount. To do this, the manager needs to make use

of the concept of duration, the average lifetime of a debt security’s stream of payments.

The fact that two bonds have the same term to maturity does not mean that they

have the same interest-rate risk. A long-term discount bond with ten years to maturity,

a so-called zero-coupon bond, makes all of its payments at the end of the ten years,

whereas a 10% coupon bond with ten years to maturity makes substantial cash payments

before the maturity date. Since the coupon bond makes payments earlier than

the zero-coupon bond, we might intuitively guess that the coupon bond’s effective

maturity, the term to maturity that accurately measures interest-rate risk, is shorter

than it is for the zero-coupon discount bond.

Indeed, this is exactly what we find in example 1.

EXAMPLE 1: Rate of Capital Gain

Calculate the rate of capital gain or loss on a ten-year zero-coupon bond for which the

interest rate has increased from 10% to 20%. The bond has a face value of $1,000.

Solution

The rate of capital gain or loss is 49.7%.

g

where

Pt1 price of the bond one year from now $193.81

Pt price of the bond today $385.54

$1,000

(1 0.10)10

$1,000

(1 0.20)9

Pt1 Pt

Pt

Measuring Interest-Rate

Risk: Duration

appendix

to chapter 4

1

Thus:

g

g 0.497 49.7%

But as we have already calculated in Table 2 in Chapter 4, the capital gain on the

10% ten-year coupon bond is 40.3%. We see that interest-rate risk for the ten-year

coupon bond is less than for the ten-year zero-coupon bond, so the effective maturity

on the coupon bond (which measures interest-rate risk) is, as expected, shorter than

the effective maturity on the zero-coupon bond.

To calculate the duration or effective maturity on any debt security, Frederick

Macaulay, a researcher at the National Bureau of Economic Research, invented the

concept of duration more than half a century ago. Because a zero-coupon bond makes

no cash payments before the bond matures, it makes sense to define its effective maturity

as equal to its actual term to maturity. Macaulay then realized that he could measure

the effective maturity of a coupon bond by recognizing that a coupon bond is

equivalent to a set of zero-coupon discount bonds. A ten-year 10% coupon bond with

a face value of $1,000 has cash payments identical to the following set of zero-coupon

bonds: a $100 one-year zero-coupon bond (which pays the equivalent of the $100

coupon payment made by the $1,000 ten-year 10% coupon bond at the end of one

year), a $100 two-year zero-coupon bond (which pays the equivalent of the $100

coupon payment at the end of two years), … , a $100 ten-year zero-coupon bond

(which pays the equivalent of the $100 coupon payment at the end of ten years), and

a $1,000 ten-year zero-coupon bond (which pays back the equivalent of the coupon

bond’s $1,000 face value). This set of coupon bonds is shown in the following time

line:

This same set of coupon bonds is listed in column (2) of Table 1, which calculates the

duration on the ten-year coupon bond when its interest rate is 10%.

To get the effective maturity of this set of zero-coupon bonds, we would want to

sum up the effective maturity of each zero-coupon bond, weighting it by the percentage

of the total value of all the bonds that it represents. In other words, the duration

of this set of zero-coupon bonds is the weighted average of the effective

maturities of the individual zero-coupon bonds, with the weights equaling the proportion

of the total value represented by each zero-coupon bond. We do this in several

steps in Table 1. First we calculate the present value of each of the zero-coupon

bonds when the interest rate is 10% in column (3). Then in column (4) we divide

each of these present values by $1,000, the total present value of the set of zerocoupon

bonds, to get the percentage of the total value of all the bonds that each bond

represents. Note that the sum of the weights in column (4) must total 100%, as shown

at the bottom of the column.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Year When Paid

Amount

$100 $100 $100 $100 $100 $100 $100 $100 $100 $100

$1,000

Calculating

Duration

$193.81 $385.54

$385.54

2 Appendix to Chapter 4

To get the effective maturity of the set of zero-coupon bonds, we add up the

weighted maturities in column (5) and obtain the figure of 6.76 years. This figure for

the effective maturity of the set of zero-coupon bonds is the duration of the 10% tenyear

coupon bond because the bond is equivalent to this set of zero-coupon bonds.

In short, we see that duration is a weighted average of the maturities of the cash

payments.

The duration calculation done in Table 1 can be written as follows:

(1)

where DUR duration

t years until cash payment is made

CPt cash payment (interest plus principal) at time t

i interest rate

n years to maturity of the security

This formula is not as intuitive as the calculation done in Table 1, but it does have the

advantage that it can easily be programmed into a calculator or computer, making

duration calculations very easy.

If we calculate the duration for an 11-year 10% coupon bond when the interest

rate is again 10%, we find that it equals 7.14 years, which is greater than the 6.76

years for the ten-year bond. Thus we have reached the expected conclusion: All else

being equal, the longer the term to maturity of a bond, the longer its duration.

DUR n

t1

CPt

(1 i )t n

t1

CPt

(1 i )t

Measuring Interest-Rate Risk: Duration

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Present

Cash Payments Value (PV) Weights Weighted

(Zero-Coupon of Cash Payments (% of total Maturity

Bonds) (i 10%) PV PV/$1,000) (1 4)/100

Year ($) ($) (%) (years)

1 100 90.91 9.091 0.09091

2 100 82.64 8.264 0.16528

3 100 75.13 7.513 0.22539

4 100 68.30 6.830 0.27320

5 100 62.09 6.209 0.31045

6 100 56.44 5.644 0.33864

7 100 51.32 5.132 0.35924

8 100 46.65 4.665 0.37320

9 100 42.41 4.241 0.38169

10 100 38.55 3.855 0.38550

10 1,000 385.54 38.554 3.85500

Total 1,000.00 100.000 6.75850

Table 1 Calculating Duration on a $1,000 Ten-Year 10% Coupon Bond When Its Interest Rate Is 10%

3

You might think that knowing the maturity of a coupon bond is enough to tell

you what its duration is. However, that is not the case. To see this and to give you

more practice in calculating duration, in Table 2 we again calculate the duration for

the ten-year 10% coupon bond, but when the current interest rate is 20%, rather than

10% as in Table 1. The calculation in Table 2 reveals that the duration of the coupon

bond at this higher interest rate has fallen from 6.76 years to 5.72 years. The explanation

is fairly straightforward. When the interest rate is higher, the cash payments in

the future are discounted more heavily and become less important in present-value

terms relative to the total present value of all the payments. The relative weight for

these cash payments drops as we see in Table 2, and so the effective maturity of the

bond falls. We have come to an important conclusion: All else being equal, when

interest rates rise, the duration of a coupon bond falls.

The duration of a coupon bond is also affected by its coupon rate. For example,

consider a ten-year 20% coupon bond when the interest rate is 10%. Using the same

procedure, we find that its duration at the higher 20% coupon rate is 5.98 years versus

6.76 years when the coupon rate is 10%. The explanation is that a higher coupon

rate means that a relatively greater amount of the cash payments are made earlier in

the life of the bond, and so the effective maturity of the bond must fall. We have thus

established a third fact about duration: All else being equal, the higher the coupon

rate on the bond, the shorter the bond’s duration.

Appendix to Chapter 4

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

Present

Cash Payments Value (PV) Weights Weighted

(Zero-Coupon of Cash Payments (% of total Maturity

Bonds) (i 20%) PV PV/$580.76) (1 4)/100

Year ($) ($) (%) (years)

1 100 83.33 14.348 0.14348

2 100 69.44 11.957 0.23914

3 100 57.87 9.965 0.29895

4 100 48.23 8.305 0.33220

5 100 40.19 6.920 0.34600

6 100 33.49 5.767 0.34602

7 100 27.91 4.806 0.33642

8 100 23.26 4.005 0.32040

9 100 19.38 3.337 0.30033

10 100 16.15 2.781 0.27810

10 $1,000 161.51 27.808 2.78100

Total 580.76 100.000 5.72204

Table 2 Calculating Duration on a $1,000 Ten-Year 10% Coupon Bond When Its Interest Rate Is 20%

4

Study Guide To make certain that you understand how to calculate duration, practice doing the

calculations in Tables 1 and 2. Try to produce the tables for calculating duration in

the case of an 11-year 10% coupon bond and also for the 10-year 20% coupon bond

mentioned in the text when the current interest rate is 10%. Make sure your calculations

produce the same results found in this appendix.

One additional fact about duration makes this concept useful when applied to a

portfolio of securities. Our examples have shown that duration is equal to the

weighted average of the durations of the cash payments (the effective maturities of the

corresponding zero-coupon bonds). So if we calculate the duration for two different

securities, it should be easy to see that the duration of a portfolio of the two securities

is just the weighted average of the durations of the two securities, with the

weights reflecting the proportion of the portfolio invested in each.

EXAMPLE 2: Duration

A manager of a financial institution is holding 25% of a portfolio in a bond with a fiveyear

duration and 75% in a bond with a ten-year duration. What is the duration of the

portfolio?

Solution

The duration of the portfolio is 8.75 years.

(0.25 5) (0.75 10) 1.25 7.5 8.75 years

We now see that the duration of a portfolio of securities is the weighted average

of the durations of the individual securities, with the weights reflecting the proportion

of the portfolio invested in each. This fact about duration is often referred to as

the additive property of duration, and it is extremely useful, because it means that the

duration of a portfolio of securities is easy to calculate from the durations of the individual

securities.

To summarize, our calculations of duration for coupon bonds have revealed

four facts:

1. The longer the term to maturity of a bond, everything else being equal, the

greater its duration.

2. When interest rates rise, everything else being equal, the duration of a coupon

bond falls.

3. The higher the coupon rate on the bond, everything else being equal, the shorter

the bond’s duration.

4. Duration is additive: The duration of a portfolio of securities is the weighted average

of the durations of the individual securities, with the weights reflecting the

proportion of the portfolio invested in each.

Measuring Interest-Rate Risk: Duration 5

Now that we understand how duration is calculated, we want to see how it can be

used by the practicing financial institution manager to measure interest-rate risk.

Duration is a particularly useful concept, because it provides a good approximation,

particularly when interest-rate changes are small, for how much the security price

changes for a given change in interest rates, as the following formula indicates:

(2)

where %P (Pt1 Pt)/Pt percent change in the price of the security

from t to t 1 rate of capital gain

DUR duration

i interest rate

EXAMPLE 3: Duration and Interest-Rate Risk

A pension fund manager is holding a ten-year 10% coupon bond in the fund’s portfolio

and the interest rate is currently 10%. What loss would the fund be exposed to if the

interest rate rises to 11% tomorrow?

Solution

The approximate percentage change in the price of the bond is 6.15%.

As the calculation in Table 1 shows, the duration of a ten-year 10% coupon bond

is 6.76 years.

where

DUR duration 6.76

i change in interest rate 0.11 0.10 0.01

i current interest rate 0.10

Thus:

%P 6.76

%P 0.0615 6.15%

EXAMPLE 4: Duration and Interest-Rate Risk

Now the pension manager has the option to hold a ten-year coupon bond with a coupon

rate of 20% instead of 10%. As mentioned earlier, the duration for this 20% coupon

bond is 5.98 years when the interest rate is 10%. Find the approximate change in the

bond price when the interest rate increases from 10% to 11%.

Solution

This time the approximate change in bond price is 5.4%. This change in bond price

is much smaller than for the higher-duration coupon bond:

%P DUR

i

1 i

0.01

1 0.10

%P DUR

i

1 i

%P DUR

i

1 i

Duration and

Interest-Rate Risk

6 Appendix to Chapter 4

where

DUR duration 5.98

i change in interest rate 0.11 0.10 0.01

i current interest rate 0.10

Thus:

%P 5.98

%P 0.054 5.4%

The pension fund manager realizes that the interest-rate risk on the 20% coupon

bond is less than on the 10% coupon, so he switches the fund out of the 10%

coupon bond and into the 20% coupon bond.

Examples 3 and 4 have led the pension fund manager to an important conclusion

about the relationship of duration and interest-rate risk: The greater the duration of

a security, the greater the percentage change in the market value of the security for

a given change in interest rates. Therefore, the greater the duration of a security,

the greater its interest-rate risk.

This reasoning applies equally to a portfolio of securities. So by calculating the

duration of the fund’s portfolio of securities using the methods outlined here, a pension

fund manager can easily ascertain the amount of interest-rate risk the entire fund

is exposed to. As we will see in Chapter 9, duration is a highly useful concept for the

management of interest-rate risk that is widely used by managers of banks and other

financial institutions.

0.01

1 0.10

Measuring Interest-Rate Risk: Duration 7

PREVIEW In the early 1950s, nominal interest rates on three-month Treasury bills were about

1% at an annual rate; by 1981, they had reached over 15%, then fell to 3% in 1993,

rose to above 5% by the mid-1990s, and fell below 2% in the early 2000s. What

explains these substantial fluctuations in interest rates? One reason why we study

money, banking, and financial markets is to provide some answers to this question.

In this chapter, we examine how the overall level of nominal interest rates (which

we refer to as simply “interest rates”) is determined and which factors influence their

behavior. We learned in Chapter 4 that interest rates are negatively related to the price

of bonds, so if we can explain why bond prices change, we can also explain why interest

rates fluctuate. To do this, we make use of supply and demand analysis for bond

markets and money markets to examine how interest rates change.

In order to derive a demand curve for assets like money or bonds, the first step

in our analysis, we must first understand what determines the demand for these

assets. We do this by examining an economic theory known as the theory of asset

demand, which outlines criteria that are important when deciding how much of an

asset to buy. Armed with this theory, we can then go on to derive the demand curve

for bonds or money. After deriving supply curves for these assets, we develop the

concept of market equilibrium, the point at which the quantity supplied equals the

quantity demanded. Then we use this model to explain changes in equilibrium interest

rates.

Because interest rates on different securities tend to move together, in this chapter

we will proceed as if there were only one type of security and a single interest rate

in the entire economy. In the following chapter, we expand our analysis to look at why

interest rates on different types of securities differ.

Determinants of Asset Demand

Before going on to our supply and demand analysis of the bond market and the market

for money, we must first understand what determines the quantity demanded of

an asset. Recall that an asset is a piece of property that is a store of value. Items such

as money, bonds, stocks, art, land, houses, farm equipment, and manufacturing

machinery are all assets. Facing the question of whether to buy and hold an asset or

85

Chap ter

5 The Behavior of Interest Rates

whether to buy one asset rather than another, an individual must consider the following

factors:

1. Wealth, the total resources owned by the individual, including all assets

2. Expected return (the return expected over the next period) on one asset relative

to alternative assets

3. Risk (the degree of uncertainty associated with the return) on one asset relative

to alternative assets

4. Liquidity (the ease and speed with which an asset can be turned into cash) relative

to alternative assets

Study Guide As we discuss each factor that influences asset demand, remember that we are always

holding all the other factors constant. Also, think of additional examples of how

changes in each factor would influence your decision to purchase a particular asset:

say, a house or a share of common stock. This intuitive approach will help you understand

how the theory works in practice.

When we find that our wealth has increased, we have more resources available with

which to purchase assets, and so, not surprisingly, the quantity of assets we demand

increases. Therefore, the effect of changes in wealth on the quantity demanded of an

asset can be summarized as follows: Holding everything else constant, an increase in

wealth raises the quantity demanded of an asset.

In Chapter 4, we saw that the return on an asset (such as a bond) measures how much

we gain from holding that asset. When we make a decision to buy an asset, we are

influenced by what we expect the return on that asset to be. If a Mobil Oil

Corporation bond, for example, has a return of 15% half the time and 5% the other

half of the time, its expected return (which you can think of as the average return) is

10% ( 0.5 15% 0.5 5%).1 If the expected return on the Mobil Oil bond rises

relative to expected returns on alternative assets, holding everything else constant,

then it becomes more desirable to purchase it, and the quantity demanded increases.

This can occur in either of two ways: (1) when the expected return on the Mobil Oil

bond rises while the return on an alternative asset—say, stock in IBM—remains

unchanged or (2) when the return on the alternative asset, the IBM stock, falls while

the return on the Mobil Oil bond remains unchanged. To summarize, an increase in

an asset’s expected return relative to that of an alternative asset, holding everything

else unchanged, raises the quantity demanded of the asset.

Expected Returns

Wealth

86 PA RT I I Financial Markets

1If you are interested in finding out more information on how to calculate expected returns, as well as standard

deviations of returns that measure risk, you can look at an appendix to this chapter describing models of asset

pricing that is on this book’s web site at www.aw.com/mishkin. This appendix also describes how diversification

lowers the overall risk of a portfolio and has a discussion of systematic risk and basic asset pricing models such

as the capital asset pricing model and arbitrage pricing theory.

The degree of risk or uncertainty of an asset’s returns also affects the demand for the

asset. Consider two assets, stock in Fly-by-Night Airlines and stock in Feet-on-the-

Ground Bus Company. Suppose that Fly-by-Night stock has a return of 15% half the

time and 5% the other half of the time, making its expected return 10%, while stock

in Feet-on-the-Ground has a fixed return of 10%. Fly-by-Night stock has uncertainty

associated with its returns and so has greater risk than stock in Feet-on-the-Ground,

whose return is a sure thing.

A risk-averse person prefers stock in Feet-on-the-Ground (the sure thing) to Flyby-

Night stock (the riskier asset), even though the stocks have the same expected

return, 10%. By contrast, a person who prefers risk is a risk preferrer or risk lover. Most

people are risk-averse, especially in their financial decisions: Everything else being

equal, they prefer to hold the less risky asset. Hence, holding everything else constant,

if an asset’s risk rises relative to that of alternative assets, its quantity

demanded will fall.

Another factor that affects the demand for an asset is how quickly it can be converted

into cash at low costs—its liquidity. An asset is liquid if the market in which it is traded

has depth and breadth; that is, if the market has many buyers and sellers. A house is

not a very liquid asset, because it may be hard to find a buyer quickly; if a house must

be sold to pay off bills, it might have to be sold for a much lower price. And the transaction

costs in selling a house (broker’s commissions, lawyer’s fees, and so on) are substantial.

A U.S. Treasury bill, by contrast, is a highly liquid asset. It can be sold in a

well-organized market where there are many buyers, so it can be sold quickly at low

cost. The more liquid an asset is relative to alternative assets, holding everything

else unchanged, the more desirable it is, and the greater will be the quantity

demanded.

All the determining factors we have just discussed can be assembled into the theory

of asset demand, which states that, holding all of the other factors constant:

1. The quantity demanded of an asset is positively related to wealth.

2. The quantity demanded of an asset is positively related to its expected return relative

to alternative assets.

3. The quantity demanded of an asset is negatively related to the risk of its returns

relative to alternative assets.

4. The quantity demanded of an asset is positively related to its liquidity relative to

alternative assets.

These results are summarized in Table 1.

Supply and Demand in the Bond Market

Our first approach to the analysis of interest-rate determination looks at supply and

demand in the bond market. The first step in the analysis is to obtain a bond demand

curve, which shows the relationship between the quantity demanded and the price

when all other economic variables are held constant (that is, values of other variables

are taken as given). You may recall from previous economics courses that the

Theory of

Asset Demand

Liquidity

Risk

C H A P T E R 5 The Behavior of Interest Rates 87

assumption that all other economic variables are held constant is called ceteris paribus,

which means “other things being equal” in Latin.

To clarify our analysis, let us consider the demand for one-year discount bonds,

which make no coupon payments but pay the owner the $1,000 face value in a year.

If the holding period is one year, then as we have seen in Chapter 4, the return on the

bonds is known absolutely and is equal to the interest rate as measured by the yield

to maturity. This means that the expected return on this bond is equal to the interest

rate i, which, using Equation 6 in Chapter 4, is:

where i interest rate yield to maturity

expected return

F face value of the discount bond

P initial purchase price of the discount bond

This formula shows that a particular value of the interest rate corresponds to each

bond price. If the bond sells for $950, the interest rate and expected return is:

At this 5.3% interest rate and expected return corresponding to a bond price of

$950, let us assume that the quantity of bonds demanded is $100 billion, which is

plotted as point A in Figure 1. To display both the bond price and the corresponding

interest rate, Figure 1 has two vertical axes. The left vertical axis shows the bond price,

with the price of bonds increasing from $750 near the bottom of the axis toward $1,000

at the top. The right vertical axis shows the interest rate, which increases in the opposite

direction from 0% at the top of the axis to 33% near the bottom. The right and left

vertical axes run in opposite directions because, as we learned in Chapter 4, bond

$1,000 $950

$950

0.053 5.3%

RET e

i RETe

F P

P

Demand Curve

88 PA RT I I Financial Markets

Table 1 Response of the Quantity of an Asset Demanded to Changes in Wealth,

Expected Returns, Risk, and Liquidity

S U M M A R Y

Change in

Variable Change in Variable Quantity Demanded

Wealth ↑ ↑

Expected return relative to other assets ↑ ↑

Risk relative to other assets ↑ ↓

Liquidity relative to other assets ↑ ↑

Note: Only increases in the variables are shown. The effect of decreases in the variables on the change in demand would be the opposite

of those indicated in the rightmost column.

price and interest rate are always negatively related: As the price of the bond rises, the

interest rate on the bond necessarily falls.

At a price of $900, the interest rate and expected return equals:

Because the expected return on these bonds is higher, with all other economic variables

(such as income, expected returns on other assets, risk, and liquidity) held constant,

the quantity demanded of bonds will be higher as predicted by the theory of asset

demand. Point B in Figure 1 shows that the quantity of bonds demanded at the price of

$900 has risen to $200 billion. Continuing with this reasoning, if the bond price is $850

(interest rate and expected return 17.6%), the quantity of bonds demanded (point C)

will be greater than at point B. Similarly, at the lower prices of $800 (interest rate

25%) and $750 (interest rate 33.3%), the quantity of bonds demanded will be even

higher (pointsDand E). The curve Bd, which connects these points, is the demand curve

for bonds. It has the usual downward slope, indicating that at lower prices of the bond

(everything else being equal), the quantity demanded is higher.2

$1,000 $900

$900

0.111 11.1%

C H A P T E R 5 The Behavior of Interest Rates 89

2Note that although our analysis indicates that the demand curve is downward-sloping, it does not imply that the curve

is a straight line. For ease of exposition, however, we will draw demand curves and supply curves as straight lines.

100 200 300 400 500

750

800

P* = 850

900

950

1,000

33.0

25.0

17.6 = i *

11.1

5.3

0.0

Quantity of Bonds, B

($ billions)

A

B

C

D

F E

G

H

I

Bs

Bd

Interest Rate, i (%)

(i increases )↑

Price of Bonds, P ($)

(P increases ↑ )

FIGURE 1 Supply and

Demand for Bonds

Equilibrium in the bond market

occurs at point C, the intersection

of the demand curve Bd and

the bond supply curve Bs. The

equilibrium price is P* $850,

and the equilibrium interest rate

is i * 17.6%. (Note: P and i

increase in opposite directions. P

on the left vertical axis increases

as we go up the axis from $750

near the bottom to $1,000 at the

top, while i on the right vertical

axis increases as we go down the

axis from 0% at the top to 33%

near the bottom.)

An important assumption behind the demand curve for bonds in Figure 1 is that all

other economic variables besides the bond’s price and interest rate are held constant.

We use the same assumption in deriving a supply curve, which shows the relationship

between the quantity supplied and the price when all other economic variables

are held constant.

When the price of the bonds is $750 (interest rate 33.3%), point F shows that

the quantity of bonds supplied is $100 billion for the example we are considering. If

the price is $800, the interest rate is the lower rate of 25%. Because at this interest

rate it is now less costly to borrow by issuing bonds, firms will be willing to borrow

more through bond issues, and the quantity of bonds supplied is at the higher level

of $200 billion (point G). An even higher price of $850, corresponding to a lower

interest rate of 17.6%, results in a larger quantity of bonds supplied of $300 billion

(point C). Higher prices of $900 and $950 result in even greater quantities of bonds

supplied (points H and I). The Bs curve, which connects these points, is the supply

curve for bonds. It has the usual upward slope found in supply curves, indicating that

as the price increases (everything else being equal), the quantity supplied increases.

In economics, market equilibrium occurs when the amount that people are willing

to buy (demand) equals the amount that people are willing to sell (supply) at a given

price. In the bond market, this is achieved when the quantity of bonds demanded

equals the quantity of bonds supplied:

Bd Bs (1)

In Figure 1, equilibrium occurs at point C, where the demand and supply curves

intersect at a bond price of $850 (interest rate of 17.6%) and a quantity of bonds of

$300 billion. The price of P* 850, where the quantity demanded equals the quantity

supplied, is called the equilibrium or market-clearing price. Similarly, the interest

rate of i * 17.6% that corresponds to this price is called the equilibrium or marketclearing

interest rate.

The concepts of market equilibrium and equilibrium price or interest rate are

useful, because there is a tendency for the market to head toward them. We can see

that it does in Figure 1 by first looking at what happens when we have a bond price

that is above the equilibrium price. When the price of bonds is set too high, at, say,

$950, the quantity of bonds supplied at point I is greater than the quantity of bonds

demanded at point A. A situation like this, in which the quantity of bonds supplied

exceeds the quantity of bonds demanded, is called a condition of excess supply.

Because people want to sell more bonds than others want to buy, the price of the

bonds will fall, and this is why the downward arrow is drawn in the figure at the bond

price of $950. As long as the bond price remains above the equilibrium price, there

will continue to be an excess supply of bonds, and the price will continue to fall. This

will stop only when the price has reached the equilibrium price of $850, where the

excess supply of bonds has been eliminated.

Now let’s look at what happens when the price of bonds is below the equilibrium

price. If the price of the bonds is set too low, at, say, $750, the quantity demanded at

point E is greater than the quantity supplied at point F. This is called a condition of

excess demand. People now want to buy more bonds than others are willing to sell,

and so the price of bonds will be driven up. This is illustrated by the upward arrow

drawn in the figure at the bond price of $750. Only when the excess demand for

Market

Equilibrium

Supply Curve

90 PA RT I I Financial Markets

bonds is eliminated by the price rising to the equilibrium level of $850 is there no further

tendency for the price to rise.

We can see that the concept of equilibrium price is a useful one because it indicates

where the market will settle. Because each price on the left vertical axis of Figure 1 corresponds

to a value of the interest rate on the right vertical axis, the same diagram also

shows that the interest rate will head toward the equilibrium interest rate of 17.6%.

When the interest rate is below the equilibrium interest rate, as it is when it is at 5.3%,

the price of the bond is above the equilibrium price, and there will be an excess supply

of bonds. The price of the bond then falls, leading to a rise in the interest rate toward

the equilibrium level. Similarly, when the interest rate is above the equilibrium level, as

it is when it is at 33.3%, there is excess demand for bonds, and the bond price will rise,

driving the interest rate back down to the equilibrium level of 17.6%.

Our Figure 1 is a conventional supply and demand diagram with price on the left vertical

axis and quantity on the horizontal axis. Because the interest rate that corresponds

to each bond price is also marked on the right vertical axis, this diagram

allows us to read the equilibrium interest rate, giving us a model that describes the

determination of interest rates. It is important to recognize that a supply and demand

diagram like Figure 1 can be drawn for any type of bond because the interest rate and

price of a bond are always negatively related for any type of bond, whether a discount

bond or a coupon bond.

Throughout this book we will use diagrams like Figure 1 and analyze interest rate

behavior in terms of the supply and demand for bonds. However, the analysis of the

bond market that we have developed here has another interpretation with a different

terminology. Here we discuss this other terminology, which is couched in terms of the

supply and demand for loanable funds used by some economists. We include this discussion

in case you come across this other terminology, but you will not need to make

use of it to understand how interest rates are determined.

One disadvantage of the diagram in Figure 1 is that interest rates run in an

unusual direction on the right vertical axis: As we go up the right axis, interest rates

fall. Because economists are typically more concerned with the value of interest rates

than with the price of bonds, we could plot the supply of and demand for bonds on

a diagram that has only a left vertical axis that provides the values of the interest rates

running in the usual direction, rising as we go up the axis. Figure 2 is such a diagram,

in which points A through I match the corresponding points in Figure 1.

However, making interest rates run in the “usual” direction on the vertical axis

presents us with a problem. Our demand curve for bonds, points A through E, now

looks peculiar because it has an upward slope. This upward slope is, however, completely

consistent with our usual demand analysis, which produces a negative relationship

between price and quantity. The inverse relationship between bond prices

and interest rates means that in moving from point A to point B to point C, bond

prices are falling and, consistent with usual demand analysis, the quantity demanded

is rising. Similarly, our supply curve for bonds, points F through I, has an unusuallooking

downward slope but is completely consistent with the usual view that price

and the quantity supplied are positively related.

One way to give the demand curve the usual downward slope and the supply

curve the usual upward slope is to rename the horizontal axis and the demand and

Loanable Funds

Framework

Supply and

Demand Analysis

C H A P T E R 5 The Behavior of Interest Rates 91

supply curves. Because a firm supplying bonds is in fact taking out a loan from a person

buying a bond, “supplying a bond” is equivalent to “demanding a loan.” Thus the

supply curve for bonds can be reinterpreted as indicating the quantity of loans

demanded for each value of the interest rate. If we rename the horizontal axis loanable

funds, defined as the quantity of loans, the supply of bonds can be reinterpreted as

the demand for loanable funds. Similarly, the demand curve for bonds can be reidentified

as the supply of loanable funds because buying (demanding) a bond is equivalent

to supplying a loan. Figure 2 relabels the curves and the horizontal axis using the

loanable funds terminology in parentheses, and now the renamed loanable funds

demand curve has the usual downward slope and the renamed loanable funds supply

curve the usual upward slope.

Because supply and demand diagrams that explain how interest rates are determined

in the bond market often use the loanable funds terminology, this analysis is

frequently referred to as the loanable funds framework. However, because in later

chapters describing the conduct of monetary policy we focus on how the demand for

and supply of bonds is affected, we will continue to conduct supply and demand

analysis in terms of bonds, as in Figure 1, rather than loanable funds. Whether the

analysis is done in terms of loanable funds or in terms of the demand for and supply

92 PA RT I I Financial Markets

33.0

100 200 300 400 500 600

25.0

i * = 17.6

11.1

5.3

0.0

Quantity of Bonds, B

(Loanable Funds, L)

($ billions)

C

Supply of Bonds, Bs

(Demand for Loanable Funds, Ld )

Demand for Bonds, Bd

(Supply of Loanable Funds, Ls )

Interest Rate, i (%)

(i increases ↑ )

F

G

H

A I

B

D

E

FIGURE 2 A Comparison of Terminology: Loanable Funds and Supply and Demand for Bonds

The demand for bonds is equivalent to the supply of loanable funds, and the supply of bonds is equivalent to the demand for loanable

funds. (Note: i increases as we go up the vertical axis, in contrast to Figure 1, in which the opposite occurs.)

of bonds, the results are the same: The two ways of analyzing the determination of

interest rates are equivalent.

An important feature of the analysis here is that supply and demand are always

in terms of stocks (amounts at a given point in time) of assets, not in terms of flows.

This approach is somewhat different from certain loanable funds analyses, which are

conducted in terms of flows (loans per year). The asset market approach for understanding

behavior in financial markets—which emphasizes stocks of assets rather

than flows in determining asset prices—is now the dominant methodology used by

economists, because correctly conducting analyses in terms of flows is very tricky,

especially when we encounter inflation.3

Changes in Equilibrium Interest Rates

We will now use the supply and demand framework for bonds to analyze why interest

rates change. To avoid confusion, it is important to make the distinction between

movements along a demand (or supply) curve and shifts in a demand (or supply) curve.

When quantity demanded (or supplied) changes as a result of a change in the price

of the bond (or, equivalently, a change in the interest rate), we have a movement along

the demand (or supply) curve. The change in the quantity demanded when we move

from point A to B to C in Figure 1, for example, is a movement along a demand curve.

A shift in the demand (or supply) curve, by contrast, occurs when the quantity

demanded (or supplied) changes at each given price (or interest rate) of the bond in

response to a change in some other factor besides the bond’s price or interest rate.

When one of these factors changes, causing a shift in the demand or supply curve,

there will be a new equilibrium value for the interest rate.

In the following pages, we will look at how the supply and demand curves shift

in response to changes in variables, such as expected inflation and wealth, and what

effects these changes have on the equilibrium value of interest rates.

The theory of asset demand demonstrated at the beginning of the chapter provides a

framework for deciding what factors cause the demand curve for bonds to shift. These

factors include changes in four parameters:

1. Wealth

2. Expected returns on bonds relative to alternative assets

3. Risk of bonds relative to alternative assets

4. Liquidity of bonds relative to alternative assets

To see how a change in each of these factors (holding all other factors constant) can

shift the demand curve, let us look at some examples. (As a study aid, Table 2 summarizes

the effects of changes in these factors on the bond demand curve.)

Shifts in the

Demand for

Bonds

C H A P T E R 5 The Behavior of Interest Rates 93

3The asset market approach developed in the text is useful in understanding not only how interest rates behave

but also how any asset price is determined. A second appendix to this chapter, which is on this book’s web site

at www.aw.com/mishkin, shows how the asset market approach can be applied to understanding the behavior of

commodity markets; in particular, the gold market.

94 PA RT I I Financial Markets

S U M M A R Y Table 2 Factors That Shift the Demand Curve for Bonds

Change in

Change in Quantity Shift in

Variable Variable Demanded Demand Curve

Wealth ↑ ↑

Expected interest rate ↑ ↓

Expected inflation ↑ ↓

Riskiness of bonds ↑ ↓

relative to other assets

Liquidity of bonds ↑ ↑

relative to other assets

Note: P and i increase in opposite directions: P on the left vertical axis increases as we go up the axis, while i on the right vertical axis increases

as we go down the axis. Only increases in the variables are shown. The effect of decreases in the variables on the change in demand would

be the opposite of those indicated in the remaining columns.

B d1B d2

(increases )↑

(increases )↑

(increases )↑

(increases )↑

(increases ↑)

P

(increases ↑)

P

(increases ↑)

P

(increases ↑)

P

B

B

B

B

B d1

B d2

B d1

B d2

B d1

B d2

(increases )↑

(increases ↑)

P

B

B d1

B d2

Wealth. When the economy is growing rapidly in a business cycle expansion and

wealth is increasing, the quantity of bonds demanded at each bond price (or interest

rate) increases as shown in Figure 3. To see how this works, consider point B on the

initial demand curve for bonds Bd

1. It tells us that at a bond price of $900 and an interest

rate of 11.1%, the quantity of bonds demanded is $200 billion. With higher

wealth, the quantity of bonds demanded at the same interest rate must rise, say, to

$400 billion (point B). Similarly, the higher wealth causes the quantity demanded at

a bond price of $800 and an interest rate of 25% to rise from $400 billion to $600

billion (point D to D). Continuing with this reasoning for every point on the initial

demand curve Bd

1, we can see that the demand curve shifts to the right from Bd

1 to Bd

2

as is indicated by the arrows.

The conclusion we have reached is that in a business cycle expansion with growing

wealth, the demand for bonds rises and the demand curve for bonds shifts to the

right. Using the same reasoning, in a recession, when income and wealth are falling,

the demand for bonds falls, and the demand curve shifts to the left.

Another factor that affects wealth is the public’s propensity to save. If households

save more, wealth increases and, as we have seen, the demand for bonds rises and the

demand curve for bonds shifts to the right. Conversely, if people save less, wealth and

the demand for bonds will fall and the demand curve shifts to the left.

Expected Returns. For a one-year discount bond and a one-year holding period, the

expected return and the interest rate are identical, so nothing besides today’s interest

rate affects the expected return.

C H A P T E R 5 The Behavior of Interest Rates 95

FIGURE 3 Shift in the

Demand Curve for Bonds

When the demand for bonds

increases, the demand curve

shifts to the right as shown.

(Note: P and i increase in opposite

directions. P on the left

vertical axis increases as we go

up the axis, while i on the right

vertical axis increases as we go

down the axis.)

A

B

C

D

E

A

B

C

D

E

750

800

850

900

950

1,000

100 200 300 400 500 600 700

Quantity of Bonds, B

($ billions)

0.0

5.3

11.1

17.6

25.0

33.0

Bd

1

Bd

2

Price of Bonds, P

(P increases )

Interest Rate, i (%)

(i increases )↑ ↑

For bonds with maturities of greater than one year, the expected return may differ

from the interest rate. For example, we saw in Chapter 4, Table 2, that a rise in the

interest rate on a long-term bond from 10 to 20% would lead to a sharp decline in

price and a very negative return. Hence if people begin to think that interest rates will

be higher next year than they had originally anticipated, the expected return today on

long-term bonds would fall, and the quantity demanded would fall at each interest

rate. Higher expected interest rates in the future lower the expected return for longterm

bonds, decrease the demand, and shift the demand curve to the left.

By contrast, a revision downward of expectations of future interest rates would

mean that long-term bond prices would be expected to rise more than originally

anticipated, and the resulting higher expected return today would raise the quantity

demanded at each bond price and interest rate. Lower expected interest rates in the

future increase the demand for long-term bonds and shift the demand curve to the

right (as in Figure 3).

Changes in expected returns on other assets can also shift the demand curve for

bonds. If people suddenly became more optimistic about the stock market and began

to expect higher stock prices in the future, both expected capital gains and expected

returns on stocks would rise. With the expected return on bonds held constant, the

expected return on bonds today relative to stocks would fall, lowering the demand for

bonds and shifting the demand curve to the left.

A change in expected inflation is likely to alter expected returns on physical assets

(also called real assets) such as automobiles and houses, which affect the demand for

bonds. An increase in expected inflation, say, from 5 to 10%, will lead to higher prices

on cars and houses in the future and hence higher nominal capital gains. The resulting

rise in the expected returns today on these real assets will lead to a fall in the

expected return on bonds relative to the expected return on real assets today and thus

cause the demand for bonds to fall. Alternatively, we can think of the rise in expected

inflation as lowering the real interest rate on bonds, and the resulting decline in the

relative expected return on bonds causes the demand for bonds to fall. An increase

in the expected rate of inflation lowers the expected return for bonds, causing their

demand to decline and the demand curve to shift to the left.

Risk. If prices in the bond market become more volatile, the risk associated with

bonds increases, and bonds become a less attractive asset. An increase in the riskiness

of bonds causes the demand for bonds to fall and the demand curve to shift to

the left.

Conversely, an increase in the volatility of prices in another asset market, such as

the stock market, would make bonds more attractive. An increase in the riskiness of

alternative assets causes the demand for bonds to rise and the demand curve to shift

to the right (as in Figure 3).

Liquidity. If more people started trading in the bond market, and as a result it became

easier to sell bonds quickly, the increase in their liquidity would cause the quantity of

bonds demanded at each interest rate to rise. Increased liquidity of bonds results in

an increased demand for bonds, and the demand curve shifts to the right (see Figure

3). Similarly, increased liquidity of alternative assets lowers the demand for bonds

and shifts the demand curve to the left. The reduction of brokerage commissions for

trading common stocks that occurred when the fixed-rate commission structure was

96 PA RT I I Financial Markets

abolished in 1975, for example, increased the liquidity of stocks relative to bonds,

and the resulting lower demand for bonds shifted the demand curve to the left.

Certain factors can cause the supply curve for bonds to shift, among them these:

1. Expected profitability of investment opportunities

2. Expected inflation

3. Government activities

We will look at how the supply curve shifts when each of these factors changes (all

others remaining constant). (As a study aid, Table 3 summarizes the effects of changes

in these factors on the bond supply curve.)

Shifts in the

Supply of Bonds

C H A P T E R 5 The Behavior of Interest Rates 97

S U M M A R Y Table 3 Factors That Shift the Supply of Bonds

Change in

Change in Quantity Shift in

Variable Variable Supplied Supply Curve

Profitability of ↑ ↑

investments

Expected inflation ↑ ↑

Government deficit ↑ ↑

Note: P and i increase in opposite directions: P on the left vertical axis increases as we go up the axis, while i on the right vertical axis increases

as we go down the axis. Only increases in the variables are shown. The effect of decreases in the variables on the change in supply would

be the opposite of those indicated in the remaining columns.

B s2

B s1

B

(increases ↑)

P

(increases )↑

B s2

B s1

B

(increases ↑)

P

(increases )↑

B s2

B s1

B

(increases ↑)

P

(increases )↑

Expected Profitability of Investment Opportunities. The more profitable plant and

equipment investments that a firm expects it can make, the more willing it will be to

borrow in order to finance these investments. When the economy is growing rapidly,

as in a business cycle expansion, investment opportunities that are expected to be

profitable abound, and the quantity of bonds supplied at any given bond price and

interest rate will increase (see Figure 4). Therefore, in a business cycle expansion, the

supply of bonds increases, and the supply curve shifts to the right. Likewise, in a

recession, when there are far fewer expected profitable investment opportunities,

the supply of bonds falls, and the supply curve shifts to the left.

Expected Inflation. As we saw in Chapter 4, the real cost of borrowing is more accurately

measured by the real interest rate, which equals the (nominal) interest rate

minus the expected inflation rate. For a given interest rate, when expected inflation

increases, the real cost of borrowing falls; hence the quantity of bonds supplied

increases at any given bond price and interest rate. An increase in expected inflation

causes the supply of bonds to increase and the supply curve to shift to the right (see

Figure 4).

Government Activities. The activities of the government can influence the supply of

bonds in several ways. The U.S. Treasury issues bonds to finance government deficits,

the gap between the government’s expenditures and its revenues. When these deficits

are large, the Treasury sells more bonds, and the quantity of bonds supplied at each

bond price and interest rate increases. Higher government deficits increase the supply

of bonds and shift the supply curve to the right (see Figure 4). On the other hand,

98 PA RT I I Financial Markets

FIGURE 4 Shift in the

Supply Curve for Bonds

When the supply of bonds

increases, the supply curve shifts

to the right. (Note: P and i

increase in opposite directions. P

on the left vertical axis increases

as we go up the axis, while i on

the right vertical axis increases

as we go down the axis.)

F

750

800

850

900

950

1,000

100 200 300 400 500 600 700

Quantity of Bonds, B

($ billions)

0.0

5.3

11.1

17.6

25.0

33.0

Price of Bonds, P ($)

(P increases )

Interest Rate, i (%)

(i increases )↑ ↑

I

H

C

G

F

I

H

C

G

Bs1

Bs2

ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special

.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt

Contains historical information

about inflation.

government surpluses, as occurred in the late 1990s, decrease the supply of bonds

and shift the supply curve to the left.

State and local governments and other government agencies also issue bonds to

finance their expenditures, and this can also affect the supply of bonds. We will see

in later chapters that the conduct of monetary policy involves the purchase and sale

of bonds, which in turn influences the supply of bonds.

C H A P T E R 5 The Behavior of Interest Rates 99

Changes in the Equilibrium Interest Rate Due to Expected Inflation

or Business Cycle Expansions

Application

We now can use our knowledge of how supply and demand curves shift to

analyze how the equilibrium interest rate can change. The best way to do this

is to pursue several applications that are particularly relevant to our understanding

of how monetary policy affects interest rates.

Study Guide Supply and demand analysis for the bond market is best learned by practicing

applications. When there is an application in the text and we look at how

the interest rate changes because some economic variable increases, see if you

can draw the appropriate shifts in the supply and demand curves when this

same economic variable decreases. While you are practicing applications,

keep two things in mind:

1. When you examine the effect of a variable change, remember that we are

assuming that all other variables are unchanged; that is, we are making

use of the ceteris paribus assumption.

2. Remember that the interest rate is negatively related to the bond price,

so when the equilibrium bond price rises, the equilibrium interest rate

falls. Conversely, if the equilibrium bond price moves downward, the

equilibrium interest rate rises.

We have already done most of the work to evaluate how a change in expected

inflation affects the nominal interest rate, in that we have already analyzed

how a change in expected inflation shifts the supply and demand curves.

Figure 5 shows the effect on the equilibrium interest rate of an increase in

expected inflation.

Suppose that expected inflation is initially 5% and the initial supply and

demand curves Bs

1 and Bd

1 intersect at point 1, where the equilibrium bond

price is P1 and the equilibrium interest rate is i1. If expected inflation rises to

10%, the expected return on bonds relative to real assets falls for any given

bond price and interest rate. As a result, the demand for bonds falls, and the

demand curve shifts to the left from Bd

1 to Bd

2. The rise in expected inflation

also shifts the supply curve. At any given bond price and interest rate, the

real cost of borrowing has declined, causing the quantity of bonds supplied

to increase, and the supply curve shifts to the right, from Bs

1 to B s

2.

When the demand and supply curves shift in response to the change in

expected inflation, the equilibrium moves from point 1 to point 2, the intersection

Changes in

Expected Inflation:

The Fisher Effect

100 PA RT I I Financial Markets

FIGURE 5 Response to a

Change in Expected Inflation

When expected inflation rises,

the supply curve shifts from Bs

1

to Bs2

, and the demand curve

shifts from Bd

1 to Bd

2 . The equilibrium

moves from point 1 to

point 2, with the result that the

equilibrium bond price (left

axis) falls from P1 to P2 and the

equilibrium interest rate (right

axis) rises from i1 to i2. (Note: P

and i increase in opposite

directions. P on the left vertical

axis increases as we go up the

axis, while i on the right vertical

axis increases as we go

down the axis.)

1

2

Bd

1

Bd

2

i1

i2

P1

P2

Price of Bonds, P

(P increases )

Interest Rate, i

(i increases )

Quantity of Bonds, B

↑ ↑

Bs

1

Bs

2

of Bd

2 and Bs

2. The equilibrium bond price has fallen from P1 to P2, and

because the bond price is negatively related to the interest rate (as is indicated

by the interest rate rising as we go down the right vertical axis), this means

that the interest rate has risen from i1 to i2. Note that Figure 5 has been drawn

so that the equilibrium quantity of bonds remains the same for both point 1

and point 2. However, depending on the size of the shifts in the supply and

demand curves, the equilibrium quantity of bonds could either rise or fall

when expected inflation rises.

Our supply and demand analysis has led us to an important observation:

When expected inflation rises, interest rates will rise. This result has been

named the Fisher effect, after Irving Fisher, the economist who first pointed

out the relationship of expected inflation to interest rates. The accuracy of

this prediction is shown in Figure 6. The interest rate on three-month

Treasury bills has usually moved along with the expected inflation rate.

Consequently, it is understandable that many economists recommend that

inflation must be kept low if we want to keep interest rates low.

Figure 7 analyzes the effects of a business cycle expansion on interest rates.

In a business cycle expansion, the amounts of goods and services being produced

in the economy rise, so national income increases. When this occurs,

businesses will be more willing to borrow, because they are likely to have

many profitable investment opportunities for which they need financing.

Hence at a given bond price and interest rate, the quantity of bonds that firms

want to sell (that is, the supply of bonds) will increase. This means that in a

business cycle expansion, the supply curve for bonds shifts to the right (see

Figure 7) from Bs

1 to Bs

2.

Business Cycle

Expansion

C H A P T E R 5 The Behavior of Interest Rates 101

FIGURE 6 Expected Inflation and Interest Rates (Three-Month Treasury Bills), 1953–2002

Source: Expected inflation calculated using procedures outlined in Frederic S. Mishkin, “The Real Interest Rate: An Empirical Investigation,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference

Series on Public Policy 15 (1981): 151–200. These procedures involve estimating expected inflation as a function of past interest rates, inflation, and time trends.

1955

20

16

12

8

4

0

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Annual Rate (%)

1965 1975 1985 1995

Interest Rate

Expected Inflation

FIGURE 7 Response to a

Business Cycle Expansion

In a business cycle expansion,

when income and wealth are

rising, the demand curve shifts

rightward from Bd

1 to Bd

2, and

the supply curve shifts rightward

from Bs1

to Bs

2. If the supply

curve shifts to the right

more than the demand curve, as

in this figure, the equilibrium

bond price (left axis) moves down

from P1 to P2, and the equilibrium

interest rate (right axis) rises

from i1 to i2. (Note: P and i

increase in opposite directions.

P on the left vertical axis

increases as we go up the axis,

while i on the right vertical axis

increases as we go down the

axis.)

Price of Bonds, P

(P increases )

Interest Rate, i

(i increases )

Quantity of Bonds, B

↑ ↑

1

2

Bd

1

Bd

2

i 1

i 2

P1

P2

Bs1

Bs2

102 PA RT I I Financial Markets

Expansion in the economy will also affect the demand for bonds. As the

business cycle expands, wealth is likely to increase, and then the theory of

asset demand tells us that the demand for bonds will rise as well. We see this

in Figure 7, where the demand curve has shifted to the right, from Bd

1 to Bd

2.

Given that both the supply and demand curves have shifted to the right,

we know that the new equilibrium reached at the intersection of Bd

2 and Bs

2

must also move to the right. However, depending on whether the supply

curve shifts more than the demand curve or vice versa, the new equilibrium

interest rate can either rise or fall.

The supply and demand analysis used here gives us an ambiguous

answer to the question of what will happen to interest rates in a business

cycle expansion. The figure has been drawn so that the shift in the supply

curve is greater than the shift in the demand curve, causing the equilibrium

bond price to fall to P2, leading to a rise in the equilibrium interest rate to i2.

The reason the figure has been drawn so that a business cycle expansion and

a rise in income lead to a higher interest rate is that this is the outcome we

actually see in the data. Figure 8 plots the movement of the interest rate on

three-month U.S. Treasury bills from 1951 to 2002 and indicates when the

business cycle is undergoing recessions (shaded areas). As you can see, the

interest rate rises during business cycle expansions and falls during recessions,

which is what the supply and demand diagram indicates.

FIGURE 8 Business Cycle and Interest Rates (Three-Month Treasury Bills), 1951–2002

Shaded areas indicate periods of recession. The figure shows that interest rates rise during business cycle expansions and fall during contractions,

which is what Figure 7 suggests would happen.

Source: Federal Reserve: www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/data.htm.

16

14

18

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990

Interest Rate

(%)

1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2000

Interest Rate

C H A P T E R 5 The Behavior of Interest Rates 103

Application Explaining Low Japanese Interest Rates

In the 1990s and early 2000s, Japanese interest rates became the lowest in

the world. Indeed, in November 1998, an extraordinary event occurred:

Interest rates on Japanese six-month Treasury bills turned slightly negative

(see Chapter 4). Why did Japanese rates drop to such low levels?

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Japan experienced a prolonged recession,

which was accompanied by deflation, a negative inflation rate. Using

these facts, analysis similar to that used in the preceding application explains

the low Japanese interest rates.

Negative inflation caused the demand for bonds to rise because the

expected return on real assets fell, thereby raising the relative expected return

on bonds and in turn causing the demand curve to shift to the right. The negative

inflation also raised the real interest rate and therefore the real cost of

borrowing for any given nominal rate, thereby causing the supply of bonds

to contract and the supply curve to shift to the left. The outcome was then

exactly the opposite of that graphed in Figure 5: The rightward shift of the

demand curve and leftward shift of the supply curve led to a rise in the bond

price and a fall in interest rates.

The business cycle contraction and the resulting lack of investment

opportunities in Japan also led to lower interest rates, by decreasing the supply

of bonds and shifting the supply curve to the left. Although the demand

curve also would shift to the left because wealth decreased during the business

cycle contraction, we have seen in the preceding application that the

demand curve would shift less than the supply curve. Thus, the bond price

rose and interest rates fell (the opposite outcome to that in Figure 7).

Usually, we think that low interest rates are a good thing, because they

make it cheap to borrow. But the Japanese example shows that just as there

is a fallacy in the adage, “You can never be too rich or too thin”: (maybe you

can’t be too rich, but you can certainly be too thin and do damage to your

health), there is a fallacy in always thinking that lower interest rates are better.

In Japan, the low and even negative interest rates were a sign that the

Japanese economy was in real trouble, with falling prices and a contracting

economy. Only when the Japanese economy returns to health will interest

rates rise back to more normal levels.

Application Reading the Wall Street Journal “Credit Markets” Column

Now that we have an understanding of how supply and demand determine

prices and interest rates in the bond market, we can use our analysis to

understand discussions about bond prices and interest rates appearing in the

financial press. Every day, the Wall Street Journal reports on developments in

the bond market on the previous business day in its “Credit Markets” column,

an example of which is found in the “Following the Financial News”

box. Let’s see how statements in the “Credit Markets” column can be

explained using our supply and demand framework.

104 PA RT I I Financial Markets

The column describes how the coming announcement of the Bush stimulus

package, which was larger than expected, has led to a decline in the prices

of Treasury bonds. This is exactly what our supply and demand analysis predicts

would happen.

The larger than expected stimulus package has raised concerns about rising

future issuance of government bonds, as is mentioned in the second paragraph.

The increased supply of bonds in the future will thus shift the supply

curve to the right, thereby lowering the price of these bonds in the future by

more than expected. The resulting decline in the expected return on these

bonds because of their higher future price will lead to an immediate rightward

shift in the demand for these bonds today. The outcome is thus a fall in their

equilibrium price and a rise in their interest rates.

Our analysis thus demonstrates why, even though the Bush plan has not

increased the supply of bonds today, the price of these bonds falls immediately.

BY MICHAEL MACKENZIE

Dow Jones Newswires

NEW YORK—Already buckling amid signs

of improvement in the economy and a departure

of investors seeking better returns in corporate

bonds and equities, Treasurys face

another bearish element when President Bush

outlines his fiscal-stimulus package today.

Reports that the package could total

about $600 billion over 10 years, much

larger than expected by bond investors, contributed

to a further selloff yesterday amid

concerns about rising future issuance of government

bonds.

After closing 2002 around 2.73% and

3.81%, respectively, five-year and 10-year

Treasury yields have risen sharply in the new

year. Yesterday, five-year and 10-year yields

ended at 3.04% and 4.06%, respectively, up

from 2.98% and 4.03% Friday.

The benchmark 10-year note’s price,

which moves inversely to its yield, at 4 p.m.

was down 11/32 point, or $3.44 per $1,000

face value, at 99 15/32.

The 30-year bond’s price was down 14/32

point at 105 27/32 to yield 4.984%, up from

4.949% Friday.

The selloff was concentrated in shortermaturity

Treasurys, as investors sold those

issues while buying long-dated Treasurys in

so-called curve-flattening trades. Later, hedging

related to nongovernment bond issues

helped lift prices from lows but failed to

spark any real rally.

Although uncertainty about geopolitical

issues continued to lend some support to

Treasurys, the proposed Bush stimulus package

“is front and center for the Treasurys

market at the moment,” said Michael

Kastner, head of taxable fixed income for

Deutsche Private Banking, New York.

“Details are leaking out, and Treasurys are

selling off.”

The prospect of rising government spending

means more Treasury issuance, concentrated

in the five-and 10-year areas, analysts

said. Lehman Brothers forecast “net supply”

of Treasurys would increase about $300 billion

this year.

“The Treasury market already reflects the

assumption that a large stimulus package

will be unveiled,” said Joseph Shatz, government-

securities strategist at Merrill Lynch.

However, he noted that key questions for the

market are “what elements of stimulus will

be passed, and the time frame of stimulus

objectives.”

Indeed, there are some factors that mitigate

the package’s short-term impact on the

economy and the market, some added.

Analysts at Wrightson ICAP in Jersey City,

N.J., said roughly half of a $500 billion to

$600 billion stimulus package “will be

longer-term supply-side tax reform measures

spread evenly over the period, while the

other half would be more quick-focused fixes

for the business cycle.”

The proposal to eliminate taxes individuals

pay on dividends would boost stocks,

likely at the expense of bonds, analysts said.

They also noted that the Bush proposals

have to muster congressional support, which

could take some time.

Yet, most added, there is no escaping the

sense that the stars are aligned against the

Treasury market this year, with a hefty stimulus

package another bleak factor clouding

the outlook for government bonds.

“Treasury yields are currently too low,” said

Deutsche’s Mr. Kastner. “Uncertainty over Iraq

is maintaining some support for Treasurys,

but we are starting to sense that the mood of

the market is one of selling the rallies.”

Treasurys Drop Ahead of Bush Stimulus Package

Selloff Is Fueled by Reports Of More Extensive Plan Than Investors Expected

CREDIT MARKETS

Source: Wall Street Journal, Tuesday, January 7, 2003, p. C14.

Following the Financial News

The “Credit Markets” column appears daily in

the Wall Street Journal; an example is presented here.

It is found in the third section, “Money and Investing.”

The “Credit Markets” Column

Supply and Demand in the Market for Money:

The Liquidity Preference Framework

Whereas the loanable funds framework determines the equilibrium interest rate using

the supply of and demand for bonds, an alternative model developed by John

Maynard Keynes, known as the liquidity preference framework, determines the

equilibrium interest rate in terms of the supply of and demand for money. Although

the two frameworks look different, the liquidity preference analysis of the market for

money is closely related to the loanable funds framework of the bond market.4

The starting point of Keynes’s analysis is his assumption that there are two main

categories of assets that people use to store their wealth: money and bonds. Therefore,

total wealth in the economy must equal the total quantity of bonds plus money in the

economy, which equals the quantity of bonds supplied (Bs) plus the quantity of

money supplied (Ms). The quantity of bonds (Bd) and money (Md) that people want

to hold and thus demand must also equal the total amount of wealth, because people

cannot purchase more assets than their available resources allow. The conclusion is

that the quantity of bonds and money supplied must equal the quantity of bonds and

money demanded:

Bs Ms Bd Md (2)

Collecting the bond terms on one side of the equation and the money terms on

the other, this equation can be rewritten as:

Bs Bd Md Ms (3)

The rewritten equation tells us that if the market for money is in equilibrium (Ms

Md ), the right-hand side of Equation 3 equals zero, implying that Bs Bd, meaning

that the bond market is also in equilibrium.

Thus it is the same to think about determining the equilibrium interest rate by

equating the supply and demand for bonds or by equating the supply and demand

for money. In this sense, the liquidity preference framework, which analyzes the market

for money, is equivalent to the loanable funds framework, which analyzes the

bond market. In practice, the approaches differ, because by assuming that there are

only two kinds of assets, money and bonds, the liquidity preference approach implicitly

ignores any effects on interest rates that arise from changes in the expected returns

on real assets such as automobiles and houses. In most instances, however, both

frameworks yield the same predictions.

The reason that we approach the determination of interest rates with both frameworks

is that the loanable funds framework is easier to use when analyzing the effects

from changes in expected inflation, whereas the liquidity preference framework provides

a simpler analysis of the effects from changes in income, the price level, and the

supply of money.

Because the definition of money that Keynes used includes currency (which earns

no interest) and checking account deposits (which in his time typically earned little

C H A P T E R 5 The Behavior of Interest Rates 105

4Note that the term market for money refers to the market for the medium of exchange, money. This market differs

from the money market referred to by finance practitioners, which is the financial market in which short-term

debt instruments are traded.

or no interest), he assumed that money has a zero rate of return. Bonds, the only alternative

asset to money in Keynes’s framework, have an expected return equal to the

interest rate i.5 As this interest rate rises (holding everything else unchanged), the

expected return on money falls relative to the expected return on bonds, and as the

theory of asset demand tells us, this causes the demand for money to fall.

We can also see that the demand for money and the interest rate should be negatively

related by using the concept of opportunity cost, the amount of interest

(expected return) sacrificed by not holding the alternative asset—in this case, a bond.

As the interest rate on bonds, i, rises, the opportunity cost of holding money rises,

and so money is less desirable and the quantity of money demanded must fall.

Figure 9 shows the quantity of money demanded at a number of interest rates,

with all other economic variables, such as income and the price level, held constant.

At an interest rate of 25%, point A shows that the quantity of money demanded is $100

billion. If the interest rate is at the lower rate of 20%, the opportunity cost of money is

lower, and the quantity of money demanded rises to $200 billion, as indicated by the

move from point A to point B. If the interest rate is even lower, the quantity of money

demanded is even higher, as is indicated by points C, D, and E. The curve Md connecting

these points is the demand curve for money, and it slopes downward.

At this point in our analysis, we will assume that a central bank controls the

amount of money supplied at a fixed quantity of $300 billion, so the supply curve for

106 PA RT I I Financial Markets

FIGURE 9 Equilibrium in the

Market for Money

5

10

20

25

30

0 200 300 400 500 600

i * = 15

Quantity of Money, M

($ billions)

Ms

Md

100

Interest Rate, i

(%)

A

B

C

D

E

5Keynes did not actually assume that the expected returns on bonds equaled the interest rate but rather argued

that they were closely related (see Chapter 24). This distinction makes no appreciable difference in our analysis.

money Ms in the figure is a vertical line at $300 billion. The equilibrium where the

quantity of money demanded equals the quantity of money supplied occurs at the

intersection of the supply and demand curves at point C, where

Md Ms (4)

The resulting equilibrium interest rate is at i * 15%.

We can again see that there is a tendency to approach this equilibrium by first

looking at the relationship of money demand and supply when the interest rate is

above the equilibrium interest rate. When the interest rate is 25%, the quantity of

money demanded at point A is $100 billion, yet the quantity of money supplied is

$300 billion. The excess supply of money means that people are holding more money

than they desire, so they will try to get rid of their excess money balances by trying

to buy bonds. Accordingly, they will bid up the price of bonds, and as the bond price

rises, the interest rate will fall toward the equilibrium interest rate of 15%. This tendency

is shown by the downward arrow drawn at the interest rate of 25%.

Likewise, if the interest rate is 5%, the quantity of money demanded at point E is

$500 billion, but the quantity of money supplied is only $300 billion. There is now

an excess demand for money because people want to hold more money than they currently

have. To try to obtain more money, they will sell their only other asset—

bonds—and the price will fall. As the price of bonds falls, the interest rate will rise

toward the equilibrium rate of 15%. Only when the interest rate is at its equilibrium

value will there be no tendency for it to move further, and the interest rate will settle

to its equilibrium value.

Changes in Equilibrium Interest Rates in the

Liquidity Preference Framework

Analyzing how the equilibrium interest rate changes using the liquidity preference

framework requires that we understand what causes the demand and supply curves

for money to shift.

Study Guide Learning the liquidity preference framework also requires practicing applications.

When there is an application in the text to examine how the interest rate changes

because some economic variable increases, see if you can draw the appropriate shifts

in the supply and demand curves when this same economic variable decreases. And

remember to use the ceteris paribus assumption: When examining the effect of a

change in one variable, hold all other variables constant.

In Keynes’s liquidity preference analysis, two factors cause the demand curve for

money to shift: income and the price level.

Income Effect. In Keynes’s view, there were two reasons why income would affect the

demand for money. First, as an economy expands and income rises, wealth increases

and people will want to hold more money as a store of value. Second, as the economy

Shifts in the

Demand for

Money

C H A P T E R 5 The Behavior of Interest Rates 107

expands and income rises, people will want to carry out more transactions using

money, with the result that they will also want to hold more money. The conclusion

is that a higher level of income causes the demand for money to increase and the

demand curve to shift to the right.

Price-Level Effect. Keynes took the view that people care about the amount of money

they hold in real terms; that is, in terms of the goods and services that it can buy.

When the price level rises, the same nominal quantity of money is no longer as valuable;

it cannot be used to purchase as many real goods or services. To restore their

holdings of money in real terms to its former level, people will want to hold a greater

nominal quantity of money, so a rise in the price level causes the demand for money

to increase and the demand curve to shift to the right.

We will assume that the supply of money is completely controlled by the central bank,

which in the United States is the Federal Reserve. (Actually, the process that determines

the money supply is substantially more complicated, involving banks, depositors,

and borrowers from banks. We will study it in more detail later in the book.) For

now, all we need to know is that an increase in the money supply engineered by the

Federal Reserve will shift the supply curve for money to the right.

Shifts in the

Supply of Money

108 PA RT I I Financial Markets

Changes in the Equilibrium Interest Rate Due to Changes in

Income, the Price Level, or the Money Supply

Application

To see how the liquidity preference framework can be used to analyze the movement

of interest rates, we will again look at several applications that will be useful

in evaluating the effect of monetary policy on interest rates. (As a study aid,

Table 4 summarizes the shifts in the demand and supply curves for money.)

When income is rising during a business cycle expansion, we have seen that

the demand for money will rise, shown in Figure 10 by the shift rightward in

the demand curve from Md

1 to Md

2. The new equilibrium is reached at point

2 at the intersection of the Md

2 curve with the money supply curve Ms. As you

can see, the equilibrium interest rate rises from i1 to i2. The liquidity preference

framework thus generates the conclusion that when income is rising

during a business cycle expansion (holding other economic variables constant),

interest rates will rise. This conclusion is unambiguous when contrasted

to the conclusion reached about the effects of a change in income on

interest rates using the loanable funds framework.

When the price level rises, the value of money in terms of what it can purchase

is lower. To restore their purchasing power in real terms to its former

level, people will want to hold a greater nominal quantity of money. A higher

price level shifts the demand curve for money to the right from Md

1 to Md

2

(see Figure 10). The equilibrium moves from point 1 to point 2, where the

equilibrium interest rate has risen from i1 to i2, illustrating that when the

price level increases, with the supply of money and other economic variables

held constant, interest rates will rise.

Changes in the

Price Level

Changes in Income

C H A P T E R 5 The Behavior of Interest Rates 109

An increase in the money supply due to expansionary monetary policy by the

Federal Reserve implies that the supply curve for money shifts to the right.

As is shown in Figure 11 by the movement of the supply curve from Ms

1 to

Ms

2, the equilibrium moves from point 1 down to point 2, where the Ms

2 supply

curve intersects with the demand curve Md and the equilibrium interest

rate has fallen from i1 to i2. When the money supply increases (everything

else remaining equal), interest rates will decline.6

Changes in the

Money Supply

S U M M A R Y Table 4 Factors That Shift the Demand for and Supply of Money

Change in Money

Change in Demand (Md) Change in

Variable Variable or Supply (Ms) Interest Rate

Income ↑ Md ↑ ↑

Price level ↑ Md ↑ ↑

Money supply ↑ Ms ↑ ↓

Note: Only increases in the variables are shown. The effect of decreases in the variables on the change in demand would be the opposite

of those indicated in the remaining columns.

M

Ms

i2

i1

M d1

M d2

M

i1

i2

M s1

M s2

Md

M

i2

i1

M d1

M d2

Ms

6This same result can be generated using the loanable funds framework. As we will see in Chapters 15 and 16,

the primary way that a central bank produces an increase in the money supply is by buying bonds and thereby

decreasing the supply of bonds to the public. The resulting shift to the left of the supply curve for bonds will lead

to a decline in the equilibrium interest rate.

www.federalreserve.gov

/releases/H6/Current

The Federal Reserve reports

money supply data at

4:30 p.m. every Thursday.

110 PA RT I I Financial Markets

FIGURE 10 Response to a

Change in Income or the Price Level

In a business cycle expansion,

when income is rising, or when

the price level rises, the demand

curve shifts from Md

1 to Md

2. The

supply curve is fixed at Ms .

The equilibrium interest rate rises

from i1 to i2.

M

FIGURE 11 Response to a

Change in the Money Supply

When the money supply increases,

the supply curve shifts from Ms1

Ms2

, and the equilibrium interest

rate falls from i1 to i2.

Md

1

Md

2

2

1

i2

i1

M

Interest Rate, i

Quantity of Money, M

Ms

Quantity of Money, M

Ms Ms

2

1

i2

i1

Interest Rate, i

Md

1 2

C H A P T E R 5 The Behavior of Interest Rates 111

Following the Financial News

Forecasting interest rates is a time-honored profession.

Economists are hired (sometimes at very high

salaries) to forecast interest rates, because businesses

need to know what the rates will be in order to plan

their future spending, and banks and investors

require interest-rate forecasts in order to decide

which assets to buy. Interest-rate forecasters predict

what will happen to the factors that affect the supply

and demand for bonds and for money—factors such

as the strength of the economy, the profitability of

investment opportunities, the expected inflation rate,

and the size of government budget deficits and borrowing.

They then use the supply and demand analysis

we have outlined in this chapter to come up with

their interest-rate forecasts.

The Wall Street Journal reports interest-rate forecasts

by leading prognosticators twice a year (early January

and July) in its “Economy” column or in its “Credit

Markets” column, which surveys developments in the

bond market daily. Forecasting interest rates is a perilous

business. To their embarrassment, even the top

experts are frequently far off in their forecasts.

Forecasting Interest Rates

The Wall Street Journal Forecasting Survey for 2003

In percent except for dollar vs. yen and dollar vs. euro

JULY 2002 SURVEY NEW FORECASTS FOR 2003

3-MO. 10-YR. GDP-b CPI-c $U.S. UNEMPL. 3-MO. 10-YR. GDP-b CPI-c $U.S. $U.S. UNEMPL.

TREASURY vs. TREASURY vs. vs.

BILL-a NOTE Q1–Q3 YEN BILLS-a NOTE Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 YEN EURO

Dec. Dec. 2002 Nov. Dec. Nov. June June 2003 2003 2003 2003 May June June May

Susan M. Sterne, Economic Analysis 2.50 5.30 2.9 2.1 125 5.8 2.25 5.50 4.6 4.0 4.2 4.3 2.5 115 1.10 5.6

Gail Fosler, The Conference Board 2.30 5.35 2.2 2.7 132 6.1 1.50 5.10 4.2 3.1 4.1 5.2 2.5 131 0.87 5.9

Stephen Gallagher, Societe Generale 2.15 5.60 2.4 2.7 120 5.9 1.25 4.50 4.0 3.0 3.5 3.5 2.3 125 1.00 5.7

Ian Shepherdson, High Frequency Economics 2.00 5.25 3.3 N.A. 135 6.5 1.25 4.75 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 2.2 N.A. N.A. 6.5

James F. Smith, University of North Carolina 2.45 4.30 4.8 1.8 143 5.2 1.48 4.00 3.8 4.3 3.2 2.8 1.5 137 0.89 5.6

Lawrence Kudlow, Kudlow & Co. LLC 1.90 5.30 3.7 2.2 130 5.8 1.50 5.00 3.6 4.5 4.5 5.0 2.1 130 1.00 5.8

D. Malpass/J. Ryding, Bear Stearns 2.00 5.10 1.6 1.9 132 6.1 1.60 4.80 3.6 3.9 4.1 4.1 1.8 130 0.95 5.9

Michael K. Evans, Evans Carroll & Assoc. 1.75 5.00 1.0 2.1 130 6.1 1.30 4.30 3.5 2.0 3.5 2.5 3.0 135 1.00 6.2

Tracy Herrick, Jefferies & Company Inc. 2.60 5.40 2.3 1.8 118 5.4 1.20 4.00 3.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 2.7 125 1.05 5.7

David L. Littman, Comerica Bank 2.42 5.50 3.4 1.2 117 6.0 1.60 4.80 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.2 130 0.97 5.7

Paul McCulley, PIMCO 1.70 5.20 2.3 1.5 130 6.0 1.20 4.15 3.5 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.3 125 1.03 5.8

Henry Willmore, Barclays Capital 2.40 5.60 4.2 2.3 135 6.2 1.40 4.40 3.5 4.5 4.5 2.0 2.3 135 0.92 5.9

J. Meil/A. Raha, Eaton Corp. 2.80 5.40 N.A. 2.8 130 5.6 1.50 4.30 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.4 2.2 123 1.00 6.0

A. Hodge/W. Mak, Global Insight 2.30 5.60 1.2 2.0 125 6.0 1.30 5.60 3.2 3.3 3.9 4.5 2.2 123 0.98 6.1

Kurt Karl, Swiss Re 2.70 5.40 0.4 2.5 120 6.0 1.60 5.00 3.2 3.6 4.2 3.9 1.9 128 1.00 5.8

Richard D. Rippe, Prudential Securities 2.25 5.20 3.3 2.4 115 6.0 1.30 4.50 3.2 3.5 3.9 4.3 2.3 120 1.05 6.1

Daniel Laufenberg, American Express 2.30 5.15 3.1 2.5 125 5.6 1.50 4.50 3.1 3.0 4.1 3.8 2.0 120 1.04 5.7

John D. Mueller, LBMC LLC 2.50 5.60 4.7 1.6 115 5.5 1.50 4.90 3.1 5.5 6.7 6.0 0.9 118 0.96 5.6

Diane C. Swonk, Bank One, NA 3.00 5.10 2.5 2.0 123 5.7 1.44 4.00 3.1 2.9 3.3 3.3 2.9 123 0.98 6.1

David Wyss, Standard and Poor’s 1.80 4.90 2.1 2.4 115 5.7 1.20 4.30 3.1 3.1 4.5 3.8 2.2 130 1.02 6.4

James W. Coons, Huntington National Bank 1.85 5.00 1.5 2.5 120 5.7 1.50 4.35 3.0 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.4 130 1.00 5.8

Richard DeKaser, National City Corporation 2.69 5.05 2.5 2.3 135 5.7 1.27 4.53 3.0 3.2 4.3 4.4 2.4 118 1.04 5.8

Neal Soss, CSFB 1.70 4.25 2.0 2.6 122 5.5 1.25 3.40 3.0 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.4 112 1.07 6.1

Brian S.Wesbury, Griffin Kubik Steph. & Thomp. 2.32 5.80 1.8 2.1 126 5.4 1.25 4.50 3.0 3.0 4.8 5.2 2.6 125 1.05 5.8

Stuart Hoffman, PNC Financial Services Group 2.00 5.30 1.3 2.3 125 5.7 1.25 4.05 2.8 3.0 3.5 3.5 2.4 125 1.02 5.8

John Lonski, Moody’s Investors Service 2.30 5.40 2.4 1.8 125 5.5 1.53 4.40 2.8 2.9 3.5 3.7 2.3 122 1.04 5.7

R. T. McGee/T.W. Synnott, US Trust Co. 2.00 5.40 1.8 2.2 125 5.7 1.20 4.30 2.8 2.9 3.5 3.8 2.2 125 1.05 5.8

David Lereah, National Association of Realtors N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 1.80 4.40 2.7 3.0 3.6 3.2 2.4 125 0.98 5.7

Maria Fiorini Ramirez, MFR Inc. 2.00 5.00 1.7 1.7 123 5.9 1.25 4.00 2.6 2.0 2.5 2.7 2.1 128 1.05 6.2

J. Prakken/C. Varvares, Macroeconomic Adv. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 1.20 4.32 2.6 3.4 3.7 3.7 2.0 121 1.01 5.7

David W. Berson, Fannie Mae 2.00 5.20 2.2 2.6 121 5.5 1.30 4.40 2.5 3.5 3.7 3.6 2.0 135 1.05 5.8

(continued)

N.A. Not Available; a Treasury bill rates are on a bond-equivalent basis; b Real gross domestic product, average annualized rate for first three quarters, based on January and July surveys;

c Year-to-year change in the consumer price index; d David Rosenberg replaces Bruce Steinberg at Merrill Lynch; e Averages are for analysts polled at time of survey

Source: Wall Street Journal, Thursday, January 2, 2003, p. A2.

112 PA RT I I Financial Markets

Application Money and Interest Rates

The liquidity preference analysis in Figure 11 seems to lead to the conclusion

that an increase in the money supply will lower interest rates. This conclusion

has important policy implications because it has frequently caused

politicians to call for a more rapid growth of the money supply in order to

drive down interest rates.

But is this conclusion that money and interest rates should be negatively

related correct? Might there be other important factors left out of the liquidity

preference analysis in Figure 11 that would reverse this conclusion? We

will provide answers to these questions by applying the supply and demand

analysis we have used in this chapter to obtain a deeper understanding of the

relationship between money and interest rates.

An important criticism of the conclusion that a rise in the money supply

lowers interest rates has been raised by Milton Friedman, a Nobel laureate in

economics. He acknowledges that the liquidity preference analysis is correct

and calls the result—that an increase in the money supply (everything else

Following the Financial News

The Wall Street Journal Forecasting Survey for 2003 (continued)

In percent except for dollar vs. yen and dollar vs. euro

JULY 2002 SURVEY NEW FORECASTS FOR 2003

3-MO. 10-YR. GDP-b CPI-c $U.S. UNEMPL. 3-MO. 10-YR. GDP-b CPI-c $U.S. $U.S. UNEMPL.

TREASURY vs. TREASURY vs. vs.

BILL-a NOTE Q1–Q3 YEN BILLS-a NOTE Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 YEN EURO

Dec. Dec. 2002 Nov. Dec. Nov. June June 2003 2003 2003 2003 May June June May

Maury Harris, UBS Warburg 2.00 5.00 1.7 2.0 120 5.9 1.60 4.60 2.5 4.5 3.5 3.5 2.3 115 1.05 5.7

William B. Hummer,Wayne Hummer Invest. 2.21 5.05 2.2 2.4 119 5.5 1.31 4.14 2.5 3.1 3.6 3.8 2.1 125 1.05 5.8

R. Shrouds/R. Fry, DuPont Co. 1.80 5.00 2.9 2.1 110 5.8 1.30 4.50 2.5 3.0 3.5 3.5 1.9 128 1.05 6.0

Allen Sinai, Decision Economics Inc. 1.82 4.94 0.8 1.9 123 6.0 1.27 4.17 2.5 2.2 2.9 3.2 2.2 135 1.06 6.5

Sung Won Sohn,Wells Fargo & Co. 2.05 5.20 1.8 3.0 115 5.7 1.30 4.40 2.5 3.7 3.8 3.8 1.5 125 0.99 5.8

Gary Thayer, A.G. Edwards 2.20 5.60 2.0 1.8 120 5.5 1.40 4.50 2.5 3.5 3.0 4.5 2.1 119 1.06 5.7

Mark Zandi, Economy.com 2.20 5.25 1.1 2.2 125 6.0 1.70 4.50 2.4 2.7 3.2 3.8 2.2 125 1.00 6.3

R. Berner/D. Greenlaw, Morgan Stanley 2.00 5.30 1.9 2.6 124 5.8 1.50 4.50 2.3 3.8 3.9 3.5 1.9 120 1.05 5.9

David Resler, Nomura Securities International 1.90 5.10 3.2 2.4 120 5.9 1.25 4.25 2.3 3.0 3.5 3.8 1.8 125 1.04 6.0

Edward Leamer, UCLA Anderson Forecast N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 2.03 4.00 2.2 2.3 2.7 3.2 2.4 N.A. 1.10 6.1

David Rosenberg, Merrill Lynch[d] 2.25 5.25 2.3 2.0 125 5.8 1.20 4.00 2.2 3.3 3.0 3.5 2.4 125 1.07 6.5

Saul Hymans, RSQE, University of Michigan 2.30 5.30 1.9 2.7 122 5.6 1.72 4.03 2.1 4.3 4.2 4.2 2.4 N.A. N.A. 6.1

Nicholas S. Perna, Perna Associates 2.62 5.53 1.3 2.1 122 5.7 1.47 4.53 2.1 3.0 2.9 3.1 2.3 114 1.03 5.5

Richard Yamarone, Argus Research 3.00 5.65 3.1 2.8 128 4.7 1.70 4.60 2.1 2.5 3.0 2.5 3.3 128 1.00 5.6

Ram Bhagavatula, The Royal Bank of Scotland 2.45 5.35 3.8 2.4 121 5.4 1.10 3.75 2.0 2.8 4.1 4.3 21 127 1.06 6.1

J. Dewey Daane, Vanderbilt University 2.00 5.00 0.8 2.0 121 6.0 1.60 4.50 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.0 118 1.00 5.9

Peter Hooper, Deutsche Bank Securities 2.25 5.40 2.7 2.3 130 5.7 1.75 4.50 2.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 1.4 130 1.05 6.1

William T.Wilson, Ernst & Young 2.50 6.25 2.0 2.5 115 5.5 1.60 5.40 2.0 5.0 4.0 4.1 1.4 120 1.00 5.6

Robert DiClemente, Citibank SSB 1.90 5.30 2.6 1.9 125 5.8 1.30 4.60 1.8 2.7 3.3 4.1 1.9 132 0.93 5.9

Mike Cosgrove, Econoclast 2.00 5.30 2.1 2.3 130 6.0 1.30 4.30 1.6 2.9 3.5 4.0 2.4 125 1.00 6.0

William C. Dudley, Goldman Sachs 2.00 5.00 1.5 2.4 132 6.0 1.00 4.20 1.5 2.5 3.0 3.5 2.1 120 1.08 6.4

Ethan S. Harris, Lehman Brothers N.A. 4.85 N.A. 2.2 116 6.1 1.20 4.20 1.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 2.3 124 1.07 6.2

Donald H. Straszheim, Straszheim Global Adv. 2.25 5.15 N.A. 1.9 114 5.9 1.40 4.40 1.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 127 1.04 6.1

A. Gary Shilling, A. Gary Shilling & Co. 1.50 4.00 –1.1 0.5 130 6.4 0.75 3.50 –2.0 –2.0 2.0 3.0 1.2 130 0.94 7.3

AVERAGE [e] 2.20 5.20 2.3 2.2 122 5.8 1.41 4.42 2.7 3.2 3.7 3.7 2.2 125 1.02 6.0

ACTUAL NUMBERS as of Dec. 31, 2002 1.21 3.82 3.4 2.2 119 6.0

N.A. Not Available; a Treasury bill rates are on a bond-equivalent basis; b Real gross domestic product, average annualized rate for first three quarters, based on January and July surveys;

c Year-to-year change in the consumer price index; d David Rosenberg replaces Bruce Steinberg at Merrill Lynch; e Averages are for analysts polled at time of survey

Source: Wall Street Journal, Thursday, January 2, 2003, p. A2.

C H A P T E R 5 The Behavior of Interest Rates 113

remaining equal) lowers interest rates—the liquidity effect. However, he views

the liquidity effect as merely part of the story: An increase in the money supply

might not leave “everything else equal” and will have other effects on the

economy that may make interest rates rise. If these effects are substantial, it is

entirely possible that when the money supply rises, interest rates too may rise.

We have already laid the groundwork to discuss these other effects

because we have shown how changes in income, the price level, and

expected inflation affect the equilibrium interest rate.

Study Guide To get further practice with the loanable funds and liquidity preference

frameworks, show how the effects discussed here work by drawing the supply

and demand diagrams that explain each effect. This exercise will also

improve your understanding of the effect of money on interest rates.

1. Income Effect. Because an increasing money supply is an expansionary

influence on the economy, it should raise national income and wealth.

Both the liquidity preference and loanable funds frameworks indicate that

interest rates will then rise (see Figures 7 and 10). Thus the income effect of

an increase in the money supply is a rise in interest rates in response to the

higher level of income.

2. Price-Level Effect. An increase in the money supply can also cause the

overall price level in the economy to rise. The liquidity preference framework

predicts that this will lead to a rise in interest rates. So the price-level effect

from an increase in the money supply is a rise in interest rates in response

to the rise in the price level.

3. Expected-Inflation Effect. The higher inflation rate that results from an

increase in the money supply also affects interest rates by affecting the

expected inflation rate. Specifically, an increase in the money supply may lead

people to expect a higher price level in the future—hence the expected inflation

rate will be higher. The loanable funds framework has shown us that this

increase in expected inflation will lead to a higher level of interest rates.

Therefore, the expected-inflation effect of an increase in the money supply is

a rise in interest rates in response to the rise in the expected inflation rate.

At first glance it might appear that the price-level effect and the

expected-inflation effect are the same thing. They both indicate that increases

in the price level induced by an increase in the money supply will raise interest

rates. However, there is a subtle difference between the two, and this is

why they are discussed as two separate effects.

Suppose that there is a onetime increase in the money supply today that

leads to a rise in prices to a permanently higher level by next year. As the

price level rises over the course of this year, the interest rate will rise via the

price-level effect. Only at the end of the year, when the price level has risen

to its peak, will the price-level effect be at a maximum.

The rising price level will also raise interest rates via the expectedinflation

effect, because people will expect that inflation will be higher over

the course of the year. However, when the price level stops rising next year,

inflation and the expected inflation rate will return to zero. Any rise in interest

rates as a result of the earlier rise in expected inflation will then be

114 PA RT I I Financial Markets

reversed. We thus see that in contrast to the price-level effect, which reaches

its greatest impact next year, the expected-inflation effect will have its smallest

impact (zero impact) next year. The basic difference between the two

effects, then, is that the price-level effect remains even after prices have

stopped rising, whereas the expected-inflation effect disappears.

An important point is that the expected-inflation effect will persist only

as long as the price level continues to rise. As we will see in our discussion

of monetary theory in subsequent chapters, a onetime increase in the money

supply will not produce a continually rising price level; only a higher rate of

money supply growth will. Thus a higher rate of money supply growth is

needed if the expected-inflation effect is to persist.

We can now put together all the effects we have discussed to help us decide

whether our analysis supports the politicians who advocate a greater rate of

growth of the money supply when they feel that interest rates are too high.

Of all the effects, only the liquidity effect indicates that a higher rate of money

growth will cause a decline in interest rates. In contrast, the income, pricelevel,

and expected-inflation effects indicate that interest rates will rise when

money growth is higher. Which of these effects are largest, and how quickly

do they take effect? The answers are critical in determining whether interest

rates will rise or fall when money supply growth is increased.

Generally, the liquidity effect from the greater money growth takes effect

immediately, because the rising money supply leads to an immediate decline in

the equilibrium interest rate. The income and price-level effects take time to

work, because it takes time for the increasing money supply to raise the price

level and income, which in turn raise interest rates. The expected-inflation

effect, which also raises interest rates, can be slow or fast, depending on

whether people adjust their expectations of inflation slowly or quickly when

the money growth rate is increased.

Three possibilities are outlined in Figure 12; each shows how interest

rates respond over time to an increased rate of money supply growth starting

at time T. Panel (a) shows a case in which the liquidity effect dominates the

other effects so that the interest rate falls from i1 at time T to a final level of

i2. The liquidity effect operates quickly to lower the interest rate, but as time

goes by, the other effects start to reverse some of the decline. Because the liquidity

effect is larger than the others, however, the interest rate never rises

back to its initial level.

Panel (b) has a smaller liquidity effect than the other effects, with the

expected-inflation effect operating slowly because expectations of inflation are

slow to adjust upward. Initially, the liquidity effect drives down the interest

rate. Then the income, price-level, and expected-inflation effects begin to raise

it. Because these effects are dominant, the interest rate eventually rises above

its initial level to i2. In the short run, lower interest rates result from increased

money growth, but eventually they end up climbing above the initial level.

Panel (c) has the expected-inflation effect dominating as well as operating

rapidly because people quickly raise their expectations of inflation when the

rate of money growth increases. The expected-inflation effect begins immediately

to overpower the liquidity effect, and the interest rate immediately starts

Does a Higher Rate

of Growth of the

Money Supply Lower

Interest Rates?

C H A P T E R 5 The Behavior of Interest Rates 115

FIGURE 12 Response Over Time to an Increase in Money Supply Growth

Liquidity

Effect

Income, Price-Level,

and Expected-

Inflation Effects

( a ) Liquidity effect larger than

other effects

Time

i1

i2

T

Liquidity

Effect

Income, Price-Level,

and Expected-

Inflation Effects

(b) Liquidity effect smaller than

other effects and slow adjustment

of expected inflation

Time

i1

i2

T

Liquidity and

Expected-

Inflation Effects

Income and Price-

Level Effects

( c ) Liquidity effect smaller than

expected-inflation effect and fast

adjustment of expected inflation

Time

i1

i2

T

Interest Rate, i

Interest Rate, i

Interest Rate, i

116 PA RT I I Financial Markets

FIGURE 13 Money Growth (M2, Annual Rate) and Interest Rates (Three-Month Treasury Bills), 1950–2002

Sources: Federal Reserve: www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/hist/h6hist1.txt.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

22

20

Money Growth Rate (M2)

Interest Rate

Interest

Rate (%)

Money

Growth Rate

(% annual rate)

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0

to climb. Over time, as the income and price-level effects start to take hold,

the interest rate rises even higher, and the eventual outcome is an interest rate

that is substantially above the initial interest rate. The result shows clearly that

increasing money supply growth is not the answer to reducing interest rates;

rather, money growth should be reduced in order to lower interest rates!

An important issue for economic policymakers is which of these three

scenarios is closest to reality. If a decline in interest rates is desired, then an

increase in money supply growth is called for when the liquidity effect dominates

the other effects, as in panel (a). A decrease in money growth is appropriate

if the other effects dominate the liquidity effect and expectations of

inflation adjust rapidly, as in panel (c). If the other effects dominate the liquidity

effect but expectations of inflation adjust only slowly, as in panel (b),

then whether you want to increase or decrease money growth depends on

whether you care more about what happens in the short run or the long run.

Which scenario is supported by the evidence? The relationship of interest

rates and money growth from 1950 to 2002 is plotted in Figure 13. When the

rate of money supply growth began to climb in the mid-1960s, interest rates

rose, indicating that the liquidity effect was dominated by the price-level,

income, and expected-inflation effects. By the 1970s, interest rates reached

C H A P T E R 5 The Behavior of Interest Rates 117

Summary

1. The theory of asset demand tells us that the quantity

demanded of an asset is (a) positively related to wealth,

(b ) positively related to the expected return on the

asset relative to alternative assets, (c) negatively related

to the riskiness of the asset relative to alternative assets,

and (d) positively related to the liquidity of the asset

relative to alternative assets.

2. The supply and demand analysis for bonds, frequently

referred to as the loanable funds framework, provides

one theory of how interest rates are determined. It

predicts that interest rates will change when there is a

change in demand because of changes in income (or

wealth), expected returns, risk, or liquidity or when

there is a change in supply because of changes in the

attractiveness of investment opportunities, the real cost

of borrowing, or government activities.

3. An alternative theory of how interest rates are

determined is provided by the liquidity preference

framework, which analyzes the supply of and demand

for money. It shows that interest rates will change when

there is a change in the demand for money because of

changes in income or the price level or when there is a

change in the supply of money.

4. There are four possible effects of an increase in the

money supply on interest rates: the liquidity effect, the

income effect, the price-level effect, and the expectedinflation

effect. The liquidity effect indicates that a rise

in money supply growth will lead to a decline in interest

rates; the other effects work in the opposite direction.

The evidence seems to indicate that the income, pricelevel,

and expected-inflation effects dominate the

liquidity effect such that an increase in money supply

growth leads to higher rather than lower interest rates.

levels unprecedented in the post-World War II period, as did the rate of

money supply growth.

The scenario depicted in panel (a) of Figure 12 seems doubtful, and the

case for lowering interest rates by raising the rate of money growth is much

weakened. Looking back at Figure 6, which shows the relationship between

interest rates and expected inflation, you should not find this too surprising.

The rise in the rate of money supply growth in the 1960s and 1970s is

matched by a large rise in expected inflation, which would lead us to predict

that the expected-inflation effect would be dominant. It is the most plausible

explanation for why interest rates rose in the face of higher money growth.

However, Figure 13 does not really tell us which one of the two scenarios,

panel (b) or panel (c) of Figure 12, is more accurate. It depends critically on

how fast people’s expectations about inflation adjust. However, recent

research using more sophisticated methods than just looking at a graph like

Figure 13 do indicate that increased money growth temporarily lowers shortterm

interest rates.7

7See Lawrence J. Christiano and Martin Eichenbaum, “Identification and the Liquidity Effect of a

Monetary Policy Shock,” in Business Cycles, Growth, and Political Economy, ed. Alex Cukierman, Zvi

Hercowitz, and Leonardo Leiderman (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 335–370; Eric M.

Leeper and David B. Gordon, “In Search of the Liquidity Effect,” Journal of Monetary Economics 29

(1992): 341–370; Steven Strongin, “The Identification of Monetary Policy Disturbances: Explaining the

Liquidity Puzzle,” Journal of Monetary Economics 35 (1995): 463–497; Adrian Pagan and John C.

Robertson, “Resolving the Liquidity Effect,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 77 (May-June

1995): 33–54; and Ben S. Bernanke and Ilian Mihov, “Measuring Monetary Policy,” Quarterly Journal of

Economics 113, 3 (August 1998), pp. 869–902.

118 PA RT I I Financial Markets

Key Terms

asset market approach, p. 93

demand curve, p. 87

expected return, p. 86

excess demand, p. 90

excess supply, p. 90

Fisher effect, p. 100

liquidity, p. 86

liquidity preference framework,

p. 105

loanable funds, p. 92

loanable funds framework, p. 92

market equilibrium, p. 90

opportunity cost, p. 106

risk, p. 86

supply curve, p. 90

theory of asset demand, p. 87

wealth, p. 86

Questions and Problems

Questions marked with an asterisk are answered at the end

of the book in an appendix, “Answers to Selected Questions

and Problems.”

1. Explain why you would be more or less willing to buy

a share of Microsoft stock in the following situations:

a. Your wealth falls.

b. You expect the stock to appreciate in value.

c. The bond market becomes more liquid.

d. You expect gold to appreciate in value.

e. Prices in the bond market become more volatile.

*2. Explain why you would be more or less willing to buy

a house under the following circumstances:

a. You just inherited $100,000.

b. Real estate commissions fall from 6% of the sales

price to 5% of the sales price.

c. You expect Microsoft stock to double in value next

year.

d. Prices in the stock market become more volatile.

e. You expect housing prices to fall.

3. Explain why you would be more or less willing to buy

gold under the following circumstances:

a. Gold again becomes acceptable as a medium of

exchange.

b. Prices in the gold market become more volatile.

c. You expect inflation to rise, and gold prices tend to

move with the aggregate price level.

d. You expect interest rates to rise.

*4. Explain why you would be more or less willing to buy

long-term AT&T bonds under the following circumstances:

a. Trading in these bonds increases, making them easier

to sell.

b. You expect a bear market in stocks (stock prices

are expected to decline).

c. Brokerage commissions on stocks fall.

d. You expect interest rates to rise.

e. Brokerage commissions on bonds fall.

5. What would happen to the demand for Rembrandts if

the stock market undergoes a boom? Why?

Answer each question by drawing the appropriate supply

and demand diagrams.

*6. An important way in which the Federal Reserve

decreases the money supply is by selling bonds to the

public. Using a supply and demand analysis for

bonds, show what effect this action has on interest

rates. Is your answer consistent with what you would

expect to find with the liquidity preference framework?

7. Using both the liquidity preference framework and

supply and demand for bonds framework, show why

interest rates are procyclical (rising when the economy

is expanding and falling during recessions).

*8. Why should a rise in the price level (but not in

expected inflation) cause interest rates to rise when

the nominal money supply is fixed?

9. Find the “Credit Markets” column in the Wall Street

Journal. Underline the statements in the column that

explain bond price movements, and draw the appropriate

supply and demand diagrams that support these

statements.

10. What effect will a sudden increase in the volatility of

gold prices have on interest rates?

QUIZ

C H A P T E R 5 The Behavior of Interest Rates 119

*11. How might a sudden increase in people’s expectations

of future real estate prices affect interest rates?

12. Explain what effect a large federal deficit might have

on interest rates.

*13. Using both the supply and demand for bonds and liquidity

preference frameworks, show what the effect is

on interest rates when the riskiness of bonds rises. Are

the results the same in the two frameworks?

14. If the price level falls next year, remaining fixed thereafter,

and the money supply is fixed, what is likely to

happen to interest rates over the next two years? (Hint:

Take account of both the price-level effect and the

expected-inflation effect.)

*15. Will there be an effect on interest rates if brokerage

commissions on stocks fall? Explain your answer.

Using Economic Analysis to Predict the Future

16. The president of the United States announces in a

press conference that he will fight the higher inflation

rate with a new anti-inflation program. Predict what

will happen to interest rates if the public believes him.

*17. The chairman of the Fed announces that interest rates

will rise sharply next year, and the market believes

him. What will happen to today’s interest rate on

AT&T bonds, such as the 8 s of 2022?

18. Predict what will happen to interest rates if the public

suddenly expects a large increase in stock prices.

*19. Predict what will happen to interest rates if prices in

the bond market become more volatile.

20. If the next chair of the Federal Reserve Board has a

reputation for advocating an even slower rate of

money growth than the current chair, what will happen

to interest rates? Discuss the possible resulting

situations.

18

Web Exercises

1. One of the largest single influences on the level of

interest rates is inflation. There are a number of sites

that report inflation over time. Go to ftp://ftp.bls.gov

/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt and review the data

available. Note that the last columns report various

averages. Move this data into a spreadsheet using the

method discussed in the Web exploration at the end

of Chapter 1. What has the average rate of inflation

been since 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990? What

year had the lowest level of inflation? What year had

the highest level of inflation?

2. Increasing prices erodes the purchasing power of the

dollar. It is interesting to compute what goods would

have cost at some point in the past after adjusting for

inflation. Go to www.interest.com/hugh/calc/cpi.cgi.

What would a car that cost $22,000 today have cost

the year that you were born?

3. One of the points made in this chapter is that inflation

erodes investment returns. Go to www.src-net.com

/InvestmentMultiplier/iminflation.htm and review how

changes in inflation alter your real return. What happens

to the difference between the adjusted value of an

investment compared to its inflation-adjusted value as:

a. Inflation increases?

b. The investment horizon lengthens?

c. Expected returns increase?

In Chapter 4, we saw that the return on an asset (such as a bond) measures how

much we gain from holding that asset. When we make a decision to buy an asset, we

are influenced by what we expect the return on that asset to be and its risk. Here we

show how to calculate expected return and risk, which is measured by the standard

deviation.

Expected Return

If a Mobil Oil Corporation bond, for example, has a return of 15% half of the time

and 5% the other half of the time, its expected return (which you can think of as the

average return) is 10%. More formally, the expected return on an asset is the weighted

average of all possible returns, where the weights are the probabilities of occurrence

of that return:

Re p1R1 p2R2 . . . pnRn (1)

where Re expected return

n number of possible outcomes (states of nature)

Ri return in the ith state of nature

pi probability of occurrence of the return Ri

EXAMPLE 1: Expected Return

What is the expected return on the Mobil Oil bond if the return is 12% two-thirds of the

time and 8% one-third of the time?

Solution

The expected return is 10.68%:

Re p1R1 p2R2

where

p1 probability of occurrence of return 1 0.67

R1 return in state 1 12% 0.12

2

3

Models of Asset Pricing

appendix1

to chapter 5

1

p2 probability of occurrence return 2 .33

R2 return in state 2 8% 0.08

Thus:

Re (0.67)(0.12) (0.33)(0.08) 0.1068 10.68%

The degree of risk or uncertainty of an asset’s returns also affects the demand for the

asset. Consider two assets, stock in Fly-by-Night Airlines and stock in Feet-on-the-

Ground Bus Company. Suppose that Fly-by-Night stock has a return of 15% half of

the time and 5% the other half of the time, making its expected return 10%, while

stock in Feet-on-the-Ground has a fixed return of 10%. Fly-by-Night stock has uncertainty

associated with its returns and so has greater risk than stock in Feet-on-the-

Ground, whose return is a sure thing.

To see this more formally, we can use a measure of risk called the standard deviation.

The standard deviation of returns on an asset is calculated as follows. First calculate

the expected return, Re; then subtract the expected return from each return to

get a deviation; then square each deviation and multiply it by the probability of occurrence

of that outcome; finally, add up all these weighted squared deviations and take

the square root. The formula for the standard deviation, , is thus:

(2)

The higher the standard deviation, , the greater the risk of an asset.

EXAMPLE 2: Standard Deviation

What is the standard deviation of the returns on the Fly-by-Night Airlines stock and Feeton-

the-Ground Bus Company, with the same return outcomes and probabilities

described above? Of these two stocks, which is riskier?

Solution

Fly-by-Night Airlines has a standard deviation of returns of 5%.

Re p1R1 p2R2

where

p1 probability of occurrence of return 1 0.50

R1 return in state 1 15% 0.15

p2 probability of occurrence of return 2 0.50

R2 return in state 2 5% 0.05

Re expected return (0.50)(0.15) (0.50)(0.05) 0.10

1

2

1

2

p1(R1 Re )2 p2(R2 Re )2

p1(R1 Re )2 p2(R2 Re )2 . . . pn(Rn Re )2

Calculating

Standard Deviation

of Returns

1

3

Models of Asset Pricing 2

Thus:

0.05 5%

Feet-on-the-Ground Bus Company has a standard deviation of returns of 0%.

Re p1R1

where

p1 probability of occurrence of return 1 1.0

R1 return in state 1 10% 0.10

Re expected return (1.0)(0.10) 0.10

Thus:

Clearly, Fly-by-Night Airlines is a riskier stock, because its standard deviation of

returns of 5% is higher than the zero standard deviation of returns for Feet-on-the-

Ground Bus Company, which has a certain return.

Benefits of Diversification

Our discussion of the theory of asset demand indicates that most people like to avoid

risk; that is, they are risk-averse. Why, then, do many investors hold many risky assets

rather than just one? Doesn’t holding many risky assets expose the investor to more

risk?

The old warning about not putting all your eggs in one basket holds the key to

the answer: Because holding many risky assets (called diversification) reduces the overall

risk an investor faces, diversification is beneficial. To see why this is so, let’s look

at some specific examples of how an investor fares on his investments when he is

holding two risky securities.

Consider two assets: common stock of Frivolous Luxuries, Inc., and common

stock of Bad Times Products, Unlimited. When the economy is strong, which we’ll

assume is one-half of the time, Frivolous Luxuries has high sales and the return on

the stock is 15%; when the economy is weak, the other half of the time, sales are low

and the return on the stock is 5%. On the other hand, suppose that Bad Times

Products thrives when the economy is weak, so that its stock has a return of 15%, but

it earns less when the economy is strong and has a return on the stock of 5%. Since

both these stocks have an expected return of 15% half the time and 5% the other half

of the time, both have an expected return of 10%. However, both stocks carry a fair

amount of risk, because there is uncertainty about their actual returns.

Suppose, however, that instead of buying one stock or the other, Irving the

Investor puts half his savings in Frivolous Luxuries stock and the other half in Bad

0 0 0%

(1.0 )(0.10 0.10)2

p1(R1 Re )2

(0.50)(0.0025) (0.50)(0.0025) 0.0025

(0.50)(0.15 0.10)2 (0.50)(0.05 0.10)2

3 Appendix 1 to Chapter 5

Times Products stock. When the economy is strong, Frivolous Luxuries stock has a

return of 15%, while Bad Times Products has a return of 5%. The result is that Irving

earns a return of 10% (the average of 5% and 15%) on his holdings of the two stocks.

When the economy is weak, Frivolous Luxuries has a return of only 5% and Bad Times

Products has a return of 15%, so Irving still earns a return of 10% regardless of whether

the economy is strong or weak. Irving is better off from this strategy of diversification

because his expected return is 10%, the same as from holding either Frivolous

Luxuries or Bad Times Products alone, and yet he is not exposed to any risk.

Although the case we have described demonstrates the benefits of diversification,

it is somewhat unrealistic. It is quite hard to find two securities with the characteristic

that when the return of one is high, the return of the other is always low.1 In the real

world, we are more likely to find at best returns on securities that are independent of

each other; that is, when one is high, the other is just as likely to be high as to be low.

Suppose that both securities have an expected return of 10%, with a return of 5%

half the time and 15% the other half of the time. Sometimes both securities will earn

the higher return and sometimes both will earn the lower return. In this case if Irving

holds equal amounts of each security, he will on average earn the same return as if he

had just put all his savings into one of these securities. However, because the returns

on these two securities are independent, it is just as likely that when one earns the

high 15% return, the other earns the low 5% return and vice versa, giving Irving a

return of 10% (equal to the expected return). Because Irving is more likely to earn

what he expected to earn when he holds both securities instead of just one, we can

see that Irving has again reduced his risk through diversification.2

The one case in which Irving will not benefit from diversification occurs when the

returns on the two securities move perfectly together. In this case, when the first security

has a return of 15%, the other also has a return of 15% and holding both securities

results in a return of 15%. When the first security has a return of 5%, the other

has a return of 5% and holding both results in a return of 5%. The result of diversifying

by holding both securities is a return of 15% half of the time and 5% the other

half of the time, which is exactly the same set of returns that are earned by holding

only one of the securities. Consequently, diversification in this case does not lead to

any reduction of risk.

The examples we have just examined illustrate the following important points

about diversification:

1. Diversification is almost always beneficial to the risk-averse investor since it

reduces risk unless returns on securities move perfectly together (which is an

extremely rare occurrence).

2. The less the returns on two securities move together, the more benefit (risk reduction)

there is from diversification.

Models of Asset Pricing

1Such a case is described by saying that the returns on the two securities are perfectly negatively correlated.

2 We can also see that diversification in the example above leads to lower risk by examining the standard deviation

of returns when Irving diversifies and when he doesn’t. The standard deviation of returns if Irving holds

only one of the two securities is . When Irving holds

equal amounts of each security, there is a probability of 1/4 that he will earn 5% on both (for a total return of

5%), a probability of 1/4 that he will earn 15% on both (for a total return of 15%), and a probability of 1/2 that

he will earn 15% on one and 5% on the other (for a total return of 10%). The standard deviation of returns when

Irving diversifies is thus .

Since the standard deviation of returns when Irving diversifies is lower than when he holds only one security,

we can see that diversification has reduced risk.

0.25 (15% 10%)2 0.25 (5% 10%)2 0.5 (10% 10%)2 3.5%

0.5 (15% 10%)2 0.5 (5% 10%)2 5%

4

Diversification and Beta

In the previous section, we demonstrated the benefits of diversification. Here, we

examine diversification and the relationship between risk and returns in more detail.

As a result, we obtain an understanding of two basic theories of asset pricing: the capital

asset pricing model (CAPM) and arbitrage pricing theory (APT).

We start our analysis by considering a portfolio of n assets whose return is:

Rp x1R1 x2R2 … xnRn (3)

where Rp the return on the portfolio of n assets

Ri the return on asset i

xi the proportion of the portfolio held in asset i

The expected return on this portfolio, E(Rp), equals

E(Rp) E(x1R1) E(x2R2) … E(xnRn)

x1E(R1) x2E(R2) … xnE(Rn) (4)

An appropriate measure of the risk for this portfolio is the standard deviation of the

portfolio’s return (p) or its squared value, the variance of the portfolio’s return (p

2),

which can be written as:

p

2 E[Rp E(Rp)]2 E[{x1R1 … xnRn} {x1E(R1) … xnE(Rn)}]2

E[x1{R1 E(R1)} … xn{Rn E(Rn)}]2

This expression can be rewritten as:

p

2 E[{x1[R1 E(R1)] … xn[Rn E(Rn)]} {Rp E(Rp)}]

x1E[{R1 E(R1)} {Rp E(Rp)}] … xnE[{Rn E(Rn)} {Rp E(Rp)}]

This gives us the following expression for the variance for the portfolio’s return:

p

2 x11p x22p xnnp (5)

where

ip the covariance of the return on asset i

with the portfolio’s return E[{Ri E(Ri)} {Rp E(Rp)}]

Equation 5 tells us that the contribution to risk of asset i to the portfolio is xiip.

By dividing this contribution to risk by the total portfolio risk (p

2), we have the proportionate

contribution of asset i to the portfolio risk:

xiip/p

2

The ratio ip/p

2 tells us about the sensitivity of asset i’s return to the portfolio’s return.

The higher the ratio is, the more the value of the asset moves with changes in the

5 Appendix 1 to Chapter 5

value of the portfolio, and the more asset i contributes to portfolio risk. Our algebraic

manipulations have thus led to the following important conclusion: The marginal

contribution of an asset to the risk of a portfolio depends not on the risk of the asset

in isolation, but rather on the sensitivity of that asset’s return to changes in the

value of the portfolio.

If the total of all risky assets in the market is included in the portfolio, then it is

called the market portfolio. If we suppose that the portfolio, p, is the market portfolio,

m, then the ratio im/m

2 is called the asset i’s beta, that is:

i im /m

2 (6)

where

i the beta of asset i

An asset’s beta then is a measure of the asset’s marginal contribution to the risk of the

market portfolio. A higher beta means that an asset’s return is more sensitive to

changes in the value of the market portfolio and that the asset contributes more to the

risk of the portfolio.

Another way to understand beta is to recognize that the return on asset i can be

considered as being made up of two components—one that moves with the market’s

return (Rm) and the other a random factor with an expected value of zero that is

unique to the asset (i) and so is uncorrelated with the market return:

Ri     i iRm i (7)

The expected return of asset i can then be written as:

E(Ri)     i iE(Rm)

It is easy to show that i in the above expression is the beta of asset i we defined before

by calculating the covariance of asset i’s return with the market return using the two

equations above:

im E[{Ri E(Ri)} {Rm E(Rm)}] E[{i[Rm E(Rm)] i}

{Rm E(Rm)}]

However, since i is uncorrelated with Rm, E[{i} {Rm E(Rm)}] 0. Therefore,

im im

2

Dividing through by m

2 gives us the following expression for i:

i im /m

2

which is the same definition for beta we found in Equation 6.

The reason for demonstrating that the i in Equation 7 is the same as the one we

defined before is that Equation 7 provides better intuition about how an asset’s beta

measures its sensitivity to changes in the market return. Equation 7 tells us that when

Models of Asset Pricing 6

the beta of an asset is 1.0, it’s return on average increases by 1 percentage point when

the market return increases by 1 percentage point; when the beta is 2.0, the asset’s

return increases by 2 percentage points when the market return increases by 1 percentage

point; and when the beta is 0.5, the asset’s return only increases by 0.5 percentage

point on average when the market return increases by 1 percentage point.

Equation 7 also tells us that we can get estimates of beta by comparing the average

return on an asset with the average market return. For those of you who know a

little econometrics, this estimate of beta is just an ordinary least squares regression of

the asset’s return on the market return. Indeed, the formula for the ordinary least

squares estimate of i im/m

2 is exactly the same as the definition of i earlier.

Systematic and Nonsystematic Risk

We can derive another important idea about the riskiness of an asset using Equation

7. The variance of asset i’s return can be calculated from Equation 7 as:

i

2 E[Ri E(Ri)]2 E{i[Rm E(Rm)} i]2

and since i is uncorrelated with market return:

i

2 i

2 m

2

2

The total variance of the asset’s return can thus be broken up into a component that

is related to market risk, i

2 m

2 , and a component that is unique to the asset,

2. The

i

2 m

2 component related to market risk is referred to as systematic risk and the

2

component unique to the asset is called nonsystematic risk. We can thus write the total

risk of an asset as being made up of systematic risk and nonsystematic risk:

Total Asset Risk Systematic Risk Nonsystematic Risk (8)

Systematic and nonsystematic risk each have another feature that makes the distinction

between these two types of risk important. Systematic risk is the part of an

asset’s risk that cannot be eliminated by holding the asset as part of a diversified portfolio,

whereas nonsystematic risk is the part of an asset’s risk that can be eliminated

in a diversified portfolio. Understanding these features of systematic and nonsystematic

risk leads to the following important conclusion: The risk of a well-diversified

portfolio depends only on the systematic risk of the assets in the portfolio.

We can see that this conclusion is true by considering a portfolio of n assets, each

of which has the same weight on the portfolio of (1/n). Using Equation 7, the return

on this portfolio is:

which can be rewritten as:

Rp       Rm 1n)n

i1

i

Rp (1n)n

i1

    i (1n)n

i1

iRm (1n)n

i1

i

7 Appendix 1 to Chapter 5

where

the average of the     i’s

the average of the i’s

If the portfolio is well diversified so that the i’s are uncorrelated with each other, then

using this fact and the fact that all the i’s are uncorrelated with the market return, the

variance of the portfolio’s return is calculated as:

(average varience of i)

As n gets large the second term, (1/n)(average variance of i), becomes very small, so

that a well-diversified portfolio has a risk of , which is only related to systematic

risk. As the previous conclusion indicated, nonsystematic risk can be eliminated

in a well-diversified portfolio. This reasoning also tells us that the risk of a well-diversified

portfolio is greater than the risk of the market portfolio if the average beta of the assets

in the portfolio is greater than one; however, the portfolio’s risk is less than the market

portfolio if the average beta of the assets is less than one.

The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)

We can now use the ideas we developed about systematic and nonsystematic risk and

betas to derive one of the most widely used models of asset pricing—the capital asset

pricing model (CAPM) developed by William Sharpe, John Litner, and Jack Treynor.

Each cross in Figure 1 shows the standard deviation and expected return for each

risky asset. By putting different proportions of these assets into portfolios, we can generate

a standard deviation and expected return for each of the portfolios using

Equations 4 and 5. The shaded area in the figure shows these combinations of standard

deviation and expected return for these portfolios. Since risk-averse investors

always prefer to have higher expected return and lower standard deviation of the

return, the most attractive standard deviation-expected return combinations are the

ones that lie along the heavy line, which is called the efficient portfolio frontier. These

are the standard deviation-expected return combinations risk-averse investors would

always prefer.

The capital asset pricing model assumes that investors can borrow and lend as

much as they want at a risk-free rate of interest, Rf. By lending at the risk-free rate, the

investor earns an expected return of Rf and his investment has a zero standard deviation

because it is risk-free. The standard deviation-expected return combination for

this risk-free investment is marked as point A in Figure 1. Suppose an investor decides

to put half of his total wealth in the risk-free loan and the other half in the portfolio on

the efficient portfolio frontier with a standard deviation-expected return combination

marked as point M in the figure. Using Equation 4, you should be able to verify that

the expected return on this new portfolio is halfway between Rf and E(Rm); that is,

[Rf E(Rm)]/2. Similarly, because the covariance between the risk-free return and the

return on portfolio M must necessarily be zero, since there is no uncertainty about the

22

2p

22

m (1n)

(1n)n

i1

    i

(1n)n

i1

Models of Asset Pricing 8

return on the risk-free loan, you should also be able to verify, using Equation 5, that

the standard deviation of the return on the new portfolio is halfway between zero and

m, that is, (1/2)m. The standard deviation-expected return combination for this new

portfolio is marked as point B in the figure, and as you can see it lies on the line

between point A and point M. Similarly, if an investor borrows the total amount of her

wealth at the risk-free rate Rf and invests the proceeds plus her wealth (that is, twice

her wealth) in portfolio M, then the standard deviation of this new portfolio will be

twice the standard deviation of return on portfolio M, 2m. On the other hand, using

Equation 4, the expected return on this new portfolio is E(Rm) plus E(Rm) Rf, which

equals 2E(Rm) Rf. This standard deviation-expected return combination is plotted

as point C in the figure.

You should now be able to see that both point B and point C are on the line connecting

point A and point M. Indeed, by choosing different amounts of borrowing

and lending, an investor can form a portfolio with a standard deviation-expected

return combination that lies anywhere on the line connecting points A and M. You

may have noticed that point M has been chosen so that the line connecting points A

and M is tangent to the efficient portfolio frontier. The reason for choosing point M

in this way is that it leads to standard deviation-expected return combinations along

the line that are the most desirable for a risk-averse investor. This line can be thought

of as the opportunity locus, which shows the best combinations of standard deviations

and expected returns available to the investor.

The capital asset pricing model makes another assumption: All investors have the

same assessment of the expected returns and standard deviations of all assets. In this

case, portfolio M is the same for all investors. Thus when all investors’ holdings of

portfolio M are added together, they must equal all of the risky assets in the market,

Appendix 1 to Chapter 5

FIGURE 1 Risk Expected

Return Trade-off

The crosses show the combination

of standard deviation and expected

return for each risky asset. The

efficient portfolio frontier indicates

the most preferable standard

deviation-expected return combinations

that can be achieved by

putting risky assets into portfolios.

By borrowing and lending at the

risk-free rate and investing in portfolio

M, the investor can obtain

standard deviation-expected return

combinations that lie along the

line connecting A, B, M, and C.

This line, the opportunity locus,

contains the best combinations of

standard deviations and expected

returns available to the investor;

hence the opportunity locus shows

the trade-off between expected

returns and risk for the investor.

Expected

Return

E(R)

2E(Rm) — Rf

E(Rm)

Rf + E(Rm)

2

Rf

Efficient

Portfolio

Frontier

Opportunity

Locus

1/2m m 2m

A

B

M

C

Standard Deviation of Retuns

+ +

+ +

+ +

+

+ +

+

+ +

+

+ +

9

which is just the market portfolio. The assumption that all investors have the same

assessment of risk and return for all assets thus means that portfolio M is the market

portfolio.Therefore, the Rm and m in Figure 1 are identical to the market return, Rm,

and the standard deviation of this return, m, referred to earlier in this appendix.

The conclusion that the market portfolio and portfolio M are one and the same

means that the opportunity locus in Figure 1 can be thought of as showing the tradeoff

between expected returns and increased risk for the investor. This trade-off is

given by the slope of the opportunity locus, E(Rm) Rf, and it tells us that when an

investor is willing to increase the risk of his portfolio by m, then he can earn an additional

expected return of E(Rm) Rf. The market price of a unit of market risk, m,

is E(Rm) Rf. E(Rm) Rf is therefore referred to as the market price of risk.

We now know that market price of risk is E(Rm) Rf and we also have learned

that an asset’s beta tells us about systematic risk, because it is the marginal contribution

of that asset to a portfolio’s risk. Therefore the amount an asset’s expected return

exceeds the risk-free rate, E(Ri) Rf, should equal the market price of risk times the

marginal contribution of that asset to portfolio risk, [E(Rm) Rf]i. This reasoning

yields the CAPM asset pricing relationship:

E(Ri) Rf i[E(Rm) Rf] (9)

This CAPM asset pricing equation is represented by the upward sloping line in Figure 2,

which is called the security market line. It tells us the expected return that the market

sets for a security given its beta. For example, it tells us that if a security has a beta of

1.0 so that its marginal contribution to a portfolio’s risk is the same as the market

portfolio, then it should be priced to have the same expected return as the market

portfolio, E(Rm).

Models of Asset Pricing

FIGURE 2 Security Market Line

The security market line derived

from the capital asset pricing

model describes the relationship

between an asset’s beta and its

expected return.

S

T

Expected

Return

E(R)

Security

Market

Line

E(Rm)

Rf

0.5 1.0 Beta

10

To see that securities should be priced so that their expected return-beta combination

should lie on the security market line, consider a security like S in Figure 2,

which is below the security market line. If an investor makes an investment in which

half is put into the market portfolio and half into a risk-free loan, then the beta of this

investment will be 0.5, the same as security S. However, this investment will have an

expected return on the security market line, which is greater than that for security S.

Hence investors will not want to hold security S and its current price will fall, thus

raising its expected return until it equals the amount indicated on the security market

line. On the other hand, suppose there is a security like T which has a beta of 0.5

but whose expected return is above the security market line. By including this security

in a well-diversified portfolio with other assets with a beta of 0.5, none of which

can have an expected return less than that indicated by the security line (as we have

shown), investors can obtain a portfolio with a higher expected return than that

obtained by putting half into a risk-free loan and half into the market portfolio. This

would mean that all investors would want to hold more of security T, and so its price

would rise, thus lowering its expected return until it equaled the amount indicated on

the security market line.

The capital asset pricing model formalizes the following important idea: An asset

should be priced so that is has a higher expected return not when it has a greater

risk in isolation, but rather when its systematic risk is greater.

Arbitrage Pricing Theory

Although the capital asset pricing model has proved to be very useful in practice,

deriving it does require the adoption of some unrealistic assumptions; for example,

the assumption that investors can borrow and lend freely at the risk-free rate, or the

assumption that all investors have the same assessment of expected returns and standard

deviations of returns for all assets. An important alternative to the capital asset

pricing model is the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) developed by Stephen Ross of

M.I.T.

In contrast to CAPM, which has only one source of systematic risk, the market

return, APT takes the view that there can be several sources of systematic risk in the

economy that cannot be eliminated through diversification. These sources of risk can

be thought of as factors that may be related to such items as inflation, aggregate output,

default risk premiums, and/or the term structure of interest rates. The return on

an asset i can thus be written as being made up of components that move with these

factors and a random component that is unique to the asset (i):

Ri i

1 (factor 1) i

2 (factor 2) … i

k (factor k) i (10)

Since there are k factors, this model is called a k-factor model. The i

1 ,…, i

k describe

the sensitivity of the asset i’s return to each of these factors.

Just as in the capital asset pricing model, these systematic sources of risk should

be priced. The market price for each factor j can be thought of as E(Rfactor j ) Rf, and

hence the expected return on a security can be written as:

E(Ri) Rf i

1 [E(Rfactor 1) Rf] … i

k [E(Rfactor k) Rf] (11)

11 Appendix 1 to Chapter 5

This asset pricing equation indicates that all the securities should have the same market

price for the risk contributed by each factor. If the expected return for a security

were above the amount indicated by the APT pricing equation, then it would provide

a higher expected return than a portfolio of other securities with the same average

sensitivity to each factor. Hence investors would want to hold more of this security

and its price would rise until the expected return fell to the value indicated by the

APT pricing equation. On the other hand, if the security’s expected return were less

than the amount indicated by the APT pricing equation, then no one would want to

hold this security, because a higher expected return could be obtained with a portfolio

of securities with the same average sensitivity to each factor. As a result, the price

of the security would fall until its expected return rose to the value indicated by the

APT equation.

As this brief outline of arbitrage pricing theory indicates, the theory supports a

basic conclusion from the capital asset pricing model: An asset should be priced so

that it has a higher expected return not when it has a greater risk in isolation, but

rather when its systematic risk is greater. There is still substantial controversy about

whether a variant of the capital asset pricing model or the arbitrage pricing theory is

a better description of reality. At the present time, both frameworks are considered

valuable tools for understanding how risk affects the prices of assets.

Models of Asset Pricing 12

Both models of interest-rate determination in Chapter 4 make use of an asset market

approach in which supply and demand are always considered in terms of stocks of assets

(amounts at a given point in time). The asset market approach is useful in understanding

not only why interest rates fluctuate but also how any asset’s price is determined.

One asset that has fascinated people for thousands of years is gold. It has been a

driving force in history: The conquest of the Americas by Europeans was to a great

extent the result of the quest for gold, to cite just one example. The fascination with

gold continues to the present day, and developments in the gold market are followed

closely by financial analysts and the media. This appendix shows how the asset market

approach can be applied to understanding the behavior of commodity markets, in

particular the gold market. (The analysis in this appendix can also be used to understand

behavior in many other asset markets.)

Supply and Demand in the Gold Market

The analysis of a commodity market, such as the gold market, proceeds in a similar

fashion to the analysis of the bond market by examining the supply of and demand

for the commodity. We again use our analysis of the determinants of asset demand to

obtain a demand curve for gold, which shows the relationship between the quantity

of gold demanded and the price when all other economic variables are held constant.

To derive the relationship between the quantity of gold demanded and its price, we

again recognize that an important determinant of the quantity demanded is its

expected return:

where Re expected return

Pt price of gold today

Pet

1 expected price of gold next year

ge expected capital gain

In deriving the demand curve, we hold all other variables constant, particularly

the expected price of gold next year Pe

t1. With a given value of the expected price of

gold next year Pe

t1, a lower price of gold today Pt means that there will be a greater

Re

Pet

1 Pt

Pt

ge

Demand Curve

Applying the Asset Market

Approach to a Commodity

Market: The Case of Gold

appendix 2

to chapter 5

1

appreciation in the price of gold over the coming year. The result is that a lower price

of gold today implies a higher expected capital gain over the coming year and hence

a higher expected return: Re (Pe

t1 Pt)/Pt. Thus because the price of gold today

(which for simplicity we will denote as P) is lower, the expected return on gold is

higher, and the quantity demanded is higher. Consequently, the demand curve Gd

1

slopes downward in Figure 1.

To derive the supply curve, expressing the relationship between the quantity supplied

and the price, we again assume that all other economic variables are held constant. A

higher price of gold will induce producers to mine for extra gold and also possibly

induce governments to sell some of their gold stocks to the public, thus increasing the

quantity supplied. Hence the supply curve Gs

1 in Figure 1 slopes upward. Notice that

the supply curve in the figure is drawn to be very steep. The reason for this is that the

actual amount of gold produced in any year is only a tiny fraction of the outstanding

stock of gold that has been accumulated over hundreds of years. Thus the increase in

the quantity of the gold supplied in response to a higher price is only a small fraction

of the stock of gold, resulting in a very steep supply curve.

Market equilibrium in the gold market occurs when the quantity of gold demanded

equals the quantity of gold supplied:

Gd Gs

With the initial demand and supply curves of Gd

1 and Gs

1, equilibrium occurs

at point 1, where these curves intersect at a gold price of P1. At a price above this

Market

Equilibrium

Supply Curve

Applying the Asset Market Approach to a Commodity Market: The Case of Gold

FIGURE 1 A Change in the

Equilibrium Price of Gold

When the demand curve shifts rightward

from G1

d to G2 d —say, because

expected inflation rises—equilibrium

moves from point 1 to point 2, and

the equilibrium price of gold rises

from P1 to P2.

1

P2

P1

Price of Gold P

G d1

G d2

G s1

Quantity of Gold G

2

2

equilibrium, the amount of gold supplied exceeds the amount demanded, and this

condition of excess supply leads to a decline in the gold price until it reaches P1, the

equilibrium price. Similarly, if the price is below P1, there is excess demand for gold,

which drives the price upward until it settles at the equilibrium price P1.

Changes in the Equilibrium Price of Gold

Changes in the equilibrium price of gold occur when there is a shift in either the supply

curve or the demand curve; that is, when the quantity demanded or supplied

changes at each given price of gold in response to a change in some factor other than

today’s gold price.

Our analysis of the determinants of asset demand in the chapter provides the factors

that shift the demand curve for gold: wealth, expected return on gold relative to alternative

assets, riskiness of gold relative to alternative assets, and liquidity of gold relative

to alternative assets. The analysis of how changes in each of these factors shift the

demand curve for gold is the same as that found in the chapter.

When wealth rises, at a given price of gold, the quantity demanded increases, and

the demand curve shifts to the right, as in Figure 1. When the expected return on gold

relative to other assets rises—either because speculators think that the future price of

gold will be higher or because the expected return on other assets declines—gold

becomes more desirable; the quantity demanded therefore increases at any given price

of gold, and the demand curve shifts to the right, as in Figure 1. When the relative

riskiness of gold declines, either because gold prices become less volatile or because

returns on other assets become more volatile, gold becomes more desirable, the quantity

demanded at every given price rises, and the demand curve again shifts to the

right. When the gold market becomes relatively more liquid and gold therefore

becomes more desirable, the quantity demanded at any given price rises, and the

demand curve also shifts to the right, as in Figure 1.

The supply curve for gold shifts when there are changes in technology that make gold

mining more efficient or when governments at any given price of gold decide to

increase sales of their holdings of gold. In these cases, the quantity of gold supplied

at any given price increases, and the supply curve shifts to the right.

Study Guide To give yourself practice with supply and demand analysis in the gold market, see if

you can analyze what happens to the price of gold for the following situations,

remembering that all other things are held constant: 1) Interest rates rise, 2) the gold

market becomes more liquid, 3) the volatility of gold prices increases, 4) the stock

market is expected to turn bullish in the near future, 5) investors suddenly become

fearful that there will be a collapse in real estate prices, and 6) Russia sells a lot of gold

in the open market to raise hard currency to finance expenditures.

Shifts in the

Supply Curve for

Gold

Shift in the

Demand Curve

for Gold

3 Appendix 2 to Chapter 5

Applying the Asset Market Approach to a Commodity Market: The Case of Gold

Changes in the Equilibrium Price of Gold Due to a Rise in

Expected Inflation

Application

To illustrate how changes in the equilibrium price of gold occur when supply

and demand curves shift, let’s look at what happens when there is a

change in expected inflation.

Suppose that expected inflation is 5% and the initial supply and demand

curves are at Gs1

and Gd1

so that the equilibrium price of gold is at P1 in Figure

1. If expected inflation now rises to 10%, prices of goods and commodities

next year will be expected to be higher than they otherwise would have been,

and the price of gold next year Pe

t1 will also be expected to be higher than

otherwise. Now at any given price of gold today, gold is expected to have a

greater rate of appreciation over the coming year and hence a higher expected

capital gain and return. The greater expected return means that the quantity

of gold demanded increases at any given price, thus shifting the demand

curve from Gd

1 to Gd

2. Equilibrium therefore moves from point 1 to point 2,

and the price of gold rises from P1 to P2.

By using a supply and demand diagram like that in Figure 1, you should

be able to see that if the expected rate of inflation falls, the price of gold today

will also fall. We thus reach the following conclusion: The price of gold

should be positively related to the expected inflation rate.

Because the gold market responds immediately to any changes in

expected inflation, it is considered a good barometer of the trend of inflation

in the future. Indeed, Alan Greenspan, the chairman of the Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System, at one point advocated using the

price of gold as an indicator of inflationary pressures in the economy. Not

surprisingly, then, the gold market is followed closely by financial analysts

and monetary policymakers.

4

120

PREVIEW In our supply and demand analysis of interest-rate behavior in Chapter 5, we examined

the determination of just one interest rate. Yet we saw earlier that there are enormous

numbers of bonds on which the interest rates can and do differ. In this chapter,

we complete the interest-rate picture by examining the relationship of the various

interest rates to one another. Understanding why they differ from bond to bond can

help businesses, banks, insurance companies, and private investors decide which

bonds to purchase as investments and which ones to sell.

We first look at why bonds with the same term to maturity have different interest

rates. The relationship among these interest rates is called the risk structure of

interest rates, although risk, liquidity, and income tax rules all play a role in determining

the risk structure. A bond’s term to maturity also affects its interest rate, and

the relationship among interest rates on bonds with different terms to maturity is

called the term structure of interest rates. In this chapter, we examine the sources

and causes of fluctuations in interest rates relative to one another and look at a number

of theories that explain these fluctuations.

Risk Structure of Interest Rates

Figure 1 shows the yields to maturity for several categories of long-term bonds from

1919 to 2002. It shows us two important features of interest-rate behavior for bonds

of the same maturity: Interest rates on different categories of bonds differ from one

another in any given year, and the spread (or difference) between the interest rates

varies over time. The interest rates on municipal bonds, for example, are above those

on U.S. government (Treasury) bonds in the late 1930s but lower thereafter. In addition,

the spread between the interest rates on Baa corporate bonds (riskier than Aaa

corporate bonds) and U.S. government bonds is very large during the Great

Depression years 1930–1933, is smaller during the 1940s–1960s, and then widens

again afterwards. What factors are responsible for these phenomena?

One attribute of a bond that influences its interest rate is its risk of default, which

occurs when the issuer of the bond is unable or unwilling to make interest payments

when promised or pay off the face value when the bond matures. A corporation suffering

big losses, such as Chrysler Corporation did in the 1970s, might be more likely

Default Risk

Chap ter

The Risk and Term Structure

of Interest Rates

6

to suspend interest payments on its bonds.1 The default risk on its bonds would

therefore be quite high. By contrast, U.S. Treasury bonds have usually been considered

to have no default risk because the federal government can always increase taxes

to pay off its obligations. Bonds like these with no default risk are called default-free

bonds. (However, during the budget negotiations in Congress in 1995 and 1996, the

Republicans threatened to let Treasury bonds default, and this had an impact on the

bond market, as one application following this section indicates.) The spread between

the interest rates on bonds with default risk and default-free bonds, called the risk

premium, indicates how much additional interest people must earn in order to be

willing to hold that risky bond. Our supply and demand analysis of the bond market

in Chapter 5 can be used to explain why a bond with default risk always has a positive

risk premium and why the higher the default risk is, the larger the risk premium

will be.

To examine the effect of default risk on interest rates, let us look at the supply and

demand diagrams for the default-free (U.S. Treasury) and corporate long-term bond

markets in Figure 2. To make the diagrams somewhat easier to read, let’s assume that

initially corporate bonds have the same default risk as U.S. Treasury bonds. In this

case, these two bonds have the same attributes (identical risk and maturity); their

equilibrium prices and interest rates will initially be equal (P c

1 P T

1 and i c

1 i T

1 ),

and the risk premium on corporate bonds (i c

1 i T

1 ) will be zero.

C H A P T E R 6 The Risk and Term Structure of Interest Rates 121

FIGURE 1 Long-Term Bond Yields, 1919–2002

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1941–1970; Federal Reserve: www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/.

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

State and Local Government

(Municipal)

U.S. Government

Long-Term Bonds

Corporate Baa Bonds

Annual Yield (%)

Corporate Aaa Bonds

1920 1930 1940

1Chrysler did not default on its loans in this period, but it would have were it not for a government bailout plan

intended to preserve jobs, which in effect provided Chrysler with funds that were used to pay off creditors.

www.federalreserve.gov

/Releases/h15/update/

The Federal Reserve reports the

returns on different quality

bonds. Look at the bottom of

the listing of interest rates for

AAA and BBB rated bonds.

Study Guide Two exercises will help you gain a better understanding of the risk structure:

1. Put yourself in the shoes of an investor—see how your purchase decision would

be affected by changes in risk and liquidity.

2. Practice drawing the appropriate shifts in the supply and demand curves when

risk and liquidity change. For example, see if you can draw the appropriate shifts

in the supply and demand curves when, in contrast to the examples in the text,

a corporate bond has a decline in default risk or an improvement in its liquidity.

If the possibility of a default increases because a corporation begins to suffer large

losses, the default risk on corporate bonds will increase, and the expected return on

these bonds will decrease. In addition, the corporate bond’s return will be more

uncertain as well. The theory of asset demand predicts that because the expected

return on the corporate bond falls relative to the expected return on the default-free

Treasury bond while its relative riskiness rises, the corporate bond is less desirable

(holding everything else equal), and demand for it will fall. The demand curve for

corporate bonds in panel (a) of Figure 2 then shifts to the left, from Dc

1 to Dc

2.

At the same time, the expected return on default-free Treasury bonds increases

relative to the expected return on corporate bonds, while their relative riskiness

122 PA RT I I Financial Markets

FIGURE 2 Response to an Increase in Default Risk on Corporate Bonds

An increase in default risk on corporate bonds shifts the demand curve from Dc

1 to Dc

2. Simultaneously, it shifts the demand curve for

Treasury bonds from DT

1 to DT

2. The equilibrium price for corporate bonds (left axis) falls from P c

1 to P c

2, and the equilibrium interest rate

on corporate bonds (right axis) rises from i c

1 to i c

2. In the Treasury market, the equilibrium bond price rises from P T

1 to P T

2, and the equilibrium

interest rate falls from i T

1 to i T

2. The brace indicates the difference between i c

2 and i T

2, the risk premium on corporate bonds. (Note: P

and i increase in opposite directions. P on the left vertical axis increases as we go up the axis, while i on the right vertical axis increases as

we go down the axis.)

Quantity of Corporate Bonds Quantity of Treasury Bonds

Price of Bonds, P

(P increases ↑)

Interest Rate, i

(i increases )↑

Interest Rate, i

(i increases )↑

Price of Bonds, P

(P increases ↑)

(a) Corporate bond market (b) Default-free (U.S. Treasury) bond market

Risk

Premium

P c2

P c1

Sc

D c1

Dc

2

i c1

P T2

P T1

i c2

ST

D T1

DT2

i T1

i T2

i T2

declines. The Treasury bonds thus become more desirable, and demand rises, as

shown in panel (b) by the rightward shift in the demand curve for these bonds from

DT

1 to DT

2.

As we can see in Figure 2, the equilibrium price for corporate bonds (left axis)

falls from P c

1 to P c

2, and since the bond price is negatively related to the interest rate,

the equilibrium interest rate on corporate bonds (right axis) rises from i c

1 to i c

2. At the

same time, however, the equilibrium price for the Treasury bonds rises from P T

1 to P T

2,

and the equilibrium interest rate falls from i T

1 to i T

2. The spread between the interest

rates on corporate and default-free bonds—that is, the risk premium on corporate

bonds—has risen from zero to i c

2 i T

2. We can now conclude that a bond with

default risk will always have a positive risk premium, and an increase in its default

risk will raise the risk premium.

Because default risk is so important to the size of the risk premium, purchasers

of bonds need to know whether a corporation is likely to default on its bonds. Two

major investment advisory firms, Moody’s Investors Service and Standard and Poor’s

Corporation, provide default risk information by rating the quality of corporate and

municipal bonds in terms of the probability of default. The ratings and their description

are contained in Table 1. Bonds with relatively low risk of default are called

investment-grade securities and have a rating of Baa (or BBB) and above. Bonds with

C H A P T E R 6 The Risk and Term Structure of Interest Rates 123

Rating

Standard Examples of Corporations with

Moody’s and Poor’s Descriptions Bonds Outstanding in 2003

Aaa AAA Highest quality General Electric, Pfizer Inc.,

(lowest default risk) North Carolina State,

Mobil Oil

Aa AA High quality Wal-Mart, McDonald’s,

Credit Suisse First Boston

A A Upper medium grade Hewlett-Packard,

Anheuser-Busch,

Ford, Household Finance

Baa BBB Medium grade Motorola, Albertson’s, Pennzoil,

Weyerhaeuser Co.,

Tommy Hilfiger

Ba BB Lower medium grade Royal Caribbean, Levi Strauss

B B Speculative Rite Aid, Northwest Airlines Inc.,

Six Flags

Caa CCC, CC Poor (high default risk) Revlon, United Airlines

Ca C Highly speculative US Airways, Polaroid

C D Lowest grade Enron, Oakwood Homes

Table 1 Bond Ratings by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s

ratings below Baa (or BBB) have higher default risk and have been aptly dubbed

speculative-grade or junk bonds. Because these bonds always have higher interest

rates than investment-grade securities, they are also referred to as high-yield bonds.

Next let’s look back at Figure 1 and see if we can explain the relationship between

interest rates on corporate and U.S. Treasury bonds. Corporate bonds always have

higher interest rates than U.S. Treasury bonds because they always have some risk of

default, whereas U.S. Treasury bonds do not. Because Baa-rated corporate bonds have

a greater default risk than the higher-rated Aaa bonds, their risk premium is greater,

and the Baa rate therefore always exceeds the Aaa rate. We can use the same analysis

to explain the huge jump in the risk premium on Baa corporate bond rates during the

Great Depression years 1930–1933 and the rise in the risk premium after 1970 (see

Figure 1). The depression period saw a very high rate of business failures and defaults.

As we would expect, these factors led to a substantial increase in default risk for bonds

issued by vulnerable corporations, and the risk premium for Baa bonds reached

unprecedentedly high levels. Since 1970, we have again seen higher levels of business

failures and defaults, although they were still well below Great Depression levels.

Again, as expected, default risks and risk premiums for corporate bonds rose, widening

the spread between interest rates on corporate bonds and Treasury bonds.

124 PA RT I I Financial Markets

Application The Enron Bankruptcy and the Baa-Aaa Spread

In December 2001, the Enron Corporation, a firm specializing in trading in the

energy market, and once the seventh-largest corporation in the United States,

was forced to declare bankruptcy after it became clear that it had used shady

accounting to hide its financial problems. (The Enron bankruptcy, the largest

ever in the United States, will be discussed further in Chapter 8.) Because of the

scale of the bankruptcy and the questions it raised about the quality of the information

in accounting statements, the Enron collapse had a major impact on the

corporate bond market. Let’s see how our supply and demand analysis explains

the behavior of the spread between interest rates on lower quality (Baa-rated) and

highest quality (Aaa-rated) corporate bonds in the aftermath of the Enron failure.

As a consequence of the Enron bankruptcy, many investors began to

doubt the financial health of corporations with lower credit ratings such as

Baa. The increase in default risk for Baa bonds made them less desirable at

any given interest rate, decreased the quantity demanded, and shifted the

demand curve for Baa bonds to the left. As shown in panel (a) of Figure 2,

the interest rate on Baa bonds should have risen, which is indeed what happened.

Interest rates on Baa bonds rose by 24 basis points (0.24 percentage

points) from 7.81% in November 2001 to 8.05% in December 2001. But the

increase in the perceived default risk for Baa bonds after the Enron bankruptcy

made the highest quality (Aaa) bonds relatively more attractive and

shifted the demand curve for these securities to the right—an outcome

described by some analysts as a “flight to quality.” Just as our analysis predicts

in Figure 2, interest rates on Aaa bonds fell by 20 basis points, from 6.97%

in November to 6.77% in December. The overall outcome was that the

spread between interest rates on Baa and Aaa bonds rose by 44 basis points

from 0.84% before the bankruptcy to 1.28% afterward.

Another attribute of a bond that influences its interest rate is its liquidity. As we

learned in Chapter 4, a liquid asset is one that can be quickly and cheaply converted

into cash if the need arises. The more liquid an asset is, the more desirable it is (holding

everything else constant). U.S. Treasury bonds are the most liquid of all long-term

bonds, because they are so widely traded that they are the easiest to sell quickly and

the cost of selling them is low. Corporate bonds are not as liquid, because fewer bonds

for any one corporation are traded; thus it can be costly to sell these bonds in an

emergency, because it might be hard to find buyers quickly.

How does the reduced liquidity of the corporate bonds affect their interest rates

relative to the interest rate on Treasury bonds? We can use supply and demand analysis

with the same figure that was used to analyze the effect of default risk, Figure 2,

to show that the lower liquidity of corporate bonds relative to Treasury bonds

increases the spread between the interest rates on these two bonds. Let us start the

analysis by assuming that initially corporate and Treasury bonds are equally liquid

and all their other attributes are the same. As shown in Figure 2, their equilibrium

prices and interest rates will initially be equal: P c

1 P T

1 and i c

1 i T

1. If the corporate

bond becomes less liquid than the Treasury bond because it is less widely traded, then

(as the theory of asset demand indicates) its demand will fall, shifting its demand

curve from Dc

1 to Dc

2 as in panel (a). The Treasury bond now becomes relatively more

liquid in comparison with the corporate bond, so its demand curve shifts rightward

from DT

1 to DT

2 as in panel (b). The shifts in the curves in Figure 2 show that the price

of the less liquid corporate bond falls and its interest rate rises, while the price of the

more liquid Treasury bond rises and its interest rate falls.

The result is that the spread between the interest rates on the two bond types has

risen. Therefore, the differences between interest rates on corporate bonds and

Treasury bonds (that is, the risk premiums) reflect not only the corporate bond’s

default risk but its liquidity, too. This is why a risk premium is more accurately a “risk

and liquidity premium,” but convention dictates that it is called a risk premium.

Returning to Figure 1, we are still left with one puzzle—the behavior of municipal

bond rates. Municipal bonds are certainly not default-free: State and local governments

have defaulted on the municipal bonds they have issued in the past, particularly

during the Great Depression and even more recently in the case of Orange

County, California, in 1994 (more on this in Chapter 13). Also, municipal bonds are

not as liquid as U.S. Treasury bonds.

Why is it, then, that these bonds have had lower interest rates than U.S. Treasury

bonds for at least 40 years, as indicated in Figure 1? The explanation lies in the fact

that interest payments on municipal bonds are exempt from federal income taxes, a

factor that has the same effect on the demand for municipal bonds as an increase in

their expected return.

Let us imagine that you have a high enough income to put you in the 35% income

tax bracket, where for every extra dollar of income you have to pay 35 cents to the government.

If you own a $1,000-face-value U.S. Treasury bond that sells for $1,000 and

has a coupon payment of $100, you get to keep only $65 of the payment after taxes.

Although the bond has a 10% interest rate, you actually earn only 6.5% after taxes.

Suppose, however, that you put your savings into a $1,000-face-value municipal

bond that sells for $1,000 and pays only $80 in coupon payments. Its interest rate is

only 8%, but because it is a tax-exempt security, you pay no taxes on the $80 coupon

payment, so you earn 8% after taxes. Clearly, you earn more on the municipal bond

Income Tax

Considerations

Liquidity

C H A P T E R 6 The Risk and Term Structure of Interest Rates 125

after taxes, so you are willing to hold the riskier and less liquid municipal bond even

though it has a lower interest rate than the U.S. Treasury bond. (This was not true

before World War II, when the tax-exempt status of municipal bonds did not convey

much of an advantage because income tax rates were extremely low.)

Another way of understanding why municipal bonds have lower interest rates than

Treasury bonds is to use the supply and demand analysis displayed in Figure 3. We

assume that municipal and Treasury bonds have identical attributes and so have the

same bond prices and interest rates as drawn in the figure: P m

1 P T

1 and i m

1 i T

1. Once

the municipal bonds are given a tax advantage that raises their after-tax expected return

relative to Treasury bonds and makes them more desirable, demand for them rises, and

their demand curve shifts to the right, from Dm

1 to Dm

2. The result is that their equilibrium

bond price rises from Pm

1 to P m

2, and their equilibrium interest rate falls from i m

1 to

2. By contrast, Treasury bonds have now become less desirable relative to municipal

bonds; demand for Treasury bonds decreases, and DT

1 shifts to DT

2. The Treasury bond

price falls from P T

1 to P T

2, and the interest rate rises from i T

1 to i T

2. The resulting lower

interest rates for municipal bonds and higher interest rates for Treasury bonds explains

why municipal bonds can have interest rates below those of Treasury bonds.2

126 PA RT I I Financial Markets

FIGURE 3 Interest Rates on Municipal and Treasury Bonds

When the municipal bond is given tax-free status, demand for the municipal bond shifts rightward from Dm1

to Dm2

and demand

for the Treasury bond shifts leftward from DT

1 to DT

2. The equilibrium price of the municipal bond (left axis) rises from Pm1

Pm2

, so its interest rate (right axis) falls from im1

2, while the equilibrium price of the Treasury bond falls from PT

1 to PT

2 and

its interest rate rises from iT

1 to iT

2. The result is that municipal bonds end up with lower interest rates than those on Treasury

bonds. (Note: P and i increase in opposite directions. P on the left vertical axis increases as we go up the axis, while i on the

right vertical axis increases as we go down the axis.)

Quantity of Municipal Bonds Quantity of Treasury Bonds

Price of Bonds, P

(P increases ↑)

Interest Rate, i

(i increases ) ↑

Price of Bonds, P

(P increases ↑)

(a) Market for municipal bonds (b) Market for Treasury bonds

Interest Rate, i

(i increases )↑

P m1

P m2

Sm

D m1

i m1

i m2

D m2

P T2

P T1

ST

DT1

DT2

i T1

i T2

2In contrast to corporate bonds, Treasury bonds are exempt from state and local income taxes. Using the analysis

in the text, you should be able to show that this feature of Treasury bonds provides an additional reason why

interest rates on corporate bonds are higher than those on Treasury bonds.

The risk structure of interest rates (the relationship among interest rates on bonds

with the same maturity) is explained by three factors: default risk, liquidity, and the

income tax treatment of the bond’s interest payments. As a bond’s default risk

increases, the risk premium on that bond (the spread between its interest rate and the

interest rate on a default-free Treasury bond) rises. The greater liquidity of Treasury

bonds also explains why their interest rates are lower than interest rates on less liquid

bonds. If a bond has a favorable tax treatment, as do municipal bonds, whose interest

payments are exempt from federal income taxes, its interest rate will be lower.

Summary

Term Structure of Interest Rates

We have seen how risk, liquidity, and tax considerations (collectively embedded in the

risk structure) can influence interest rates. Another factor that influences the interest

rate on a bond is its term to maturity: Bonds with identical risk, liquidity, and tax

characteristics may have different interest rates because the time remaining to maturity

is different. A plot of the yields on bonds with differing terms to maturity but the

same risk, liquidity, and tax considerations is called a yield curve, and it describes the

term structure of interest rates for particular types of bonds, such as government

bonds. The “Following the Financial News” box shows several yield curves for

Treasury securities that were published in the Wall Street Journal. Yield curves can be

classified as upward-sloping, flat, and downward-sloping (the last sort is often

referred to as an inverted yield curve). When yield curves slope upward, as in the

“Following the Financial News” box, the long-term interest rates are above the shortterm

interest rates; when yield curves are flat, short- and long-term interest rates are

the same; and when yield curves are inverted, long-term interest rates are below

short-term interest rates. Yield curves can also have more complicated shapes in

which they first slope up and then down, or vice versa. Why do we usually see

C H A P T E R 6 The Risk and Term Structure of Interest Rates 127

Application Effects of the Bush Tax Cut on Bond Interest Rates

The Bush tax cut passed in 2001 scheduled a reduction of the top income tax

bracket from 39% to 35% over a ten-year period. What is the effect of this

income tax decrease on interest rates in the municipal bond market relative

to those in the Treasury bond market?

Our supply and demand analysis provides the answer. A decreased income

tax rate for rich people means that the after-tax expected return on tax-free

municipal bonds relative to that on Treasury bonds is lower, because the

interest on Treasury bonds is now taxed at a lower rate. Because municipal

bonds now become less desirable, their demand decreases, shifting the

demand curve to the left, which lowers their price and raises their interest

rate. Conversely, the lower income tax rate makes Treasury bonds more desirable;

this change shifts their demand curve to the right, raises their price, and

lowers their interest rates.

Our analysis thus shows that the Bush tax cut raises the interest rates on

municipal bonds relative to interest rates on Treasury bonds.

upward slopes of the yield curve as in the “Following the Financial News” box but

sometimes other shapes?

Besides explaining why yield curves take on different shapes at different times, a

good theory of the term structure of interest rates must explain the following three

important empirical facts:

1. As we see in Figure 4, interest rates on bonds of different maturities move

together over time.

2. When short-term interest rates are low, yield curves are more likely to have an

upward slope; when short-term interest rates are high, yield curves are more

likely to slope downward and be inverted.

3. Yield curves almost always slope upward, as in the “Following the Financial

News” box.

Three theories have been put forward to explain the term structure of interest

rates; that is, the relationship among interest rates on bonds of different maturities

reflected in yield curve patterns: (1) the expectations theory, (2) the segmented markets

theory, and (3) the liquidity premium theory, each of which is described in the

following sections. The expectations theory does a good job of explaining the first two

facts on our list, but not the third. The segmented markets theory can explain fact 3

but not the other two facts, which are well explained by the expectations theory.

Because each theory explains facts that the other cannot, a natural way to seek a better

understanding of the term structure is to combine features of both theories, which

leads us to the liquidity premium theory, which can explain all three facts.

If the liquidity premium theory does a better job of explaining the facts and is

hence the most widely accepted theory, why do we spend time discussing the other

two theories? There are two reasons. First, the ideas in these two theories provide the

128 PA RT I I Financial Markets

Following the Financial News

The Wall Street Journal publishes a daily plot of the yield

curves for Treasury securities, an example of which is

presented here. It is typically found on page 2 of the

“Money and Investing” section.

The numbers on the vertical axis indicate the interest

rate for the Treasury security, with the maturity given by

the numbers on the horizontal axis. For example, the

yield curve marked “Yesterday” indicates that the interest

rate on the three-month Treasury bill yesterday was

1.25%, while the one-year bill had an interest rate of

1.35% and the ten-year bond had an interest rate of

4.0%. As you can see, the yield curves in the plot have the

typical upward slope.

Source: Wall Street Journal, Wednesday, January 22, 2003, p. C2.

Yield Curves

www.ratecurve.com/yc2.html

Check out today’s yield curve.

Treasury Yield Curve

Yield to maturity of current bills,

notes and bonds.

Source: Reuters

1

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0%

3 6 2 5 10 30

mos. yrs. maturity

Yesterday

1 month ago

1 year ago

groundwork for the liquidity premium theory. Second, it is important to see how

economists modify theories to improve them when they find that the predicted results

are inconsistent with the empirical evidence.

The expectations theory of the term structure states the following commonsense

proposition: The interest rate on a long-term bond will equal an average of short-term

interest rates that people expect to occur over the life of the long-term bond. For

example, if people expect that short-term interest rates will be 10% on average over

the coming five years, the expectations theory predicts that the interest rate on bonds

with five years to maturity will be 10% too. If short-term interest rates were expected

to rise even higher after this five-year period so that the average short-term interest

rate over the coming 20 years is 11%, then the interest rate on 20-year bonds would

equal 11% and would be higher than the interest rate on five-year bonds. We can see

that the explanation provided by the expectations theory for why interest rates on

bonds of different maturities differ is that short-term interest rates are expected to

have different values at future dates.

The key assumption behind this theory is that buyers of bonds do not prefer

bonds of one maturity over another, so they will not hold any quantity of a bond if

its expected return is less than that of another bond with a different maturity. Bonds

that have this characteristic are said to be perfect substitutes. What this means in practice

is that if bonds with different maturities are perfect substitutes, the expected

return on these bonds must be equal.

Expectations

Theory

C H A P T E R 6 The Risk and Term Structure of Interest Rates 129

FIGURE 4 Movements over Time of Interest Rates on U.S. Government Bonds with Different Maturities

Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1941–1970; Federal Reserve: www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15

/data.htm#top.

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

20-Year Bond

Averages

Three-Month Bills

(Short-Term)

Three-to

Five-Year

Averages

Interest

Rate (%)

To see how the assumption that bonds with different maturities are perfect substitutes

leads to the expectations theory, let us consider the following two investment

strategies:

1. Purchase a one-year bond, and when it matures in one year, purchase another

one-year bond.

2. Purchase a two-year bond and hold it until maturity.

Because both strategies must have the same expected return if people are holding

both one- and two-year bonds, the interest rate on the two-year bond must equal the

average of the two one-year interest rates. For example, let’s say that the current interest

rate on the one-year bond is 9% and you expect the interest rate on the one-year bond

next year to be 11%. If you pursue the first strategy of buying the two one-year bonds,

the expected return over the two years will average out to be (9% 11%)/2 10% per

year. You will be willing to hold both the one- and two-year bonds only if the expected

return per year of the two-year bond equals this. Therefore, the interest rate on the twoyear

bond must equal 10%, the average interest rate on the two one-year bonds.

We can make this argument more general. For an investment of $1, consider the

choice of holding, for two periods, a two-period bond or two one-period bonds.

Using the definitions

it today’s (time t) interest rate on a one-period bond

ie t1 interest rate on a one-period bond expected for next period (time t 1)

i2t today’s (time t) interest rate on the two-period bond

the expected return over the two periods from investing $1 in the two-period bond

and holding it for the two periods can be calculated as:

(1 i2t )(1 i2t ) 1 1 2i2t (i2t )2 1 = 2i2t (i2t )2

After the second period, the $1 investment is worth (1 i2t )(1 i2t ). Subtracting

the $1 initial investment from this amount and dividing by the initial $1 investment

gives the rate of return calculated in the previous equation. Because (i2t )2 is extremely

small—if i2 t 10% 0.10, then (i2t )2 0.01—we can simplify the expected return

for holding the two-period bond for the two periods to

2i2t

With the other strategy, in which one-period bonds are bought, the expected

return on the $1 investment over the two periods is:

(1 it)(1 ie t1) 1 1 it ie t1 it(ie t1) 1 it iet

it(ie t1)

This calculation is derived by recognizing that after the first period, the $1 investment

becomes 1 it , and this is reinvested in the one-period bond for the next period,

yielding an amount (1 it )(1 ie t1). Then subtracting the $1 initial investment

from this amount and dividing by the initial investment of $1 gives the expected

return for the strategy of holding one-period bonds for the two periods. Because

it(ie t1) is also extremely small—if it ie t1 0.10, then it(ie t1) 0.01—we can simplify

this to:

it ie t1

Both bonds will be held only if these expected returns are equal; that is, when:

2i2t it ie t1

130 PA RT I I Financial Markets

Solving for i2t in terms of the one-period rates, we have:

(1)

which tells us that the two-period rate must equal the average of the two one-period

rates. Graphically, this can be shown as:

We can conduct the same steps for bonds with a longer maturity so that we can examine

the whole term structure of interest rates. Doing so, we will find that the interest

rate of int on an n-period bond must equal:

(2)

Equation 2 states that the n-period interest rate equals the average of the oneperiod

interest rates expected to occur over the n-period life of the bond. This is a

restatement of the expectations theory in more precise terms.3

A simple numerical example might clarify what the expectations theory in

Equation 2 is saying. If the one-year interest rate over the next five years is expected

to be 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9%, Equation 2 indicates that the interest rate on the two-year

bond would be:

while for the five-year bond it would be:

Doing a similar calculation for the one-, three-, and four-year interest rates, you

should be able to verify that the one- to five-year interest rates are 5.0, 5.5, 6.0, 6.5,

and 7.0%, respectively. Thus we see that the rising trend in expected short-term interest

rates produces an upward-sloping yield curve along which interest rates rise as

maturity lengthens.

The expectations theory is an elegant theory that provides an explanation of why

the term structure of interest rates (as represented by yield curves) changes at different

times. When the yield curve is upward-sloping, the expectations theory suggests

that short-term interest rates are expected to rise in the future, as we have seen in our

numerical example. In this situation, in which the long-term rate is currently above

the short-term rate, the average of future short-term rates is expected to be higher

than the current short-term rate, which can occur only if short-term interest rates are

expected to rise. This is what we see in our numerical example. When the yield curve

is inverted (slopes downward), the average of future short-term interest rates is

5% 6% 7% 8% 9%

5

7%

5% 6%

2

5.5%

in t

it i e

t1 i e

t2 . . . i e

t(n1)

Today

0

Year

1

Year

2

t1

i 2t

it i e

t1

2

i2t

it i e

t1

2

C H A P T E R 6 The Risk and Term Structure of Interest Rates 131

3The analysis here has been conducted for discount bonds. Formulas for interest rates on coupon bonds would

differ slightly from those used here, but would convey the same principle.

expected to be below the current short-term rate, implying that short-term interest

rates are expected to fall, on average, in the future. Only when the yield curve is flat

does the expectations theory suggest that short-term interest rates are not expected to

change, on average, in the future.

The expectations theory also explains fact 1 that interest rates on bonds with different

maturities move together over time. Historically, short-term interest rates have

had the characteristic that if they increase today, they will tend to be higher in the

future. Hence a rise in short-term rates will raise people’s expectations of future shortterm

rates. Because long-term rates are the average of expected future short-term

rates, a rise in short-term rates will also raise long-term rates, causing short- and longterm

rates to move together.

The expectations theory also explains fact 2 that yield curves tend to have an

upward slope when short-term interest rates are low and are inverted when shortterm

rates are high. When short-term rates are low, people generally expect them to

rise to some normal level in the future, and the average of future expected short-term

rates is high relative to the current short-term rate. Therefore, long-term interest rates

will be substantially above current short-term rates, and the yield curve would then

have an upward slope. Conversely, if short-term rates are high, people usually expect

them to come back down. Long-term rates would then drop below short-term rates

because the average of expected future short-term rates would be below current shortterm

rates and the yield curve would slope downward and become inverted.4

The expectations theory is an attractive theory because it provides a simple explanation

of the behavior of the term structure, but unfortunately it has a major shortcoming:

It cannot explain fact 3, which says that yield curves usually slope upward.

The typical upward slope of yield curves implies that short-term interest rates are usually

expected to rise in the future. In practice, short-term interest rates are just as

likely to fall as they are to rise, and so the expectations theory suggests that the typical

yield curve should be flat rather than upward-sloping.

As the name suggests, the segmented markets theory of the term structure sees markets

for different-maturity bonds as completely separate and segmented. The interest

rate for each bond with a different maturity is then determined by the supply of and

demand for that bond with no effects from expected returns on other bonds with

other maturities.

The key assumption in the segmented markets theory is that bonds of different

maturities are not substitutes at all, so the expected return from holding a bond of one

maturity has no effect on the demand for a bond of another maturity. This theory of

the term structure is at the opposite extreme to the expectations theory, which

assumes that bonds of different maturities are perfect substitutes.

The argument for why bonds of different maturities are not substitutes is that

investors have strong preferences for bonds of one maturity but not for another, so

they will be concerned with the expected returns only for bonds of the maturity they

prefer. This might occur because they have a particular holding period in mind, and

Segmented

Markets Theory

132 PA RT I I Financial Markets

4The expectations theory explains another important fact about the relationship between short-term and long-term

interest rates. As you can see in Figure 4, short-term interest rates are more volatile than long-term rates. If interest

rates are mean-reverting—that is, if they tend to head back down after they are at unusually high levels or go

back up when they are at unusually low levels—then an average of these short-term rates must necessarily have

lower volatility than the short-term rates themselves. Because the expectations theory suggests that the long-term

rate will be an average of future short-term rates, it implies that the long-term rate will have lower volatility than

short-term rates.

if they match the maturity of the bond to the desired holding period, they can obtain

a certain return with no risk at all.5 (We have seen in Chapter 4 that if the term to

maturity equals the holding period, the return is known for certain because it equals

the yield exactly, and there is no interest-rate risk.) For example, people who have a

short holding period would prefer to hold short-term bonds. Conversely, if you were

putting funds away for your young child to go to college, your desired holding period

might be much longer, and you would want to hold longer-term bonds.

In the segmented markets theory, differing yield curve patterns are accounted for

by supply and demand differences associated with bonds of different maturities. If, as

seems sensible, investors have short desired holding periods and generally prefer

bonds with shorter maturities that have less interest-rate risk, the segmented markets

theory can explain fact 3 that yield curves typically slope upward. Because in the typical

situation the demand for long-term bonds is relatively lower than that for shortterm

bonds, long-term bonds will have lower prices and higher interest rates, and

hence the yield curve will typically slope upward.

Although the segmented markets theory can explain why yield curves usually

tend to slope upward, it has a major flaw in that it cannot explain facts 1 and 2.

Because it views the market for bonds of different maturities as completely segmented,

there is no reason for a rise in interest rates on a bond of one maturity to affect the

interest rate on a bond of another maturity. Therefore, it cannot explain why interest

rates on bonds of different maturities tend to move together (fact 1). Second, because

it is not clear how demand and supply for short- versus long-term bonds change with

the level of short-term interest rates, the theory cannot explain why yield curves tend

to slope upward when short-term interest rates are low and to be inverted when

short-term interest rates are high (fact 2).

Because each of our two theories explains empirical facts that the other cannot, a

logical step is to combine the theories, which leads us to the liquidity premium theory.

The liquidity premium theory of the term structure states that the interest rate on a

long-term bond will equal an average of short-term interest rates expected to occur

over the life of the long-term bond plus a liquidity premium (also referred to as a term

premium) that responds to supply and demand conditions for that bond.

The liquidity premium theory’s key assumption is that bonds of different maturities

are substitutes, which means that the expected return on one bond does influence

the expected return on a bond of a different maturity, but it allows investors to prefer

one bond maturity over another. In other words, bonds of different maturities are

assumed to be substitutes but not perfect substitutes. Investors tend to prefer shorterterm

bonds because these bonds bear less interest-rate risk. For these reasons,

investors must be offered a positive liquidity premium to induce them to hold longerterm

bonds. Such an outcome would modify the expectations theory by adding a positive

liquidity premium to the equation that describes the relationship between longand

short-term interest rates. The liquidity premium theory is thus written as:

int (3)

it i e

t1 i e

t2 . . . i e

t(n1)

lnt

Liquidity

Premium and

Preferred Habitat

Theories

C H A P T E R 6 The Risk and Term Structure of Interest Rates 133

5The statement that there is no uncertainty about the return if the term to maturity equals the holding period is

literally true only for a discount bond. For a coupon bond with a long holding period, there is some risk because

coupon payments must be reinvested before the bond matures. Our analysis here is thus being conducted for

discount bonds. However, the gist of the analysis remains the same for coupon bonds because the amount of this

risk from reinvestment is small when coupon bonds have the same term to maturity as the holding period.

where lnt the liquidity (term) premium for the n-period bond at time t, which is

always positive and rises with the term to maturity of the bond, n.

Closely related to the liquidity premium theory is the preferred habitat theory,

which takes a somewhat less direct approach to modifying the expectations hypothesis

but comes up with a similar conclusion. It assumes that investors have a preference

for bonds of one maturity over another, a particular bond maturity (preferred

habitat) in which they prefer to invest. Because they prefer bonds of one maturity over

another they will be willing to buy bonds that do not have the preferred maturity only

if they earn a somewhat higher expected return. Because investors are likely to prefer

the habitat of short-term bonds over that of longer-term bonds, they are willing to

hold long-term bonds only if they have higher expected returns. This reasoning leads

to the same Equation 3 implied by the liquidity premium theory with a term premium

that typically rises with maturity.

The relationship between the expectations theory and the liquidity premiums and

preferred habitat theories is shown in Figure 5. There we see that because the liquidity

premium is always positive and typically grows as the term to maturity increases,

the yield curve implied by the liquidity premium theory is always above the yield

curve implied by the expectations theory and generally has a steeper slope.

A simple numerical example similar to the one we used for the expectations

hypothesis further clarifies what the liquidity premium and preferred habitat theories

in Equation 3 are saying. Again suppose that the one-year interest rate over the next

five years is expected to be 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9%, while investors’ preferences for holding

short-term bonds means that the liquidity premiums for one- to five-year bonds

are 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 1.0%, respectively. Equation 3 then indicates that the interest

rate on the two-year bond would be:

5% 6%

2

0.25% 5.75%

134 PA RT I I Financial Markets

http://stockcharts.com/charts

/YieldCurve.html

This site lets you look at the

dynamic yield curve at any

point in time since 1995.

FIGURE 5 The Relationship

Between the Liquidity Premium

(Preferred Habitat) and Expectations

Theory

Because the liquidity premium is

always positive and grows as the

term to maturity increases, the

yield curve implied by the liquidity

premium and preferred habitat

theories is always above the yield

curve implied by the expectations

theory and has a steeper slope.

Note that the yield curve implied

by the expectations theory is

drawn under the scenario of

unchanging future one-year interest

rates.

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

Years to Maturity, n

Interest

Rate, int

Expectations Theory

Yield Curve

Liquidity

Premium, lnt

Liquidity Premium (Preferred Habitat) Theory

Yield Curve

while for the five-year bond it would be:

Doing a similar calculation for the one-, three-, and four-year interest rates, you

should be able to verify that the one- to five-year interest rates are 5.0, 5.75, 6.5, 7.25,

and 8.0%, respectively. Comparing these findings with those for the expectations theory,

we see that the liquidity premium and preferred habitat theories produce yield

curves that slope more steeply upward because of investors’ preferences for shortterm

bonds.

Let’s see if the liquidity premium and preferred habitat theories are consistent

with all three empirical facts we have discussed. They explain fact 1 that interest rates

on different-maturity bonds move together over time: A rise in short-term interest

rates indicates that short-term interest rates will, on average, be higher in the future,

and the first term in Equation 3 then implies that long-term interest rates will rise

along with them.

They also explain why yield curves tend to have an especially steep upward

slope when short-term interest rates are low and to be inverted when short-term

rates are high (fact 2). Because investors generally expect short-term interest rates

to rise to some normal level when they are low, the average of future expected shortterm

rates will be high relative to the current short-term rate. With the additional

boost of a positive liquidity premium, long-term interest rates will be substantially

above current short-term rates, and the yield curve would then have a steep upward

slope. Conversely, if short-term rates are high, people usually expect them to come

back down. Long-term rates would then drop below short-term rates because the

average of expected future short-term rates would be so far below current shortterm

rates that despite positive liquidity premiums, the yield curve would slope

downward.

The liquidity premium and preferred habitat theories explain fact 3 that yield

curves typically slope upward by recognizing that the liquidity premium rises with a

bond’s maturity because of investors’ preferences for short-term bonds. Even if shortterm

interest rates are expected to stay the same on average in the future, long-term

interest rates will be above short-term interest rates, and yield curves will typically

slope upward.

How can the liquidity premium and preferred habitat theories explain the occasional

appearance of inverted yield curves if the liquidity premium is positive? It must

be that at times short-term interest rates are expected to fall so much in the future that

the average of the expected short-term rates is well below the current short-term rate.

Even when the positive liquidity premium is added to this average, the resulting longterm

rate will still be below the current short-term interest rate.

As our discussion indicates, a particularly attractive feature of the liquidity premium

and preferred habitat theories is that they tell you what the market is predicting

about future short-term interest rates just from the slope of the yield curve. A

steeply rising yield curve, as in panel (a) of Figure 6, indicates that short-term interest

rates are expected to rise in the future. A moderately steep yield curve, as in panel

(b), indicates that short-term interest rates are not expected to rise or fall much in the

future. A flat yield curve, as in panel (c), indicates that short-term rates are expected

to fall moderately in the future. Finally, an inverted yield curve, as in panel (d), indicates

that short-term interest rates are expected to fall sharply in the future.

5% 6% 7% 8% 9%

5

1% 8%

C H A P T E R 6 The Risk and Term Structure of Interest Rates 135

In the 1980s, researchers examining the term structure of interest rates questioned

whether the slope of the yield curve provides information about movements of future

short-term interest rates.6 They found that the spread between long- and short-term

interest rates does not always help predict future short-term interest rates, a finding

that may stem from substantial fluctuations in the liquidity (term) premium for longterm

bonds. More recent research using more discriminating tests now favors a different

view. It shows that the term structure contains quite a bit of information for the

very short run (over the next several months) and the long run (over several years)

Evidence on the

Term Structure

136 PA RT I I Financial Markets

6Robert J. Shiller, John Y. Campbell, and Kermit L. Schoenholtz, “Forward Rates and Future Policy: Interpreting

the Term Structure of Interest Rates,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 (1983): 173–217; N. Gregory

Mankiw and Lawrence H. Summers, “Do Long-Term Interest Rates Overreact to Short-Term Interest Rates?”

Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 (1984): 223–242.

FIGURE 6 Yield Curves and the Market’s Expectations of Future Short-Term Interest Rates According to the Liquidity Premium Theory

Term to Maturity

Term to Maturity

Term to Maturity

Term to Maturity

(a) Future short-term interest rates

expected to rise

(b) Future short-term interest rates

expected to stay the same

(c) Future short-term interest rates

expected to fall moderately

(d) Future short-term interest rates

expected to fall sharply

Yield to

Maturity

Yield to

Maturity

Yield to

Maturity

Yield to

Maturity

but is unreliable at predicting movements in interest rates over the intermediate term

(the time in between).7

The liquidity premium and preferred habitat theories are the most widely accepted

theories of the term structure of interest rates because they explain the major empirical

facts about the term structure so well. They combine the features of both the

expectations theory and the segmented markets theory by asserting that a long-term

interest rate will be the sum of a liquidity (term) premium and the average of the

short-term interest rates that are expected to occur over the life of the bond.

The liquidity premium and preferred habitat theories explain the following facts:

(1) Interest rates on bonds of different maturities tend to move together over time, (2)

yield curves usually slope upward, and (3) when short-term interest rates are low,

yield curves are more likely to have a steep upward slope, whereas when short-term

interest rates are high, yield curves are more likely to be inverted.

The theories also help us predict the movement of short-term interest rates in the

future. A steep upward slope of the yield curve means that short-term rates are expected

to rise, a mild upward slope means that short-term rates are expected to remain the

same, a flat slope means that short-term rates are expected to fall moderately, and an

inverted yield curve means that short-term rates are expected to fall sharply.

Summary

C H A P T E R 6 The Risk and Term Structure of Interest Rates 137

7Eugene Fama, “The Information in the Term Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 13 (1984): 509–528;

Eugene Fama and Robert Bliss, “The Information in Long-Maturity Forward Rates,” American Economic Review 77

(1987): 680–692; John Y. Campbell and Robert J. Shiller, “Cointegration and Tests of the Present Value Models,”

Journal of Political Economy 95 (1987): 1062–1088; John Y. Campbell and Robert J. Shiller, “Yield Spreads and

Interest Rate Movements: A Bird’s Eye View,” Review of Economic Studies 58 (1991): 495–514.

Application Interpreting Yield Curves, 1980–2003

Figure 7 illustrates several yield curves that have appeared for U.S. government

bonds in recent years. What do these yield curves tell us about the public’s

expectations of future movements of short-term interest rates?

Study Guide Try to answer the preceding question before reading further in the text. If you

have trouble answering it with the liquidity premium and preferred habitat

theories, first try answering it with the expectations theory (which is simpler

because you don’t have to worry about the liquidity premium). When you

understand what the expectations of future interest rates are in this case,

modify your analysis by taking the liquidity premium into account.

The steep inverted yield curve that occurred on January 15, 1981, indicated

that short-term interest rates were expected to decline sharply in the

future. In order for longer-term interest rates with their positive liquidity

premium to be well below the short-term interest rate, short-term interest

rates must be expected to decline so sharply that their average is far below

the current short-term rate. Indeed, the public’s expectations of sharply lower

short-term interest rates evident in the yield curve were realized soon after

January 15; by March, three-month Treasury bill rates had declined from the

16% level to 13%.

138 PA RT I I Financial Markets

The steep upward-sloping yield curves on March 28, 1985, and January

23, 2003, indicated that short-term interest rates would climb in the future.

The long-term interest rate is above the short-term interest rate when shortterm

interest rates are expected to rise because their average plus the liquidity

premium will be above the current short-term rate. The moderately

upward-sloping yield curves on May 16, 1980, and March 3, 1997, indicated

that short-term interest rates were expected neither to rise nor to fall in the

near future. In this case, their average remains the same as the current shortterm

rate, and the positive liquidity premium for longer-term bonds explains

the moderate upward slope of the yield curve.

FIGURE 7 Yield Curves for U.S. Government Bonds

Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; U.S. Financial Data, various issues; Wall Street Journal, various dates.

1 2 3 4 5 5 10 15 20

6

8

10

12

14

16

Terms to Maturity (Years)

Interest Rate (%)

May 16, 1980

March 28, 1985

January 15, 1981

March 3, 1997

0

4

2

January 23, 2003

Summary

1. Bonds with the same maturity will have different

interest rates because of three factors: default risk,

liquidity, and tax considerations. The greater a bond’s

default risk, the higher its interest rate relative to other

bonds; the greater a bond’s liquidity, the lower its

interest rate; and bonds with tax-exempt status will

have lower interest rates than they otherwise would.

The relationship among interest rates on bonds with the

same maturity that arise because of these three factors is

known as the risk structure of interest rates.

C H A P T E R 6 The Risk and Term Structure of Interest Rates 139

2. Four theories of the term structure provide

explanations of how interest rates on bonds with

different terms to maturity are related. The expectations

theory views long-term interest rates as equaling the

average of future short-term interest rates expected to

occur over the life of the bond; by contrast, the

segmented markets theory treats the determination of

interest rates for each bond’s maturity as the outcome of

supply and demand in that market only. Neither of

these theories by itself can explain the fact that interest

rates on bonds of different maturities move together

over time and that yield curves usually slope upward.

3. The liquidity premium and preferred habitat theories

combine the features of the other two theories, and by

so doing are able to explain the facts just mentioned.

They view long-term interest rates as equaling the

average of future short-term interest rates expected to

occur over the life of the bond plus a liquidity

premium. These theories allow us to infer the market’s

expectations about the movement of future short-term

interest rates from the yield curve. A steeply upwardsloping

curve indicates that future short-term rates are

expected to rise, a mildly upward-sloping curve

indicates that short-term rates are expected to stay the

same, a flat curve indicates that short-term rates are

expected to decline slightly, and an inverted yield curve

indicates that a substantial decline in short-term rates is

expected in the future.

Key Terms

default, p. 120

default-free bonds, p. 121

expectations theory, p. 129

inverted yield curve, p. 127

junk bonds, p. 124

liquidity premium theory, p. 133

preferred habitat theory, p. 134

risk premium, p. 121

risk structure of interest rates, p. 120

segmented markets theory, p. 132

term structure of interest rates, p. 120

yield curve, p. 127

Questions and Problems

Questions marked with an asterisk are answered at the end

of the book in an appendix, “Answers to Selected Questions

and Problems.”

1. Which should have the higher risk premium on its

interest rates, a corporate bond with a Moody’s Baa

rating or a corporate bond with a C rating? Why?

*2. Why do U.S. Treasury bills have lower interest rates

than large-denomination negotiable bank CDs?

3. Risk premiums on corporate bonds are usually anticyclical;

that is, they decrease during business cycle expansions

and increase during recessions. Why is this so?

*4. “If bonds of different maturities are close substitutes, their

interest rates are more likely to move together.” Is this

statement true, false, or uncertain? Explain your answer.

5. If yield curves, on average, were flat, what would this

say about the liquidity (term) premiums in the term

structure? Would you be more or less willing to accept

the expectations theory?

*6. Assuming that the expectations theory is the correct

theory of the term structure, calculate the interest

rates in the term structure for maturities of one to five

years, and plot the resulting yield curves for the following

series of one-year interest rates over the next

five years:

(a) 5%, 7%, 7%, 7%, 7%

(b) 5%, 4%, 4%, 4%, 4%

How would your yield curves change if people preferred

shorter-term bonds over longer-term bonds?

7. Assuming that the expectations theory is the correct

theory of the term structure, calculate the interest rates

in the term structure for maturities of one to five years,

and plot the resulting yield curves for the following

path of one-year interest rates over the next five years:

(a) 5%, 6%, 7%, 6%, 5%

(b) 5%, 4%, 3%, 4%, 5%

How would your yield curves change if people preferred

shorter-term bonds over longer-term bonds?

QUIZ

*8. If a yield curve looks like the one shown in figure (a)

in this section, what is the market predicting about

the movement of future short-term interest rates?

What might the yield curve indicate about the market’s

predictions about the inflation rate in the future?

9. If a yield curve looks like the one shown in (b), what

is the market predicting about the movement of future

short-term interest rates? What might the yield curve

indicate about the market’s predictions about the inflation

rate in the future?

*10. What effect would reducing income tax rates have on

the interest rates of municipal bonds? Would interest

rates of Treasury securities be affected, and if so, how?

Using Economic Analysis

to Predict the Future

11. Predict what will happen to interest rates on a

corporation’s bonds if the federal government guarantees

today that it will pay creditors if the corporation

goes bankrupt in the future. What will happen to the

interest rates on Treasury securities?

*12. Predict what would happen to the risk premiums on

corporate bonds if brokerage commissions were lowered

in the corporate bond market.

13. If the income tax exemption on municipal bonds were

abolished, what would happen to the interest rates on

these bonds? What effect would the change have on

interest rates on U.S. Treasury securities?

*14. If the yield curve suddenly becomes steeper, how

would you revise your predictions of interest rates in

the future?

15. If expectations of future short-term interest rates suddenly

fall, what would happen to the slope of the

yield curve?

140 PA RT I I Financial Markets

Web Exercises

1. The amount of additional interest investors receive

due to the various premiums changes over time.

Sometimes the risk premiums are much larger than at

other times. For example, the default risk premium

was very small in the late 1990s when the economy

was so healthy business failures were rare. This risk

premium increases during recessions.

Go to www.federalreserve.gov/releases/releases/h15

(historical data) and find the interest rate listings for

AAA and Baa rated bonds at three points in time, the

most recent, June 1, 1995, and June 1, 1992. Prepare

a graph that shows these three time periods (see

Figure 1 for an example). Are the risk premiums stable

or do they change over time?

2. Figure 7 shows a number of yield curves at various

points in time. Go to www.bloomberg.com, and click

on “Markets” at the top of the page. Find the Treasury

yield curve. Does the current yield curve fall above or

below the most recent one listed in Figure 7? Is the

current yield curve flatter or steeper than the most

recent one reported in Figure 7?

3. Investment companies attempt to explain to investors

the nature of the risk the investor incurs when buying

shares in their mutual funds. For example, Vanguard

carefully explains interest rate risk and offers alternative

funds with different interest rate risks. Go to

http://flagship5.vanguard.com/VGApp/hnw

/FundsStocksOverview.

a. Select the bond fund you would recommend to an

investor who has very low tolerance for risk and a

short investment horizon. Justify your answer.

b. Select the bond fund you would recommend to an

investor who has very high tolerance for risk and a

long investment horizon. Justify your answer.

Yield to

Maturity

Term to Maturity

(a)

Yield to

Maturity

(b) Term to Maturity

PREVIEW Rarely does a day go by that the stock market isn’t a major news item. We have witnessed

huge swings in the stock market in recent years. The 1990s were an extraordinary

decade for stocks: the Dow Jones and S&P 500 indexes increased more than

400%, while the tech-laden NASDAQ index rose more than 1,000%. By early 2000,

both indexes had reached record highs. Unfortunately, the good times did not last,

and many investors lost their shirts. Starting in early 2000, the stock market began to

decline: the NASDAQ crashed, falling by over 50%, while the Dow Jones and S&P

500 indexes fell by 30% through January 2003.

Because so many people invest in the stock market and the price of stocks affects

the ability of people to retire comfortably, the market for stocks is undoubtedly the

financial market that receives the most attention and scrutiny. In this chapter, we look

at how this important market works.

We begin by discussing the fundamental theories that underlie the valuation of

stocks. These theories are critical to understanding the forces that cause the value of

stocks to rise and fall minute by minute and day by day. Once we have learned the

methods for stock valuation, we need to explore how expectations about the market

affect its behavior. We do so by examining the theory of rational expectations. When

this theory is applied to financial markets, the outcome is the efficient market hypothesis.

The theory of rational expectations is also central to debates about the conduct

of monetary policy, to be discussed in Chapter 28.

Theoretically, the theory of rational expectations should be a powerful tool for

analyzing behavior. But to establish that it is in reality a useful tool, we must compare

the outcomes predicted by the theory with empirical evidence. Although the evidence

is mixed and controversial, it indicates that for many purposes, the theory of rational

expectations is a good starting point for analyzing expectations.

Computing the Price of Common Stock

Common stock is the principal way that corporations raise equity capital. Holders of

common stock own an interest in the corporation consistent with the percentage of

outstanding shares owned. This ownership interest gives stockholders—those who

hold stock in a corporation—a bundle of rights. The most important are the right to

vote and to be the residual claimant of all funds flowing into the firm (known as

cash flows), meaning that the stockholder receives whatever remains after all other

141

Chap ter The Stock Market, the Theory of

Rational Expectations, and the

Efficient Market Hypothesis

7

claims against the firm’s assets have been satisfied. Stockholders are paid dividends

from the net earnings of the corporation. Dividends are payments made periodically,

usually every quarter, to stockholders. The board of directors of the firm sets the level

of the dividend, usually upon the recommendation of management. In addition, the

stockholder has the right to sell the stock.

One basic principle of finance is that the value of any investment is found by

computing the value today of all cash flows the investment will generate over its life.

For example, a commercial building will sell for a price that reflects the net cash flows

(rents – expenses) it is projected to have over its useful life. Similarly, we value common

stock as the value in today’s dollars of all future cash flows. The cash flows a

stockholder might earn from stock are dividends, the sales price, or both.

To develop the theory of stock valuation, we begin with the simplest possible scenario:

You buy the stock, hold it for one period to get a dividend, then sell the stock.

We call this the one-period valuation model.

Suppose that you have some extra money to invest for one year. After a year, you will

need to sell your investment to pay tuition. After watching CNBC or Wall Street Week

on TV, you decide that you want to buy Intel Corp. stock. You call your broker and

find that Intel is currently selling for $50 per share and pays $0.16 per year in dividends.

The analyst on Wall Street Week predicts that the stock will be selling for $60

in one year. Should you buy this stock?

To answer this question, you need to determine whether the current price accurately

reflects the analyst’s forecast. To value the stock today, you need to find the present

discounted value of the expected cash flows (future payments) using the formula

in Equation 1 of Chapter 4. Note that in this equation, the discount factor used to discount

the cash flows is the required return on investments in equity rather than the

interest rate. The cash flows consist of one dividend payment plus a final sales price.

When these cash flows are discounted back to the present, the following equation

computes the current price of the stock:

(1)

where P0=the current price of the stock. The zero subscript refers to

time period zero, or the present.

Div1=the dividend paid at the end of year 1.

ke=the required return on investments in equity.

P1=the price at the end of the first period; the assumed sales

price of the stock.

To see how Equation 1 works, let’s compute the price of the Intel stock if, after

careful consideration, you decide that you would be satisfied to earn a 12% return on

the investment. If you have decided that ke = 0.12, are told that Intel pays $0.16 per

year in dividends (Div1 = 0.16), and forecast the share price of $60 for next year (P1

= $60), you get the following from Equation 1:

P0

0.16

1 0.12

$60

1 0.12

$0.14 $53.57 $53.71

P0

Div1

(1 ke )

P1

(1 ke )

The One-Period

Valuation Model

142 PA RT I I Financial Markets

http://stocks.tradingcharts.com

Access detailed stock quotes,

charts, and historical stock data.

Based on your analysis, you find that the present value of all cash flows from the

stock is $53.71. Because the stock is currently priced at $50 per share, you would

choose to buy it. However, you should be aware that the stock may be selling for less

than $53.71, because other investors place a different risk on the cash flows or estimate

the cash flows to be less than you do.

Using the same concept, the one-period dividend valuation model can be extended to

any number of periods: The value of stock is the present value of all future cash flows.

The only cash flows that an investor will receive are dividends and a final sales price

when the stock is ultimately sold in period n. The generalized multi-period formula

for stock valuation can be written as:

(2)

If you tried to use Equation 2 to find the value of a share of stock, you would

soon realize that you must first estimate the value the stock will have at some point

in the future before you can estimate its value today. In other words, you must find

Pn in order to find P0. However, if Pn is far in the future, it will not affect P0. For example,

the present value of a share of stock that sells for $50 seventy-five years from now

using a 12% discount rate is just one cent [$50/(1.1275)=$0.01]. This reasoning

implies that the current value of a share of stock can be calculated as simply the present

value of the future dividend stream. The generalized dividend model is rewritten

in Equation 3 without the final sales price:

(3)

Consider the implications of Equation 3 for a moment. The generalized dividend

model says that the price of stock is determined only by the present value of the dividends

and that nothing else matters. Many stocks do not pay dividends, so how is it

that these stocks have value? Buyers of the stock expect that the firm will pay dividends

someday. Most of the time a firm institutes dividends as soon as it has completed the

rapid growth phase of its life cycle.

The generalized dividend valuation model requires that we compute the present

value of an infinite stream of dividends, a process that could be difficult, to say the

least. Therefore, simplified models have been developed to make the calculations easier.

One such model is the Gordon growth model, which assumes constant dividend

growth.

Many firms strive to increase their dividends at a constant rate each year. Equation 4

rewrites Equation 3 to reflect this constant growth in dividends:

(4)

where D0=the most recent dividend paid

g=the expected constant growth rate in dividends

ke=the required return on an investment in equity

P0

D0 (1 g )1

(1 ke )1

D0 (1 g )2

(1 ke )2 …

D0 (1 g )

(1 ke )

The Gordon

Growth Model

P0 ∞

t1

Dt

(1 ke )t

P0

D1

(1 ke )1

D2

(1 ke )2 ...

Dn

(1 ke )n

Pn

(1 ke )n

The Generalized

Dividend

Valuation Model

C H A P T E R 7 The Stock Market, the Theory of Rational Expectations, and the Efficient Market Hypothesis 143

Equation 4 has been simplified using algebra to obtain Equation 5.1

(5)

This model is useful for finding the value of stock, given a few assumptions:

1. Dividends are assumed to continue growing at a constant rate forever. Actually, as long

as they are expected to grow at a constant rate for an extended period of time, the

model should yield reasonable results. This is because errors about distant cash

flows become small when discounted to the present.

2. The growth rate is assumed to be less than the required return on equity, ke. Myron

Gordon, in his development of the model, demonstrated that this is a reasonable

assumption. In theory, if the growth rate were faster than the rate demanded by

holders of the firm’s equity, in the long run the firm would grow impossibly large.

How the Market Sets Security Prices

Suppose you went to an auto auction. The cars are available for inspection before the

auction begins, and you find a little Mazda Miata that you like. You test-drive it in the

parking lot and notice that it makes a few strange noises, but you decide that you

would still like the car. You decide $5,000 would be a fair price that would allow you

to pay some repair bills should the noises turn out to be serious. You see that the auction

is ready to begin, so you go in and wait for the Miata to enter.

Suppose there is another buyer who also spots the Miata. He test-drives the car

and recognizes that the noises are simply the result of worn brake pads that he can

fix himself at a nominal cost. He decides that the car is worth $7,000. He also goes in

and waits for the Miata to enter.

Who will buy the car and for how much? Suppose only the two of you are interested

in the Miata. You begin the bidding at $4,000. He ups your bid to $4,500. You

P0

D0 (1 g )

(ke g )

D1

(ke g )

144 PA RT I I Financial Markets

1To generate Equation 5 from Equation 4, first multiply both sides of Equation 4 by (1 ke)/(1 g) and subtract

Equation 4 from the result. This yields:

Assuming that ke is greater than g, the term on the far right will approach zero and can be dropped. Thus, after

factoring P0 out of the left-hand side:

Next, simplify by combining terms to:

P0

D0 (1 g )

ke g

D1

ke g

P0

(1 ke ) (1 g )

1 g

D0

P0 c1 ke

1 g

1d D0

P0 (1 ke )

(1 g )

P0 D0

D0 (1 g )∞

(1 ke )∞

bid your top price of $5,000. He counters with $5,100. The price is now higher than

you are willing to pay, so you stop bidding. The car is sold to the more informed buyer

for $5,100.

This simple example raises a number of points. First, the price is set by the buyer

willing to pay the highest price. The price is not necessarily the highest price the asset

could fetch, but it is incrementally greater than what any other buyer is willing to pay.

Second, the market price will be set by the buyer who can take best advantage of

the asset. The buyer who purchased the car knew that he could fix the noise easily

and cheaply. Because of this he was willing to pay more for the car than you were. The

same concept holds for other assets. For example, a piece of property or a building

will sell to the buyer who can put the asset to the most productive use.

Finally, the example shows the role played by information in asset pricing.

Superior information about an asset can increase its value by reducing its risk. When

you consider buying a stock, there are many unknowns about the future cash flows.

The buyer who has the best information about these cash flows will discount them at

a lower interest rate than will a buyer who is very uncertain.

Now let us apply these ideas to stock valuation. Suppose that you are considering

the purchase of stock expected to pay a $2 dividend next year. Market analysts

expect the firm to grow at 3% indefinitely. You are uncertain about both the constancy

of the dividend stream and the accuracy of the estimated growth rate. To compensate

yourself for this uncertainty (risk), you require a return of 15%.

Now suppose Jennifer, another investor, has spoken with industry insiders and

feels more confident about the projected cash flows. Jennifer requires only a 12%

return because her perceived risk is lower than yours. Bud, on the other hand, is dating

the CEO of the company. He knows with more certainty what the future of the

firm actually is, and thus requires only a 10% return.

What are the values each investor will give to the stock? Applying the Gordon

growth model yields the following stock prices:

You are willing to pay $16.67 for the stock. Jennifer would pay up to $22.22, and

Bud would pay $28.57. The investor with the lowest perceived risk is willing to pay

the most for the stock. If there were no other traders but these three, the market price

would be between $22.22 and $28.57. If you already held the stock, you would sell

it to Bud.

We thus see that the players in the market, bidding against each other, establish

the market price. When new information is released about a firm, expectations

change and with them, prices change. New information can cause changes in expectations

about the level of future dividends or the risk of those dividends. Since market

participants are constantly receiving new information and revising their expectations,

it is reasonable that stock prices are constantly changing as well.

Investor Discount Rate Stock Price

You 15% $16.67

Jennifer 12% $22.22

Bud 10% $28.57

C H A P T E R 7 The Stock Market, the Theory of Rational Expectations, and the Efficient Market Hypothesis 145

146 PA RT I I Financial Markets

Application Monetary Policy and Stock Prices

Stock market analysts tend to hang on every word that the Chairman of the

Federal Reserve utters because they know that an important determinant of

stock prices is monetary policy. But how does monetary policy affect stock

prices?

The Gordon growth model in Equation 5 tells us how. Monetary policy

can affect stock prices in two ways. First, when the Fed lowers interest rates,

the return on bonds (an alternative asset to stocks) declines, and investors are

likely to accept a lower required rate of return on an investment in equity

(ke). The resulting decline in ke would lower the denominator in the Gordon

growth model (Equation 5), lead to a higher value of P0, and raise stock

prices. Furthermore, a lowering of interest rates is likely to stimulate the

economy, so that the growth rate in dividends, g, is likely to be somewhat

higher. This rise in g also causes the denominator in Equation 5 to fall, which

also leads to a higher P0 and a rise in stock prices.

As we will see in Chapter 26, the impact of monetary policy on stock

prices is one of the key ways in which monetary policy affects the economy.

The September 11 Terrorist Attacks,

the Enron Scandal, and the Stock Market

Application

In 2001, two big shocks hit the stock market: the September 11 terrorist

attacks and the Enron scandal. Our analysis of stock price evaluation, again

using the Gordon growth model, can help us understand how these events

affected stock prices.

The September 11 terrorist attacks raised the possibility that terrorism

against the United States would paralyze the country. These fears led to a

downward revision of the growth prospects for U.S. companies, thus lowering

the dividend growth rate (g) in the Gordon model. The resulting rise in

the denominator in Equation 5 would lead to a decline in P0 and hence a

decline in stock prices.

Increased uncertainty for the U.S. economy would also raise the required

return on investment in equity. A higher ke also leads to a rise in the denominator

in Equation 5, a decline in P0, and a general fall in stock prices. As the

Gordon model predicts, the stock market fell by over 10% immediately after

September 11.

Subsequently, the U.S. successes against the Taliban in Afghanistan and

the absence of further terrorist attacks reduced market fears and uncertainty,

causing g to recover and ke to fall. The denominator in Equation 5 then fell,

leading to a recovery in P0 and a rebound in the stock market in October and

November. However, by the beginning of 2002, the Enron scandal and disclosures

that many companies had overstated their earnings caused many

investors to doubt the formerly rosy forecast of earnings and dividend growth

The Theory of Rational Expectations

The analysis of stock price evaluation we have outlined in the previous section

depends on people’s expectations—especially of cash flows. Indeed, it is difficult to

think of any sector in the economy in which expectations are not crucial; this is why

it is important to examine how expectations are formed. We do so by outlining the

theory of rational expectations, currently the most widely used theory to describe the

formation of business and consumer expectations.

In the 1950s and 1960s, economists regularly viewed expectations as formed

from past experience only. Expectations of inflation, for example, were typically

viewed as being an average of past inflation rates. This view of expectation formation,

called adaptive expectations, suggests that changes in expectations will occur slowly

over time as past data change.2 So if inflation had formerly been steady at a 5% rate,

expectations of future inflation would be 5% too. If inflation rose to a steady rate of

10%, expectations of future inflation would rise toward 10%, but slowly: In the first

year, expected inflation might rise only to 6%; in the second year, to 7%; and so on.

Adaptive expectations have been faulted on the grounds that people use more

information than just past data on a single variable to form their expectations of that

variable. Their expectations of inflation will almost surely be affected by their predictions

of future monetary policy as well as by current and past monetary policy. In

addition, people often change their expectations quickly in the light of new information.

To meet these objections to adaptive expectations, John Muth developed an

alternative theory of expectations, called rational expectations, which can be stated

as follows: Expectations will be identical to optimal forecasts (the best guess of the

future) using all available information.3

What exactly does this mean? To explain it more clearly, let’s use the theory of

rational expectations to examine how expectations are formed in a situation that most

of us encounter at some point in our lifetime: our drive to work. Suppose that when

Joe Commuter travels when it is not rush hour, it takes an average of 30 minutes for

C H A P T E R 7 The Stock Market, the Theory of Rational Expectations, and the Efficient Market Hypothesis 147

for corporations. The resulting revision of g downward, and the rise in ke

because of increased uncertainty about the quality of accounting information,

would lead to a rise in the denominator in the Gordon Equation 5, thereby

lowering P0 for many companies and hence the overall stock market. As predicted

by our analysis, this is exactly what happened. The stock market

recovery was aborted, and the market began a downward slide.

2More specifically, adaptive expectations—say, of inflation—are written as a weighted average of past inflation

rates:

where et

adaptive expectation of inflation at time t

tj inflation at time t j

a constant between the values of 0 and 1

3John Muth, “Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements,” Econometrica 29 (1961): 315–335.

et

(1 )

j0

j tj

his trip. Sometimes it takes him 35 minutes, other times 25 minutes, but the average

non-rush-hour driving time is 30 minutes. If, however, Joe leaves for work during the

rush hour, it takes him, on average, an additional 10 minutes to get to work. Given

that he leaves for work during the rush hour, the best guess of the driving time—the

optimal forecast—is 40 minutes.

If the only information available to Joe before he leaves for work that would have

a potential effect on his driving time is that he is leaving during the rush hour, what

does rational expectations theory allow you to predict about Joe’s expectations of his

driving time? Since the best guess of his driving time using all available information

is 40 minutes, Joe’s expectation should also be the same. Clearly, an expectation of 35

minutes would not be rational, because it is not equal to the optimal forecast, the best

guess of the driving time.

Suppose that the next day, given the same conditions and the same expectations,

it takes Joe 45 minutes to drive because he hits an abnormally large number of red

lights, and the day after that he hits all the lights right and it takes him only 35 minutes.

Do these variations mean that Joe’s 40-minute expectation is irrational? No, an

expectation of 40 minutes’ driving time is still a rational expectation. In both cases,

the forecast is off by 5 minutes, so the expectation has not been perfectly accurate.

However, the forecast does not have to be perfectly accurate to be rational—it need

only be the best possible given the available information; that is, it has to be correct on

average, and the 40-minute expectation meets this requirement. Since there is bound

to be some randomness in Joe’s driving time regardless of driving conditions, an optimal

forecast will never be completely accurate.

The example makes the following important point about rational expectations:

Even though a rational expectation equals the optimal forecast using all available

information, a prediction based on it may not always be perfectly accurate.

What if an item of information relevant to predicting driving time is unavailable

or ignored? Suppose that on Joe’s usual route to work there is an accident that causes

a two-hour traffic jam. If Joe has no way of ascertaining this information, his rushhour

expectation of 40 minutes’ driving time is still rational, because the accident

information is not available to him for incorporation into his optimal forecast.

However, if there was a radio or TV traffic report about the accident that Joe did not

bother to listen to or heard but ignored, his 40-minute expectation is no longer

rational. In light of the availability of this information, Joe’s optimal forecast should

have been two hours and 40 minutes.

Accordingly, there are two reasons why an expectation may fail to be rational:

1. People might be aware of all available information but find it takes too much

effort to make their expectation the best guess possible.

2. People might be unaware of some available relevant information, so their best

guess of the future will not be accurate.

Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that if an additional factor is important but

information about it is not available, an expectation that does not take account of it

can still be rational.

We can state the theory of rational expectations somewhat more formally. If X stands

for the variable that is being forecast (in our example, Joe Commuter’s driving time),

Xe for the expectation of this variable ( Joe’s expectation of his driving time), and Xof

Formal Statement

of the Theory

148 PA RT I I Financial Markets

for the optimal forecast of X using all available information (the best guess possible of

his driving time), the theory of rational expectations then simply says:

Xe Xof (6)

That is, the expectation of X equals the optimal forecast using all available information.

Why do people try to make their expectations match their best possible guess of the

future using all available information? The simplest explanation is that it is costly

for people not to do so. Joe Commuter has a strong incentive to make his expectation

of the time it takes him to drive to work as accurate as possible. If he underpredicts

his driving time, he will often be late to work and risk being fired. If he

overpredicts, he will, on average, get to work too early and will have given up sleep

or leisure time unnecessarily. Accurate expectations are desirable, and there are

strong incentives for people to try to make them equal to optimal forecasts by using

all available information.

The same principle applies to businesses. Suppose that an appliance manufacturer—

say, General Electric—knows that interest-rate movements are important to

the sales of appliances. If GE makes poor forecasts of interest rates, it will earn less

profit, because it might produce either too many appliances or too few. There are

strong incentives for GE to acquire all available information to help it forecast interest

rates and use the information to make the best possible guess of future interestrate

movements.

The incentives for equating expectations with optimal forecasts are especially

strong in financial markets. In these markets, people with better forecasts of the future

get rich. The application of the theory of rational expectations to financial markets

(where it is called the efficient market hypothesis or the theory of efficient capital

markets) is thus particularly useful.

Rational expectations theory leads to two commonsense implications for the forming

of expectations that are important in the analysis of the aggregate economy:

1. If there is a change in the way a variable moves, the way in which expectations

of this variable are formed will change as well. This tenet of rational expectations

theory can be most easily understood through a concrete example. Suppose that

interest rates move in such a way that they tend to return to a “normal” level in the

future. If today’s interest rate is high relative to the normal level, an optimal forecast

of the interest rate in the future is that it will decline to the normal level. Rational

expectations theory would imply that when today’s interest rate is high, the expectation

is that it will fall in the future.

Suppose now that the way in which the interest rate moves changes so that when

the interest rate is high, it stays high. In this case, when today’s interest rate is high,

the optimal forecast of the future interest rate, and hence the rational expectation, is

that it will stay high. Expectations of the future interest rate will no longer indicate

that the interest rate will fall. The change in the way the interest-rate variable moves

has therefore led to a change in the way that expectations of future interest rates are

formed. The rational expectations analysis here is generalizable to expectations of any

variable. Hence when there is a change in the way any variable moves, the way in

which expectations of this variable are formed will change too.

Implications of

the Theory

Rationale Behind

the Theory

C H A P T E R 7 The Stock Market, the Theory of Rational Expectations, and the Efficient Market Hypothesis 149

2. The forecast errors of expectations will on average be zero and cannot be

predicted ahead of time. The forecast error of an expectation is X X e, the difference

between the realization of a variable X and the expectation of the variable; that is, if

Joe Commuter’s driving time on a particular day is 45 minutes and his expectation of

the driving time is 40 minutes, the forecast error is 5 minutes.

Suppose that in violation of the rational expectations tenet, Joe’s forecast error is

not, on average, equal to zero; instead, it equals 5 minutes. The forecast error is now

predictable ahead of time because Joe will soon notice that he is, on average, 5 minutes

late for work and can improve his forecast by increasing it by 5 minutes. Rational

expectations theory implies that this is exactly what Joe will do because he will want

his forecast to be the best guess possible. When Joe has revised his forecast upward

by 5 minutes, on average, the forecast error will equal zero so that it cannot be predicted

ahead of time. Rational expectations theory implies that forecast errors of

expectations cannot be predicted.

The Efficient Market Hypothesis:

Rational Expectations in Financial Markets

While the theory of rational expectations was being developed by monetary economists,

financial economists were developing a parallel theory of expectation formation

in financial markets. It led them to the same conclusion as that of the rational expectations

theorists: Expectations in financial markets are equal to optimal forecasts using

all available information.4 Although financial economists gave their theory another

name, calling it the efficient market hypothesis, in fact their theory is just an application

of rational expectations to the pricing of securities.

The efficient market hypothesis is based on the assumption that prices of securities

in financial markets fully reflect all available information. You may recall from

Chapter 4 that the rate of return from holding a security equals the sum of the capital

gain on the security (the change in the price), plus any cash payments, divided by

the initial purchase price of the security:

(7)

where R rate of return on the security held from time t to t 1

(say, the end of 2000 to the end of 2001)

Pt1 price of the security at time t 1, the end of the holding period

Pt price of the security at time t, the beginning of the holding

period

C cash payment (coupon or dividend payments) made in the

period t to t 1

Let’s look at the expectation of this return at time t, the beginning of the holding

period. Because the current price Pt and the cash payment C are known at the beginning,

the only variable in the definition of the return that is uncertain is the price next

R

Pt1 Pt C

Pt

150 PA RT I I Financial Markets

4The development of the efficient market hypothesis was not wholly independent of the development of rational

expectations theory, in that financial economists were aware of Muth’s work.

www.investorhome.com

/emh.htm

Learn more about the efficient

market hypothesis.

period, Pt1.5 Denoting the expectation of the security’s price at the end of the holding

period as P e

t1, the expected return Re is:

The efficient market hypothesis also views expectations of future prices as equal

to optimal forecasts using all currently available information. In other words, the market’s

expectations of future securities prices are rational, so that:

which in turn implies that the expected return on the security will equal the optimal

forecast of the return:

Re Rof (8)

Unfortunately, we cannot observe either Re or Pe t1, so the rational expectations equations

by themselves do not tell us much about how the financial market behaves.

However, if we can devise some way to measure the value of Re, these equations will

have important implications for how prices of securities change in financial markets.

The supply and demand analysis of the bond market developed in Chapter 5

shows us that the expected return on a security (the interest rate, in the case of the

bond examined) will have a tendency to head toward the equilibrium return that

equates the quantity demanded to the quantity supplied. Supply and demand analysis

enables us to determine the expected return on a security with the following equilibrium

condition: The expected return on a security Re equals the equilibrium return R*,

which equates the quantity of the security demanded to the quantity supplied; that is,

Re R* (9)

The academic field of finance explores the factors (risk and liquidity, for example) that

influence the equilibrium returns on securities. For our purposes, it is sufficient to

know that we can determine the equilibrium return and thus determine the expected

return with the equilibrium condition.

We can derive an equation to describe pricing behavior in an efficient market by

using the equilibrium condition to replace Re with R* in the rational expectations

equation (Equation 8). In this way, we obtain:

Rof R* (10)

This equation tells us that current prices in a financial market will be set so that the

optimal forecast of a security’s return using all available information equals the

security’s equilibrium return. Financial economists state it more simply: In an efficient

market, a security’s price fully reflects all available information.

Let’s see what the efficient markets condition means in practice and why it is a sensible

characterization of pricing behavior. Suppose that the equilibrium return on a

security—say, Exxon common stock—is 10% at an annual rate, and its current price

Rationale Behind

the Hypothesis

Pet

1 P of

t1

R e

P e

t1 Pt C

Pt

C H A P T E R 7 The Stock Market, the Theory of Rational Expectations, and the Efficient Market Hypothesis 151

5There are cases where C might not be known at the beginning of the period, but that does not make a substantial

difference to the analysis. We would in that case assume that not only price expectations but also the expectations

of C are optimal forecasts using all available information.

Pt is lower than the optimal forecast of tomorrow’s price P t

of

1 so that the optimal forecast

of the return at an annual rate is 50%, which is greater than the equilibrium

return of 10%. We are now able to predict that, on average, Exxon’s return would be

abnormally high. This situation is called an unexploited profit opportunity because,

on average, people would be earning more than they should, given the characteristics

of that security. Knowing that, on average, you can earn such an abnormally high rate

of return on Exxon because Rof      R*, you would buy more, which would in turn

drive up its current price Pt relative to the expected future price P t

of

1, thereby lowering

Rof. When the current price had risen sufficiently so that Rof equals R* and the efficient

markets condition (Equation 10) is satisfied, the buying of Exxon will stop, and

the unexploited profit opportunity will have disappeared.

Similarly, a security for which the optimal forecast of the return is 5% and the

equilibrium return is 10% (Rof

 R*) would be a poor investment, because, on average,

it earns less than the equilibrium return. In such a case, you would sell the security

and drive down its current price relative to the expected future price until Rof rose

to the level of R* and the efficient markets condition is again satisfied. What we have

shown can be summarized as follows:

Rof      R* → Pt↑ → Rof↓

Rof

 R* → Pt↓ → Rof↑

until

Rof R*

Another way to state the efficient markets condition is this: In an efficient market, all

unexploited profit opportunities will be eliminated.

An extremely important factor in this reasoning is that not everyone in a financial

market must be well informed about a security or have rational expectations for

its price to be driven to the point at which the efficient markets condition holds.

Financial markets are structured so that many participants can play. As long as a few

keep their eyes open for unexploited profit opportunities, they will eliminate the

profit opportunities that appear, because in so doing, they make a profit. The efficient

market hypothesis makes sense, because it does not require everyone in a market to

be cognizant of what is happening to every security.

Many financial economists take the efficient market hypothesis one step further in their

analysis of financial markets. Not only do they define efficient markets as those in

which expectations are rational—that is, equal to optimal forecasts using all available

information—but they also add the condition that an efficient market is one in which

prices reflect the true fundamental (intrinsic) value of the securities. Thus in an efficient

market, all prices are always correct and reflect market fundamentals (items that

have a direct impact on future income streams of the securities). This stronger view of

market efficiency has several important implications in the academic field of finance.

First, it implies that in an efficient capital market, one investment is as good as any

other because the securities’ prices are correct. Second, it implies that a security’s price

reflects all available information about the intrinsic value of the security. Third, it

implies that security prices can be used by managers of both financial and nonfinancial

firms to assess their cost of capital (cost of financing their investments) accurately

and hence that security prices can be used to help them make the correct decisions

about whether a specific investment is worth making or not. The stronger version of

market efficiency is a basic tenet of much analysis in the finance field.

Stronger Version

of the Efficient

Market

Hypothesis

152 PA RT I I Financial Markets

Evidence on the Efficient Market Hypothesis

Early evidence on the efficient market hypothesis was quite favorable to it, but in

recent years, deeper analysis of the evidence suggests that the hypothesis may not

always be entirely correct. Let’s first look at the earlier evidence in favor of the hypothesis

and then examine some of the more recent evidence that casts some doubt on it.

Evidence in favor of market efficiency has examined the performance of investment

analysts and mutual funds, whether stock prices reflect publicly available information,

the random-walk behavior of stock prices, and the success of so-called technical

analysis.

Performance of Investment Analysts and Mutual Funds. We have seen that one implication

of the efficient market hypothesis is that when purchasing a security, you cannot

expect to earn an abnormally high return, a return greater than the equilibrium

return. This implies that it is impossible to beat the market. Many studies shed light

on whether investment advisers and mutual funds (some of which charge steep sales

commissions to people who purchase them) beat the market. One common test that

has been performed is to take buy and sell recommendations from a group of advisers

or mutual funds and compare the performance of the resulting selection of stocks

with the market as a whole. Sometimes the advisers’ choices have even been compared

to a group of stocks chosen by throwing darts at a copy of the financial page of

the newspaper tacked to a dartboard. The Wall Street Journal, for example, has a regular

feature called “Investment Dartboard” that compares how well stocks picked by

investment advisers do relative to stocks picked by throwing darts. Do the advisers

win? To their embarrassment, the dartboard beats them as often as they beat the dartboard.

Furthermore, even when the comparison includes only advisers who have

been successful in the past in predicting the stock market, the advisers still don’t regularly

beat the dartboard.

Consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, mutual funds also do not beat

the market. Not only do mutual funds not outperform the market on average, but

when they are separated into groups according to whether they had the highest or

lowest profits in a chosen period, the mutual funds that did well in the first period do

not beat the market in the second period.6

The conclusion from the study of investment advisers and mutual fund performance

is this: Having performed well in the past does not indicate that an investment

adviser or a mutual fund will perform well in the future. This is not pleasing news

to investment advisers, but it is exactly what the efficient market hypothesis predicts.

It says that some advisers will be lucky and some will be unlucky. Being lucky does

not mean that a forecaster actually has the ability to beat the market.

Evidence in Favor

of Market

Efficiency

C H A P T E R 7 The Stock Market, the Theory of Rational Expectations, and the Efficient Market Hypothesis 153

6An early study that found that mutual funds do not outperform the market is Michael C. Jensen, “The

Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945–64,” Journal of Finance 23 (1968): 389–416. Further studies

on mutual fund performance are Mark Grimblatt and Sheridan Titman, “Mutual Fund Performance: An Analysis

of Quarterly Portfolio Holdings,” Journal of Business 62 (1989): 393–416; R. A. Ippolito, “Efficiency with Costly

Information: A Study of Mutual Fund Performance, 1965–84,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (1989): 1–23;

J. Lakonishok, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, “The Structure and Performance of the Money Management Industry,”

Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics (1992); and B. Malkiel, “Returns from Investing in Equity

Mutual Funds, 1971–1991,” Journal of Finance 50 (1995): 549–72.

Do Stock Prices Reflect Publicly Available Information? The efficient market hypothesis

predicts that stock prices will reflect all publicly available information. Thus if information

is already publicly available, a positive announcement about a company will

not, on average, raise the price of its stock because this information is already reflected

in the stock price. Early empirical evidence also confirmed this conjecture from the

efficient market hypothesis: Favorable earnings announcements or announcements of

stock splits (a division of a share of stock into multiple shares, which is usually followed

by higher earnings) do not, on average, cause stock prices to rise.7

Random-Walk Behavior of Stock Prices. The term random walk describes the movements

of a variable whose future changes cannot be predicted (are random) because,

given today’s value, the variable is just as likely to fall as to rise. An important implication

of the efficient market hypothesis is that stock prices should approximately follow

a random walk; that is, future changes in stock prices should, for all practical

purposes, be unpredictable. The random-walk implication of the efficient market

hypothesis is the one most commonly mentioned in the press, because it is the most

readily comprehensible to the public. In fact, when people mention the “randomwalk

theory of stock prices,” they are in reality referring to the efficient market

hypothesis.

The case for random-walk stock prices can be demonstrated. Suppose that people

could predict that the price of Happy Feet Corporation (HFC) stock would rise

1% in the coming week. The predicted rate of capital gains and rate of return on HFC

stock would then be over 50% at an annual rate. Since this is very likely to be far

higher than the equilibrium rate of return on HFC stock (Rof      R*), the efficient markets

hypothesis indicates that people would immediately buy this stock and bid up

its current price. The action would stop only when the predictable change in the price

dropped to near zero so that Rof R*.

Similarly, if people could predict that the price of HFC stock would fall by 1%,

the predicted rate of return would be negative (Rof

 R*), and people would immediately

sell. The current price would fall until the predictable change in the price rose

back to near zero, where the efficient market condition again holds. The efficient market

hypothesis suggests that the predictable change in stock prices will be near zero,

leading to the conclusion that stock prices will generally follow a random walk.8

Financial economists have used two types of tests to explore the hypothesis that

stock prices follow a random walk. In the first, they examine stock market records to

see if changes in stock prices are systematically related to past changes and hence

could have been predicted on that basis. The second type of test examines the data to

see if publicly available information other than past stock prices could have been used

to predict changes. These tests are somewhat more stringent because additional information

(money supply growth, government spending, interest rates, corporate profits)

might be used to help forecast stock returns. Early results from both types of tests

154 PA RT I I Financial Markets

7Ray Ball and Philip Brown, “An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers,” Journal of Accounting

Research 6 (1968):159–178, and Eugene F. Fama, Lawrence Fisher, Michael C. Jensen, and Richard Roll, “The

Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information,” International Economic Review 10 (1969): 1–21.

8Note that the random-walk behavior of stock prices is only an approximation derived from the efficient market

hypothesis. It would hold exactly only for a stock for which an unchanged price leads to its having the equilibrium

return. Then, when the predictable change in the stock price is exactly zero, Rof R*.

generally confirmed the efficient market view that stock prices are not predictable and

follow a random walk.9

Technical Analysis. A popular technique used to predict stock prices, called technical

analysis, is to study past stock price data and search for patterns such as trends and

regular cycles. Rules for when to buy and sell stocks are then established on the basis

of the patterns that emerge. The efficient market hypothesis suggests that technical

analysis is a waste of time. The simplest way to understand why is to use the randomwalk

result derived from the efficient market hypothesis that holds that past stock

price data cannot help predict changes. Therefore, technical analysis, which relies on

such data to produce its forecasts, cannot successfully predict changes in stock prices.

Two types of tests bear directly on the value of technical analysis. The first performs

the empirical analysis described earlier to evaluate the performance of any financial

analyst, technical or otherwise. The results are exactly what the efficient market

hypothesis predicts: Technical analysts fare no better than other financial analysts; on

average, they do not outperform the market, and successful past forecasting does not

imply that their forecasts will outperform the market in the future. The second type of

test (first performed by Sidney Alexander) takes the rules developed in technical analysis

for when to buy and sell stocks and applies them to new data.10 The performance

of these rules is then evaluated by the profits that would have been made using them.

These tests also discredit technical analysis: It does not outperform the overall market.

C H A P T E R 7 The Stock Market, the Theory of Rational Expectations, and the Efficient Market Hypothesis 155

9The first type of test, using only stock market data, is referred to as a test of weak-form efficiency, because the

information that can be used to predict stock prices is restricted to past price data. The second type of test is

referred to as a test of semistrong-form efficiency, because the information set is expanded to include all publicly

available information, not just past stock prices. A third type of test is called a test of strong-form efficiency, because

the information set includes insider information, known only to the managers (directors) of the corporation, as

when they plan to declare a high dividend. Strong-form tests do sometimes indicate that insider information can

be used to predict changes in stock prices. This finding does not contradict the efficient market hypothesis,

because the information is not available to the market and hence cannot be reflected in market prices. In fact,

there are strict laws against using insider information to trade in financial markets. For an early survey on the

three forms of tests, see Eugene F. Fama, “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,”

Journal of Finance 25 (1970): 383– 416.

10Sidney Alexander, “Price Movements in Speculative Markets: Trends or Random Walks?” Industrial Management

Review, May 1961, pp. 7–26, and Sidney Alexander, “Price Movements in Speculative Markets: Trends or Random

Walks? No. 2,” in The Random Character of Stock Prices, ed. Paul Cootner (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964),

pp. 338–372. More recent evidence also seems to discredit technichal analysis; for example, F. Allen and R.

Karjalainen, “Using Genetic Algorithms to Find Technical Trading Rules,” Journal of Financial Economics 51

(1999): 245–271. However, some other research is more favorable to technical analysis: e.g., R. Sullivan, A.

Timmerman, and H. White, “Data-Snooping, Technical Trading Rule Performance and the Bootstrap,” Centre for

Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 1976, 1998.

Application Should Foreign Exchange Rates Follow a Random Walk?

Although the efficient market hypothesis is usually applied to the stock market,

it can also be used to show that foreign exchange rates, like stock prices,

should generally follow a random walk. To see why this is the case, consider

what would happen if people could predict that a currency would appreciate

All the early evidence supporting the efficient market hypothesis appeared to be overwhelming,

causing Eugene Fama, a prominent financial economist, to state in his

famous 1970 survey of the empirical evidence on the efficient market hypothesis, “The

evidence in support of the efficient markets model is extensive, and (somewhat uniquely

in economics) contradictory evidence is sparse.”12 However, in recent years, the hypothesis

has begun to show a few cracks, referred to as anomalies, and empirical evidence

indicates that the efficient market hypothesis may not always be generally applicable.

Small-Firm Effect. One of the earliest reported anomalies in which the stock market did

not appear to be efficient is called the small-firm effect. Many empirical studies have

shown that small firms have earned abnormally high returns over long periods of time,

even when the greater risk for these firms has been taken into account.13 The small-firm

effect seems to have diminished in recent years, but is still a challenge to the efficient

market hypothesis. Various theories have been developed to explain the small-firm

effect, suggesting that it may be due to rebalancing of portfolios by institutional

investors, tax issues, low liquidity of small-firm stocks, large information costs in evaluating

small firms, or an inappropriate measurement of risk for small-firm stocks.

January Effect. Over long periods of time, stock prices have tended to experience an

abnormal price rise from December to January that is predictable and hence inconsistent

with random-walk behavior. This so-called January effect seems to have

diminished in recent years for shares of large companies but still occurs for shares of

small companies.14 Some financial economists argue that the January effect is due to

Evidence Against

Market Efficiency

156 PA RT I I Financial Markets

by 1% in the coming week. By buying this currency, they could earn a greater

than 50% return at an annual rate, which is likely to be far above the equilibrium

return for holding a currency. As a result, people would immediately

buy the currency and bid up its current price, thereby reducing the expected

return. The process would stop only when the predictable change in the

exchange rate dropped to near zero so that the optimal forecast of the return

no longer differed from the equilibrium return. Likewise, if people could predict

that the currency would depreciate by 1% in the coming week, they

would sell it until the predictable change in the exchange rate was again near

zero. The efficient market hypothesis therefore implies that future changes in

exchange rates should, for all practical purposes, be unpredictable; in other

words, exchange rates should follow random walks. This is exactly what

empirical evidence finds.11

11See Richard A. Meese and Kenneth Rogoff, “Empirical Exchange Rate Models of the Seventies: Do They Fit Out

of Sample?” Journal of International Economics 14 (1983): 3–24.

12Eugene F. Fama, “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,” Journal of Finance 25

(1970): 383– 416.

13For example, see Marc R. Reinganum, “The Anomalous Stock Market Behavior of Small Firms in January:

Empirical Tests of Tax Loss Selling Effects,” Journal of Financial Economics 12 (1983): 89–104; Jay R. Ritter, “The

Buying and Selling Behavior of Individual Investors at the Turn of the Year,” Journal of Finance 43 (1988):

701–717; and Richard Roll, “Vas Ist Das? The Turn-of-the-Year Effect: Anomaly or Risk Mismeasurement?”

Journal of Portfolio Management 9 (1988): 18–28.

14For example, see Donald B. Keim, “The CAPM and Equity Return Regularities,” Financial Analysts Journal 42

(May–June 1986): 19–34.

tax issues. Investors have an incentive to sell stocks before the end of the year in

December, because they can then take capital losses on their tax return and reduce

their tax liability. Then when the new year starts in January, they can repurchase the

stocks, driving up their prices and producing abnormally high returns. Although this

explanation seems sensible, it does not explain why institutional investors such as private

pension funds, which are not subject to income taxes, do not take advantage of

the abnormal returns in January and buy stocks in December, thus bidding up their

price and eliminating the abnormal returns.15

Market Overreaction. Recent research suggests that stock prices may overreact to

news announcements and that the pricing errors are corrected only slowly.16 When

corporations announce a major change in earnings—say, a large decline—the stock

price may overshoot, and after an initial large decline, it may rise back to more normal

levels over a period of several weeks. This violates the efficient market hypothesis,

because an investor could earn abnormally high returns, on average, by buying a

stock immediately after a poor earnings announcement and then selling it after a couple

of weeks when it has risen back to normal levels.

Excessive Volatility. A phenomenon closely related to market overreaction is that the

stock market appears to display excessive volatility; that is, fluctuations in stock prices

may be much greater than is warranted by fluctuations in their fundamental value. In

an important paper, Robert Shiller of Yale University found that fluctuations in the

S&P 500 stock index could not be justified by the subsequent fluctuations in the dividends

of the stocks making up this index. There has been much subsequent technical

work criticizing these results, but Shiller’s work, along with research finding that

there are smaller fluctuations in stock prices when stock markets are closed, has produced

a consensus that stock market prices appear to be driven by factors other than

fundamentals.17

Mean Reversion. Some researchers have also found that stock returns display mean

reversion: Stocks with low returns today tend to have high returns in the future, and

vice versa. Hence stocks that have done poorly in the past are more likely to do well in

the future, because mean reversion indicates that there will be a predictable positive

change in the future price, suggesting that stock prices are not a random walk. Other

researchers have found that mean reversion is not nearly as strong in data after World

C H A P T E R 7 The Stock Market, the Theory of Rational Expectations, and the Efficient Market Hypothesis 157

15Another anomaly that makes the stock market seem less than efficient is that the Value Line Survey, one of the

most prominent investment advice newsletters, has produced stock recommendations that have yielded abnormally

high returns on average. See Fischer Black, “Yes, Virginia, There Is Hope: Tests of the Value Line Ranking

System,” Financial Analysts Journal 29 (September–October 1973): 10–14, and Gur Huberman and Shmuel

Kandel, “Market Efficiency and Value Line’s Record,” Journal of Business 63 (1990): 187–216. Whether the excellent

performance of the Value Line Survey will continue in the future is, of course, a question mark.

16Werner De Bondt and Richard Thaler, “Further Evidence on Investor Overreaction and Stock Market

Seasonality,” Journal of Finance 62 (1987): 557–580.

17Robert Shiller, “Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to Be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?” American

Economic Review 71 (1981): 421– 436, and Kenneth R. French and Richard Roll, “Stock Return Variances: The

Arrival of Information and the Reaction of Traders,” Journal of Financial Economics 17 (1986): 5–26.

War II and so have raised doubts about whether it is currently an important phenomenon.

The evidence on mean reversion remains controversial.18

New Information Is Not Always Immediately Incorporated into Stock Prices. Although it

is generally found that stock prices adjust rapidly to new information, as is suggested

by the efficient market hypothesis, recent evidence suggests that, inconsistent with

the efficient market hypothesis, stock prices do not instantaneously adjust to profit

announcements. Instead, on average stock prices continue to rise for some time after

the announcement of unexpectedly high profits, and they continue to fall after surprisingly

low profit announcments.19

As you can see, the debate on the efficient market hypothesis is far from over. The evidence

seems to suggest that the efficient market hypothesis may be a reasonable starting

point for evaluating behavior in financial markets. However, there do seem to be

important violations of market efficiency that suggest that the efficient market hypothesis

may not be the whole story and so may not be generalizable to all behavior in

financial markets.

Overview of the

Evidence on the

Efficient Market

Hypothesis

158 PA RT I I Financial Markets

18Evidence for mean reversion has been reported by James M. Poterba and Lawrence H. Summers, “Mean

Reversion in Stock Prices: Evidence and Implications,” Journal of Financial Economics 22 (1988): 27–59;

Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, “Permanent and Temporary Components of Stock Prices,” Journal of

Political Economy 96 (1988): 246–273; and Andrew W. Lo and A. Craig MacKinlay, “Stock Market Prices Do

Not Follow Random Walks: Evidence from a Simple Specification Test,” Review of Financial Studies 1 (1988):

41–66. However, Myung Jig Kim, Charles R. Nelson, and Richard Startz, in “Mean Reversion in Stock Prices?

A Reappraisal of the Evidence,” Review of Economic Studies 58 (1991): 515–528, question whether some of

these findings are valid. For an excellent summary of this evidence, see Charles Engel and Charles S. Morris,

“Challenges to Stock Market Efficiency: Evidence from Mean Reversion Studies,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas

City Economic Review, September–October 1991, pp. 21–35. See also N. Jegadeesh and Sheridan Titman,

“Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency,” Journal of Finance

48 (1993): 65–92, which shows that mean reversion also occurs for individual stocks.

19For example, see R. Ball and P. Brown, “An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers,” Journal of

Accounting Research 6 (1968): 159–178, L. Chan, N. Jegadeesh, and J. Lakonishok, “Momentum Strategies,” Journal

of Finance 51 (1996): 1681–1713, and Eugene Fama, “Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns and Behavioral

Finance,” Journal of Financial Economics 49 (1998): 283–306.

Application Practical Guide to Investing in the Stock Market

The efficient market hypothesis has numerous applications to the real world.

It is especially valuable because it can be applied directly to an issue that concerns

many of us: how to get rich (or at least not get poor) in the stock market.

(The “Following the Financial News” box shows how stock prices are

reported daily.) A practical guide to investing in the stock market, which we

develop here, provides a better understanding of the use and implications of

the efficient market hypothesis.

Suppose you have just read in the “Heard on the Street” column of the Wall

Street Journal that investment advisers are predicting a boom in oil stocks

because an oil shortage is developing. Should you proceed to withdraw all

your hard-earned savings from the bank and invest it in oil stocks?

How Valuable Are

Published Reports

by Investment

Advisers?

C H A P T E R 7 The Stock Market, the Theory of Rational Expectations, and the Efficient Market Hypothesis 159

The efficient market hypothesis tells us that when purchasing a security,

we cannot expect to earn an abnormally high return, a return greater than the

equilibrium return. Information in newspapers and in the published reports

of investment advisers is readily available to many market participants and is

already reflected in market prices. So acting on this information will not yield

abnormally high returns, on average. As we have seen, the empirical evidence

for the most part confirms that recommendations from investment advisers

cannot help us outperform the general market. Indeed, as Box 1 suggests,

human investment advisers in San Francisco do not on average even outperform

an orangutan!

Probably no other conclusion is met with more skepticism by students

than this one when they first hear it. We all know or have heard of somebody

who has been successful in the stock market for a period of many years. We

wonder, “How could someone be so consistently successful if he or she did

not really know how to predict when returns would be abnormally high?”

YTD 52-Week Yld. Vol. Net

% Chg. Hi Lo Stock (Sym.) Div. % PE 100s Close Chg.

0.6 23.85 15.50♣ IntAlum IAL 1.20 6.9 88 21 17.39 0.10

4.0 126.39 54.01 IBM IBM .60 .7 29 76523 80.57 3.07

1.9 37.45 26.05 IntFlavor IFF .60 1.7 21 5952 35.78 0.68

2.9 80.10 47.75♣ IntGameTch IGT ... 24 9427 78.15 2.23

Source: Wall Street Journal, January 3, 2003, p. C4.

Following the Financial News

Stock prices are published daily, and in the Wall Street

Journal, they are reported in the sections “NYSE—

Composite Transactions,” “Amex—Composite Transactions,”

and “NASDAQ National Market Issues.”

Stock prices are quoted in the following format:

The following information is included in each column.

International Business Machines (IBM) common

stock is used as an example.

YTD % Chg: The stock price percentage change for the

calendar year to date, adjusted for stock splits and

dividends over 10%

52 Weeks Hi: Highest price of a share in the past 52

weeks: 126.39 for IBM stock

52 Weeks Lo: Lowest price of a share in the past 52

weeks: 54.01 for IBM stock

Stock: Company name: IBM for International Business

Machines

Sym: Symbol that identifies company: IBM

Div: Annual dividends: $0.60 for IBM

Yld %: Yield for stock expressed as annual dividends

divided by today’s closing price: 0.7% ( 0.6

80.57) for IBM stock

PE: Price-earnings ratio; the stock price divided by

the annual earnings per share: 29

Vol 100s: Number of shares (in hundreds) traded that

day: 7,652,300 shares for IBM

Close: Closing price (last price) that day: 80.57

Net Chg: Change in the closing price from the previous

day: 3.07

Prices quoted for shares traded over-the-counter

(through dealers rather than on an organized

exchange) are sometimes quoted with the same information,

but in many cases only the bid price (the price

the dealer is willing to pay for the stock) and the

asked price (the price the dealer is willing to sell the

stock for) are quoted.

Stock Prices

The following story, reported in the press, illustrates why such anecdotal evidence

is not reliable.

A get-rich-quick artist invented a clever scam. Every week, he wrote two

letters. In letter A, he would pick team A to win a particular football game,

and in letter B, he would pick the opponent, team B. A mailing list would

then be separated into two groups, and he would send letter A to the people

in one group and letter B to the people in the other. The following week he

would do the same thing but would send these letters only to the group who

had received the first letter with the correct prediction. After doing this for

ten games, he had a small cluster of people who had received letters predicting

the correct winning team for every game. He then mailed a final letter to

them, declaring that since he was obviously an expert predictor of the outcome

of football games (he had picked winners ten weeks in a row) and since

his predictions were profitable for the recipients who bet on the games, he

would continue to send his predictions only if he were paid a substantial

amount of money. When one of his clients figured out what he was up to, the

con man was prosecuted and thrown in jail!

What is the lesson of the story? Even if no forecaster is an accurate predictor

of the market, there will always be a group of consistent winners. A

person who has done well regularly in the past cannot guarantee that he or

she will do well in the future. Note that there will also be a group of persistent

losers, but you rarely hear about them because no one brags about a poor

forecasting record.

Suppose your broker phones you with a hot tip to buy stock in the Happy

Feet Corporation (HFC) because it has just developed a product that is completely

effective in curing athlete’s foot. The stock price is sure to go up.

Should you follow this advice and buy HFC stock?

The efficient market hypothesis indicates that you should be skeptical of

such news. If the stock market is efficient, it has already priced HFC stock so

that its expected return will equal the equilibrium return. The hot tip is not

particularly valuable and will not enable you to earn an abnormally high

return.

You might wonder, though, if the hot tip is based on new information and

would give you an edge on the rest of the market. If other market participants

Should You Be

Skeptical of

Hot Tips?

160 PA RT I I Financial Markets

Box 1

Should You Hire an Ape as Your Investment Adviser?

The San Francisco Chronicle came up with an amusing

way of evaluating how successful investment

advisers are at picking stocks. They asked eight analysts

to pick five stocks at the beginning of the year

and then compared the performance of their stock

picks to those chosen by Jolyn, an orangutan living at

Marine World/Africa USA in Vallejo, California.

Consistent with the results found in the

“Investment Dartboard” feature of the Wall Street

Journal, Jolyn beat the investment advisers as often

as they beat her. Given this result, you might be

just as well off hiring an orangutan as your investment

adviser as you would hiring a human being!

have gotten this information before you, the answer is no. As soon as the

information hits the street, the unexploited profit opportunity it creates will be

quickly eliminated. The stock’s price will already reflect the information, and

you should expect to realize only the equilibrium return. But if you are one of

the first to gain the new information, it can do you some good. Only then can

you be one of the lucky ones who, on average, will earn an abnormally high

return by helping eliminate the profit opportunity by buying HFC stock.

If you follow the stock market, you might have noticed a puzzling phenomenon:

When good news about a stock, such as a particularly favorable earnings

report, is announced, the price of the stock frequently does not rise. The

efficient market hypothesis and the random-walk behavior of stock prices

explain this phenomenon.

Because changes in stock prices are unpredictable, when information is

announced that has already been expected by the market, the stock price will

remain unchanged. The announcement does not contain any new information

that should lead to a change in stock prices. If this were not the case and

the announcement led to a change in stock prices, it would mean that the

change was predictable. Because that is ruled out in an efficient market, stock

prices will respond to announcements only when the information being

announced is new and unexpected. If the news is expected, there will be no

stock price response. This is exactly what the evidence we described earlier,

which shows that stock prices reflect publicly available information, suggests

will occur.

Sometimes an individual stock price declines when good news is

announced. Although this seems somewhat peculiar, it is completely consistent

with the workings of an efficient market. Suppose that although the

announced news is good, it is not as good as expected. HFC’s earnings may

have risen 15%, but if the market expected earnings to rise by 20%, the new

information is actually unfavorable, and the stock price declines.

What does the efficient market hypothesis recommend for investing in the

stock market? It tells us that hot tips, investment advisers’ published recommendations,

and technical analysis—all of which make use of publicly available

information—cannot help an investor outperform the market. Indeed, it

indicates that anyone without better information than other market participants

cannot expect to beat the market. So what is an investor to do?

The efficient market hypothesis leads to the conclusion that such an

investor (and almost all of us fit into this category) should not try to outguess

the market by constantly buying and selling securities. This process

does nothing but boost the income of brokers, who earn commissions on

each trade.20 Instead, the investor should pursue a “buy and hold” strategy—

purchase stocks and hold them for long periods of time. This will lead to the

same returns, on average, but the investor’s net profits will be higher,

because fewer brokerage commissions will have to be paid.

Efficient Market

Prescription for the

Investor

Do Stock Prices

Always Rise When

There Is Good News?

C H A P T E R 7 The Stock Market, the Theory of Rational Expectations, and the Efficient Market Hypothesis 161

20The investor may also have to pay Uncle Sam capital gains taxes on any profits that are realized when a security

is sold—an additional reason why continual buying and selling does not make sense.

Evidence on Rational Expectations in Other Markets

Evidence in other financial markets also supports the efficient market hypothesis and

hence the rationality of expectations. For example, there is little evidence that financial

analysts are able to outperform the bond market.21 The returns on bonds appear

to conform to the efficient markets condition of Equation 10.

Rationality of expectations is, however, much harder to test in markets other than

financial markets, because price data that reflect expectations are not as readily available.

The most common tests of rational expectations in these markets make use of

survey data on the forecasts of market participants. For example, one well-known

study by James Pesando used a survey of inflation expectations collected from prominent

economists and inflation forecasters.22 In that survey, these people were asked

what they predicted the inflation rate would be over the next six months and over the

next year. Because rational expectations theory implies that forecast errors should on

average be zero and cannot be predicted, tests of the theory involve asking whether

the forecast errors in a survey could be predicted ahead of time using publicly available

information. The evidence from Pesando’s and subsequent studies is mixed.

Sometimes the forecast errors cannot be predicted, and at other times they can. The

evidence is not as supportive of rational expectations theory as the evidence from

financial markets.

Does the fact that forecast errors from surveys are often predictable suggest that

we should reject rational expectations theory in these other markets? The answer is:

not necessarily. One problem with this evidence is that the expectations data are

obtained from surveys rather than from actual economic decisions of market participants.

That is a serious criticism of this evidence. Survey responses are not always

reliable, because there is little incentive for participants to tell the truth. For example,

when people are asked in surveys how much television they watch, responses greatly

underestimate the actual time spent. Neither are people very truthful about the shows

It is frequently a sensible strategy for a small investor, whose costs of

managing a portfolio may be high relative to its size, to buy into a mutual

fund rather than individual stocks. Because the efficient market hypothesis

indicates that no mutual fund can consistently outperform the market, an

investor should not buy into one that has high management fees or that

pays sales commissions to brokers, but rather should purchase a no-load

(commission-free) mutual fund that has low management fees.

As we have seen, the evidence indicates that it will not be easy to beat

the prescription suggested here, although some of the anomalies to the efficient

market hypothesis suggest that an extremely clever investor (which

rules out most of us) may be able to outperform a buy-and-hold strategy.

162 PA RT I I Financial Markets

21See the discussion in Frederic S. Mishkin, “Efficient Markets Theory: Implications for Monetary Policy,”

Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 3 (1978): 707–768, of the results in Michael J. Prell, “How Well Do the

Experts Forecast Interest Rates?” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Monthly Review, September–October 1973,

pp. 3–15.

22James Pesando, “A Note on the Rationality of the Livingston Price Expectations,” Journal of Political Economy 83

(1975): 845–858.

they watch. They may say they watch ballet on public television, but we know they

are actually watching Vanna White light up the letters on Wheel of Fortune instead,

because it, not ballet, gets high Nielsen ratings. How many people will admit to being

regular watchers of Wheel of Fortune?

A second problem with survey evidence is that a market’s behavior may not be

equally influenced by the expectations of all the survey participants, making survey

evidence a poor guide to market behavior. For example, we have already seen that

prices in financial markets often behave as if expectations are rational even though

many of the market participants do not have rational expectations.23

Proof is not yet conclusive on the validity of rational expectations theory in markets

other than financial markets. One important conclusion, however, that is supported

by the survey evidence is that if there is a change in the way a variable moves,

there will be a change in the way expectations of this variable are formed as well.

C H A P T E R 7 The Stock Market, the Theory of Rational Expectations, and the Efficient Market Hypothesis 163

23There is some fairly strong evidence for this proposition. For example, Frederic S. Mishkin, “Are Market

Forecasts Rational?” American Economic Review 71 (1981): 295–306, finds that although survey forecasts of shortterm

interest rates are not rational, the bond market behaves as if the expectations of these interest rates are

rational.

What Do the Black Monday Crash of 1987 and the Tech Crash of

2000 Tell Us About Rational Expectations and Efficient Markets?

Application

On October 19, 1987, dubbed “Black Monday,” the Dow Jones Industrial Average

declined more than 20%, the largest one-day decline in U.S. history. The collapse

of the high-tech companies’ share prices from their peaks in March 2000 caused

the heavily tech-laden NASDAQ index to fall from around 5,000 in March 2000

to around 1,500 in 2001 and 2002, for a decline of well over 60%. These two

crashes have caused many economists to question the validity of efficient markets

and rational expectations. They do not believe that a rational marketplace

could have produced such a massive swing in share prices. To what degree

should these stock market crashes make us doubt the validity of rational expectations

and the efficient market hypothesis?

Nothing in rational expectations theory rules out large changes in stock

prices. A large change in stock prices can result from new information that produces

a dramatic decline in optimal forecasts of the future valuation of firms.

However, economists are hard pressed to come up with fundamental changes in

the economy that can explain the Black Monday and tech crashes. One lesson

from these crashes is that factors other than market fundamentals probably have

an effect on stock prices. Hence these crashes have convinced many economists

that the stronger version of the efficient market hypothesis, which states that asset

prices reflect the true fundamental (intrinsic) value of securities, is incorrect. They

attribute a large role in determination of stock prices to market psychology and

to the institutional structure of the marketplace. However, nothing in this view

contradicts the basic reasoning behind rational expectations or the efficient

market hypothesis—that market participants eliminate unexploited profit

opportunities. Even though stock market prices may not always solely reflect

164 PA RT I I Financial Markets

market fundamentals, this does not mean that rational expectations do not

hold. As long as stock market crashes are unpredictable, the basic lessons of

the theory of rational expectations hold.

Some economists have come up with theories of what they call rational

bubbles to explain stock market crashes. A bubble is a situation in which the

price of an asset differs from its fundamental market value. In a rational bubble,

investors can have rational expectations that a bubble is occurring

because the asset price is above its fundamental value but continue to hold

the asset anyway. They might do this because they believe that someone else

will buy the asset for a higher price in the future. In a rational bubble, asset

prices can therefore deviate from their fundamental value for a long time

because the bursting of the bubble cannot be predicted and so there are no

unexploited profit opportunities.

However, other economists believe that the Black Monday crash of 1987

and the tech crash of 2000 suggest that there may be unexploited profit

opportunities and that the theory of rational expectations and the efficient

market hypothesis might be fundamentally flawed. The controversy over

whether capital markets are efficient or expectations are rational continues.

Summary

1. Stocks are valued as the present value of future dividends.

Unfortunately, we do not know very precisely what

these dividends will be. This introduces a great deal of

error to the valuation process. The Gordon growth

model is a simplified method of computing stock value

that depends on the assumption that the dividends are

growing at a constant rate forever. Given our uncertainty

regarding future dividends, this assumption is often the

best we can do.

2. The interaction among traders in the market is what

actually sets prices on a day-to-day basis. The trader

that values the security the most (either because of less

uncertainty about the cash flows or because of greater

estimated cash flows) will be willing to pay the most. As

new information is released, investors will revise their

estimates of the true value of the security and will either

buy or sell it depending upon how the market price

compares to their estimated valuation. Because small

changes in estimated growth rates or required return

result in large changes in price, it is not surprising that

the markets are often volatile.

3. The efficient market hypothesis states that current

security prices will fully reflect all available information,

because in an efficient market, all unexploited profit

opportunities are eliminated. The elimination of

unexploited profit opportunities necessary for a

financial market to be efficient does not require that all

market participants be well informed.

4. The evidence on the efficient market hypothesis is quite

mixed. Early evidence on the performance of

investment analysts and mutual funds, whether stock

prices reflect publicly available information, the

random-walk behavior of stock prices, and the success

of so-called technical analysis was quite favorable to the

efficient market hypothesis. However, in recent years,

evidence on the small-firm effect, the January effect,

market overreaction, excessive volatility, mean

reversion, and new information is not always

incorporated into stock prices, suggesting that the

hypothesis may not always be entirely correct. The

evidence seems to suggest that the efficient market

hypothesis may be a reasonable starting point for

evaluating behavior in financial markets but may not be

generalizable to all behavior in financial markets.

5. The efficient market hypothesis indicates that hot tips,

investment advisers’ published recommendations, and

technical analysis cannot help an investor out-perform

the market. The prescription for investors is to pursue a

C H A P T E R 7 The Stock Market, the Theory of Rational Expectations, and the Efficient Market Hypothesis 165

buy-and-hold strategy—purchase stocks and hold them

for long periods of time. Empirical evidence generally

supports these implications of the efficient market

hypothesis in the stock market.

6. The stock market crash of 1987 and the tech crash of

2000 have convinced many financial economists that

the stronger version of the efficient market hypothesis,

which states that asset prices reflect the true

fundamental (intrinsic) value of securities, is not

correct. It is less clear that these crashes shows that the

weaker version of the efficient market hypothesis is

wrong. Even if the stock market was driven by factors

other than fundamentals, these crashes do not clearly

demonstrate that many of the basic lessons of the

efficient market hypothesis are no longer valid, as long

as these crashes could not have been predicted.

Key Terms

adaptive expectations, p. 147

bubble, p. 164

cash flows, p. 141

dividends, p. 142

efficient market hypothesis, p. 149

generalized dividend model, p. 143

Gordon growth model, p. 143

January effect, p. 156

market fundamentals, p. 152

mean reversion, p. 157

optimal forecast, p. 148

random walk, p. 154

rational expectations, p. 147

residual claimant, p. 141

stockholders, p. 141

theory of efficient capital markets,

p. 149

unexploited profit opportunity, p. 152

Questions and Problems

Questions marked with an asterisk are answered at the end

of the book in an appendix, “Answers to Selected Questions

and Problems.”

1. What basic principle of finance can be applied to the

valuation of any investment asset?

*2. Identify the cash flows available to an investor in

stock. How reliably can these cash flows be estimated?

Compare the problem of estimating stock cash flows

to estimating bond cash flows. Which security would

you predict to be more volatile?

3. Compute the price of a share of stock that pays a $1

per year dividend and that you expect to be able to

sell in one year for $20, assuming you require a 15%

return.

*4. After careful analysis, you have determined that a

firm’s dividends should grow at 7% on average in the

foreseeable future. Its last dividend was $3. Compute

the current price of this stock, assuming the required

return is 18%.

5. Some economists think that the central banks should

try to prick bubbles in the stock market before they

get out of hand and cause later damage when they

burst. How can monetary policy be used to prick a

bubble? Explain how it can do this using the Gordon

growth model.

*6. “Forecasters’ predictions of inflation are notoriously

inaccurate, so their expectations of inflation cannot be

rational.” Is this statement true, false, or uncertain?

Explain your answer.

7. “Whenever it is snowing when Joe Commuter gets up

in the morning, he misjudges how long it will take

him to drive to work. Otherwise, his expectations of

the driving time are perfectly accurate. Considering

that it snows only once every ten years where Joe

lives, Joe’s expectations are almost always perfectly

accurate.” Are Joe’s expectations rational? Why or

why not?

*8. If a forecaster spends hours every day studying data to

forecast interest rates but his expectations are not as

accurate as predicting that tomorrow’s interest rates

will be identical to today’s interest rate, are his expectations

rational?

QUIZ

166 PA RT I I Financial Markets

9. “If stock prices did not follow a random walk, there

would be unexploited profit opportunities in the market.”

Is this statement true, false, or uncertain? Explain

your answer.

*10. Suppose that increases in the money supply lead to a

rise in stock prices. Does this mean that when you see

that the money supply has had a sharp rise in the past

week, you should go out and buy stocks? Why or why

not?

11. If the public expects a corporation to lose $5 a share

this quarter and it actually loses $4, which is still the

largest loss in the history of the company, what does

the efficient market hypothesis say will happen to the

price of the stock when the $4 loss is announced?

*12. If I read in the Wall Street Journal that the “smart

money” on Wall Street expects stock prices to fall,

should I follow that lead and sell all my stocks?

13. If my broker has been right in her five previous buy

and sell recommendations, should I continue listening

to her advice?

*14. Can a person with rational expectations expect the

price of IBM to rise by 10% in the next month?

15. “If most participants in the stock market do not follow

what is happening to the monetary aggregates, prices

of common stocks will not fully reflect information

about them.” Is this statement true, false, or uncertain?

Explain your answer.

*16. “An efficient market is one in which no one ever profits

from having better information than the rest.” Is

this statement true, false, or uncertain? Explain your

answer.

17. If higher money growth is associated with higher

future inflation and if announced money growth turns

out to be extremely high but is still less than the market

expected, what do you think would happen to

long-term bond prices?

*18. “Foreign exchange rates, like stock prices, should follow

a random walk.” Is this statement true, false, or

uncertain? Explain your answer.

19. Can we expect the value of the dollar to rise by 2%

next week if our expectations are rational?

*20. “Human fear is the source of stock market crashes, so

these crashes indicate that expectations in the stock

market cannot be rational.” Is this statement true,

false, or uncertain? Explain your answer.

Web Exercises

1. Visit www.forecasts.org/data/index.htm. Click on

“Stock Index” at the very top of the page. Now choose

“U.S. Stock Indices-monthly.” Review the indices for

the DJIA, the S&P 500, and the NASDAQ composite.

Which index appears most volatile? In which index

would you have rather invested in 1985 if the

investment had been allowed to compound until now?

2. The Internet is a great source of information on stock

prices and stock price movements. There are many

sites that provide up-to-the minute data on stock

market indices. One of the best is found at

http://finance.lycos.com/home/livecharts. This site

provides free real-time streaming of stock market data.

Click on the $indu to have the chart display the Dow

Jones Industrial Average. Look at the stock trend over

various intervals by adjusting the update frequency

(click on “INT” at the top of the chart). Have stock

prices been going up or down over the last day, week,

month, and year?

P a r t I I I

Financial

Institutions

PREVIEW A healthy and vibrant economy requires a financial system that moves funds from

people who save to people who have productive investment opportunities. But how

does the financial system make sure that your hard-earned savings get channeled to

Paula the Productive Investor rather than to Benny the Bum?

This chapter answers that question by providing an economic analysis of how our

financial structure is designed to promote economic efficiency. The analysis focuses

on a few simple but powerful economic concepts that enable us to explain features of

our financial system, such as why financial contracts are written as they are and why

financial intermediaries are more important than securities markets for getting funds

to borrowers. The analysis also demonstrates the important link between the financial

system and the performance of the aggregate economy, which is the subject of Part V

of the book. The economic analysis of financial structure explains how the performance

of the financial sector affects economic growth and why financial crises occur

and have such severe consequences for aggregate economic activity.

Basic Puzzles About Financial Structure Throughout the World

The financial system is complex in structure and function throughout the world. It

includes many different types of institutions: banks, insurance companies, mutual

funds, stock and bond markets, and so on—all of which are regulated by government.

The financial system channels billions of dollars per year from savers to people

with productive investment opportunities. If we take a close look at financial structure

all over the world, we find eight basic puzzles that we need to solve in order to

understand how the financial system works.

The pie chart in Figure 1 indicates how American businesses financed their activities

using external funds (those obtained from outside the business itself) in the

period 1970–1996. The Bank Loans category is made up primarily of bank loans;

Nonbank Loans is composed primarily of loans by other financial intermediaries; the

Bonds category includes marketable debt securities such as corporate bonds and commercial

paper; and Stock consists of new issues of new equity (stock market shares).

Figure 2 uses the same classifications as Figure 1 and compares the U.S. data to those

of Germany and Japan.

169

Chap ter

An Economic Analysis

of Financial Structure

8

Now let us explore the eight puzzles.

1. Stocks are not the most important source of external financing for businesses.

Because so much attention in the media is focused on the stock market, many

people have the impression that stocks are the most important sources of financing for

American corporations. However, as we can see from the pie chart in Figure 1, the

stock market accounted for only a small fraction of the external financing of American

businesses in the 1970–1996 period: 9.2%.1 (In fact, in the mid- to late 1980s,

American corporations generally stopped issuing shares to finance their activities;

instead they purchased large numbers of shares, meaning that the stock market was

actually a negative source of corporate finance in those years.) Similarly small figures

apply in the other countries presented in Figure 2 as well. Why is the stock market less

important than other sources of financing in the United States and other countries?

2. Issuing marketable debt and equity securities is not the primary way in

which businesses finance their operations. Figure 1 shows that bonds are a far more

important source of financing than stocks in the United States (35.5% versus 9.2%).

However, stocks and bonds combined (44.7%), which make up the total share of

marketable securities, still supply less than one-half of the external funds corporations

need to finance their activities. The fact that issuing marketable securities is not the

most important source of financing is true elsewhere in the world as well. Indeed, as

170 PART I I I Financial Institutions

FIGURE 1 Sources of External

Funds for Nonfinancial Businesses in

the United States

Source: Reinhard H. Schmidt,

“Differences Between Financial Systems

in European Countries: Consequences

for EMU,” in Deutsche Bundesbank,

ed., The Monetary Transmission Process:

Recent Developments and Lessons for

Europe (Hampshire: Palgrave Publishers,

2001), p. 222.

Bonds

35.5%

Bank Loans

40.2%

Nonbank

Loans

15.1%

Stock

9.2%

1The 9.2% figure for the percentage of external financing provided by stocks is based on the flows of external

funds to corporations. However, this flow figure is somewhat misleading, because when a share of stock is issued,

it raises funds permanently; whereas when a bond is issued, it raises funds only temporarily until they are paid

back at maturity. To see this, suppose that a firm raises $1,000 by selling a share of stock and another $1,000 by

selling a $1,000 one-year bond. In the case of the stock issue, the firm can hold on to the $1,000 it raised this

way, but to hold on to the $1,000 it raised through debt, it has to issue a new $1,000 bond every year. If we look

at the flow of funds to corporations over a 26-year period, as in Figure 1, the firm will have raised $1,000 with

a stock issue only once in the 26-year period, while it will have raised $1,000 with debt 26 times, once in each

of the 26 years. Thus it will look as though debt is 26 times more important than stocks in raising funds, even

though our example indicates that they are actually equally important for the firm.

we see in Figure 2, other countries have a much smaller share of external financing

supplied by marketable securities than the United States. Why don’t businesses use

marketable securities more extensively to finance their activities?

3. Indirect finance, which involves the activities of financial intermediaries, is

many times more important than direct finance, in which businesses raise funds

directly from lenders in financial markets. Direct finance involves the sale to households

of marketable securities such as stocks and bonds. The 44.7% share of stocks and

bonds as a source of external financing for American businesses actually greatly overstates

the importance of direct finance in our financial system. Since 1970, less than 5%

of newly issued corporate bonds and commercial paper and around 50% of stocks have

been sold directly to American households. The rest of these securities have been

bought primarily by financial intermediaries such as insurance companies, pension

funds, and mutual funds. These figures indicate that direct finance is used in less than

10% of the external funding of American business. Because in most countries marketable

securities are an even less important source of finance than in the United States, direct

finance is also far less important than indirect finance in the rest of the world. Why are

financial intermediaries and indirect finance so important in financial markets? In recent

years, indirect finance has been declining in importance. Why is this happening?

4. Banks are the most important source of external funds used to finance businesses.

As we can see in Figures 1 and 2, the primary sources of external funds for

C H A P T E R 8 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure 171

FIGURE 2 Sources of External Funds for Nonfinancial Businesses: A Comparison of the United States with Germany and Japan

The categories of external funds are the same as in Figure 1 and the data are for the period 1970–1996.

Source: Reinhard H. Schmidt, “Differences Between Financial Systems in European Countries: Consequences for EMU,” in Deutsche Bundesbank, ed., The

Monetary Transmission Process: Recent Developments and Lessons for Europe (Hampshire: Palgrave Publishers, 2001), p. 222.

United States

Germany

Japan

%

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Bank Loans Nonbank Loans Bonds Stock

businesses throughout the world are loans (55.3% in the United States). Most of these

loans are bank loans, so the data suggest that banks have the most important role in

financing business activities. An extraordinary fact that surprises most people is that

in an average year in the United States, more than four times more funds are raised

with bank loans than with stocks. Banks are even more important in countries such

as Germany and Japan than they are in the United States, and in developing countries

banks play an even more important role in the financial system than they do in the

industrialized countries. What makes banks so important to the workings of the

financial system? Although banks remain important, their share of external funds for

businesses has been declining in recent years. What is driving their decline?

5. The financial system is among the most heavily regulated sectors of the economy.

You learned in Chapter 2 that the financial system is heavily regulated, not only

in the United States but in all other developed countries as well. Governments regulate

financial markets primarily to promote the provision of information, in part, to

protect consumers, and to ensure the soundness (stability) of the financial system.

Why are financial markets so extensively regulated throughout the world?

6. Only large, well-established corporations have easy access to securities markets

to finance their activities. Individuals and smaller businesses that are not well

established are less likely to raise funds by issuing marketable securities. Instead, they

most often obtain their financing from banks. Why do only large, well-known corporations

find it easier to raise funds in securities markets?

7. Collateral is a prevalent feature of debt contracts for both households and

businesses. Collateral is property that is pledged to the lender to guarantee payment

in the event that the borrower is unable to make debt payments. Collateralized debt

(also known as secured debt to contrast it with unsecured debt, such as credit card

debt, which is not collateralized) is the predominant form of household debt and is

widely used in business borrowing as well. The majority of household debt in the

United States consists of collateralized loans: Your automobile is collateral for your

auto loan, and your house is collateral for your mortgage. Commercial and farm mortgages,

for which property is pledged as collateral, make up one-quarter of borrowing

by nonfinancial businesses; corporate bonds and other bank loans also often involve

pledges of collateral. Why is collateral such an important feature of debt contracts?

8. Debt contracts typically are extremely complicated legal documents that

place substantial restrictions on the behavior of the borrower. Many students think

of a debt contract as a simple IOU that can be written on a single piece of paper. The

reality of debt contracts is far different, however. In all countries, bond or loan contracts

typically are long legal documents with provisions (called restrictive covenants)

that restrict and specify certain activities that the borrower can engage in. Restrictive

covenants are not just a feature of debt contracts for businesses; for example, personal

automobile loan and home mortgage contracts have covenants that require the borrower

to maintain sufficient insurance on the automobile or house purchased with the

loan. Why are debt contracts so complex and restrictive?

As you may recall from Chapter 2, an important feature of financial markets is

that they have substantial transaction and information costs. An economic analysis of

how these costs affect financial markets provides us with solutions to the eight puzzles,

which in turn provide us with a much deeper understanding of how our financial

system works. In the next section, we examine the impact of transaction costs on

the structure of our financial system. Then we turn to the effect of information costs

on financial structure.

172 PART I I I Financial Institutions

Transaction Costs

Transaction costs are a major problem in financial markets. An example will make

this clear.

Say you have $5,000 you would like to invest, and you think about investing in the

stock market. Because you have only $5,000, you can buy only a small number of

shares. The stockbroker tells you that your purchase is so small that the brokerage

commission for buying the stock you picked will be a large percentage of the purchase

price of the shares. If instead you decide to buy a bond, the problem is even worse,

because the smallest denomination for some bonds you might want to buy is as much

as $10,000, and you do not have that much to invest. Indeed, the broker may not be

interested in your business at all, because the small size of your account doesn’t make

spending time on it worthwhile. You are disappointed and realize that you will not be

able to use financial markets to earn a return on your hard-earned savings. You can

take some consolation, however, in the fact that you are not alone in being stymied by

high transaction costs. This is a fact of life for many of us: Only around one-half of

American households own any securities.

You also face another problem because of transaction costs. Because you have

only a small amount of funds available, you can make only a restricted number of

investments. That is, you have to put all your eggs in one basket, and your inability

to diversify will subject you to a lot of risk.

This example of the problems posed by transaction costs and the example outlined in

Chapter 2 when legal costs kept you from making a loan to Carl the Carpenter illustrate

that small savers like you are frozen out of financial markets and are unable to

benefit from them. Fortunately, financial intermediaries, an important part of the

financial structure, have evolved to reduce transaction costs and allow small savers

and borrowers to benefit from the existence of financial markets.

Economies of Scale. One solution to the problem of high transaction costs is to bundle

the funds of many investors together so that they can take advantage of economies

of scale, the reduction in transaction costs per dollar of investment as the size (scale) of

transactions increases. By bundling investors’ funds together, transaction costs for each

individual investor are far smaller. Economies of scale exist because the total cost of

carrying out a transaction in financial markets increases only a little as the size of the

transaction grows. For example, the cost of arranging a purchase of 10,000 shares of

stock is not much greater than the cost of arranging a purchase of 50 shares of stock.

The presence of economies of scale in financial markets helps explain why financial

intermediaries developed and have become such an important part of our financial

structure. The clearest example of a financial intermediary that arose because of

economies of scale is a mutual fund. A mutual fund is a financial intermediary that sells

shares to individuals and then invests the proceeds in bonds or stocks. Because it buys

large blocks of stocks or bonds, a mutual fund can take advantage of lower transaction

costs. These cost savings are then passed on to individual investors after the

mutual fund has taken its cut in the form of management fees for administering their

accounts. An additional benefit for individual investors is that a mutual fund is large

enough to purchase a widely diversified portfolio of securities. The increased diversification

for individual investors reduces their risk, making them better off.

How Financial

Intermediaries

Reduce

Transaction Costs

How Transaction

Costs Influence

Financial

Structure

C H A P T E R 8 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure 173

Economies of scale are also important in lowering the costs of things such as

computer technology that financial institutions need to accomplish their tasks. Once

a large mutual fund has invested a lot of money in setting up a telecommunications

system, for example, the system can be used for a huge number of transactions at a

low cost per transaction.

Expertise. Financial intermediaries are also better able to develop expertise to lower

transaction costs. Their expertise in computer technology enables them to offer customers

convenient services like being able to call a toll-free number for information

on how well their investments are doing and to write checks on their accounts.

An important outcome of a financial intermediary’s low transaction costs is the

ability to provide its customers with liquidity services, services that make it easier for

customers to conduct transactions. Money market mutual funds, for example, not

only pay shareholders high interest rates, but also allow them to write checks for convenient

bill-paying.

Asymmetric Information: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

The presence of transaction costs in financial markets explains in part why financial

intermediaries and indirect finance play such an important role in financial markets

(puzzle 3). To understand financial structure more fully, however, we turn to the role

of information in financial markets.2

Asymmetric information—one party’s insufficient knowledge about the other party

involved in a transaction to make accurate decisions—is an important aspect of financial

markets. For example, managers of a corporation know whether they are honest

or have better information about how well their business is doing than the stockholders

do. The presence of asymmetric information leads to adverse selection and

moral hazard problems, which were introduced in Chapter 2.

Adverse selection is an asymmetric information problem that occurs before the

transaction occurs: Potential bad credit risks are the ones who most actively seek out

loans. Thus the parties who are the most likely to produce an undesirable outcome

are the ones most likely to want to engage in the transaction. For example, big risk

takers or outright crooks might be the most eager to take out a loan because they

know that they are unlikely to pay it back. Because adverse selection increases the

chances that a loan might be made to a bad credit risk, lenders might decide not to

make any loans, even though there are good credit risks in the marketplace.

Moral hazard arises after the transaction occurs: The lender runs the risk that the

borrower will engage in activities that are undesirable from the lender’s point of view

because they make it less likely that the loan will be paid back. For example, once

borrowers have obtained a loan, they may take on big risks (which have possible high

returns but also run a greater risk of default) because they are playing with someone

else’s money. Because moral hazard lowers the probability that the loan will be repaid,

lenders may decide that they would rather not make a loan.

174 PART I I I Financial Institutions

2An excellent survey of the literature on information and financial structure that expands on the topics discussed

in the rest of this chapter is contained in Mark Gertler, “Financial Structure and Aggregate Economic Activity: An

Overview,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 20 (1988): 559–588.

The analysis of how asymmetric information problems affect economic behavior

is called agency theory. We will apply this theory here to explain why financial structure

takes the form it does, thereby solving the puzzles described at the beginning of

the chapter.

The Lemons Problem: How Adverse Selection Influences

Financial Structure

A particular characterization of the adverse selection problem and how it interferes

with the efficient functioning of a market was outlined in a famous article by Nobel

prize winner George Akerlof. It is referred to as the “lemons problem,” because it

resembles the problem created by lemons in the used-car market.3 Potential buyers of

used cars are frequently unable to assess the quality of the car; that is, they can’t tell

whether a particular used car is a good car that will run well or a lemon that will continually

give them grief. The price that a buyer pays must therefore reflect the average

quality of the cars in the market, somewhere between the low value of a lemon and

the high value of a good car.

The owner of a used car, by contrast, is more likely to know whether the car is a

peach or a lemon. If the car is a lemon, the owner is more than happy to sell it at the

price the buyer is willing to pay, which, being somewhere between the value of a

lemon and a good car, is greater than the lemon’s value. However, if the car is a peach,

the owner knows that the car is undervalued by the price the buyer is willing to pay,

and so the owner may not want to sell it. As a result of this adverse selection, very few

good used cars will come to the market. Because the average quality of a used car

available in the market will be low and because very few people want to buy a lemon,

there will be few sales. The used-car market will then function poorly, if at all.

A similar lemons problem arises in securities markets, that is, the debt (bond) and

equity (stock) markets. Suppose that our friend Irving the Investor, a potential buyer

of securities such as common stock, can’t distinguish between good firms with high

expected profits and low risk and bad firms with low expected profits and high risk.

In this situation, Irving will be willing to pay only a price that reflects the average

quality of firms issuing securities—a price that lies between the value of securities

from bad firms and the value of those from good firms. If the owners or managers of

a good firm have better information than Irving and know that they are a good firm,

they know that their securities are undervalued and will not want to sell them to

Irving at the price he is willing to pay. The only firms willing to sell Irving securities

will be bad firms (because the price is higher than the securities are worth). Our

friend Irving is not stupid; he does not want to hold securities in bad firms, and hence

he will decide not to purchase securities in the market. In an outcome similar to that

Lemons in the

Stock and Bond

Markets

C H A P T E R 8 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure 175

3George Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality, Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal

of Economics 84 (1970): 488–500. Two important papers that have applied the lemons problem analysis to financial

markets are Stewart Myers and N. S. Majluf, “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms

Have Information That Investors Do Not Have,” Journal of Financial Economics 13 (1984): 187–221, and Bruce

Greenwald, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and Andrew Weiss, “Information Imperfections in the Capital Market and

Macroeconomic Fluctuations,” American Economic Review 74 (1984): 194–199.

www.nobel.se/economics

/laureates/2001/public.html

A complete discussion of the

lemons problem on a site

dedicated to Nobel prize

winners.

in the used-car market, this securities market will not work very well because few

firms will sell securities in it to raise capital.

The analysis is similar if Irving considers purchasing a corporate debt instrument

in the bond market rather than an equity share. Irving will buy a bond only if its interest

rate is high enough to compensate him for the average default risk of the good and

bad firms trying to sell the debt. The knowledgeable owners of a good firm realize that

they will be paying a higher interest rate than they should, and so they are unlikely

to want to borrow in this market. Only the bad firms will be willing to borrow, and

because investors like Irving are not eager to buy bonds issued by bad firms, they will

probably not buy any bonds at all. Few bonds are likely to sell in this market, and so

it will not be a good source of financing.

The analysis we have just conducted explains puzzle 2—why marketable securities

are not the primary source of financing for businesses in any country in the world.

It also partly explains puzzle 1—why stocks are not the most important source of

financing for American businesses. The presence of the lemons problem keeps securities

markets such as the stock and bond markets from being effective in channeling

funds from savers to borrowers.

In the absence of asymmetric information, the lemons problem goes away. If buyers

know as much about the quality of used cars as sellers, so that all involved can tell a

good car from a bad one, buyers will be willing to pay full value for good used cars.

Because the owners of good used cars can now get a fair price, they will be willing to

sell them in the market. The market will have many transactions and will do its

intended job of channeling good cars to people who want them.

Similarly, if purchasers of securities can distinguish good firms from bad, they will

pay the full value of securities issued by good firms, and good firms will sell their

securities in the market. The securities market will then be able to move funds to the

good firms that have the most productive investment opportunities.

Private Production and Sale of Information. The solution to the adverse selection problem

in financial markets is to eliminate asymmetric information by furnishing people

supplying funds with full details about the individuals or firms seeking to finance

their investment activities. One way to get this material to saver-lenders is to have private

companies collect and produce information that distinguishes good from bad

firms and then sell it. In the United States, companies such as Standard and Poor’s,

Moody’s, and Value Line gather information on firms’ balance sheet positions and

investment activities, publish these data, and sell them to subscribers (individuals,

libraries, and financial intermediaries involved in purchasing securities).

The system of private production and sale of information does not completely

solve the adverse selection problem in securities markets, however, because of the socalled

free-rider problem. The free-rider problem occurs when people who do not

pay for information take advantage of the information that other people have paid for.

The free-rider problem suggests that the private sale of information will be only a partial

solution to the lemons problem. To see why, suppose that you have just purchased

information that tells you which firms are good and which are bad. You believe that

this purchase is worthwhile because you can make up the cost of acquiring this information,

and then some, by purchasing the securities of good firms that are undervalued.

However, when our savvy (free-riding) investor Irving sees you buying certain

securities, he buys right along with you, even though he has not paid for any infor-

Tools to Help

Solve Adverse

Selection

Problems

176 PART I I I Financial Institutions

mation. If many other investors act as Irving does, the increased demand for the

undervalued good securities will cause their low price to be bid up immediately to

reflect the securities’ true value. Because of all these free riders, you can no longer buy

the securities for less than their true value. Now because you will not gain any profits

from purchasing the information, you realize that you never should have paid for

this information in the first place. If other investors come to the same realization, private

firms and individuals may not be able to sell enough of this information to make

it worth their while to gather and produce it. The weakened ability of private firms to

profit from selling information will mean that less information is produced in the marketplace,

and so adverse selection (the lemons problem) will still interfere with the

efficient functioning of securities markets.

Government Regulation to Increase Information. The free-rider problem prevents the

private market from producing enough information to eliminate all the asymmetric

information that leads to adverse selection. Could financial markets benefit from government

intervention? The government could, for instance, produce information to

help investors distinguish good from bad firms and provide it to the public free of

charge. This solution, however, would involve the government in releasing negative

information about firms, a practice that might be politically difficult. A second possibility

(and one followed by the United States and most governments throughout the

world) is for the government to regulate securities markets in a way that encourages

firms to reveal honest information about themselves so that investors can determine

how good or bad the firms are. In the United States, the Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC) is the government agency that requires firms selling their securities

in public markets to adhere to standard accounting principles and to disclose

information about their sales, assets, and earnings. Similar regulations are found in

other countries. However, disclosure requirements do not always work well, as the

recent collapse of Enron and accounting scandals at other corporations (WorldCom,

etc.) suggest (Box 1).

The asymmetric information problem of adverse selection in financial markets

helps explain why financial markets are among the most heavily regulated sectors in

the economy (puzzle 5). Government regulation to increase information for investors

is needed to reduce the adverse selection problem, which interferes with the efficient

functioning of securities (stock and bond) markets.

Although government regulation lessens the adverse selection problem, it does

not eliminate it. Even when firms provide information to the public about their sales,

assets, or earnings, they still have more information than investors: There is a lot more

to knowing the quality of a firm than statistics can provide. Furthermore, bad firms

have an incentive to make themselves look like good firms, because this would enable

them to fetch a higher price for their securities. Bad firms will slant the information

they are required to transmit to the public, thus making it harder for investors to sort

out the good firms from the bad.

Financial Intermediation. So far we have seen that private production of information

and government regulation to encourage provision of information lessen, but do not

eliminate, the adverse selection problem in financial markets. How, then, can the

financial structure help promote the flow of funds to people with productive investment

opportunities when there is asymmetric information? A clue is provided by the

structure of the used-car market.

C H A P T E R 8 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure 177

An important feature of the used-car market is that most used cars are not sold

directly by one individual to another. An individual considering buying a used car might

pay for privately produced information by subscribing to a magazine like Consumer

Reports to find out if a particular make of car has a good repair record. Nevertheless,

reading Consumer Reports does not solve the adverse selection problem, because even if

a particular make of car has a good reputation, the specific car someone is trying to sell

could be a lemon. The prospective buyer might also bring the used car to a mechanic

for a once-over. But what if the prospective buyer doesn’t know a mechanic who can be

trusted or if the mechanic would charge a high fee to evaluate the car?

Because these roadblocks make it hard for individuals to acquire enough information

about used cars, most used cars are not sold directly by one individual to

another. Instead, they are sold by an intermediary, a used-car dealer who purchases

used cars from individuals and resells them to other individuals. Used-car dealers

produce information in the market by becoming experts in determining whether a car

is a peach or a lemon. Once they know that a car is good, they can sell it with some

178 PART I I I Financial Institutions

Box 1

The Enron Implosion and the Arthur Andersen Conviction

Until 2001, Enron Corporation, a firm that specialized

in trading in the energy market, appeared to be spectacularly

successful. It had a quarter of the energytrading

market and was valued as high as $77 billion

in August 2000 (just a little over a year before its collapse),

making it the seventh-largest corporation in

the United States at that time. However, toward the

end of 2001, Enron came crashing down. In October

2001, Enron announced a third-quarter loss of $618

million and disclosed accounting “mistakes.” The SEC

then engaged in a formal investigation of Enron’s

financial dealings with partnerships led by its former

finance chief. It became clear that Enron was engaged

in a complex set of transactions by which it was keeping

substantial amounts of debt and financial contracts

off of its balance sheet. These transactions

enabled Enron to hide its financial difficulties. Despite

securing as much as $1.5 billion of new financing

from J. P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup, the company

was forced to declare bankruptcy in December 2001,

the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history up to then.

Arthur Andersen, Enron’s accounting firm, and one

of the so-called Big Five accounting firms, was then

indicted and finally convicted in June 2002 for

obstruction of justice for impeding the SEC’s investigation

of the Enron collapse. This conviction—the

first ever against a major accounting firm—meant that

Andersen could no longer conduct audits of publicly

traded firms, a development leading to its demise.

Enron’s incredibly rapid collapse, combined with

revelations of faulty accounting information from

other publicly traded firms (e.g., WorldCom, which

overstated its earnings by nearly $4 billion in 2001

and 2002), has raised concerns that disclosure and

accounting regulations may be inadequate for firms

that are involved in complicated financial transactions,

and that accounting firms may not have the

proper incentives to make sure that the accounting

numbers are accurate. The scandals at Enron, Arthur

Andersen, and other corporations resulted in the passage

of legislation that is intended to make future

Enrons less likely. The law established an independent

oversight board for the accounting profession,

prohibited auditors from offering certain consulting

services to their clients, increased criminal penalties

for corporate fraud, and required corporate chief

executive officers and chief financial officers to certify

financial reports.

The Enron collapse illustrates that government

regulation can lessen asymmetric information problems,

but cannot eliminate them. Managers have

tremendous incentives to hide their companies’ problems,

making it hard for investors to know the true

value of the firm.

form of a guarantee: either a guarantee that is explicit, such as a warranty, or an

implicit guarantee in which they stand by their reputation for honesty. People are

more likely to purchase a used car because of a dealer’s guarantee, and the dealer is

able to make a profit on the production of information about automobile quality by

being able to sell the used car at a higher price than the dealer paid for it. If dealers

purchase and then resell cars on which they have produced information, they avoid

the problem of other people free-riding on the information they produced.

Just as used-car dealers help solve adverse selection problems in the automobile

market, financial intermediaries play a similar role in financial markets. A financial

intermediary, such as a bank, becomes an expert in the production of information about

firms, so that it can sort out good credit risks from bad ones. Then it can acquire

funds from depositors and lend them to the good firms. Because the bank is able to

lend mostly to good firms, it is able to earn a higher return on its loans than the interest

it has to pay to its depositors. The resulting profit that the bank earns allows it to

engage in this information production activity.

An important element in the ability of the bank to profit from the information it

produces is that it avoids the free-rider problem by primarily making private loans

rather than by purchasing securities that are traded in the open market. Because a private

loan is not traded, other investors cannot watch what the bank is doing and bid up

the loan’s price to the point that the bank receives no compensation for the information

it has produced. The bank’s role as an intermediary that holds mostly nontraded loans

is the key to its success in reducing asymmetric information in financial markets.

Our analysis of adverse selection indicates that financial intermediaries in general—

and banks in particular, because they hold a large fraction of nontraded loans—should

play a greater role in moving funds to corporations than securities markets do. Our

analysis thus explains puzzles 3 and 4: why indirect finance is so much more important

than direct finance and why banks are the most important source of external

funds for financing businesses.

Another important fact that is explained by the analysis here is the greater importance

of banks in the financial systems of developing countries. As we have seen,

when the quality of information about firms is better, asymmetric information problems

will be less severe, and it will be easier for firms to issue securities. Information

about private firms is harder to collect in developing countries than in industrialized

countries; therefore, the smaller role played by securities markets leaves a greater role

for financial intermediaries such as banks. A corollary of this analysis is that as information

about firms becomes easier to acquire, the role of banks should decline. A

major development in the past 20 years in the United States has been huge improvements

in information technology. Thus the analysis here suggests that the lending role

of financial institutions such as banks in the United States should have declined, and

this is exactly what has occurred (see Chapter 10).

Our analysis of adverse selection also explains puzzle 6, which questions why

large firms are more likely to obtain funds from securities markets, a direct route,

rather than from banks and financial intermediaries, an indirect route. The better

known a corporation is, the more information about its activities is available in the

marketplace. Thus it is easier for investors to evaluate the quality of the corporation

and determine whether it is a good firm or a bad one. Because investors have fewer

worries about adverse selection with well-known corporations, they will be willing to

invest directly in their securities. Our adverse selection analysis thus suggests that

there should be a pecking order for firms that can issue securities. The larger and

more established a corporation is, the more likely it will be to issue securities to raise

C H A P T E R 8 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure 179

funds, a view that is known as the pecking order hypothesis. This hypothesis is supported

in the data, and is described in puzzle 6.

Collateral and Net Worth. Adverse selection interferes with the functioning of financial

markets only if a lender suffers a loss when a borrower is unable to make loan

payments and thereby defaults. Collateral, property promised to the lender if the borrower

defaults, reduces the consequences of adverse selection because it reduces the

lender’s losses in the event of a default. If a borrower defaults on a loan, the lender

can sell the collateral and use the proceeds to make up for the losses on the loan. For

example, if you fail to make your mortgage payments, the lender can take title to your

house, auction it off, and use the receipts to pay off the loan. Lenders are thus more

willing to make loans secured by collateral, and borrowers are willing to supply collateral

because the reduced risk for the lender makes it more likely they will get the

loan in the first place and perhaps at a better loan rate. The presence of adverse selection

in credit markets thus provides an explanation for why collateral is an important

feature of debt contracts (puzzle 7).

Net worth (also called equity capital), the difference between a firm’s assets

(what it owns or is owed) and its liabilities (what it owes), can perform a similar role

to collateral. If a firm has a high net worth, then even if it engages in investments that

cause it to have negative profits and so defaults on its debt payments, the lender can

take title to the firm’s net worth, sell it off, and use the proceeds to recoup some of

the losses from the loan. In addition, the more net worth a firm has in the first place,

the less likely it is to default, because the firm has a cushion of assets that it can use

to pay off its loans. Hence when firms seeking credit have high net worth, the consequences

of adverse selection are less important and lenders are more willing to make

loans. This analysis lies behind the often-heard lament, “Only the people who don’t

need money can borrow it!”

Summary. So far we have used the concept of adverse selection to explain seven of the

eight puzzles about financial structure introduced earlier: The first four emphasize the

importance of financial intermediaries and the relative unimportance of securities markets

for the financing of corporations; the fifth, that financial markets are among the

most heavily regulated sectors of the economy; the sixth, that only large, well-established

corporations have access to securities markets; and the seventh, that collateral is

an important feature of debt contracts. In the next section, we will see that the other

asymmetric information concept of moral hazard provides additional reasons for the

importance of financial intermediaries and the relative unimportance of securities markets

for the financing of corporations, the prevalence of government regulation, and the

importance of collateral in debt contracts. In addition, the concept of moral hazard can

be used to explain our final puzzle (puzzle 8) of why debt contracts are complicated

legal documents that place substantial restrictions on the behavior of the borrower.

How Moral Hazard Affects the Choice Between Debt

and Equity Contracts

Moral hazard is the asymmetric information problem that occurs after the financial

transaction takes place, when the seller of a security may have incentives to hide

information and engage in activities that are undesirable for the purchaser of the secu-

180 PART I I I Financial Institutions

rity. Moral hazard has important consequences for whether a firm finds it easier to

raise funds with debt than with equity contracts.

Equity contracts, such as common stock, are claims to a share in the profits and assets

of a business. Equity contracts are subject to a particular type of moral hazard called

the principal–agent problem. When managers own only a small fraction of the firm

they work for, the stockholders who own most of the firm’s equity (called the principals)

are not the same people as the managers of the firm, who are the agents of the

owners. This separation of ownership and control involves moral hazard, in that the

managers in control (the agents) may act in their own interest rather than in the interest

of the stockholder-owners (the principals) because the managers have less incentive

to maximize profits than the stockholder-owners do.

To understand the principal–agent problem more fully, suppose that your friend

Steve asks you to become a silent partner in his ice-cream store. The store requires an

investment of $10,000 to set up and Steve has only $1,000. So you purchase an equity

stake (stock shares) for $9,000, which entitles you to 90% of the ownership of the firm,

while Steve owns only 10%. If Steve works hard to make tasty ice cream, keeps the

store clean, smiles at all the customers, and hustles to wait on tables quickly, after all

expenses (including Steve’s salary), the store will have $50,000 in profits per year, of

which Steve receives 10% ($5,000) and you receive 90% ($45,000).

But if Steve doesn’t provide quick and friendly service to his customers, uses the

$50,000 in income to buy artwork for his office, and even sneaks off to the beach

while he should be at the store, the store will not earn any profit. Steve can earn the

additional $5,000 (his 10% share of the profits) over his salary only if he works hard

and forgoes unproductive investments (such as art for his office). Steve might decide

that the extra $5,000 just isn’t enough to make him expend the effort to be a good

manager; he might decide that it would be worth his while only if he earned an extra

$10,000. If Steve feels this way, he does not have enough incentive to be a good manager

and will end up with a beautiful office, a good tan, and a store that doesn’t show

any profits. Because the store won’t show any profits, Steve’s decision not to act in

your interest will cost you $45,000 (your 90% of the profits if he had chosen to be a

good manager instead).

The moral hazard arising from the principal–agent problem might be even worse

if Steve were not totally honest. Because his ice-cream store is a cash business, Steve

has the incentive to pocket $50,000 in cash and tell you that the profits were zero. He

now gets a return of $50,000, but you get nothing.

Further indications that the principal–agent problem created by equity contracts

can be severe are provided by recent corporate scandals in corporations such as Enron

and Tyco International, in which managers have been accused of diverting funds for

their own personal use. Besides pursuing personal benefits, managers might also pursue

corporate strategies (such as the acquisition of other firms) that enhance their personal

power but do not increase the corporation’s profitability

The principal–agent problem would not arise if the owners of a firm had complete

information about what the managers were up to and could prevent wasteful

expenditures or fraud. The principal–agent problem, which is an example of moral

hazard, arises only because a manager, like Steve, has more information about his

activities than the stockholder does—that is, there is asymmetric information. The

principal–agent problem would also not arise if Steve alone owned the store and there

were no separation of ownership and control. If this were the case, Steve’s hard work

Moral Hazard in

Equity Contracts:

The Principal–

Agent Problem

C H A P T E R 8 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure 181

and avoidance of unproductive investments would yield him a profit (and extra income)

of $50,000, an amount that would make it worth his while to be a good manager.

Production of Information: Monitoring. You have seen that the principal–agent problem

arises because managers have more information about their activities and actual profits

than stockholders do. One way for stockholders to reduce this moral hazard problem is

for them to engage in a particular type of information production, the monitoring of the

firm’s activities: auditing the firm frequently and checking on what the management is

doing. The problem is that the monitoring process can be expensive in terms of time

and money, as reflected in the name economists give it, costly state verification. Costly

state verification makes the equity contract less desirable, and it explains, in part, why

equity is not a more important element in our financial structure.

As with adverse selection, the free-rider problem decreases the amount of information

production that would reduce the moral hazard (principal–agent) problem. In

this example, the free-rider problem decreases monitoring. If you know that other

stockholders are paying to monitor the activities of the company you hold shares in,

you can take a free ride on their activities. Then you can use the money you save by

not engaging in monitoring to vacation on a Caribbean island. If you can do this,

though, so can other stockholders. Perhaps all the stockholders will go to the islands,

and no one will spend any resources on monitoring the firm. The moral hazard problem

for shares of common stock will then be severe, making it hard for firms to issue

them to raise capital (providing an additional explanation for puzzle 1).

Government Regulation to Increase Information. As with adverse selection, the government

has an incentive to try to reduce the moral hazard problem created by asymmetric

information, which provides another reason why the financial system is so

heavily regulated (puzzle 5). Governments everywhere have laws to force firms to

adhere to standard accounting principles that make profit verification easier. They

also pass laws to impose stiff criminal penalties on people who commit the fraud of

hiding and stealing profits. However, these measures can be only partly effective.

Catching this kind of fraud is not easy; fraudulent managers have the incentive to

make it very hard for government agencies to find or prove fraud.

Financial Intermediation. Financial intermediaries have the ability to avoid the freerider

problem in the face of moral hazard, and this is another reason why indirect

finance is so important (puzzle 3). One financial intermediary that helps reduce the

moral hazard arising from the principal–agent problem is the venture capital firm.

Venture capital firms pool the resources of their partners and use the funds to help

budding entrepreneurs start new businesses. In exchange for the use of the venture

capital, the firm receives an equity share in the new business. Because verification of

earnings and profits is so important in eliminating moral hazard, venture capital firms

usually insist on having several of their own people participate as members of the

managing body of the firm, the board of directors, so that they can keep a close watch

on the firm’s activities. When a venture capital firm supplies start-up funds, the equity

in the firm is not marketable to anyone but the venture capital firm. Thus other

investors are unable to take a free ride on the venture capital firm’s verification activities.

As a result of this arrangement, the venture capital firm is able to garner the full

benefits of its verification activities and is given the appropriate incentives to reduce

Tools to Help

Solve the

Principal–Agent

Problem

182 PART I I I Financial Institutions

the moral hazard problem. Venture capital firms have been important in the development

of the high-tech sector in the United States, which has resulted in job creation,

economic growth, and increased international competitiveness. However, these firms

have made mistakes, as Box 2 indicates.

Debt Contracts. Moral hazard arises with an equity contract, which is a claim on

profits in all situations, whether the firm is making or losing money. If a contract

could be structured so that moral hazard would exist only in certain situations, there

would be a reduced need to monitor managers, and the contract would be more

attractive than the equity contract. The debt contract has exactly these attributes

because it is a contractual agreement by the borrower to pay the lender fixed dollar

amounts at periodic intervals. When the firm has high profits, the lender receives the

contractual payments and does not need to know the exact profits of the firm. If the

managers are hiding profits or are pursuing activities that are personally beneficial but

don’t increase profitability, the lender doesn’t care as long as these activities do not

interfere with the ability of the firm to make its debt payments on time. Only when

the firm cannot meet its debt payments, thereby being in a state of default, is there a

need for the lender to verify the state of the firm’s profits. Only in this situation do

lenders involved in debt contracts need to act more like equity holders; now they

need to know how much income the firm has in order to get their fair share.

C H A P T E R 8 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure 183

Venture Capitalists and the High-Tech Sector

Over the last half century, venture capital firms have

nurtured the growth of America’s high technology

sector. Venture capitalists backed many of the most

successful high-technology companies during the

1980s and 1990s, including Apple Computer, Cisco

Systems, Genetech, Microsoft, Netscape, and Sun

Microsystems.

Venture capital firms experienced explosive

growth during the last half of the 1990s, with investments

growing from $5.6 billion in 1995 to more

than $103 billion by 2000, increasingly focused on

investing in Internet “dot-com” companies. These

two developments led to large losses for venture capitalists,

for the following reasons.

First, it is likely that there are relatively few projects

worthy of financing at any one time. When too

much money chases too few deals, firms that would

be rejected at other times will obtain financing.

Second, the surge of money into venture capital

funds reduced the ability of partners of venture capital

firms to provide quality monitoring. Third, the

infatuation with dot-com firms, many of which did

not have adequately developed business plans, meant

that too much investment was directed to this sector.

Consequently, in the late 1990s, venture capital firms

made many poor investments, which led to large

losses by the early 2000s.

Consider the case of Webvan, an Internet grocer

that received more than $1 billion in venture capital

financing. Even though it was backed by a group of

experienced financiers, including Goldman Sachs

and Sequoia Capital, its business plan was fundamentally

flawed. In its short life, Webvan spent more

than $1 billion building automated warehouses and

pricey tech gear. The resulting high overhead made it

impossible to compete in the grocery business. Had

the venture capitalists been actively monitoring the

activities of Webvan, they might have balked at

Webvan’s plan to develop an infrastructure that

requried 4,000 orders per day per warehouse just to

break even. Not surprisingly, Webvan declared bankruptcy

in July 2001.

Box 2: E-Finance

The advantage of a less frequent need to monitor the firm, and thus a lower cost

of state verification, helps explain why debt contracts are used more frequently than

equity contracts to raise capital. The concept of moral hazard thus helps explain puzzle

1, why stocks are not the most important source of financing for businesses.4

How Moral Hazard Influences Financial Structure in Debt Markets

Even with the advantages just described, debt contracts are still subject to moral hazard.

Because a debt contract requires the borrowers to pay out a fixed amount and lets

them keep any profits above this amount, the borrowers have an incentive to take on

investment projects that are riskier than the lenders would like.

For example, suppose that because you are concerned about the problem of verifying

the profits of Steve’s ice-cream store, you decide not to become an equity partner.

Instead, you lend Steve the $9,000 he needs to set up his business and have a

debt contract that pays you an interest rate of 10%. As far as you are concerned, this

is a surefire investment because there is a strong and steady demand for ice cream in

your neighborhood. However, once you give Steve the funds, he might use them for

purposes other than you intended. Instead of opening up the ice-cream store, Steve

might use your $9,000 loan to invest in chemical research equipment because he

thinks he has a 1-in-10 chance of inventing a diet ice cream that tastes every bit as

good as the premium brands but has no fat or calories.

Obviously, this is a very risky investment, but if Steve is successful, he will

become a multimillionaire. He has a strong incentive to undertake the riskier investment

with your money, because the gains to him would be so large if he succeeded.

You would clearly be very unhappy if Steve used your loan for the riskier investment,

because if he were unsuccessful, which is highly likely, you would lose most, if not

all, of the money you gave him. And if he were successful, you wouldn’t share in his

success—you would still get only a 10% return on the loan because the principal and

interest payments are fixed. Because of the potential moral hazard (that Steve might

use your money to finance a very risky venture), you would probably not make the

loan to Steve, even though an ice-cream store in the neighborhood is a good investment

that would provide benefits for everyone.

Net Worth. When borrowers have more at stake because their net worth (the difference

between their assets and their liabilities) is high, the risk of moral hazard—the

temptation to act in a manner that lenders find objectionable—will be greatly reduced

because the borrowers themselves have a lot to lose. Let’s return to Steve and his icecream

business. Suppose that the cost of setting up either the ice-cream store or the

research equipment is $100,000 instead of $10,000. So Steve needs to put $91,000

of his own money into the business (instead of $1,000) in addition to the $9,000 supplied

by your loan. Now if Steve is unsuccessful in inventing the no-calorie nonfat ice

cream, he has a lot to lose—the $91,000 of net worth ($100,000 in assets minus the

$9,000 loan from you). He will think twice about undertaking the riskier investment

Tools to Help

Solve Moral

Hazard in Debt

Contracts

184 PART I I I Financial Institutions

4Another factor that encourages the use of debt contracts rather than equity contracts in the United States is our

tax code. Debt interest payments are a deductible expense for American firms, whereas dividend payments to

equity shareholders are not.

and is more likely to invest in the ice-cream store, which is more of a sure thing.

Hence when Steve has more of his own money (net worth) in the business, you are

more likely to make him the loan.

One way of describing the solution that high net worth provides to the moral hazard

problem is to say that it makes the debt contract incentive-compatible; that is, it

aligns the incentives of the borrower with those of the lender. The greater the borrower’s

net worth, the greater the borrower’s incentive to behave in the way that the

lender expects and desires, the smaller the moral hazard problem in the debt contract

is, and the easier it is for the firm to borrow. Conversely, when the borrower’s net worth

is lower, the moral hazard problem is greater, and it is harder for the firm to borrow.

Monitoring and Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants. As the example of Steve and his

ice-cream store shows, if you could make sure that Steve doesn’t invest in anything

riskier than the ice-cream store, it would be worth your while to make him the loan.

You can ensure that Steve uses your money for the purpose you want it to be used for

by writing provisions (restrictive covenants) into the debt contract that restrict his

firm’s activities. By monitoring Steve’s activities to see whether he is complying with the

restrictive covenants and enforcing the covenants if he is not, you can make sure that

he will not take on risks at your expense. Restrictive covenants are directed at reducing

moral hazard either by ruling out undesirable behavior or by encouraging desirable

behavior. There are four types of restrictive covenants that achieve this objective:

1. Covenants to discourage undesirable behavior. Covenants can be designed to

lower moral hazard by keeping the borrower from engaging in the undesirable behavior

of undertaking risky investment projects. Some such covenants mandate that a

loan can be used only to finance specific activities, such as the purchase of particular

equipment or inventories. Others restrict the borrowing firm from engaging in certain

risky business activities, such as purchasing other businesses.

2. Covenants to encourage desirable behavior. Restrictive covenants can encourage

the borrower to engage in desirable activities that make it more likely that the loan

will be paid off. One restrictive covenant of this type requires the breadwinner in a

household to carry life insurance that pays off the mortgage upon that person’s death.

Restrictive covenants of this type for businesses focus on encouraging the borrowing

firm to keep its net worth high because higher borrower net worth reduces moral hazard

and makes it less likely that the lender will suffer losses. These restrictive

covenants typically specify that the firm must maintain minimum holdings of certain

assets relative to the firm’s size.

3. Covenants to keep collateral valuable. Because collateral is an important protection

for the lender, restrictive covenants can encourage the borrower to keep the

collateral in good condition and make sure that it stays in the possession of the borrower.

This is the type of covenant ordinary people encounter most often. Automobile

loan contracts, for example, require the car owner to maintain a minimum amount of

collision and theft insurance and prevent the sale of the car unless the loan is paid off.

Similarly, the recipient of a home mortgage must have adequate insurance on the

home and must pay off the mortgage when the property is sold.

4. Covenants to provide information. Restrictive covenants also require a borrowing

firm to provide information about its activities periodically in the form of

quarterly accounting and income reports, thereby making it easier for the lender to

monitor the firm and reduce moral hazard. This type of covenant may also stipulate

that the lender has the right to audit and inspect the firm’s books at any time.

C H A P T E R 8 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure 185

We now see why debt contracts are often complicated legal documents with

numerous restrictions on the borrower’s behavior (puzzle 8): Debt contracts require

complicated restrictive covenants to lower moral hazard.

Financial Intermediation. Although restrictive covenants help reduce the moral hazard

problem, they do not eliminate it completely. It is almost impossible to write

covenants that rule out every risky activity. Furthermore, borrowers may be clever

enough to find loopholes in restrictive covenants that make them ineffective.

Another problem with restrictive covenants is that they must be monitored and

enforced. A restrictive covenant is meaningless if the borrower can violate it knowing

that the lender won’t check up or is unwilling to pay for legal recourse. Because monitoring

and enforcement of restrictive covenants are costly, the free-rider problem

arises in the debt securities (bond) market just as it does in the stock market. If you

know that other bondholders are monitoring and enforcing the restrictive covenants,

you can free-ride on their monitoring and enforcement. But other bondholders can

do the same thing, so the likely outcome is that not enough resources are devoted to

monitoring and enforcing the restrictive covenants. Moral hazard therefore continues

to be a severe problem for marketable debt.

As we have seen before, financial intermediaries—particularly banks—have the

ability to avoid the free-rider problem as long as they make primarily private loans.

Private loans are not traded, so no one else can free-ride on the intermediary’s monitoring

and enforcement of the restrictive covenants. The intermediary making private

loans thus receives the benefits of monitoring and enforcement and will work to

shrink the moral hazard problem inherent in debt contracts. The concept of moral

hazard has provided us with additional reasons why financial intermediaries play a

more important role in channeling funds from savers to borrowers than marketable

securities do, as described in puzzles 3 and 4.

The presence of asymmetric information in financial markets leads to adverse selection

and moral hazard problems that interfere with the efficient functioning of those

markets. Tools to help solve these problems involve the private production and sale

of information, government regulation to increase information in financial markets,

the importance of collateral and net worth to debt contracts, and the use of monitoring

and restrictive covenants. A key finding from our analysis is that the existence of

the free-rider problem for traded securities such as stocks and bonds indicates that

financial intermediaries—particularly banks—should play a greater role than securities

markets in financing the activities of businesses. Economic analysis of the consequences

of adverse selection and moral hazard has helped explain the basic features

of our financial system and has provided solutions to the eight puzzles about our

financial structure outlined at the beginning of this chapter.

Study Guide To help you keep track of all the tools that help solve asymmetric information problems,

summary Table 1 provides a listing of the asymmetric information problems and

what tools can help solve them. In addition, it lists how these tools and asymmetric

information problems explain the eight puzzles of financial structure described at the

beginning of the chapter.

Summary

186 PART I I I Financial Institutions

C H A P T E R 8 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure 187

S U M M A R Y Table 1 Asymmetric Information Problems and Tools to Solve Them

Explains

Asymmetric Information Problem Tools to Solve It Puzzle No.

Adverse Selection Private Production and Sale of Information 1, 2

Government Regulation to Increase Information 5

Financial Intermediation 3, 4, 6

Collateral and Net Worth 7

Moral Hazard in Equity Contracts Production of Information: Monitoring 1

(Principal–Agent Problem) Government Regulation to Increase Information 5

Financial Intermediation 3

Debt Contracts 1

Moral Hazard in Debt Contracts Net Worth

Monitoring and Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants 8

Financial Intermediation 3, 4

Note: List of puzzles:

1. Stocks are not the most important source of external financing.

2. Marketable securities are not the primary source of finance.

3. Indirect finance is more important than direct finance.

4. Banks are the most important source of external funds.

5. The financial system is heavily regulated.

6. Only large, well-established firms have access to securities markets.

7. Collateral is prevalent in debt contracts.

8. Debt contracts have numerous restrictive covenants.

5See World Bank, Finance for Growth: Policy Choices in a Volatile World (World Bank and Oxford University Press,

2001) for a survey of this literature and a list of additional references.

Application Financial Development and Economic Growth

Recent research has found that an important reason why many developing countries

or ex-communist countries like Russia (which are referred to as transition

countries) experience very low rates of growth is that their financial systems are

underdeveloped (a situation referred to as financial repression).5 The economic

analysis of financial structure helps explain how an underdeveloped financial system

leads to a low state of economic development and economic growth.

The financial systems in developing and transition countries face several

difficulties that keep them from operating efficiently. As we have seen, two

important tools used to help solve adverse selection and moral hazard problems

in credit markets are collateral and restrictive covenants. In many developing

countries, the legal system functions poorly, making it hard to make

188 PART I I I Financial Institutions

effective use of these two tools. In these countries, bankruptcy procedures are

often extremely slow and cumbersome. For example, in many countries, creditors

(holders of debt) must first sue the defaulting debtor for payment, which

can take several years, and then, once a favorable judgment has been

obtained, the creditor has to sue again to obtain title to the collateral. The

process can take in excess of five years, and by the time the lender acquires

the collateral, it well may have been neglected and thus have little value. In

addition, governments often block lenders from foreclosing on borrowers in

politically powerful sectors such as agriculture. Where the market is unable to

use collateral effectively, the adverse selection problem will be worse, because

the lender will need even more information about the quality of the borrower

in order to screen out a good loan from a bad one. The result is that it will be

harder for lenders to channel funds to borrowers with the most productive

investment opportunities, thereby leading to less productive investment, and

hence a slower-growing economy. Similarly, a poorly developed legal system

may make it extremely difficult for borrowers to enforce restrictive covenants.

Thus they may have a much more limited ability to reduce moral hazard on

the part of borrowers and so will be less willing to lend. Again the outcome

will be less productive investment and a lower growth rate for the economy.

Governments in developing and transition countries have also often

decided to use their financial systems to direct credit to themselves or to

favored sectors of the economy by setting interest rates at artificially low levels

for certain types of loans, by creating so-called development finance institutions

to make specific types of loans, or by directing existing institutions to

lend to certain entities. As we have seen, private institutions have an incentive

to solve adverse selection and moral hazard problems and lend to borrowers

with the most productive investment opportunities. Governments

have less incentive to do so because they are not driven by the profit motive

and so their directed credit programs may not channel funds to sectors that

will produce high growth for the economy. The outcome is again likely to

result in less efficient investment and slower growth.

In addition, banks in many developing and transition countries have

been nationalized by their governments. Again, because of the absence of the

profit motive, these nationalized banks have little incentive to allocate their

capital to the most productive uses. Indeed, the primary loan customer of

these nationalized banks is often the government, which does not always use

the funds wisely.

We have seen that government regulation can increase the amount of

information in financial markets to make them work more efficiently. Many

developing and transition countries have an underdeveloped regulatory apparatus

that retards the provision of adequate information to the marketplace.

For example, these countries often have weak accounting standards, making

it very hard to ascertain the quality of a borrower’s balance sheet. As a result,

asymmetric information problems are more severe, and the financial system is

severely hampered in channeling funds to the most productive uses.

The institutional environment of a poor legal system, weak accounting

standards, inadequate government regulation, and government intervention

through directed credit programs and nationalization of banks all help

explain why many countries stay poor while others grow richer.

Financial Crises and Aggregate Economic Activity

Agency theory, our economic analysis of the effects of adverse selection and moral

hazard, can help us understand financial crises, major disruptions in financial markets

that are characterized by sharp declines in asset prices and the failures of many

financial and nonfinancial firms. Financial crises have been common in most countries

throughout modern history. The United States experienced major financial crises

in 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1884, 1893, 1907, and 1930–1933 but has not had a

full-scale financial crisis since then.6 Studying financial crises is worthwhile because

they have led to severe economic downturns in the past and have the potential for

doing so in the future.

Financial crises occur when there is a disruption in the financial system that

causes such a sharp increase in adverse selection and moral hazard problems in financial

markets that the markets are unable to channel funds efficiently from savers to

people with productive investment opportunities. As a result of this inability of financial

markets to function efficiently, economic activity contracts sharply.

To understand why banking and financial crises occur and, more specifically, how

they lead to contractions in economic activity, we need to examine the factors that

cause them. Five categories of factors can trigger financial crises: increases in interest

rates, increases in uncertainty, asset market effects on balance sheets, problems in the

banking sector, and government fiscal imbalances.

Increases in Interest Rates. As we saw earlier, individuals and firms with the riskiest

investment projects are exactly those who are willing to pay the highest interest rates.

If market interest rates are driven up sufficiently because of increased demand for

credit or because of a decline in the money supply, good credit risks are less likely to

want to borrow while bad credit risks are still willing to borrow. Because of the resulting

increase in adverse selection, lenders will no longer want to make loans. The substantial

decline in lending will lead to a substantial decline in investment and

aggregate economic activity.

Increases in Uncertainty. A dramatic increase in uncertainty in financial markets, due

perhaps to the failure of a prominent financial or nonfinancial institution, a recession,

or a stock market crash, makes it harder for lenders to screen good from bad credit

risks. The resulting inability of lenders to solve the adverse selection problem makes

them less willing to lend, which leads to a decline in lending, investment, and aggregate

economic activity.

Asset Market Effects on Balance Sheets. The state of firms’ balance sheets has important

implications for the severity of asymmetric information problems in the financial

system. A sharp decline in the stock market is one factor that can cause a serious deterioration

in firms’ balance sheets that can increase adverse selection and moral hazard

Factors Causing

Financial Crises

C H A P T E R 8 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure 189

6Although we in the United States have not experienced any financial crises since the Great Depression, we have

had several close calls—the October 1987 stock market crash, for example. An important reason why we have

escaped financial crises is the timely action of the Federal Reserve to prevent them during episodes like that of

October 1987. We look at the issue of the Fed’s role in preventing financial crises in Chapter 17.

problems in financial markets and provoke a financial crisis. A decline in the stock

market means that the net worth of corporations has fallen, because share prices are

the valuation of a corporation’s net worth. The decline in net worth as a result of a

stock market decline makes lenders less willing to lend because, as we have seen, the

net worth of a firm plays a role similar to that of collateral. When the value of collateral

declines, it provides less protection to lenders, meaning that losses on loans are

likely to be more severe. Because lenders are now less protected against the consequences

of adverse selection, they decrease their lending, which in turn causes investment

and aggregate output to decline. In addition, the decline in corporate net worth

as a result of a stock market decline increases moral hazard by providing incentives for

borrowing firms to make risky investments, as they now have less to lose if their investments

go sour. The resulting increase in moral hazard makes lending less attractive—

another reason why a stock market decline and resultant decline in net worth leads

to decreased lending and economic activity.

In economies in which inflation has been moderate, which characterizes most

industrialized countries, many debt contracts are typically of fairly long maturity with

fixed interest rates. In this institutional environment, unanticipated declines in the

aggregate price level also decrease the net worth of firms. Because debt payments are

contractually fixed in nominal terms, an unanticipated decline in the price level raises

the value of firms’ liabilities in real terms (increases the burden of the debt) but does

not raise the real value of firms’ assets. The result is that net worth in real terms (the

difference between assets and liabilities in real terms) declines. A sharp drop in the

price level therefore causes a substantial decline in real net worth and an increase in

adverse selection and moral hazard problems facing lenders. An unanticipated decline

in the aggregate price level thus leads to a drop in lending and economic activity.

Because of uncertainty about the future value of the domestic currency in developing

countries (and in some industrialized countries), many nonfinancial firms,

banks, and governments in these countries find it easier to issue debt denominated in

foreign currencies. This can lead to a financial crisis in a similar fashion to an unanticipated

decline in the price level. With debt contracts denominated in foreign currency,

when there is an unanticipated decline in the value of the domestic currency,

the debt burden of domestic firms increases. Since assets are typically denominated in

domestic currency, there is a resulting deterioration in firms’ balance sheets and a

decline in net worth, which then increases adverse selection and moral hazard problems

along the lines just described. The increase in asymmetric information problems

leads to a decline in investment and economic activity.

Although we have seen that increases in interest rates have a direct effect on

increasing adverse selection problems, increases in interest rates also play a role in

promoting a financial crisis through their effect on both firms’ and households’ balance

sheets. A rise in interest rates and therefore in households’ and firms’ interest

payments decreases firms’ cash flow, the difference between cash receipts and cash

expenditures. The decline in cash flow causes a deterioration in the balance sheet

because it decreases the liquidity of the household or firm and thus makes it harder

for lenders to know whether the firm or household will be able to pay its bills. As a

result, adverse selection and moral hazard problems become more severe for potential

lenders to these firms and households, leading to a decline in lending and economic

activity. There is thus an additional reason why sharp increases in interest rates

can be an important factor leading to financial crises.

190 PART I I I Financial Institutions

Problems in the Banking Sector. Banks play a major role in financial markets because

they are well positioned to engage in information-producing activities that facilitate

productive investment for the economy. The state of banks’ balance sheets has an

important effect on bank lending. If banks suffer a deterioration in their balance

sheets and so have a substantial contraction in their capital, they will have fewer

resources to lend, and bank lending will decline. The contraction in lending then

leads to a decline in investment spending, which slows economic activity.

If the deterioration in bank balance sheets is severe enough, banks will start to

fail, and fear can spread from one bank to another, causing even healthy banks to go

under. The multiple bank failures that result are known as a bank panic. The source

of the contagion is again asymmetric information. In a panic, depositors, fearing for

the safety of their deposits (in the absence of deposit insurance) and not knowing the

quality of banks’ loan portfolios, withdraw their deposits to the point that the banks

fail. The failure of a large number of banks in a short period of time means that there

is a loss of information production in financial markets and hence a direct loss of

financial intermediation by the banking sector. The decrease in bank lending during

a financial crisis also decreases the supply of funds to borrowers, which leads to

higher interest rates. The outcome of a bank panic is an increase in adverse selection

and moral hazard problems in credit markets: These problems produce an even

sharper decline in lending to facilitate productive investments that leads to an even

more severe contraction in economic activity.

Government Fiscal Imbalances. In emerging market countries (Argentina, Brazil, and

Turkey are recent examples), government fiscal imbalances may create fears of default

on the government debt. As a result, the government may have trouble getting people

to buy its bonds and so it might force banks to purchase them. If the debt then

declines in price—which, as we have seen in Chapter 6, will occur if a government

default is likely—this can substantially weaken bank balance sheets and lead to a contraction

in lending for the reasons described earlier. Fears of default on the government

debt can also spark a foreign exchange crisis in which the value of the domestic

currency falls sharply because investors pull their money out of the country. The

decline in the domestic currency’s value will then lead to the destruction of the balance

sheets of firms with large amounts of debt denominated in foreign currency.

These balance sheet problems lead to an increase in adverse selection and moral hazard

problems, a decline in lending, and a contraction of economic activity.

C H A P T E R 8 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure 191

Application Financial Crises in the United States

As mentioned, the United States has a long history of banking and financial

crises, such crises having occurred every 20 years or so in the nineteenth and

early twentieth centuries—in 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1884, 1893, 1907,

and 1930–1933. Our analysis of the factors that lead to a financial crisis can

explain why these crises took place and why they were so damaging to the

U.S. economy.

192 PART I I I Financial Institutions

Study Guide To understand fully what took place in a U.S. financial crisis, make sure that

you can state the reasons why each of the factors—increases in interest rates,

increases in uncertainty, asset market effects on balance sheets, and problems

in the banking sector—increases adverse selection and moral hazard problems,

which in turn lead to a decline in economic activity. To help you understand

these crises, you might want to refer to Figure 3, a diagram that traces

the sequence of events in a U.S. financial crisis.

As shown in Figure 3, most financial crises in the United States have

begun with a deterioration in banks’ balance sheets, a sharp rise in interest

rates (frequently stemming from increases in interest rates abroad), a steep

stock market decline, and an increase in uncertainty resulting from a failure

of major financial or nonfinancial firms (the Ohio Life Insurance & Trust

Company in 1857, the Northern Pacific Railroad and Jay Cooke & Company

in 1873, Grant & Ward in 1884, the National Cordage Company in 1893,

the Knickerbocker Trust Company in 1907, and the Bank of United States in

1930). During these crises, deterioration in banks’ balance sheets, the

increase in uncertainty, the rise in interest rates, and the stock market decline

increased the severity of adverse selection problems in credit markets; the

stock market decline, the deterioration in banks’ balance sheets, and the rise

in interest rates, which decreased firms’ cash flow, also increased moral hazard

problems. The rise in adverse selection and moral hazard problems then

made it less attractive for lenders to lend and led to a decline in investment and

aggregate economic activity.

Because of the worsening business conditions and uncertainty about

their bank’s health (perhaps banks would go broke), depositors began to

withdraw their funds from banks, which led to bank panics. The resulting

decline in the number of banks raised interest rates even further and

decreased the amount of financial intermediation by banks. Worsening of the

problems created by adverse selection and moral hazard led to further economic

contraction.

Finally, there was a sorting out of firms that were insolvent (had a negative

net worth and hence were bankrupt) from healthy firms by bankruptcy

proceedings. The same process occurred for banks, often with the help of

public and private authorities. Once this sorting out was complete, uncertainty

in financial markets declined, the stock market underwent a recovery,

and interest rates fell. The overall result was that adverse selection and moral

hazard problems diminished and the financial crisis subsided. With the

financial markets able to operate well again, the stage was set for the recovery

of the economy.

If, however, the economic downturn led to a sharp decline in prices, the

recovery process was short-circuited. In this situation, shown in Figure 3, a

process called debt deflation occurred, in which a substantial decline in the

price level set in, leading to a further deterioration in firms’ net worth

because of the increased burden of indebtedness. When debt deflation set in,

www.amatecon.com/gd

/gdtimeline.html

A time line of the

Great Depression.

C H A P T E R 8 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure 193

the adverse selection and moral hazard problems continued to increase so

that lending, investment spending, and aggregate economic activity remained

depressed for a long time. The most significant financial crisis that included

debt deflation was the Great Depression, the worst economic contraction in

U.S. history (see Box 3).

FIGURE 3 Sequence of Events in U.S. Financial Crises

The solid arrows trace the sequence of events in a typical financial crisis; the dotted arrows show the additional set of events that occur if the

crisis develops into a debt deflation.

Consequences of Changes in Factors

Factors Causing Financial Crises

Typical

Financial

Crisis

Debt

Deflation

Increase in

Interest Rates

Increase in

Uncertainty

Stock Market

Decline

Unanticipated Decline

in Price Level

Bank

Panic

Economic Activity

Declines

Economic Activity

Declines

Economic Activity

Declines

Adverse Selection and Moral

Hazard Problems Worsen

Adverse Selection and Moral

Hazard Problems Worsen

Adverse Selection and Moral

Hazard Problems Worsen

Deterioration in

Banks’ Balance Sheets

194 PART I I I Financial Institutions

Box 3

Case Study of a Financial Crisis

The Great Depression. Federal Reserve officials

viewed the stock market boom of 1928 and 1929, during

which stock prices doubled, as excessive speculation.

To curb it, they pursued a tight monetary policy to

raise interest rates. The Fed got more than it bargained

for when the stock market crashed in October 1929.

Although the 1929 crash had a great impact on the

minds of a whole generation, most people forget that

by the middle of 1930, more than half of the stock

market decline had been reversed. What might have

been a normal recession turned into something far

different, however, with adverse shocks to the agricultural

sector, a continuing decline in the stock market

after the middle of 1930, and a sequence of bank

collapses from October 1930 until March 1933 in

which over one-third of the banks in the United

States went out of business (events described in more

detail in Chapter 18).

The continuing decline in stock prices after mid-

1930 (by mid-1932 stocks had declined to 10% of

their value at the 1929 peak) and the increase in

uncertainty from the unsettled business conditions

created by the economic contraction made adverse

selection and moral hazard problems worse in the

credit markets. The loss of one-third of the banks

reduced the amount of financial intermediation. This

intensified adverse selection and moral hazard problems,

thereby decreasing the ability of financial markets

to channel funds to firms with productive

investment opportunities. As our analysis predicts,

the amount of outstanding commercial loans fell by

half from 1929 to 1933, and investment spending

collapsed, declining by 90% from its 1929 level.

The short-circuiting of the process that kept the

economy from recovering quickly, which it does in

most recessions, occurred because of a fall in the

price level by 25% in the 1930–1933 period. This

huge decline in prices triggered a debt deflation in

which net worth fell because of the increased burden

of indebtedness borne by firms. The decline in net

worth and the resulting increase in adverse selection

and moral hazard problems in the credit markets led

to a prolonged economic contraction in which unemployment

rose to 25% of the labor force. The financial

crisis in the Great Depression was the worst ever

experienced in the United States, and it explains why

this economic contraction was also the most severe

one ever experienced by the nation.*

*See Ben Bernanke, “Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression,” American Economic Review 73 (1983): 257–276, for a

discussion of the role of asymmetric information problems in the Great Depression period.

Financial Crises in Emerging-Market Countries: Mexico,

1994–1995; East Asia, 1997–1998; and Argentina, 2001–2002

Application

In recent years, many emerging-market countries have experienced financial

crises, the most dramatic of which were the Mexican crisis, which started in

December 1994; the East Asian crisis, which started in July 1997; and the

Argentine crisis, which started in 2001. An important puzzle is how a developing

country can shift dramatically from a path of high growth before a

financial crisis—as was true for Mexico and particularly the East Asian countries

of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea—to a

sharp decline in economic activity. We can apply our asymmetric information

C H A P T E R 8 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure 195

analysis of financial crises to explain this puzzle and to understand the

Mexican, East Asian, and Argentine financial situations.7

Because of the different institutional features of emerging-market countries’

debt markets, the sequence of events in the Mexican, East Asian, and

Argentine crises is different from that occurring in the United States in the

nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Figure 4 diagrams the sequence of events

that occurred in Mexico, East Asia, and Argentina.

An important factor leading up to the financial crises in Mexico and East

Asia was the deterioration in banks’ balance sheets because of increasing loan

losses. When financial markets in these countries were deregulated in the

early 1990s, a lending boom ensued in which bank credit to the private nonfinancial

business sector accelerated sharply. Because of weak supervision by

bank regulators and a lack of expertise in screening and monitoring borrowers

at banking institutions, losses on the loans began to mount, causing an

erosion of banks’ net worth (capital). As a result of this erosion, banks had

fewer resources to lend, and this lack of lending eventually led to a contraction

in economic activity.

Argentina also experienced a deterioration in bank balance sheets leading

up to its crisis, but the source of this deterioration was quite different. In

contrast to Mexico and the East Asian crisis countries, Argentina had a wellsupervised

banking system, and a lending boom did not occur before the crisis.

On the other hand, in 1998 Argentina entered a recession (you can find

out more on why this occurred in Chapter 20) that led to some loan losses.

However, it was the fiscal problems of the Argentine government that led to

severe weakening of bank balance sheets. Again in contrast to Mexico and the

East Asian countries before their crises, Argentina was running substantial

budget deficits that could not be financed by foreign borrowing. To solve its

fiscal problems, the Argentine government coerced banks into absorbing

large amounts of government debt. When investors lost confidence in the

ability of the Argentine government to repay this debt, the price of this debt

plummeted, leaving big holes in commercial banks’ balance sheets. This

weakening in bank balance sheets, as in Mexico and East Asia, helped lead to

a contraction of economic activity.

Consistent with the U.S. experience in the nineteenth and early twentieth

centuries, another precipitating factor in the Mexican and Argentine (but

not East Asian) financial crises was a rise in interest rates abroad. Before the

Mexican crisis, in February 1994, and before the Argentine crisis, in mid-

1999, the Federal Reserve began a cycle of raising the federal funds rate to

head off inflationary pressures. Although the monetary policy moves by the

Fed were quite successful in keeping inflation in check in the United States,

they put upward pressure on interest rates in both Mexico and Argentina.

7This chapter does not examine two other recent crises, those in Brazil and Russia. Russia’s financial crisis in

August 1998 can also be explained with the asymmetric information story here, but it is more appropriate to view

it as a symptom of a wider breakdown in the economy—and this is why we do not focus on it here. The Brazilian

crisis in January 1999 has features of a more traditional balance-of-payments crisis (see Chapter 20), rather than

a financial crisis.

196 PART I I I Financial Institutions

Increase in

Interest Rates

Increase in

Uncertainty

Deterioration in

Banks’ Balance Sheets

Fiscal

Imbalances

Stock Market

Decline

Banking

Crisis

Foreign Exchange

Crisis

Economic Activity

Declines

Economic Activity

Declines

Adverse Selection and Moral

Hazard Problems Worsen

Adverse Selection and Moral

Hazard Problems Worsen

Adverse Selection and Moral

Hazard Problems Worsen

Consequences of Changes in Factors

Factors Causing Financial Crises

FIGURE 4 Sequence of Events in the Mexican, East Asian, and Argentine Financial Crises

The arrows trace the sequence of events during the financial crisis.

The rise in interest rates in Mexico and Argentina directly added to increased

adverse selection in their financial markets because, as discussed earlier, it

was more likely that the parties willing to take on the most risk would seek

loans.

Also consistent with the U.S. experience in the nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries, stock market declines and increases in uncertainty

occurred prior to and contributed to full-blown crises in Mexico, Thailand,

C H A P T E R 8 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure 197

South Korea, and Argentina. (The stock market declines in Malaysia,

Indonesia, and the Philippines, on the other hand, occurred simultaneously

with the onset of the crisis.) The Mexican economy was hit by political

shocks in 1994 (specifically, the assassination of the ruling party’s presidential

candidate and an uprising in the southern state of Chiapas) that created

uncertainty, while the ongoing recession increased uncertainty in Argentina.

Right before their crises, Thailand and Korea experienced major failures of

financial and nonfinancial firms that increased general uncertainty in financial

markets

As we have seen, an increase in uncertainty and a decrease in net worth

as a result of a stock market decline increase asymmetric information problems.

It becomes harder to screen out good from bad borrowers, and the

decline in net worth decreases the value of firms’ collateral and increases their

incentives to make risky investments because there is less equity to lose if the

investments are unsuccessful. The increase in uncertainty and stock market

declines that occurred before the crisis, along with the deterioration in banks’

balance sheets, worsened adverse selection and moral hazard problems

(shown at the top of the diagram in Figure 4) and made the economies ripe

for a serious financial crisis.

At this point, full-blown speculative attacks developed in the foreign

exchange market, plunging these countries into a full-scale crisis. With the

Colosio assassination, the Chiapas uprising, and the growing weakness in the

banking sector, the Mexican peso came under attack. Even though the Mexican

central bank intervened in the foreign exchange market and raised interest

rates sharply, it was unable to stem the attack and was forced to devalue the

peso on December 20, 1994. In the case of Thailand, concerns about the

large current account deficit and weakness in the Thai financial system, culminating

with the failure of a major finance company, Finance One, led to a

successful speculative attack that forced the Thai central bank to allow the

baht to float downward in July 1997. Soon thereafter, speculative attacks

developed against the other countries in the region, leading to the collapse of

the Philippine peso, the Indonesian rupiah, the Malaysian ringgit, and the

South Korean won. In Argentina, a full-scale banking panic began in

October–November 2001. This, along with realization that the government

was going to default on its debt, also led to a speculative attack on the

Argentine peso, resulting in its collapse on January 6, 2002.

The institutional structure of debt markets in Mexico and East Asia now

interacted with the currency devaluations to propel the economies into fullfledged

financial crises. Because so many firms in these countries had debt

denominated in foreign currencies like the dollar and the yen, depreciation

of their currencies resulted in increases in their indebtedness in domestic

currency terms, even though the value of their assets remained unchanged.

When the peso lost half its value by March 1995 and the Thai, Philippine,

Malaysian, and South Korean currencies lost between a third and half of their

value by the beginning of 1998, firms’ balance sheets took a big negative hit,

causing a dramatic increase in adverse selection and moral hazard problems.

This negative shock was especially severe for Indonesia and Argentina, which

saw the value of their currencies fall by over 70%, resulting in insolvency for

firms with substantial amounts of debt denominated in foreign currencies.

198 PART I I I Financial Institutions

The collapse of currencies also led to a rise in actual and expected

inflation in these countries, and market interest rates rose sky-high (to

around 100% in Mexico and Argentina). The resulting increase in interest

payments caused reductions in households’ and firms’ cash flow, which led

to further deterioration in their balance sheets. A feature of debt markets in

emerging-market countries, like those in Mexico, East Asia, and Argentina

is that debt contracts have very short durations, typically less than one

month. Thus the rise in short-term interest rates in these countries meant

that the effect on cash flow and hence on balance sheets was substantial. As

our asymmetric information analysis suggests, this deterioration in households’

and firms’ balance sheets increased adverse selection and moral hazard

problems in the credit markets, making domestic and foreign lenders

even less willing to lend.

Consistent with the theory of financial crises outlined in this chapter, the

sharp decline in lending helped lead to a collapse of economic activity, with

real GDP growth falling sharply.

As shown in Figure 4, further deterioration in the economy occurred

because the collapse in economic activity and the deterioration in the cash

flow and balance sheets of both firms and households led to worsening banking

crises. The problems of firms and households meant that many of them

were no longer able to pay off their debts, resulting in substantial losses for

the banks. Even more problematic for the banks was that they had many

short-term liabilities denominated in foreign currencies, and the sharp

increase in the value of these liabilities after the devaluation lead to a further

deterioration in the banks’ balance sheets. Under these circumstances, the

banking system would have collapsed in the absence of a government safety

net—as it did in the United States during the Great Depression—but with the

assistance of the International Monetary Fund, these countries were in some

cases able to protect depositors and avoid a bank panic. However, given the

loss of bank capital and the need for the government to intervene to prop up

the banks, the banks’ ability to lend was nevertheless sharply curtailed. As we

have seen, a banking crisis of this type hinders the ability of the banks to lend

and also makes adverse selection and moral hazard problems worse in financial

markets, because banks are less capable of playing their traditional financial

intermediation role. The banking crisis, along with other factors that

increased adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the credit markets

of Mexico, East Asia, and Argentina, explains the collapse of lending and

hence economic activity in the aftermath of the crisis.

In the aftermath of their crises, Mexico began to recover in 1996, while

the crisis countries in East Asia saw the glimmer of recovery in 1999.

Argentina was still in a severe depression in 2003. In all these countries, the

economic hardship caused by the financial crises was tremendous.

Unemployment rose sharply, poverty increased substantially, and even the

social fabric of the society was stretched thin. For example, Mexico City and

Buenos Aires have become crime-ridden, while Indonesia has experienced

waves of ethnic violence.

C H A P T E R 8 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure 199

Summary

1. There are eight basic puzzles about our financial

structure. The first four emphasize the importance of

financial intermediaries and the relative unimportance

of securities markets for the financing of corporations;

the fifth recognizes that financial markets are among the

most heavily regulated sectors of the economy; the sixth

states that only large, well-established corporations

have access to securities markets; the seventh indicates

that collateral is an important feature of debt contracts;

and the eighth presents debt contracts as complicated

legal documents that place substantial restrictions on

the behavior of the borrower.

2. Transaction costs freeze many small savers and

borrowers out of direct involvement with financial

markets. Financial intermediaries can take advantage of

economies of scale and are better able to develop

expertise to lower transaction costs, thus enabling their

savers and borrowers to benefit from the existence of

financial markets.

3. Asymmetric information results in two problems:

adverse selection, which occurs before the transaction,

and moral hazard, which occurs after the transaction.

Adverse selection refers to the fact that bad credit risks

are the ones most likely to seek loans, and moral hazard

refers to the risk of the borrower’s engaging in activities

that are undesirable from the lender’s point of view.

4. Adverse selection interferes with the efficient

functioning of financial markets. Tools to help reduce

the adverse selection problem include private

production and sale of information, government

regulation to increase information, financial

intermediation, and collateral and net worth. The freerider

problem occurs when people who do not pay for

information take advantage of information that other

people have paid for. This problem explains why

financial intermediaries, particularly banks, play a more

important role in financing the activities of businesses

than securities markets do.

5. Moral hazard in equity contracts is known as the

principal–agent problem, because managers (the

agents) have less incentive to maximize profits than

stockholders (the principals). The principal–agent

problem explains why debt contracts are so much more

prevalent in financial markets than equity contracts.

Tools to help reduce the principal–agent problem

include monitoring, government regulation to increase

information, and financial intermediation.

6. Tools to reduce the moral hazard problem in debt

contracts include net worth, monitoring and enforcement

of restrictive covenants, and financial intermediaries.

7. Financial crises are major disruptions in financial

markets. They are caused by increases in adverse

selection and moral hazard problems that prevent

financial markets from channeling funds to people with

productive investment opportunities, leading to a sharp

contraction in economic activity. The five types of factors

that lead to financial crises are increases in interest rates,

increases in uncertainty, asset market effects on balance

sheets, problems in the banking sector, and government

fiscal imbalances.

Key Terms

agency theory, p. 175, 189

bank panic, p. 191

cash flow, p. 190

collateral, p. 172

costly state verification, p. 182

creditor, p. 188

debt deflation, p. 192

financial crisis, p. 189

free-rider problem, p. 176

incentive-compatible, p. 185

insolvent, p. 192

net worth (equity capital), p. 180

pecking order hypothesis, p. 180

principal–agent problem, p. 181

restrictive covenants, p. 172

secured debt, p. 172

unsecured debt, p. 172

venture capital firm, p. 182

200 PART I I I Financial Institutions

Questions and Problems

Questions marked with an asterisk are answered at the end

of the book in an appendix, “Answers to Selected Questions

and Problems.”

1. How can economies of scale help explain the existence

of financial intermediaries?

*2. Describe two ways in which financial intermediaries

help lower transaction costs in the economy.

3. Would moral hazard and adverse selection still arise in

financial markets if information were not asymmetric?

Explain.

*4. How do standard accounting principles required by

the government help financial markets work more efficiently?

5. Do you think the lemons problem would be more

severe for stocks traded on the New York Stock

Exchange or those traded over-the-counter? Explain.

*6. Which firms are most likely to use bank financing

rather than to issue bonds or stocks to finance their

activities? Why?

7. How can the existence of asymmetric information provide

a rationale for government regulation of financial

markets?

*8. Would you be more willing to lend to a friend if she

put all of her life savings into her business than you

would if she had not done so? Why?

9. Rich people often worry that others will seek to marry

them only for their money. Is this a problem of

adverse selection?

*10. The more collateral there is backing a loan, the less

the lender has to worry about adverse selection. Is this

statement true, false, or uncertain? Explain your

answer.

11. How does the free-rider problem aggravate adverse

selection and moral hazard problems in financial

markets?

*12. Explain how the separation of ownership and control in

American corporations might lead to poor management.

13. Is a financial crisis more likely to occur when the

economy is experiencing deflation or inflation?

Explain.

*14. How can a stock market crash provoke a financial crisis?

15. How can a sharp rise in interest rates provoke a financial

crisis?

Web Exercises

1. In this chapter we discuss the lemons problem and its

effect on the efficient functioning of a market. This

theory was initially developed by George Akerlof. Go to

www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2001/public.html.

This site reports that Akerlof, Spence, and Stiglitz

were awarded the Nobel prize in economics in 2001

for their work. Read this report down through the section

on George Akerlof. Summarize his research ideas

in one page.

2. This chapter discusses how an understanding of

adverse selection and moral hazard can help us better

understand financial crises. The greatest financial crisis

faced by the U.S. has been the Great Depression from

1929–1933. Go to www.amatecon.com/greatdepression

.html. This site contains a brief discussion of the factors

that led to the Depression. Write a one-page summary

explaining how adverse selection and moral

hazard contributed to the Depression.

QUIZ

PREVIEW Because banking plays such a major role in channeling funds to borrowers with productive

investment opportunities, this financial activity is important in ensuring that

the financial system and the economy run smoothly and efficiently. In the United

States, banks (depository institutions) supply more than $5 trillion in credit annually.

They provide loans to businesses, help us finance our college educations or the purchase

of a new car or home, and provide us with services such as checking and savings

accounts.

In this chapter, we examine how banking is conducted to earn the highest profits

possible: how and why banks make loans, how they acquire funds and manage their

assets and liabilities (debts), and how they earn income. Although we focus on commercial

banking, because this is the most important financial intermediary activity,

many of the same principles are applicable to other types of financial intermediation.

The Bank Balance Sheet

To understand how banking works, first we need to examine the bank balance sheet,

a list of the bank’s assets and liabilities. As the name implies, this list balances; that is,

it has the characteristic that:

total assets total liabilities capital

Furthermore, a bank’s balance sheet lists sources of bank funds (liabilities) and

uses to which they are put (assets). Banks obtain funds by borrowing and by issuing

other liabilities such as deposits. They then use these funds to acquire assets such as

securities and loans. Banks make profits by charging an interest rate on their holdings

of securities and loans that is higher than the expenses on their liabilities. The balance

sheet of all commercial banks as of January 2003 appears in Table 1.

A bank acquires funds by issuing (selling) liabilities, which are consequently also

referred to as sources of funds. The funds obtained from issuing liabilities are used to

purchase income-earning assets.

Checkable Deposits. Checkable deposits are bank accounts that allow the owner of

the account to write checks to third parties. Checkable deposits include all accounts

Liabilities

201

Chap ter

Banking and the Management of

Financial Institutions

9

www.bankofamerica.com

/investor/index.cfm?section=700

This web site shows a sample

bank balance sheet.

on which checks can be drawn: non-interest-bearing checking accounts (demand

deposits), interest-bearing NOW (negotiable order of withdrawal) accounts, and

money market deposit accounts (MMDAs). Introduced with the Depository

Institutions Act in 1982, MMDAs have features similar to those of money market

mutual funds and are included in the checkable deposits category. However, MMDAs

differ from checkable deposits in that they are not subject to reserve requirements

(discussed later in the chapter) as checkable deposits are and are not included in the

M1 definition of money. Table 1 shows that the category of checkable deposits is an

important source of bank funds, making up 9% of bank liabilities. Once checkable

deposits were the most important source of bank funds (over 60% of bank liabilities

in 1960), but with the appearance of new, more attractive financial instruments, such

as money market mutual funds, the share of checkable deposits in total bank liabilities

has shrunk over time.

Checkable deposits and money market deposit accounts are payable on demand;

that is, if a depositor shows up at the bank and requests payment by making a withdrawal,

the bank must pay the depositor immediately. Similarly, if a person who

receives a check written on an account from a bank, presents that check at the bank,

it must pay the funds out immediately (or credit them to that person’s account).

A checkable deposit is an asset for the depositor because it is part of his or her

wealth. Conversely, because the depositor can withdraw from an account funds that

202 PART I I I Financial Institutions

Assets (Uses of Funds)* Liabilities (Sources of Funds)

Reserves and cash items 5 Checkable deposits 9

Securities Nontransaction deposits

U.S. government and agency 15 Small-denomination time deposits

State and local government and (< $100,000) + savings deposits 42

other securities 10 Large-denomination time deposits 14

Loans Borrowings 28

Commercial and industrial 14 Bank capital 7

Real estate 29

Consumer 9

Interbank 4

Other 8

Other assets (for example,

physical capital) 6

Total 100 Total 100

*In order of decreasing liquidity.

Source: www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/current/.

Table 1 Balance Sheet of All Commercial Banks (items as a percentage of the total, January 2003)

the bank is obligated to pay, checkable deposits are a liability for the bank. They are

usually the lowest-cost source of bank funds because depositors are willing to forgo

some interest in order to have access to a liquid asset that can be used to make purchases.

The bank’s costs of maintaining checkable deposits include interest payments

and the costs incurred in servicing these accounts—processing and storing canceled

checks, preparing and sending out monthly statements, providing efficient tellers

(human or otherwise), maintaining an impressive building and conveniently located

branches, and advertising and marketing to entice customers to deposit their funds

with a given bank. In recent years, interest paid on deposits (checkable and time) has

accounted for around 25% of total bank operating expenses, while the costs involved

in servicing accounts (employee salaries, building rent, and so on) have been approximately

50% of operating expenses.

Nontransaction Deposits. Nontransaction deposits are the primary source of bank

funds (56% of bank liabilities in Table 1). Owners cannot write checks on nontransaction

deposits, but the interest rates are usually higher than those on checkable

deposits. There are two basic types of nontransaction deposits: savings accounts and

time deposits (also called certificates of deposit, or CDs).

Savings accounts were once the most common type of nontransaction deposit. In

these accounts, to which funds can be added or from which funds can be withdrawn

at any time, transactions and interest payments are recorded in a monthly statement

or in a small book (the passbook) held by the owner of the account.

Time deposits have a fixed maturity length, ranging from several months to over

five years, and have substantial penalties for early withdrawal (the forfeiture of several

months’ interest). Small-denomination time deposits (deposits of less than $100,000)

are less liquid for the depositor than passbook savings, earn higher interest rates, and

are a more costly source of funds for the banks.

Large-denomination time deposits (CDs) are available in denominations of

$100,000 or over and are typically bought by corporations or other banks. Largedenomination

CDs are negotiable; like bonds, they can be resold in a secondary market

before they mature. For this reason, negotiable CDs are held by corporations,

money market mutual funds, and other financial institutions as alternative assets to

Treasury bills and other short-term bonds. Since 1961, when they first appeared,

negotiable CDs have become an important source of bank funds (14%).

Borrowings. Banks obtain funds by borrowing from the Federal Reserve System, the

Federal Home Loan banks, other banks, and corporations. Borrowings from the Fed

are called discount loans (also known as advances). Banks also borrow reserves

overnight in the federal (fed) funds market from other U.S. banks and financial institutions.

Banks borrow funds overnight in order to have enough deposits at the

Federal Reserve to meet the amount required by the Fed. (The federal funds designation

is somewhat confusing, because these loans are not made by the federal government

or by the Federal Reserve, but rather by banks to other banks.) Other sources

of borrowed funds are loans made to banks by their parent companies (bank holding

companies), loan arrangements with corporations (such as repurchase agreements),

and borrowings of Eurodollars (deposits denominated in U.S. dollars residing in foreign

banks or foreign branches of U.S. banks). Borrowings have become a more

important source of bank funds over time: In 1960, they made up only 2% of bank

liabilities; currently, they are 28% of bank liabilities.

C H A P T E R 9 Banking and the Management of Financial Institutions 203

Bank Capital. The final category on the liabilities side of the balance sheet is bank

capital, the bank’s net worth, which equals the difference between total assets and liabilities

(7% of total bank assets in Table 1). The funds are raised by selling new equity

(stock) or from retained earnings. Bank capital is a cushion against a drop in the value

of its assets, which could force the bank into insolvency (having liabilities in excess

of assets, meaning that the bank can be forced into liquidation).

A bank uses the funds that it has acquired by issuing liabilities to purchase incomeearning

assets. Bank assets are thus naturally referred to as uses of funds, and the interest

payments earned on them are what enable banks to make profits.

Reserves. All banks hold some of the funds they acquire as deposits in an account

at the Fed. Reserves are these deposits plus currency that is physically held by banks

(called vault cash because it is stored in bank vaults overnight). Although reserves

currently do not pay any interest, banks hold them for two reasons. First, some

reserves, called required reserves, are held because of reserve requirements, the

regulation that for every dollar of checkable deposits at a bank, a certain fraction (10

cents, for example) must be kept as reserves. This fraction (10 percent in the example)

is called the required reserve ratio. Banks hold additional reserves, called

excess reserves, because they are the most liquid of all bank assets and can be used

by a bank to meet its obligations when funds are withdrawn, either directly by a

depositor or indirectly when a check is written on an account.

Cash Items in Process of Collection. Suppose that a check written on an account at

another bank is deposited in your bank and the funds for this check have not yet been

received (collected) from the other bank. The check is classified as a cash item in

process of collection, and it is an asset for your bank because it is a claim on another

bank for funds that will be paid within a few days.

Deposits at Other Banks. Many small banks hold deposits in larger banks in exchange

for a variety of services, including check collection, foreign exchange transactions,

and help with securities purchases. This is an aspect of a system called correspondent

banking.

Collectively, reserves, cash items in process of collection, and deposits at other

banks are often referred to as cash items. In Table 1, they constitute only 5% of total

assets, and their importance has been shrinking over time: In 1960, for example, they

accounted for 20% of total assets.

Securities. A bank’s holdings of securities are an important income-earning asset:

Securities (made up entirely of debt instruments for commercial banks, because banks

are not allowed to hold stock) account for 25% of bank assets in Table 1, and they

provide commercial banks with about 10% of their revenue. These securities can be

classified into three categories: U.S. government and agency securities, state and local

government securities, and other securities. The United States government and

agency securities are the most liquid because they can be easily traded and converted

into cash with low transaction costs. Because of their high liquidity, short-term U.S.

government securities are called secondary reserves.

State and local government securities are desirable for banks to hold, primarily

because state and local governments are more likely to do business with banks that

Assets

204 PART I I I Financial Institutions

hold their securities. State and local government and other securities are less marketable

(hence less liquid) and are also riskier than U.S. government securities, primarily

because of default risk: There is some possibility that the issuer of the securities

may not be able to make its interest payments or pay back the face value of the securities

when they mature.

Loans. Banks make their profits primarily by issuing loans. In Table 1, some 64% of

bank assets are in the form of loans, and in recent years they have generally produced

more than half of bank revenues. A loan is a liability for the individual or corporation

receiving it, but an asset for a bank, because it provides income to the bank. Loans

are typically less liquid than other assets, because they cannot be turned into cash

until the loan matures. If the bank makes a one-year loan, for example, it cannot get

its funds back until the loan comes due in one year. Loans also have a higher probability

of default than other assets. Because of the lack of liquidity and higher default

risk, the bank earns its highest return on loans.

As you saw in Table 1, the largest categories of loans for commercial banks are

commercial and industrial loans made to businesses and real estate loans. Commercial

banks also make consumer loans and lend to each other. The bulk of these interbank

loans are overnight loans lent in the federal funds market. The major difference in the

balance sheets of the various depository institutions is primarily in the type of loan in

which they specialize. Savings and loans and mutual savings banks, for example, specialize

in residential mortgages, while credit unions tend to make consumer loans.

Other Assets. The physical capital (bank buildings, computers, and other equipment)

owned by the banks is included in this category.

Basic Banking

Before proceeding to a more detailed study of how a bank manages its assets and liabilities

in order to make the highest profit, you should understand the basic operation

of a bank.

In general terms, banks make profits by selling liabilities with one set of characteristics

(a particular combination of liquidity, risk, size, and return) and using the

proceeds to buy assets with a different set of characteristics. This process is often

referred to as asset transformation. For example, a savings deposit held by one person

can provide the funds that enable the bank to make a mortgage loan to another person.

The bank has, in effect, transformed the savings deposit (an asset held by the

depositor) into a mortgage loan (an asset held by the bank). Another way this process

of asset transformation is described is to say that the bank “borrows short and lends

long” because it makes long-term loans and funds them by issuing short-dated

deposits.

The process of transforming assets and providing a set of services (check clearing,

record keeping, credit analysis, and so forth) is like any other production process in

a firm. If the bank produces desirable services at low cost and earns substantial

income on its assets, it earns profits; if not, the bank suffers losses.

To make our analysis of the operation of a bank more concrete, we use a tool

called a T-account. A T-account is a simplified balance sheet, with lines in the form

of a T, that lists only the changes that occur in balance sheet items starting from some

C H A P T E R 9 Banking and the Management of Financial Institutions 205

initial balance sheet position. Let’s say that Jane Brown has heard that the First

National Bank provides excellent service, so she opens a checking account with a

$100 bill. She now has a $100 checkable deposit at the bank, which shows up as a

$100 liability on the bank’s balance sheet. The bank now puts her $100 bill into its

vault so that the bank’s assets rise by the $100 increase in vault cash. The T-account

for the bank looks like this:

Since vault cash is also part of the bank’s reserves, we can rewrite the T-account as follows:

Note that Jane Brown’s opening of a checking account leads to an increase in the bank’s

reserves equal to the increase in checkable deposits.

If Jane had opened her account with a $100 check written on an account at

another bank, say, the Second National Bank, we would get the same result. The initial

effect on the T-account of the First National Bank is as follows:

Checkable deposits increase by $100 as before, but now the First National Bank is

owed $100 by the Second National Bank. This asset for the First National Bank is

entered in the T-account as $100 of cash items in process of collection because the

First National Bank will now try to collect the funds that it is owed. It could go

directly to the Second National Bank and ask for payment of the funds, but if the two

banks are in separate states, that would be a time-consuming and costly process.

Instead, the First National Bank deposits the check in its account at the Fed, and the

Fed collects the funds from the Second National Bank. The result is that the Fed transfers

$100 of reserves from the Second National Bank to the First National Bank, and

the final balance sheet positions of the two banks are as follows:

206 PART I I I Financial Institutions

FIRST NATIONAL BANK

Assets Liabilities

Vault cash $100 Checkable deposits $100

Assets Liabilities

Reserves $100 Checkable deposits $100

Assets Liabilities

Cash items in process $100 Checkable deposits $100

of collection

FIRST NATIONAL BANK SECOND NATIONAL BANK

Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities

Reserves $100 Checkable $100 Reserves $100 Checkable $100

deposits deposits

The process initiated by Jane Brown can be summarized as follows: When a check

written on an account at one bank is deposited in another, the bank receiving the

deposit gains reserves equal to the amount of the check, while the bank on which the

check is written sees its reserves fall by the same amount. Therefore, when a bank

receives additional deposits, it gains an equal amount of reserves; when it loses

deposits, it loses an equal amount of reserves.

Study Guide T-accounts are used to study various topics throughout this text. Whenever you see a

T-account, try to analyze what would happen if the opposite action were taken; for

example, what would happen if Jane Brown decided to close her $100 account at the

First National Bank by writing a $100 check and depositing it in a new checking

account at the Second National Bank?

Now that you understand how banks gain and lose reserves, we can examine how

a bank rearranges its balance sheet to make a profit when it experiences a change in

its deposits. Let’s return to the situation when the First National Bank has just

received the extra $100 of checkable deposits. As you know, the bank is obliged to

keep a certain fraction of its checkable deposits as required reserves. If the fraction

(the required reserve ratio) is 10%, the First National Bank’s required reserves have

increased by $10, and we can rewrite its T-account as follows:

Let’s see how well the bank is doing as a result of the additional checkable deposits.

Because reserves pay no interest, it has no income from the additional $100 of assets.

But servicing the extra $100 of checkable deposits is costly, because the bank must

keep records, pay tellers, return canceled checks, pay for check clearing, and so forth.

The bank is taking a loss! The situation is even worse if the bank makes interest payments

on the deposits, as with NOW accounts. If it is to make a profit, the bank must

put to productive use all or part of the $90 of excess reserves it has available.

Let us assume that the bank chooses not to hold any excess reserves but to make

loans instead. The T-account then looks like this:

The bank is now making a profit because it holds short-term liabilities such as

checkable deposits and uses the proceeds to buy longer-term assets such as loans

C H A P T E R 9 Banking and the Management of Financial Institutions 207

FIRST NATIONAL BANK

Assets Liabilities

Required reserves $10 Checkable deposits $100

Excess reserves $90

Assets Liabilities

Required reserves $10 Checkable deposits $100

Loans $90

with higher interest rates. As mentioned earlier, this process of asset transformation

is frequently described by saying that banks are in the business of “borrowing short

and lending long.” For example, if the loans have an interest rate of 10% per year, the

bank earns $9 in income from its loans over the year. If the $100 of checkable

deposits is in a NOW account with a 5% interest rate and it costs another $3 per year

to service the account, the cost per year of these deposits is $8. The bank’s profit on

the new deposits is then $1 per year (a 1% return on assets).

General Principles of Bank Management

Now that you have some idea of how a bank operates, let’s look at how a bank manages

its assets and liabilities in order to earn the highest possible profit. The bank

manager has four primary concerns. The first is to make sure that the bank has

enough ready cash to pay its depositors when there are deposit outflows, that is,

when deposits are lost because depositors make withdrawals and demand payment.

To keep enough cash on hand, the bank must engage in liquidity management, the

acquisition of sufficiently liquid assets to meet the bank’s obligations to depositors.

Second, the bank manager must pursue an acceptably low level of risk by acquiring

assets that have a low rate of default and by diversifying asset holdings (asset management).

The third concern is to acquire funds at low cost (liability management).

Finally, the manager must decide the amount of capital the bank should maintain and

then acquire the needed capital (capital adequacy management).

To understand bank and other financial institution management fully, we must go

beyond the general principles of bank asset and liability management described next

and look in more detail at how a financial institution manages its assets. The two sections

following this one provide an in-depth discussion of how a financial institution

manages credit risk, the risk arising because borrowers may default, and how it manages

interest-rate risk, the riskiness of earnings and returns on bank assets that

results from interest-rate changes.

Let us see how a typical bank, the First National Bank, can deal with deposit outflows

that occur when its depositors withdraw cash from checking or savings accounts or

write checks that are deposited in other banks. In the example that follows, we

assume that the bank has ample excess reserves and that all deposits have the same

required reserve ratio of 10% (the bank is required to keep 10% of its time and checkable

deposits as reserves). Suppose that the First National Bank’s initial balance sheet

is as follows:

The bank’s required reserves are 10% of $100 million, or $10 million. Since it holds

$20 million of reserves, the First National Bank has excess reserves of $10 million. If a

deposit outflow of $10 million occurs, the bank’s balance sheet becomes:

Liquidity

Management

and the Role of

Reserves

208 PART I I I Financial Institutions

Assets Liabilities

Reserves $20 million Deposits $100 million

Loans $80 million Bank capital $ 10 million

Securities $10 million

The bank loses $10 million of deposits and $10 million of reserves, but since its

required reserves are now 10% of only $90 million ($9 million), its reserves still

exceed this amount by $1 million. In short, if a bank has ample reserves, a deposit

outflow does not necessitate changes in other parts of its balance sheet.

The situation is quite different when a bank holds insufficient excess reserves.

Let’s assume that instead of initially holding $10 million in excess reserves, the First

National Bank makes loans of $10 million, so that it holds no excess reserves. Its initial

balance sheet would be:

When it suffers the $10 million deposit outflow, its balance sheet becomes:

After $10 million has been withdrawn from deposits and hence reserves, the bank has

a problem: It has a reserve requirement of 10% of $90 million, or $9 million, but it

has no reserves! To eliminate this shortfall, the bank has four basic options. One is to

acquire reserves to meet a deposit outflow by borrowing them from other banks in

the federal funds market or by borrowing from corporations.1 If the First National

Bank acquires the $9 million shortfall in reserves by borrowing it from other banks or

corporations, its balance sheet becomes:

C H A P T E R 9 Banking and the Management of Financial Institutions 209

Assets Liabilities

Reserves $10 million Deposits $90 million

Loans $80 million Bank capital $10 million

Securities $10 million

Assets Liabilities

Reserves $10 million Deposits $100 million

Loans $90 million Bank capital $ 10 million

Securities $10 million

Assets Liabilities

Reserves $ 0 Deposits $90 million

Loans $90 million Bank capital $10 million

Securities $10 million

Assets Liabilities

Reserves $ 9 million Deposits $90 million

Loans $90 million Borrowings from other

Securities $10 million banks or corporations $ 9 million

Bank capital $10 million

1One way that the First National Bank can borrow from other banks and corporations is by selling negotiable

certificates of deposit. This method for obtaining funds is discussed in the section on liability management.

The cost of this activity is the interest rate on these borrowings, such as the federal funds rate.

A second alternative is for the bank to sell some of its securities to help cover the

deposit outflow. For example, it might sell $9 million of its securities and deposit the

proceeds with the Fed, resulting in the following balance sheet:

The bank incurs some brokerage and other transaction costs when it sells these securities.

The U.S. government securities that are classified as secondary reserves are very

liquid, so the transaction costs of selling them are quite modest. However, the other

securities the bank holds are less liquid, and the transaction cost can be appreciably

higher.

A third way that the bank can meet a deposit outflow is to acquire reserves by

borrowing from the Fed. In our example, the First National Bank could leave its security

and loan holdings the same and borrow $9 million in discount loans from the

Fed. Its balance sheet would be:

The cost associated with discount loans is the interest rate that must be paid to the Fed

(called the discount rate).

Finally, a bank can acquire the $9 million of reserves to meet the deposit outflow

by reducing its loans by this amount and depositing the $9 million it then receives

with the Fed, thereby increasing its reserves by $9 million. This transaction changes

the balance sheet as follows:

The First National Bank is once again in good shape because its $9 million of reserves

satisfies the reserve requirement.

However, this process of reducing its loans is the bank’s costliest way of acquiring

reserves when there is a deposit outflow. If the First National Bank has numerous

short-term loans renewed at fairly short intervals, it can reduce its total amount of

210 PART I I I Financial Institutions

Assets Liabilities

Reserves $ 9 million Deposits $90 million

Loans $90 million Bank capital $10 million

Securities $ 1 million

Assets Liabilities

Reserves $ 9 million Deposits $90 million

Loans $90 million Discount loans

Securities $10 million from the Fed $ 9 million

Bank capital $10 million

Assets Liabilities

Reserves $ 9 million Deposits $90 million

Loans $81 million Bank capital $10 million

Securities $10 million

loans outstanding fairly quickly by calling in loans—that is, by not renewing some

loans when they come due. Unfortunately for the bank, this is likely to antagonize the

customers whose loans are not being renewed because they have not done anything

to deserve such treatment. Indeed, they are likely to take their business elsewhere in

the future, a very costly consequence for the bank.

A second method for reducing its loans is for the bank to sell them off to other

banks. Again, this is very costly because other banks do not personally know the customers

who have taken out the loans and so may not be willing to buy the loans at their

full value (This is just the lemons adverse selection problem described in Chapter 8.)

The foregoing discussion explains why banks hold excess reserves even though

loans or securities earn a higher return. When a deposit outflow occurs, holding

excess reserves allows the bank to escape the costs of (1) borrowing from other banks

or corporations, (2) selling securities, (3) borrowing from the Fed, or (4) calling in or

selling off loans. Excess reserves are insurance against the costs associated with

deposit outflows. The higher the costs associated with deposit outflows, the more

excess reserves banks will want to hold.

Just as you and I would be willing to pay an insurance company to insure us

against a casualty loss such as the theft of a car, a bank is willing to pay the cost of

holding excess reserves (the opportunity cost, which is the earnings forgone by not

holding income-earning assets such as loans or securities) in order to insure against

losses due to deposit outflows. Because excess reserves, like insurance, have a cost,

banks also take other steps to protect themselves; for example, they might shift their

holdings of assets to more liquid securities (secondary reserves).

Study Guide Bank management is easier to grasp if you put yourself in the banker’s shoes and

imagine what you would do in the situations described. To understand a bank’s possible

responses to deposit outflows, imagine how you as a banker might respond to

two successive deposit outflows of $10 million.

Now that you understand why a bank has a need for liquidity, we can examine the

basic strategy a bank pursues in managing its assets. To maximize its profits, a bank

must simultaneously seek the highest returns possible on loans and securities, reduce

risk, and make adequate provisions for liquidity by holding liquid assets. Banks try to

accomplish these three goals in four basic ways.

First, banks try to find borrowers who will pay high interest rates and are unlikely

to default on their loans. They seek out loan business by advertising their borrowing

rates and by approaching corporations directly to solicit loans. It is up to the bank’s

loan officer to decide if potential borrowers are good credit risks who will make interest

and principal payments on time (i.e., engage in screening to reduce the adverse

selection problem). Typically, banks are conservative in their loan policies; the default

rate is usually less than 1%. It is important, however, that banks not be so conservative

that they miss out on attractive lending opportunities that earn high interest rates.

Second, banks try to purchase securities with high returns and low risk. Third, in

managing their assets, banks must attempt to lower risk by diversifying. They accomplish

this by purchasing many different types of assets (short- and long-term, U.S.

Treasury, and municipal bonds) and approving many types of loans to a number of

Asset

Management

C H A P T E R 9 Banking and the Management of Financial Institutions 211

customers. Banks that have not sufficiently sought the benefits of diversification often

come to regret it later. For example, banks that had overspecialized in making loans

to energy companies, real estate developers, or farmers suffered huge losses in the

1980s with the slump in energy, property, and farm prices. Indeed, many of these

banks went broke because they had “put too many eggs in one basket.”

Finally, the bank must manage the liquidity of its assets so that it can satisfy its

reserve requirements without bearing huge costs. This means that it will hold liquid

securities even if they earn a somewhat lower return than other assets. The bank must

decide, for example, how much in excess reserves must be held to avoid costs from a

deposit outflow. In addition, it will want to hold U.S. government securities as secondary

reserves so that even if a deposit outflow forces some costs on the bank, these

will not be terribly high. Again, it is not wise for a bank to be too conservative. If it

avoids all costs associated with deposit outflows by holding only excess reserves,

losses are suffered because reserves earn no interest, while the bank’s liabilities are

costly to maintain. The bank must balance its desire for liquidity against the increased

earnings that can be obtained from less liquid assets such as loans.

Before the 1960s, liability management was a staid affair: For the most part, banks

took their liabilities as fixed and spent their time trying to achieve an optimal mix of

assets. There were two main reasons for the emphasis on asset management. First,

over 60% of the sources of bank funds were obtained through checkable (demand)

deposits that by law could not pay any interest. Thus banks could not actively compete

with one another for these deposits by paying interest on them, and so their

amount was effectively a given for an individual bank. Second, because the markets

for making overnight loans between banks were not well developed, banks rarely borrowed

from other banks to meet their reserve needs.

Starting in the 1960s, however, large banks (called money center banks) in key

financial centers, such as New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, began to explore

ways in which the liabilities on their balance sheets could provide them with reserves

and liquidity. This led to an expansion of overnight loan markets, such as the federal

funds market, and the development of new financial instruments such as negotiable

CDs (first developed in 1961), which enabled money center banks to acquire funds

quickly.2

This new flexibility in liability management meant that banks could take a different

approach to bank management. They no longer needed to depend on checkable

deposits as the primary source of bank funds and as a result no longer treated their

sources of funds (liabilities) as given. Instead, they aggressively set target goals for

their asset growth and tried to acquire funds (by issuing liabilities) as they were

needed.

For example, today, when a money center bank finds an attractive loan opportunity,

it can acquire funds by selling a negotiable CD. Or, if it has a reserve shortfall,

funds can be borrowed from another bank in the federal funds market without incurring

high transaction costs. The federal funds market can also be used to finance

loans. Because of the increased importance of liability management, most banks now

Liability

Management

212 PART I I I Financial Institutions

2Because small banks are not as well known as money center banks and so might be a higher credit risk, they

find it harder to raise funds in the negotiable CD market. Hence they do not engage nearly as actively in liability

management.

manage both sides of the balance sheet together in a so-called asset–liability management

(ALM) committee.

The emphasis on liability management explains some of the important changes

over the past three decades in the composition of banks’ balance sheets. While negotiable

CDs and bank borrowings have greatly increased in importance as a source of

bank funds in recent years (rising from 2% of bank liabilities in 1960 to 42% by the

end of 2002), checkable deposits have decreased in importance (from 61% of bank

liabilities in 1960 to 9% in 2002). Newfound flexibility in liability management and

the search for higher profits have also stimulated banks to increase the proportion of

their assets held in loans, which earn higher income (from 46% of bank assets in 1960

to 64% in 2002).

Banks have to make decisions about the amount of capital they need to hold for three

reasons. First, bank capital helps prevents bank failure, a situation in which the bank

cannot satisfy its obligations to pay its depositors and other creditors and so goes out

of business. Second, the amount of capital affects returns for the owners (equity holders)

of the bank. And third, a minimum amount of bank capital (bank capital

requirements) is required by regulatory authorities.

How Bank Capital Helps Prevent Bank Failure. Let’s consider two banks with identical

balance sheets, except that the High Capital Bank has a ratio of capital to assets of

10% while the Low Capital Bank has a ratio of 4%.

Suppose that both banks get caught up in the euphoria of the telecom market,

only to find that $5 million of their telecom loans became worthless later. When

these bad loans are written off (valued at zero), the total value of assets declines by

$5 million, and so bank capital, which equals total assets minus liabilities, also

declines by $5 million. The balance sheets of the two banks now look like this:

Capital Adequacy

Management

C H A P T E R 9 Banking and the Management of Financial Institutions 213

HIGH CAPITAL BANK LOW CAPITAL BANK

Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities

Reserves $10 million Deposits $90 million Reserves $10 million Deposits $96 million

Loans $90 million Bank $10 million Loans $90 million Bank $ 4 million

capital capital

HIGH CAPITAL BANK LOW CAPITAL BANK

Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities

Reserves $10 million Deposits $90 million Reserves $10 million Deposits $96 million

Loans $85 million Bank $ 5 million Loans $85 million Bank $ 1 million

capital capital

The High Capital Bank takes the $5 million loss in stride because its initial cushion

of $10 million in capital means that it still has a positive net worth (bank capital)

of $5 million after the loss. The Low Capital Bank, however, is in big trouble. Now

the value of its assets has fallen below its liabilities, and its net worth is now $1 million.

Because the bank has a negative net worth, it is insolvent: It does not have sufficient

assets to pay off all holders of its liabilities (creditors). When a bank becomes

insolvent, government regulators close the bank, its assets are sold off, and its managers

are fired. Since the owners of the Low Capital Bank will find their investment

wiped out, they would clearly have preferred the bank to have had a large enough

cushion of bank capital to absorb the losses, as was the case for the High Capital Bank.

We therefore see an important rationale for a bank to maintain a high level of capital:

A bank maintains bank capital to lessen the chance that it will become insolvent.

How the Amount of Bank Capital Affects Returns to Equity Holders. Because owners of a

bank must know whether their bank is being managed well, they need good measures

of bank profitability. A basic measure of bank profitability is the return on assets

(ROA), the net profit after taxes per dollar of assets:

The return on assets provides information on how efficiently a bank is being run,

because it indicates how much profits are generated on average by each dollar of

assets.

However, what the bank’s owners (equity holders) care about most is how much

the bank is earning on their equity investment. This information is provided by the

other basic measure of bank profitability, the return on equity (ROE), the net profit

after taxes per dollar of equity (bank) capital:

There is a direct relationship between the return on assets (which measures how

efficiently the bank is run) and the return on equity (which measures how well the

owners are doing on their investment). This relationship is determined by the so-called

equity multiplier (EM), which is the amount of assets per dollar of equity capital:

To see this, we note that:

which, using our definitions, yields:

ROE ROA EM (1)

The formula in Equation 1 tells us what happens to the return on equity when a

bank holds a smaller amount of capital (equity) for a given amount of assets. As we

have seen, the High Capital Bank initially has $100 million of assets and $10 million

of equity, which gives it an equity multiplier of 10 ( $100 million/$10 million). The

net profit after taxes

equity capital

net profit after taxes

assets

assets

equity capital

EM

assets

equity capital

ROE

net profit after taxes

equity capital

ROA

net profit after taxes

assets

214 PART I I I Financial Institutions

Low Capital Bank, by contrast, has only $4 million of equity, so its equity multiplier

is higher, equaling 25 ( $100 million/$4 million). Suppose that these banks have

been equally well run so that they both have the same return on assets, 1%. The

return on equity for the High Capital Bank equals 1% 10 10%, while the return

on equity for the Low Capital Bank equals 1% 25 25%. The equity holders in

the Low Capital Bank are clearly a lot happier than the equity holders in the High

Capital Bank because they are earning more than twice as high a return. We now see

why owners of a bank may not want it to hold too much capital. Given the return on

assets, the lower the bank capital, the higher the return for the owners of the bank.

Trade-off Between Safety and Returns to Equity Holders. We now see that bank capital

has benefits and costs. Bank capital benefits the owners of a bank in that it makes their

investment safer by reducing the likelihood of bankruptcy. But bank capital is costly

because the higher it is, the lower will be the return on equity for a given return on

assets. In determining the amount of bank capital, managers must decide how much

of the increased safety that comes with higher capital (the benefit) they are willing to

trade off against the lower return on equity that comes with higher capital (the cost).

In more uncertain times, when the possibility of large losses on loans increases,

bank managers might want to hold more capital to protect the equity holders.

Conversely, if they have confidence that loan losses won’t occur, they might want to

reduce the amount of bank capital, have a high equity multiplier, and thereby increase

the return on equity.

Bank Capital Requirements. Banks also hold capital because they are required to do so

by regulatory authorities. Because of the high costs of holding capital for the reasons

just described, bank managers often want to hold less bank capital relative to assets

than is required by the regulatory authorities. In this case, the amount of bank capital is

determined by the bank capital requirements. We discuss the details of bank capital

requirements and why they are such an important part of bank regulation in Chapter 11.

C H A P T E R 9 Banking and the Management of Financial Institutions 215

Application Strategies for Managing Bank Capital

Suppose that as the manager of the First National Bank, you have to make

decisions about the appropriate amount of bank capital. Looking at the balance

sheet of the bank, which like the High Capital Bank has a ratio of bank

capital to assets of 10% ($10 million of capital and $100 million of assets),

you are concerned that the large amount of bank capital is causing the return

on equity to be too low. You conclude that the bank has a capital surplus and

should increase the equity multiplier to increase the return on equity. What

should you do?

To lower the amount of capital relative to assets and raise the equity multiplier,

you can do any of three things: (1) You can reduce the amount of bank

capital by buying back some of the bank’s stock. (2) You can reduce the

bank’s capital by paying out higher dividends to its stockholders, thereby

reducing the bank’s retained earnings. (3) You can keep bank capital constant

but increase the bank’s assets by acquiring new funds—say, by issuing CDs—

and then seeking out loan business or purchasing more securities with these

new funds. Because you think that it would enhance your position with the

216 PART I I I Financial Institutions

stockholders, you decide to pursue the second alternative and raise the dividend

on the First National Bank stock.

Now suppose that the First National Bank is in a similar situation to the

Low Capital Bank and has a ratio of bank capital to assets of 4%. You now

worry that the bank is short on capital relative to assets because it does not

have a sufficient cushion to prevent bank failure. To raise the amount of capital

relative to assets, you now have the following three choices: (1) You can

raise capital for the bank by having it issue equity (common stock). (2) You

can raise capital by reducing the bank’s dividends to shareholders, thereby

increasing retained earnings that it can put into its capital account. (3) You

can keep capital at the same level but reduce the bank’s assets by making

fewer loans or by selling off securities and then using the proceeds to reduce

its liabilities. Suppose that raising bank capital is not easy to do at the current

time because capital markets are tight or because shareholders will

protest if their dividends are cut. Then you might have to choose the third

alternative and decide to shrink the size of the bank.

In past years, many banks experienced capital shortfalls and had to

restrict asset growth, as you might have to do if the First National Bank were

short of capital. The important consequences of this for the credit markets

are discussed in the application that follows.

Application Did the Capital Crunch Cause a Credit Crunch in the Early 1990s?

During the 1990–1991 recession and the year following, there occurred a

slowdown in the growth of credit that was unprecedented in the post–World

War II era. Many economists and politicians have claimed that there was a

“credit crunch” during this period in which credit was hard to get, and as a

result the performance of the economy in 1990–1992 was very weak. Was

the slowdown in credit growth a manifestation of a credit crunch, and if so,

what caused it?

Our analysis of how a bank manages bank capital suggests that a credit

crunch was likely to have occurred in 1990–1992 and that it was caused at

least in part by the so-called capital crunch in which shortfalls of bank capital

led to slower credit growth.

The period of the late 1980s saw a boom and then a major bust in the

real estate market that led to huge losses for banks on their real estate loans.

As our example of how bank capital helps prevent bank failures demonstrates,

the loan losses caused a substantial fall in the amount of bank capital.

At the same time, regulators were raising capital requirements (a subject

discussed in Chapter 11). The resulting capital shortfalls meant that banks

had to either raise new capital or restrict their asset growth by cutting back

on lending. Because of the weak economy at the time, raising new capital was

extremely difficult for banks, so they chose the latter course. Banks did

restrict their lending, and borrowers found it harder to obtain loans, leading

to complaints from banks’ customers. Only with the stronger recovery of the

economy in 1993, helped by a low-interest-rate policy at the Federal Reserve,

did these complaints subside.

Managing Credit Risk

As seen in the earlier discussion of general principles of asset management, banks and

also other financial institutions must make successful loans that are paid back in full

(and so subject the institution to little credit risk) in order to earn high profits. The

economic concepts of adverse selection and moral hazard (introduced in Chapters 2

and 8) provide a framework for understanding the principles that financial institutions

have to follow to reduce credit risk and make successful loans.3

Adverse selection in loan markets occurs because bad credit risks (those most

likely to default on their loans) are the ones who usually line up for loans; in other

words, those who are most likely to produce an adverse outcome are the most likely

to be selected. Borrowers with very risky investment projects have much to gain if their

projects are successful, and so they are the most eager to obtain loans. Clearly, however,

they are the least desirable borrowers because of the greater possibility that they

will be unable to pay back their loans.

Moral hazard exists in loan markets because borrowers may have incentives to

engage in activities that are undesirable from the lender’s point of view. In such situations,

it is more likely that the lender will be subjected to the hazard of default. Once

borrowers have obtained a loan, they are more likely to invest in high-risk investment

projects—projects that pay high returns to the borrowers if successful. The high risk,

however, makes it less likely that they will be able to pay the loan back.

To be profitable, financial institutions must overcome the adverse selection and

moral hazard problems that make loan defaults more likely. The attempts of financial

institutions to solve these problems help explain a number of principles for managing

credit risk: screening and monitoring, establishment of long-term customer relationships,

loan commitments, collateral and compensating balance requirements, and

credit rationing.

Asymmetric information is present in loan markets because lenders have less information

about the investment opportunities and activities of borrowers than borrowers

do. This situation leads to two information-producing activities by banks and

other financial institutions—screening and monitoring. Indeed, Walter Wriston, a former

head of Citicorp, the largest bank corporation in the United States, was often

quoted as stating that the business of banking is the production of information.

Screening. Adverse selection in loan markets requires that lenders screen out the bad

credit risks from the good ones so that loans are profitable to them. To accomplish

effective screening, lenders must collect reliable information from prospective borrowers.

Effective screening and information collection together form an important

principle of credit risk management.

When you apply for a consumer loan (such as a car loan or a mortgage to purchase

a house), the first thing you are asked to do is fill out forms that elicit a great

deal of information about your personal finances. You are asked about your salary,

your bank accounts and other assets (such as cars, insurance policies, and furnishings),

and your outstanding loans; your record of loan, credit card, and charge

Screening and

Monitoring

C H A P T E R 9 Banking and the Management of Financial Institutions 217

3Other financial intermediaries, such as insurance companies, pension funds, and finance companies, also make

private loans, and the credit risk management principles we outline here apply to them as well.

account repayments; the number of years you’ve worked and who your employers

have been. You also are asked personal questions such as your age, marital status, and

number of children. The lender uses this information to evaluate how good a credit

risk you are by calculating your “credit score,” a statistical measure derived from your

answers that predicts whether you are likely to have trouble making your loan payments.

Deciding on how good a risk you are cannot be entirely scientific, so the

lender must also use judgment. The loan officer, whose job is to decide whether you

should be given the loan, might call your employer or talk to some of the personal

references you supplied. The officer might even make a judgment based on your

demeanor or your appearance. (This is why most people dress neatly and conservatively

when they go to a bank to apply for a loan.)

The process of screening and collecting information is similar when a financial

institution makes a business loan. It collects information about the company’s profits

and losses (income) and about its assets and liabilities. The lender also has to evaluate

the likely future success of the business. So in addition to obtaining information

on such items as sales figures, a loan officer might ask questions about the company’s

future plans, how the loan will be used, and the competition in the industry. The officer

may even visit the company to obtain a firsthand look at its operations. The bottom

line is that, whether for personal or business loans, bankers and other financial

institutions need to be nosy.

Specialization in Lending. One puzzling feature of bank lending is that a bank often

specializes in lending to local firms or to firms in particular industries, such as energy.

In one sense, this behavior seems surprising, because it means that the bank is not

diversifying its portfolio of loans and thus is exposing itself to more risk. But from

another perspective, such specialization makes perfect sense. The adverse selection

problem requires that the bank screen out bad credit risks. It is easier for the bank to

collect information about local firms and determine their creditworthiness than to

collect comparable information on firms that are far away. Similarly, by concentrating

its lending on firms in specific industries, the bank becomes more knowledgeable

about these industries and is therefore better able to predict which firms will be able

to make timely payments on their debt.

Monitoring and Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants. Once a loan has been made, the

borrower has an incentive to engage in risky activities that make it less likely that the

loan will be paid off. To reduce this moral hazard, financial institutions must adhere

to the principle for managing credit risk that a lender should write provisions (restrictive

covenants) into loan contracts that restrict borrowers from engaging in risky

activities. By monitoring borrowers’ activities to see whether they are complying with

the restrictive covenants and by enforcing the covenants if they are not, lenders can

make sure that borrowers are not taking on risks at their expense. The need for banks

and other financial institutions to engage in screening and monitoring explains why

they spend so much money on auditing and information-collecting activities.

An additional way for banks and other financial institutions to obtain information

about their borrowers is through long-term customer relationships, another important

principle of credit risk management.

If a prospective borrower has had a checking or savings account or other loans

with a bank over a long period of time, a loan officer can look at past activity on the

accounts and learn quite a bit about the borrower. The balances in the checking and

Long-Term

Customer

Relationships

218 PART I I I Financial Institutions

savings accounts tell the banker how liquid the potential borrower is and at what time

of year the borrower has a strong need for cash. A review of the checks the borrower

has written reveals the borrower’s suppliers. If the borrower has borrowed previously

from the bank, the bank has a record of the loan payments. Thus long-term customer

relationships reduce the costs of information collection and make it easier to screen

out bad credit risks.

The need for monitoring by lenders adds to the importance of long-term customer

relationships. If the borrower has borrowed from the bank before, the bank has

already established procedures for monitoring that customer. Therefore, the costs of

monitoring long-term customers are lower than those for new customers.

Long-term relationships benefit the customers as well as the bank. A firm with a

previous relationship will find it easier to obtain a loan at a low interest rate because

the bank has an easier time determining if the prospective borrower is a good credit

risk and incurs fewer costs in monitoring the borrower.

A long-term customer relationship has another advantage for the bank. No bank

can think of every contingency when it writes a restrictive covenant into a loan contract;

there will always be risky borrower activities that are not ruled out. However,

what if a borrower wants to preserve a long-term relationship with a bank because it

will be easier to get future loans at low interest rates? The borrower then has the incentive

to avoid risky activities that would upset the bank, even if restrictions on these

risky activities are not specified in the loan contract. Indeed, if a bank doesn’t like what

a borrower is doing even when the borrower isn’t violating any restrictive covenants, it

has some power to discourage the borrower from such activity: The bank can threaten

not to let the borrower have new loans in the future. Long-term customer relationships

therefore enable banks to deal with even unanticipated moral hazard contingencies.

Banks also create long-term relationships and gather information by issuing loan

commitments to commercial customers. A loan commitment is a bank’s commitment

(for a specified future period of time) to provide a firm with loans up to a given

amount at an interest rate that is tied to some market interest rate. The majority of

commercial and industrial loans are made under the loan commitment arrangement.

The advantage for the firm is that it has a source of credit when it needs it. The advantage

for the bank is that the loan commitment promotes a long-term relationship,

which in turn facilitates information collection. In addition, provisions in the loan

commitment agreement require that the firm continually supply the bank with information

about the firm’s income, asset and liability position, business activities, and so

on. A loan commitment arrangement is a powerful method for reducing the bank’s

costs for screening and information collection.

Collateral requirements for loans are important credit risk management tools.

Collateral, which is property promised to the lender as compensation if the borrower

defaults, lessens the consequences of adverse selection because it reduces the lender’s

losses in the case of a loan default. If a borrower defaults on a loan, the lender can sell

the collateral and use the proceeds to make up for its losses on the loan. One particular

form of collateral required when a bank makes commercial loans is called compensating

balances: A firm receiving a loan must keep a required minimum amount

of funds in a checking account at the bank. For example, a business getting a $10 million

loan may be required to keep compensating balances of at least $1 million in its

checking account at the bank. This $1 million in compensating balances can then be

taken by the bank to make up some of the losses on the loan if the borrower defaults.

Collateral and

Compensating

Balances

Loan

Commitments

C H A P T E R 9 Banking and the Management of Financial Institutions 219

Besides serving as collateral, compensating balances help increase the likelihood

that a loan will be paid off. They do this by helping the bank monitor the borrower

and consequently reduce moral hazard. Specifically, by requiring the borrower to use

a checking account at the bank, the bank can observe the firm’s check payment practices,

which may yield a great deal of information about the borrower’s financial condition.

For example, a sustained drop in the borrower’s checking account balance may

signal that the borrower is having financial trouble, or account activity may suggest

that the borrower is engaging in risky activities; perhaps a change in suppliers means

that the borrower is pursuing new lines of business. Any significant change in the borrower’s

payment procedures is a signal to the bank that it should make inquiries.

Compensating balances therefore make it easier for banks to monitor borrowers more

effectively and are another important credit risk management tool.

Another way in which financial institutions deal with adverse selection and moral

hazard is through credit rationing: refusing to make loans even though borrowers are

willing to pay the stated interest rate or even a higher rate. Credit rationing takes two

forms. The first occurs when a lender refuses to make a loan of any amount to a borrower,

even if the borrower is willing to pay a higher interest rate. The second occurs

when a lender is willing to make a loan but restricts the size of the loan to less than

the borrower would like.

At first you might be puzzled by the first type of credit rationing. After all, even if

the potential borrower is a credit risk, why doesn’t the lender just extend the loan but

at a higher interest rate? The answer is that adverse selection prevents this solution.

Individuals and firms with the riskiest investment projects are exactly those that are

willing to pay the highest interest rates. If a borrower took on a high-risk investment

and succeeded, the borrower would become extremely rich. But a lender wouldn’t

want to make such a loan precisely because the investment risk is high; the likely outcome

is that the borrower will not succeed and the lender will not be paid back.

Charging a higher interest rate just makes adverse selection worse for the lender; that

is, it increases the likelihood that the lender is lending to a bad credit risk. The lender

would therefore rather not make any loans at a higher interest rate; instead, it would

engage in the first type of credit rationing and would turn down loans.

Financial institutions engage in the second type of credit rationing to guard

against moral hazard: They grant loans to borrowers, but not loans as large as the borrowers

want. Such credit rationing is necessary because the larger the loan, the greater

the benefits from moral hazard. If a bank gives you a $1,000 loan, for example, you

are likely to take actions that enable you to pay it back because you don’t want to hurt

your credit rating for the future. However, if the bank lends you $10 million, you are

more likely to fly down to Rio to celebrate. The larger your loan, the greater your

incentives to engage in activities that make it less likely that you will repay the loan.

Since more borrowers repay their loans if the loan amounts are small, financial institutions

ration credit by providing borrowers with smaller loans than they seek.

Managing Interest-Rate Risk

With the increased volatility of interest rates that occurred in the 1980s, banks and

other financial institutions became more concerned about their exposure to interestrate

risk, the riskiness of earnings and returns that is associated with changes in

Credit Rationing

220 PART I I I Financial Institutions

interest rates. To see what interest-rate risk is all about, let’s again take a look at the

First National Bank, which has the following balance sheet:

A total of $20 million of its assets are rate-sensitive, with interest rates that change

frequently (at least once a year), and $80 million of its assets are fixed-rate, with interest

rates that remain unchanged for a long period (over a year). On the liabilities side,

the First National Bank has $50 million of rate-sensitive liabilities and $50 million of

fixed-rate liabilities. Suppose that interest rates rise by 5 percentage points on average,

from 10% to 15%. The income on the assets rises by $1 million ( 5% $20

million of rate-sensitive assets), while the payments on the liabilities rise by $2.5 million

( 5% $50 million of rate-sensitive liabilities). The First National Bank’s profits

now decline by $1.5 million ( $1 million $2.5 million). Conversely, if interest

rates fall by 5 percentage points, similar reasoning tells us that the First National

Bank’s profits rise by $1.5 million. This example illustrates the following point: If a

bank has more rate-sensitive liabilities than assets, a rise in interest rates will

reduce bank profits and a decline in interest rates will raise bank profits.

The sensitivity of bank profits to changes in interest rates can be measured more

directly using gap analysis, in which the amount of rate-sensitive liabilities is subtracted

from the amount of rate-sensitive assets. In our example, this calculation

(called the “gap”) is $30 million ( $20 million $50 million). By multiplying the

gap times the change in the interest rate, we can immediately obtain the effect on

bank profits. For example, when interest rates rise by 5 percentage points, the change

in profits is 5% $30 million, which equals $1.5 million, as we saw.

The analysis we just conducted is known as basic gap analysis, and it can be

refined in two ways. Clearly, not all assets and liabilities in the fixed-rate category have

the same maturity. One refinement, the maturity bucket approach, is to measure the gap

for several maturity subintervals, called maturity buckets, so that effects of interest-rate

changes over a multiyear period can be calculated. The second refinement, called

standardized gap analysis, accounts for the differing degrees of rate sensitivity for different

rate-sensitive assets and liabilities.

An alternative method for measuring interest-rate risk, called duration analysis,

examines the sensitivity of the market value of the bank’s total assets and liabilities to

changes in interest rates. Duration analysis is based on what is known as Macaulay’s

Gap and Duration

Analysis

C H A P T E R 9 Banking and the Management of Financial Institutions 221

FIRST NATIONAL BANK

Assets Liabilities

Rate-sensitive assets $20 million Rate-sensitive liabilities $50 million

Variable-rate and Variable-rate CDs

short-term loans Money market deposit

Short-term securities accounts

Fixed-rate assets $80 million Fixed-rate liabilities $50 million

Reserves Checkable deposits

Long-term loans Savings deposits

Long-term securities Long-term CDs

Equity capital

concept of duration, which measures the average lifetime of a security’s stream of payments.

4 Duration is a useful concept because it provides a good approximation of the

sensitivity of a security’s market value to a change in its interest rate:

percent change in market value of security

percentage-point change in interest rate duration in years

where denotes “approximately equals.”

Duration analysis involves using the average (weighted) duration of a financial

institution’s assets and of its liabilities to see how its net worth responds to a change

in interest rates. Going back to our example of the First National Bank, suppose that

the average duration of its assets is three years (that is, the average lifetime of the

stream of payments is three years), while the average duration of its liabilities is two

years. In addition, the First National Bank has $100 million of assets and $90 million

of liabilities, so its bank capital is 10% of assets. With a 5-percentage-point increase

in interest rates, the market value of the bank’s assets falls by 15% ( 5% 3

years), a decline of $15 million on the $100 million of assets. However, the market

value of the liabilities falls by 10% (5% 2 years), a decline of $9 million on the

$90 million of liabilities. The net result is that the net worth (the market value of the

assets minus the liabilities) has declined by $6 million, or 6% of the total original asset

value. Similarly, a 5-percentage-point decline in interest rates increases the net worth

of the First National Bank by 6% of the total asset value.

As our example makes clear, both duration analysis and gap analysis indicate that

the First National Bank will suffer if interest rates rise but will gain if they fall.

Duration analysis and gap analysis are thus useful tools for telling a manager of a

financial institution its degree of exposure to interest-rate risk.

222 PART I I I Financial Institutions

4Algebraically, Macaulay’s duration, D, is defined as:

where time until cash payment is made

CP cash payment (interest plus principal) at time

i interest rate

N time to maturity of the security

For a more detailed discussion of duration gap analysis using the concept of Macaulay’s duration, you can look

at an appendix to this chapter that is on this book’s web site at www.aw.com/mishkin.

D N

1

CP

(1 i ) N

1

CP

(1 i )

Application Strategies for Managing Interest-Rate Risk

Suppose that as the manager of the First National Bank, you have done a

duration and gap analysis for the bank as discussed in the text. Now you

need to decide what alternative strategies you should pursue to manage the

interest-rate risk.

If you firmly believe that interest rates will fall in the future, you may

be willing to take no action because you know that the bank has more ratesensitive

liabilities than rate-sensitive assets and so will benefit from the

Off-Balance-Sheet Activities

Although asset and liability management has traditionally been the major concern of

banks, in the more competitive environment of recent years banks have been aggressively

seeking out profits by engaging in off-balance-sheet activities.5 Off-balancesheet

activities involve trading financial instruments and generating income from

fees and loan sales, activities that affect bank profits but do not appear on bank balance

sheets. Indeed, off-balance-sheet activities have been growing in importance for

banks: The income from these activities as a percentage of assets has nearly doubled

since 1980.

One type of off-balance-sheet activity that has grown in importance in recent years

involves income generated by loan sales. A loan sale, also called a secondary loan participation,

involves a contract that sells all or part of the cash stream from a specific

loan and thereby removes the loan from the bank’s balance sheet. Banks earn profits

by selling loans for an amount slightly greater than the amount of the original loan.

Because the high interest rate on these loans makes them attractive, institutions are

willing to buy them, even though the higher price means that they earn a slightly

lower interest rate than the original interest rate on the loan, usually on the order of

0.15 percentage point.

Another type of off-balance-sheet activity involves the generation of income from fees

that banks receive for providing specialized services to their customers, such as making

foreign exchange trades on a customer’s behalf, servicing a mortgage-backed security

by collecting interest and principal payments and then paying them out,

guaranteeing debt securities such as banker’s acceptances (by which the bank promises

Generation of

Fee Income

Loan Sales

C H A P T E R 9 Banking and the Management of Financial Institutions 223

5Managers of financial institutions also need to know how well their banks are doing at any point in time. A second

appendix to this chapter discusses how bank performance is measured; it can be found on the book’s web

site at www.aw.com/mishkin.

expected interest-rate decline. However, you also realize that the First

National Bank is subject to substantial interest-rate risk because there is

always a possibility that interest rates will rise rather than fall. What should

you do to eliminate this interest-rate risk? One thing you could do is to

shorten the duration of the bank’s assets to increase their rate sensitivity.

Alternatively, you could lengthen the duration of the liabilities. By this adjustment

of the bank’s assets and liabilities, the bank’s income will be less affected

by interest-rate swings.

One problem with eliminating the First National Bank’s interest-rate

risk by altering the balance sheet is that doing so might be very costly in the

short run. The bank may be locked in to assets and liabilities of particular

durations because of where its expertise lies. Fortunately, recently developed

financial instruments known as financial derivatives—financial forwards and

futures, options, and swaps—can help the bank reduce its interest-rate risk

exposure but do not require that the bank rearrange its balance sheet. We discuss

these instruments and how banks and other financial institutions can

use them to manage interest-rate risk in Chapter 13.

to make interest and principal payments if the party issuing the security cannot), and

providing backup lines of credit. There are several types of backup lines of credit. We

have already mentioned the most important, the loan commitment, under which for

a fee the bank agrees to provide a loan at the customer’s request, up to a given dollar

amount, over a specified period of time. Credit lines are also now available to bank

depositors with “overdraft privileges”—these bank customers can write checks in

excess of their deposit balances and, in effect, write themselves a loan. Other lines of

credit for which banks get fees include standby letters of credit to back up issues of

commercial paper and other securities and credit lines (called note issuance facilities,

NIFs, and revolving underwriting facilities, RUFs) for underwriting Euronotes, which

are medium-term Eurobonds.

Off-balance-sheet activities involving guarantees of securities and backup credit

lines increase the risk a bank faces. Even though a guaranteed security does not

appear on a bank balance sheet, it still exposes the bank to default risk: If the issuer

of the security defaults, the bank is left holding the bag and must pay off the security’s

owner. Backup credit lines also expose the bank to risk because the bank may be

forced to provide loans when it does not have sufficient liquidity or when the borrower

is a very poor credit risk.

We have already mentioned that banks’ attempts to manage interest-rate risk led them

to trading in financial futures, options for debt instruments, and interest-rate swaps.

Banks engaged in international banking also conduct transactions in the foreign

exchange market. All transactions in these markets are off-balance-sheet activities

because they do not have a direct effect on the bank’s balance sheet. Although bank

trading in these markets is often directed toward reducing risk or facilitating other

bank business, banks also try to outguess the markets and engage in speculation. This

speculation can be a very risky business and indeed has led to bank insolvencies, the

most dramatic being the failure of Barings, a British bank, in 1995.

Trading activities, although often highly profitable, are dangerous because they

make it easy for financial institutions and their employees to make huge bets quickly.

A particular problem for management of trading activities is that the principal-agent

problem, discussed in Chapter 8, is especially severe. Given the ability to place large

bets, a trader (the agent), whether she trades in bond markets, in foreign exchange

markets or in financial derivatives, has an incentive to take on excessive risks: If her

trading strategy leads to large profits, she is likely to receive a high salary and bonuses,

but if she takes large losses, the financial institution (the principal) will have to cover

them. As the Barings Bank failure in 1995 so forcefully demonstrated, a trader subject

to the principal–agent problem can take an institution that is quite healthy and

drive it into insolvency very fast (see Box 1).

To reduce the principal–agent problem, managers of financial institutions must

set up internal controls to prevent debacles like the one at Barings. Such controls

include the complete separation of the people in charge of trading activities from

those in charge of the bookkeeping for trades. In addition, managers must set limits

on the total amount of traders’ transactions and on the institution’s risk exposure.

Managers must also scrutinize risk assessment procedures using the latest computer

technology. One such method involves the so-called value-at-risk approach. In this

approach, the institution develops a statistical model with which it can calculate the

Trading Activities

and Risk

Management

Techniques

224 PART I I I Financial Institutions

www.federalreserve.gov

/boarddocs/SupManual

/default.htm#trading

The Federal Reserve Bank

Trading and Capital Market

Activities Manual offers an

in-depth discussion of a wide

range of risk management

issues encountered in trading

operations.

C H A P T E R 9 Banking and the Management of Financial Institutions 225

Box 1: Global

Barings, Daiwa, Sumitomo, and Allied Irish

Rogue Traders and the Principal–Agent Problem.

The demise of Barings, a venerable British bank over a

century old, is a sad morality tale of how the principal–

agent problem operating through a rogue trader can

take a financial institution that has a healthy balance

sheet one month and turn it into an insolvent tragedy

the next.

In July 1992, Nick Leeson, Barings’s new head

clerk at its Singapore branch, began to speculate on

the Nikkei, the Japanese version of the Dow Jones

stock index. By late 1992, Leeson had suffered losses

of $3 million, which he hid from his superiors by

stashing the losses in a secret account. He even fooled

his superiors into thinking he was generating large

profits, thanks to a failure of internal controls at his

firm, which allowed him to execute trades on the

Singapore exchange and oversee the bookkeeping of

those trades. (As anyone who runs a cash business,

such as a bar, knows, there is always a lower likelihood

of fraud if more than one person handles the

cash. Similarly for trading operations, you never mix

management of the back room with management of

the front room; this principle was grossly violated by

Barings management.)

Things didn’t get better for Leeson, who by late

1994 had losses exceeding $250 million. In January

and February 1995, he bet the bank. On January 17,

1995, the day of the Kobe earthquake, he lost $75

million, and by the end of the week had lost more

than $150 million. When the stock market declined

on February 23, leaving him with a further loss of

$250 million, he called it quits and fled Singapore.

Three days later, he turned himself in at the Frankfurt

airport. By the end of his wild ride, Leeson’s losses,

$1.3 billion in all, ate up Barings’s capital and caused

the bank to fail. Leeson was subsequently convicted

and sent to jail in Singapore for his activities. He was

released in 1999 and apologized for his actions.

Our asymmetric information analysis of the principal–

agent problem explains Leeson’s behavior and the

danger of Barings’s management lapse. By letting

Leeson control both his own trades and the back

room, it increased asymmetric information, because it

reduced the principal’s (Barings’s) knowledge about

Leeson’s trading activities. This lapse increased the

moral hazard incentive for him to take risks at the

bank’s expense, as he was now less likely to be caught.

Furthermore, once he had experienced large losses, he

had even greater incentives to take on even higher risk

because if his bets worked out, he could reverse his

losses and keep in good standing with the company,

whereas if his bets soured, he had little to lose since

he was out of a job anyway. Indeed, the bigger his

losses, the more he had to gain by bigger bets, which

explains the escalation of the amount of his trades as

his losses mounted. If Barings’s managers had understood

the principal–agent problem, they would have

been more vigilant at finding out what Leeson was up

to, and the bank might still be here today.

Unfortunately, Nick Leeson is no longer a rarity in

the rogue traders’ billionaire club, those who have

lost more than $1 billion. Over 11 years, Toshihide

Iguchi, an officer in the New York branch of Daiwa

Bank, also had control of both the bond trading operation

and the back room, and he racked up $1.1 billion

in losses over the period. In July 1995, Iguchi

disclosed his losses to his superiors, but the management

of the bank did not disclose them to its regulators.

The result was that Daiwa was slapped with a

$340 million fine and the bank was thrown out of the

country by U.S. bank regulators. Yasuo Hamanaka is

another member of the billionaire club. In July 1996,

he topped Leeson’s and Iguchi’s record, losing $2.6

billion for his employer, the Sumitomo Corporation,

one of Japan’s top trading companies. John Rusnak

lost only $691 million for his bank, Allied Irish

Banks, over the period from 1997 until he was caught

in February 2002. The moral of these stories is that

management of firms engaged in trading activities

must reduce the principal–agent problem by closely

monitoring their traders’ activities, or the rogues’

gallery will continue to grow.

maximum loss that its portfolio is likely to sustain over a given time interval, dubbed

the value at risk, or VAR. For example, a bank might estimate that the maximum loss

it would be likely to sustain over one day with a probability of 1 in 100 is $1 million;

the $1 million figure is the bank’s calculated value at risk. Another approach is called

“stress testing.” In this approach, a manager asks models what would happen if a

doomsday scenario occurs; that is, she looks at the losses the institution would sustain

if an unusual combination of bad events occurred. With the value-at-risk

approach and stress testing, a financial institution can assess its risk exposure and take

steps to reduce it.

Because of the increased risk that banks are facing from their off-balance-sheet

activities, U.S. bank regulators have become concerned about increased risk from

banks’ off-balance-sheet activities and, as we will see in Chapter 11, are encouraging

banks to pay increased attention to risk management. In addition, the Bank for

International Settlements is developing additional bank capital requirements based on

value-at-risk calculations for a bank’s trading activities.

226 PART I I I Financial Institutions

Summary

1. The balance sheet of commercial banks can be thought

of as a list of the sources and uses of bank funds. The

bank’s liabilities are its sources of funds, which include

checkable deposits, time deposits, discount loans from

the Fed, borrowings from other banks and corporations,

and bank capital. The bank’s assets are its uses of funds,

which include reserves, cash items in process of

collection, deposits at other banks, securities, loans,

and other assets (mostly physical capital).

2. Banks make profits through the process of asset

transformation: They borrow short (accept deposits)

and lend long (make loans). When a bank takes in

additional deposits, it gains an equal amount of

reserves; when it pays out deposits, it loses an equal

amount of reserves.

3. Although more-liquid assets tend to earn lower returns,

banks still desire to hold them. Specifically, banks hold

excess and secondary reserves because they provide

insurance against the costs of a deposit outflow. Banks

manage their assets to maximize profits by seeking the

highest returns possible on loans and securities while at

the same time trying to lower risk and making adequate

provisions for liquidity. Although liability management

was once a staid affair, large (money center) banks now

actively seek out sources of funds by issuing liabilities

such as negotiable CDs or by actively borrowing from

other banks and corporations. Banks manage the

amount of capital they hold to prevent bank failure and

to meet bank capital requirements set by the regulatory

authorities. However, they do not want to hold too

much capital because by so doing they will lower the

returns to equity holders.

4. The concepts of adverse selection and moral hazard

explain many credit risk management principles

involving loan activities: screening and monitoring,

establishment of long-term customer relationships and

loan commitments, collateral and compensating

balances, and credit rationing.

5. With the increased volatility of interest rates that

occurred in the 1980s, financial institutions became

more concerned about their exposure to interest-rate

risk. Gap and duration analyses tell a financial

institution if it has more rate-sensitive liabilities than

assets (in which case a rise in interest rates will reduce

profits and a fall in interest rates will raise profits).

Financial institutions manage their interest-rate risk by

modifying their balance sheets but can also use

strategies (outlined in Chapter 13) involving financial

derivatives.

6. Off-balance-sheet activities consist of trading financial

instruments and generating income from fees and loan

sales, all of which affect bank profits but are not visible

on bank balance sheets. Because these off-balance-sheet

activities expose banks to increased risk, bank

management must pay particular attention to risk

assessment procedures and internal controls to restrict

employees from taking on too much risk.

C H A P T E R 9 Banking and the Management of Financial Institutions 227

Key Terms

asset management, p. 208

balance sheet, p. 201

capital adequacy management, p. 208

compensating balance, p. 219

credit rationing, p. 220

credit risk, p. 208

deposit outflows, p. 208

discount loans, p. 203

discount rate, p. 210

duration analysis, p. 221

equity multiplier (EM), p. 214

excess reserves, p. 204

gap analysis, p. 221

interest-rate risk, p. 208

liability management, p. 208

liquidity management, p. 208

loan commitment, p. 219

loan sale, p. 223

money center banks, p. 212

off-balance-sheet activities, p. 223

required reserve ratio, p. 204

required reserves, p. 204

reserve requirements, p. 204

reserves, p. 204

return on assets (ROA), p. 214

return on equity (ROE), p. 214

secondary reserves, p. 204

T-account, p. 205

vault cash, p. 204

Questions and Problems

Questions marked with an asterisk are answered at the end

of the book in an appendix, “Answers to Selected Questions

and Problems.”

1. Why might a bank be willing to borrow funds from

other banks at a higher rate than it can borrow from

the Fed?

*2. Rank the following bank assets from most to least liquid:

a. Commercial loans

b. Securities

c. Reserves

d. Physical capital

3. Using the T-accounts of the First National Bank and

the Second National Bank, describe what happens

when Jane Brown writes a $50 check on her account

at the First National Bank to pay her friend Joe Green,

who in turn deposits the check in his account at the

Second National Bank.

*4. What happens to reserves at the First National Bank if

one person withdraws $1,000 of cash and another

person deposits $500 of cash? Use T-accounts to

explain your answer.

5. The bank you own has the following balance sheet:

If the bank suffers a deposit outflow of $50 million

with a required reserve ratio on deposits of 10%, what

actions must you take to keep your bank from failing?

*6. If a deposit outflow of $50 million occurs, which balance

sheet would a bank rather have initially, the balance

sheet in Problem 5 or the following balance

sheet? Why?

7. Why has the development of overnight loan markets

made it more likely that banks will hold fewer excess

reserves?

*8. If the bank you own has no excess reserves and a

sound customer comes in asking for a loan, should

you automatically turn the customer down, explaining

that you don’t have any excess reserves to lend out?

Why or why not? What options are available for you

to provide the funds your customer needs?

9. If a bank finds that its ROE is too low because it has

too much bank capital, what can it do to raise its ROE?

*10. If a bank is falling short of meeting its capital requirements

by $1 million, what three things can it do to

rectify the situation?

Assets Liabilities

Reserves $ 75 million Deposits $500 million

Loans $525 million Bank capital $100 million

Assets Liabilities

Reserves $100 million Deposits $500 million

Loans $500 million Bank capital $100 million

QUIZ

228 PART I I I Financial Institutions

11. Why is being nosy a desirable trait for a banker?

*12. A bank almost always insists that the firms it lends to

keep compensating balances at the bank. Why?

13. “Because diversification is a desirable strategy for

avoiding risk, it never makes sense for a bank to specialize

in making specific types of loans.” Is this statement

true, false, or uncertain? Explain your answer.

*14. Suppose that you are the manager of a bank whose

$100 billion of assets have an average duration of four

years and whose $90 billion of liabilities have an average

duration of six years. Conduct a duration analysis

for the bank, and show what will happen to the net

worth of the bank if interest rates rise by 2 percentage

points. What actions could you take to reduce the

bank’s interest-rate risk?

15. Suppose that you are the manager of a bank that has

$15 million of fixed-rate assets, $30 million of ratesensitive

assets, $25 million of fixed-rate liabilities,

and $20 million of rate-sensitive liabilities. Conduct a

gap analysis for the bank, and show what will happen

to bank profits if interest rates rise by 5 percentage

points. What actions could you take to reduce the

bank’s interest-rate risk?

Web Exercises

1. Table 1 reports the balance sheet of all commercial

banks based on aggregate data found in the Federal

Reserve Bulletin. Compare this table to the balance

sheet reported by Wachovia found at www.wachovia.com

/investor/annualfinancials.asp. Does Wachovia have

more or less of its portfolio in loans than the average

bank? What type of loan is most common?

2. It is relatively easy to find up-to-date information on

banks because of their extensive reporting requirements.

Go to www2.fdic.gov/qbp/. This site is sponsored

by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

You will find summary data on financial institutions.

Go to the most recent Quarterly Banking Profile.

Scroll to the bottom and open Table 1-A.

a. Have banks’ return on assets been increasing or

decreasing over the last few years?

b. Has the core capital been increasing and how does

it compare to the capital ratio reported in Table 1

in the text?

c. How many institutions are currently reporting to

the FDIC?

An alternative method for measuring interest-rate risk, called duration gap analysis,

examines the sensitivity of the market value of the financial institution’s net worth to

changes in interest rates. Duration analysis is based on Macaulay’s concept of duration,

which measures the average lifetime of a security’s stream of payments (described in

the appendix to Chapter 4). Recall that duration is a useful concept, because it provides

a good approximation, particularly when interest-rate changes are small, of the

sensitivity of a security’s market value to a change in its interest rate using the following

formula:

(1)

where

%P (Pt 1 Pt)/Pt percent change in market value of the security

DUR duration

i interest rate

After having determined the duration of all assets and liabilities on the bank’s balance

sheet, the bank manager could use this formula to calculate how the market

value of each asset and liability changes when there is a change in interest rates and

then calculate the effect on net worth. There is, however, an easier way to go about

doing this, derived from the basic fact about duration we learned in the appendix to

Chapter 4: Duration is additive; that is, the duration of a portfolio of securities is the

weighted average of the durations of the individual securities, with the weights reflecting

the proportion of the portfolio invested in each. What this means is that the bank

manager can figure out the effect that interest-rate changes will have on the market

value of net worth by calculating the average duration for assets and for liabilities and

then using those figures to estimate the effects of interest-rate changes.

To see how a bank manager would do this, let’s return to the balance sheet of the

First National Bank. The bank manager has already used the procedures outlined in

the appendix to Chapter 4 to calculate the duration of each asset and liability, as listed

in Table 1. For each asset, the manager then calculates the weighted duration by multiplying

the duration times the amount of the asset divided by total assets, which in

this case is $100 million. For example, in the case of securities with maturities less

than one year, the manager multiplies the 0.4 year of duration times $5 million

divided by $100 million to get a weighted duration of 0.02. (Note that physical assets

have no cash payments, so they have a duration of zero years.) Doing this for all the

%P DUR

i

1 i

Duration Gap Analysis

appendix 1

to chapter 9

1

assets and adding them up, the bank manager gets a figure for the average duration

of the assets of 2.70 years.

The manager follows a similar procedure for the liabilities, noting that total liabilities

excluding capital are $95 million. For example, the weighted duration for

checkable deposits is determined by multiplying the 2.0-year duration by $15 million

divided by $95 million to get 0.32. Adding up these weighted durations, the manager

obtains an average duration of liabilities of 1.03 years.

Duration Gap Analysis

Weighted

Amount Duration Duration

($ millions) (years) (years)

Assets

Reserves and cash items 5 0.0 0.00

Securities

Less than 1 year 5 0.4 0.02

1 to 2 years 5 1.6 0.08

Greater than 2 years 10 7.0 0.70

Residential mortgages

Variable-rate 10 0.5 0.05

Fixed-rate (30-year) 10 6.0 0.60

Commercial loans

Less than 1 year 15 0.7 0.11

1 to 2 years 10 1.4 0.14

Greater than 2 years 25 4.0 1.00

Physical capital 5 0.0 0.00

Average duration 2.70

Liabilities

Checkable deposits 15 2.0 0.32

Money market deposit accounts 5 0.1 0.01

Savings deposits 15 1.0 0.16

CDs

Variable-rate 10 0.5 0.05

Less than 1 year 15 0.2 0.03

1 to 2 years 5 1.2 0.06

Greater than 2 years 5 2.7 0.14

Fed funds 5 0.0 0.00

Borrowings

Less than 1 year 10 0.3 0.03

1 to 2 years 5 1.3 0.07

Greater than 2 years 5 3.1 0.16

Average duration 1.03

Table 1 Duration of the First National Bank’s Assets and Liabilities

2

EXAMPLE 1: Duration Gap Analysis

The bank manager wants to know what happens when interest rates rise from 10% to

11%. The total asset value is $100 million, and the total liability value is $95 million.

Use Equation 1 to calculate the change in the market value of the assets and liabilities.

Solution

With a total asset value of $100 million, the market value of assets falls by $2.5 million

($100 million 0.025 $2.5 million):

%P DUR

where

DUR duration 2.70

i change in interest rate 0.11 0.10 0.01

i interest rate 0.10

Thus:

%P 2.70 0.025 2.5%

With total liabilities of $95 million, the market value of liabilities falls by $0.9 million

($95 million 0.009 $0.9 million):

%P DUR

where

DUR duration 1.03

i change in interest rate 0.11 0.10 0.01

i interest rate 0.10

Thus:

%P 1.03 0.009 0.9%

The result is that the net worth of the bank would decline by $1.6 million ($2.5

million ($0.9 million) $2.5 million $0.9 million $1.6 million).

The bank manager could have gotten to the answer even more quickly by calculating

what is called a duration gap, which is defined as follows:

DURgap DURa (2)

where DURa average duration of assets

DURl average duration of liabilities

L market value of liabilities

A market value of assets

L

A

DURl

0.01

1 0.10

i

1 i

0.01

1 0.10

i

1 i

3 Appendix 1 to Chapter 9

EXAMPLE 2: Duration Gap Analysis

Based on the information provided in Example 1, use Equation 2 to determine the duration

gap for First National Bank.

Solution

The duration gap for First National Bank is 1.72 years:

DURgap DURa

where

DURa average duration of assets 2.70

L market value of liabilities 95

A market value of assets 100

DURl average duration of liabilities 1.03

Thus:

DURgap 2.70 1.72 years

To estimate what will happen if interest rates change, the bank manager uses the

DURgap calculation in Equation 1 to obtain the change in the market value of net

worth as a percentage of total assets. In other words, the change in the market value

of net worth as a percentage of assets is calculated as:

DURgap (3)

EXAMPLE 3: Duration Gap Analysis

What is the change in the market value of net worth as a percentage of assets if interest

rates rise from 10% to 11%? (Use Equation 3.)

Solution

A rise in interest rates from 10% to 11% would lead to a change in the market value

of net worth as a percentage of assets of 1.6%:

DURgap

where

DURgap duration gap 1.72

i change in interest rate 0.11 0.10 0.01

i interest rate 0.10

Thus:

1.72 0.016 1.6%

0.01

1 0.10

NW

A

i

1 i

NW

A

i

1 i

NW

A

95

100

1.03

L

A

DURl

Duration Gap Analysis 4

With assets totaling $100 million, Example 3 indicates a fall in the market value

of net worth of $1.6 million, which is the same figure that we found in Example 1.

As our examples make clear, both income gap analysis and duration gap analysis

indicate that the First National Bank will suffer from a rise in interest rates. Indeed, in

this example, we have seen that a rise in interest rates from 10% to 11% will cause

the market value of net worth to fall by $1.6 million, which is one-third the initial

amount of bank capital. Thus the bank manager realizes that the bank faces substantial

interest-rate risk because a rise in interest rates could cause it to lose a lot of its

capital. Clearly, income gap analysis and duration gap analysis are useful tools for

telling a financial institution manager the institution’s degree of exposure to interestrate

risk.

Study Guide To make sure that you understand income gap and duration gap analysis, you should

be able to verify that if interest rates fall from 10% to 5%, the First National Bank will

find its income increasing and the market value of its net worth rising.

So far we have focused on an example involving a banking institution that has borrowed

short and lent long so that when interest rates rise, both income and the net

worth of the institution fall. It is important to recognize that income and duration gap

analysis applies equally to other financial institutions. Furthermore, it is important for

you to see that some financial institutions have income and duration gaps that are

opposite in sign to those of banks, so that when interest rates rise, both income and

net worth rise rather than fall. To get a more complete picture of income and duration

gap analysis, let us look at a nonbank financial institution, the Friendly Finance

Company, which specializes in making consumer loans.

The Friendly Finance Company has the following balance sheet:

The manager of the Friendly Finance Company calculates the rate-sensitive assets

to be equal to the $5 million of securities with maturities less than one year plus the

Example of a

Nonbanking

Financial

Institution

Appendix 1 to Chapter 9

Friendly Finance Company

Assets Liabilities

Cash and deposits $3 million Commercial paper $40 million

Securities Bank loans

Less than 1 year $5 million Less than 1 year $3 million

1 to 2 years $1 million 1 to 2 years $2 million

Greater than 2 years $1 million Greater than 2 years $5 million

Consumer loans Long-term bonds and

Less than 1 year $50 million other long-term debt $40 million

1 to 2 years $20 million Capital $10 million

Greater than 2 years $15 million

Physical capital $5 million

Total $100 million Total $100 million

5

$50 million of consumer loans with maturities of less than one year, for a total of $55

million of rate-sensitive assets. The manager then calculates the rate-sensitive liabilities

to be equal to the $40 million of commercial paper, all of which has a maturity of

less than one year, plus the $3 million of bank loans maturing in less than a year, for

a total of $43 million. The calculation of the income gap is then:

GAP RSA RSL $55 million $43 million $12 million

To calculate the effect on income if interest rates rise by 1%, the manager multiplies

the GAP of $12 million times the change in the interest rate to get the following:

I GAP i $12 million 1% $120,000

Thus the manager finds that the finance company’s income will rise by $120,000

when interest rates rise by 1%. The reason that the company has benefited from the

interest-rate rise, in contrast to the First National Bank, whose profits suffer from the

rise in interest rates, is that the Friendly Finance Company has a positive income gap

because it has more rate-sensitive assets than liabilities.

Like the bank manager, the manager of the Friendly Finance Company is also interested

in what happens to the market value of the net worth of the company when interest

rates rise by 1%. So the manager calculates the weighted duration of each item in the

balance sheet, adds them up as in Table 2, and obtains a duration for the assets of 1.16

years and for the liabilities, 2.77 years. The duration gap is then calculated to be:

Since the Friendly Finance Company has a negative duration gap, the manager realizes

that a rise in interest rates by 1 percentage point from 10% to 11% will increase

the market value of net worth of the firm. The manager checks this by calculating the

change in the market value of net worth as a percentage of assets:

With assets of $100 million, this calculation indicates that net worth will rise in market

value by $1.2 million.

Even though the income and duration gap analysis indicates that the Friendly

Finance Company gains from a rise in interest rates, the manager realizes that if interest

rates go in the other direction, the company will suffer a fall in income and market

value of net worth. Thus the finance company manager, like the bank manager,

realizes that the institution is subject to substantial interest-rate risk.

Although you might think that income and duration gap analysis is complicated

enough, further complications make a financial institution manager’s job even harder.

One assumption that we have been using in our discussion of income and duration

gap analysis is that when the level of interest rates changes, interest rates on all

maturities change by exactly the same amount. That is the same as saying that we conducted

our analysis under the assumption that the slope of the yield curve remains

unchanged. Indeed, the situation is even worse for duration gap analysis, because the

Some Problems

with Income and

Duration Gap

Analysis

NW DURgap

i

1 i

(1.33)

0.01

1 0.10

0.012 1.2%

DURgap DURa L

A

DURl 1.16 90

100

2.77 1.33 years

Duration Gap Analysis 6

duration gap is calculated assuming that interest rates for all maturities are the same—

in other words, the yield curve is assumed to be flat. As our discussion of the term

structure of interest rates in Chapter 6 indicated, however, the yield curve is not flat,

and the slope of the yield curve fluctuates and has a tendency to change when the

level of the interest rate changes. Thus to get a truly accurate assessment of interestrate

risk, a financial institution manager has to assess what might happen to the slope

of the yield curve when the level of the interest rate changes and then take this information

into account when assessing interest-rate risk. In addition, duration gap analysis

is based on the approximation in Equation 1 and thus only works well for small

changes in interest rates.

A problem with income gap analysis is that, as we have seen, the financial institution

manager must make estimates of the proportion of supposedly fixed-rate assets

and liabilities that may be rate-sensitive. This involves estimates of the likelihood of

prepayment of loans or customer shifts out of deposits when interest rates change.

Such guesses are not easy to make, and as a result, the financial institution manager’s

estimates of income gaps may not be very accurate. A similar problem occurs in cal-

Appendix 1 to Chapter 9

Weighted

Amount Duration Duration

($ millions) (years) (years)

Assets

Cash and deposits 3 0.0 0.00

Securities

Less than 1 year 5 0.5 0.05

1 to 2 years 1 1.7 0.02

Greater than 2 years 1 9.0 0.09

Consumer loans

Less than 1 year 50 0.5 0.25

1 to 2 years 20 1.5 0.30

Greater than 2 years 15 3.0 0.45

Physical capital 5 0.0 0.00

Average duration 1.16

Liabilities

Commercial paper 40 0.2 0.09

Bank loans

Less than 1 year 3 0.3 0.01

1 to 2 years 2 1.6 0.04

Greater than 2 years 5 3.5 0.19

Long-term bonds and other

long-term debt 40 5.5 2.44

Average duration 2.77

Table 2 Duration of the Friendly Finance Company’s Assets and Liabilities

7

culating durations of assets and liabilities, because many of the cash payments are

uncertain. Thus the estimate of the duration gap might not be accurate either.

Do these problems mean that managers of banks and other financial institutions

should give up on gap analysis as a tool for measuring interest-rate risk? Financial

institutions do use more sophisticated approaches to measuring interest-rate risk,

such as scenario analysis and value-at-risk analysis, which make greater use of computers

to more accurately measure changes in prices of assets when interest rates

change. Income and duration gap analyses, however, still provide simple frameworks

to help financial institution managers to get a first assessment of interest-rate risk, and

they are thus useful tools in the financial institution manager’s toolkit.

Duration Gap Analysis

Application Strategies for Managing Interest-Rate Risk

Once financial institution managers have done the duration and income gap

analysis for their institutions, they must decide which alternative strategies to

pursue. If the manager of the First National Bank firmly believes that interest

rates will fall in the future, he or she may be willing to take no action

knowing that the bank has more rate-sensitive liabilities than rate-sensitive

assets, and so will benefit from the expected interest-rate decline. However,

the bank manager also realizes that the First National Bank is subject to substantial

interest-rate risk, because there is always a possibility that interest

rates will rise rather than fall, and as we have seen, this outcome could bankrupt

the bank. The manager might try to shorten the duration of the bank’s

assets to increase their rate sensitivity either by purchasing assets of shorter

maturity or by converting fixed-rate loans into adjustable-rate loans.

Alternatively, the bank manager could lengthen the duration of the liabilities.

With these adjustments to the bank’s assets and liabilities, the bank would be

less affected by interest-rate swings.

For example, the bank manager might decide to eliminate the income

gap by increasing the amount of rate-sensitive assets to $49.5 million to

equal the $49.5 million of rate-sensitive liabilities. Or the manager could

reduce rate-sensitive liabilities to $32 million so that they equal rate-sensitive

assets. In either case, the income gap would now be zero, so a change in

interest rates would have no effect on bank profits in the coming year.

Alternatively, the bank manager might decide to immunize the market

value of the bank’s net worth completely from interest-rate risk by adjusting

assets and liabilities so that the duration gap is equal to zero. To do this, the

manager can set DURgap equal to zero in Equation 2 and solve for DURa:

DURa DURl 1.03 0.98

These calculations reveal that the manager should reduce the average duration

of the bank’s assets to 0.98 year. To check that the duration gap is set

equal to zero, the calculation is:

DURgap 0.98 0 95

100

1.03

95

100

L

A

8

Appendix 1 to Chapter 9

In this case, as in Equation 3, the market value of net worth would remain

unchanged when interest rates change. Alternatively, the bank manager could

calculate the value of the duration of the liabilities that would produce a

duration gap of zero. To do this would involve setting DURgap equal to zero

in Equation 2 and solving for DURl:

DURl DURa 2.70 2.84

This calculation reveals that the interest-rate risk could also be eliminated

by increasing the average duration of the bank’s liabilities to 2.84 years.

The manager again checks that the duration gap is set equal to zero by calculating:

DURgap 2.70 0

Study Guide To see if you understand how a financial institution manager can protect

income and net worth from interest-rate risk, first calculate how the Friendly

Finance Company might change the amount of its rate-sensitive assets or its

rate-sensitive liabilities to eliminate the income gap. You should find that the

income gap can be eliminated either by reducing the amount of rate-sensitive

assets to $43 million or by raising the amount of rate-sensitive liabilities to

$55 million. Also do the calculations to determine what modifications to the

duration of the assets or liabilities would immunize the market value of

Friendly Finance’s net worth from interest-rate risk. You should find that

interest-rate risk would be eliminated if the duration of the assets were set to

2.49 years or if the duration of the liabilities were set to 1.29 years.

One problem with eliminating a financial institution’s interest-rate risk

by altering the balance sheet is that doing so might be very costly in the

short run. The financial institution may be locked into assets and liabilities

of particular durations because of its field of expertise. Fortunately, recently

developed financial instruments, such as financial futures, options, and

interest-rate swaps, help financial institutions manage their interest-rate risk

without requiring them to rearrange their balance sheets. We discuss these

instruments and how they can be used to manage interest-rate risk in

Chapter 13.

95

100

2.84

100

95

A

L

9

To understand how well a bank is doing, we need to start by looking at a bank’s

income statement, the description of the sources of income and expenses that affect

the bank’s profitability.

The end-of-year 2002 income statement for all federally insured commercial banks

appears in Table 1.

Operating Income. Operating income is the income that comes from a bank’s ongoing

operations. Most of a bank’s operating income is generated by interest on its assets,

particularly loans. As we see in Table 1, in 2002 interest income represented 67.6%

of commercial banks’ operating income. Interest income fluctuates with the level of

interest rates, and so its percentage of operating income is highest when interest rates

are at peak levels. That is exactly what happened in 1981, when interest rates rose

above 15% and interest income rose to 93% of total bank operating income.

Noninterest income is generated partly by service charges on deposit accounts, but

the bulk of it comes from the off-balance-sheet activities, which generate fees or trading

profits for the bank. The importance of these off-balance-sheet activities to bank

profits has been growing in recent years. Whereas in 1980 other noninterest income

from off-balance-sheet activities represented only 5% of operating income, it reached

26.8% in 2002.

Operating Expenses. Operating expenses are the expenses incurred in conducting the

bank’s ongoing operations. An important component of a bank’s operating expenses

is the interest payments that it must make on its liabilities, particularly on its deposits.

Just as interest income varies with the level of interest rates, so do interest expenses.

Interest expenses as a percentage of total operating expenses reached a peak of 74%

in 1981, when interest rates were at their highest, and fell to 30.1% in 2002 as interest

rates moved lower. Noninterest expenses include the costs of running a banking

business: salaries for tellers and officers, rent on bank buildings, purchases of equipment

such as desks and vaults, and servicing costs of equipment such as computers.

The final item listed under operating expenses is provisions for loan losses. When

a bank has a bad debt or anticipates that a loan might become a bad debt in the future,

it can write up the loss as a current expense in its income statement under the “provision

for loan losses” heading. Provisions for loan losses are directly related to loan

loss reserves. When a bank wants to increase its loan loss reserves account by, say, $1

million, it does this by adding $1 million to its provisions for loan losses. Loan loss

Bank’s Income

Statement

Measuring Bank Performance

appendix 2

to chapter 9

1

reserves rise when this is done because by increasing expenses when losses have not

yet occurred, earnings are being set aside to deal with the losses in the future.

Provisions for loan losses have been a major element in fluctuating bank profits

in recent years. The 1980s brought the third-world debt crisis; a sharp decline in

energy prices in 1986, which caused substantial losses on loans to energy producers;

and a collapse in the real estate market. As a result, provisions for loan losses were

particularly high in the late 1980s, reaching a peak of 13% of operating expenses in

Appendix 2 to Chapter 9

Share of

Operating

Amount Income or

($ billions) Expenses (%)

Operating Income

Interest income 357.7 67.6

Interest on loans 266.3 50.3

Interest on securities 60.1 11.4

Other interest 31.3 5.9

Noninterest income 171.4 32.4

Service charges on deposit accounts 29.7 5.6

Other noninterest income 141.7 26.8

Total operating income 529.1 100.0

Operating Expenses

Interest expenses 120.8 30.1

Interest on deposits 82.3 20.5

Interest on fed funds and repos 10.4 2.6

Other 28.1 7.0

Noninterest expenses 232.6 57.9

Salaries and employee benefits 100.4 25.0

Premises and equipment 29.4 7.3

Other 102.8 25.6

Provisions for loan losses 48.0 12.0

Total operating expense 401.4 100.0

Net Operating Income 127.7

Gains (losses) on securities 6.5

Extraordinary items, net 0.0

Income taxes –44.1

Net Income 90.1

Source: www.fdic.gov/banks/statistical/statistics/0106/cbr

Table 1 Income Statement for All Federally Insured Commercial Banks, 2002

2

1987. Since then, losses on loans have begun to subside, and in 2002, provisions for

loan losses dropped to 12% of operating expenses.

Income. Subtracting the $401.4 billion in operating expenses from the $529.1 billion

of operating income in 2002 yields net operating income of $127.7 billion. Net

operating income is closely watched by bank managers, bank shareholders, and bank

regulators because it indicates how well the bank is doing on an ongoing basis.

Two items, gains (or losses) on securities sold by banks ($6.5 billion) and net

extraordinary items, which are events or transactions that are both unusual and infrequent

(insignificant), are added to the $127.7 billion net operating income figure to

get the $134.2 billion figure for net income before taxes. Net income before taxes is

more commonly referred to as profits before taxes. Subtracting the $44.1 billion of

income taxes then results in $90.1 billion of net income. Net income, more commonly

referred to as profits after taxes, is the figure that tells us most directly how well

the bank is doing because it is the amount that the bank has available to keep as

retained earnings or to pay out to stockholders as dividends.

Although net income gives us an idea of how well a bank is doing, it suffers from one

major drawback: It does not adjust for the bank’s size, thus making it hard to compare

how well one bank is doing relative to another. A basic measure of bank profitability

that corrects for the size of the bank is the return on assets (ROA), mentioned

earlier in the chapter, which divides the net income of the bank by the amount of its

assets. ROA is a useful measure of how well a bank manager is doing on the job

because it indicates how well a bank’s assets are being used to generate profits. At the

beginning of 2003, the assets of all federally insured commercial banks amounted to

$7,075 billion, so using the $90.1 billion net income figure from Table 1 gives us a

return on assets of:

ROA 0.0127 1.27%

Although ROA provides useful information about bank profitability, we have

already seen that it is not what the bank’s owners (equity holders) care about most.

They are more concerned about how much the bank is earning on their equity investment,

an amount that is measured by the return on equity (ROE), the net income per

dollar of equity capital. At the beginning of 2003, equity capital for all federally

insured commercial banks was $647.9 billion, so the ROE was therefore:

0.1391 13.91%

Another commonly watched measure of bank performance is called the net interest

margin (NIM), the difference between interest income and interest expenses as a

percentage of total assets:

As we have seen earlier in the chapter, one of a bank’s primary intermediation

functions is to issue liabilities and use the proceeds to purchase income-earning

assets. If a bank manager has done a good job of asset and liability management such

that the bank earns substantial income on its assets and has low costs on its liabilities,

NIM

interest income interest expenses

assets

ROE

net income

capital

90.1

647.9

net income

assets

90.1

7,075

Measures of Bank

Performance

Measuring Bank Performance 3

profits will be high. How well a bank manages its assets and liabilities is affected by

the spread between the interest earned on the bank’s assets and the interest costs on

its liabilities. This spread is exactly what the net interest margin measures. If the bank

is able to raise funds with liabilities that have low interest costs and is able to acquire

assets with high interest income, the net interest margin will be high, and the bank is

likely to be highly profitable. If the interest cost of its liabilities rises relative to the

interest earned on its assets, the net interest margin will fall, and bank profitability

will suffer.

Table 2 provides measures of return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and the

net interest margin (NIM) for all federally insured commercial banks from 1980 to

2002. Because the relationship between bank equity capital and total assets for all

commercial banks remained fairly stable in the 1980s, both the ROA and ROE meas-

Recent Trends in

Bank Performance

Measures

Appendix 2 to Chapter 9

Return on Return on Net Interest

Year Assets (ROA) (%) Equity (ROE) (%) Margin (NIM)(%)

1980 0.77 13.38 3.33

1981 0.79 13.68 3.31

1982 0.73 12.55 3.39

1983 0.68 11.60 3.34

1984 0.66 11.04 3.47

1985 0.72 11.67 3.62

1986 0.64 10.30 3.48

1987 0.09 1.54 3.40

1988 0.82 13.74 3.57

1989 0.50 7.92 3.58

1990 0.49 7.81 3.50

1991 0.53 8.25 3.60

1992 0.94 13.86 3.89

1993 1.23 16.30 3.97

1994 1.20 15.00 3.95

1995 1.17 14.66 4.29

1996 1.19 14.45 4.27

1997 1.23 14.69 4.21

1998 1.18 13.30 3.47

1999 1.31 15.31 4.07

2000 1.19 14.02 3.95

2001 1.13 12.45 3.28

2002 1.27 13.91 3.34

Source: www2.fdic.gov/qbp

Table 2 Measures of Bank Performance, 1980–2002

4

ures of bank performance move closely together and indicate that from the early to

the late 1980s, there was a sharp decline in bank profitability. The rightmost column,

net interest margin, indicates that the spread between interest income and interest

expenses remained fairly stable throughout the 1980s and even improved in the late

1980s and early 1990s, which should have helped bank profits. The NIM measure

thus tells us that the poor bank performance in the late 1980s was not the result of

interest-rate movements.

The explanation of the weak performance of commercial banks in the late 1980s

is that they had made many risky loans in the early 1980s that turned sour. The

resulting huge increase in loan loss provisions in that period directly decreased net

income and hence caused the fall in ROA and ROE. (Why bank profitability deteriorated

and the consequences for the economy are discussed in Chapters 9 and 11.)

Beginning in 1992, bank performance improved substantially. The return on

equity rose to nearly 14% in 1992 and remained above 12% in the 1993–2003

period. Similarly, the return on assets rose from the 0.5% level in the 1990–1991

period to around the 1.2% level in 1993–2003. The performance measures in Table

2 suggest that the banking industry has returned to health.

Measuring Bank Performance 5

PREVIEW The operations of individual banks (how they acquire, use, and manage funds to

make a profit) are roughly similar throughout the world. In all countries, banks are

financial intermediaries in the business of earning profits. When you consider the

structure and operation of the banking industry as a whole, however, the United

States is in a class by itself. In most countries, four or five large banks typically dominate

the banking industry, but in the United States there are on the order of 8,000

commercial banks, 1,500 savings and loan associations, 400 mutual savings banks,

and 10,000 credit unions.

Is more better? Does this diversity mean that the American banking system is

more competitive and therefore more economically efficient and sound than banking

systems in other countries? What in the American economic and political system

explains this large number of banking institutions? In this chapter, we try to answer

these questions by examining the historical trends in the banking industry and its

overall structure.

We start by examining the historical development of the banking system and how

financial innovation has increased the competitive environment for the banking

industry and is causing fundamental changes in it. We then go on to look at the commercial

banking industry in detail and then discuss the thrift industry, which includes

savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and credit unions. We spend

more time on commercial banks because they are by far the largest depository institutions,

accounting for over two-thirds of the deposits in the banking system. In addition

to looking at our domestic banking system, we also examine the forces behind

the growth in international banking to see how it has affected us in the United States.

Historical Development of the Banking System

The modern commercial banking industry in the Unted States began when the Bank

of North America was chartered in Philadelphia in 1782. With the success of this

bank, other banks opened for business, and the American banking industry was off

and running. (As a study aid, Figure 1 provides a time line of the most important

dates in the history of American banking before World War II.)

A major controversy involving the industry in its early years was whether the federal

government or the states should charter banks. The Federalists, particularly

Alexander Hamilton, advocated greater centralized control of banking and federal

229

Chap ter

Banking Industry: Structure

and Competition

10

chartering of banks. Their efforts led to the creation in 1791 of the Bank of the United

States, which had elements of both a private and a central bank, a government institution

that has responsibility for the amount of money and credit supplied in the

economy as a whole. Agricultural and other interests, however, were quite suspicious

of centralized power and hence advocated chartering by the states. Furthermore, their

distrust of moneyed interests in the big cities led to political pressures to eliminate the

Bank of the United States, and in 1811 their efforts met with success, when its charter

was not renewed. Because of abuses by state banks and the clear need for a central

bank to help the federal government raise funds during the War of 1812,

Congress was stimulated to create the Second Bank of the United States in 1816.

Tensions between advocates and opponents of centralized banking power were a

recurrent theme during the operation of this second attempt at central banking in the

United States, and with the election of Andrew Jackson, a strong advocate of states’

rights, the fate of the Second Bank was sealed. After the election in 1832, Jackson

vetoed the rechartering of the Second Bank of the United States as a national bank,

and its charter lapsed in 1836.

Until 1863, all commercial banks in the United States were chartered by the

banking commission of the state in which each operated. No national currency

existed, and banks obtained funds primarily by issuing banknotes (currency circulated

by the banks that could be redeemed for gold). Because banking regulations were

230 PART I I I Financial Institutions

FIGURE 1 Time Line of the Early History of Commercial Banking in the United States

Bank of North America is chartered.

Bank of the United States is chartered.

Bank of the United States’

charter is allowed to lapse.

Second Bank of the

United States is chartered.

Andrew Jackson vetoes rechartering

of Second Bank of the United States;

charter lapses in 1836.

National Bank Act of 1863

establishes national banks

and Office of the Comptroller

of the Currency.

Federal Reserve Act of 1913

creates Federal Reserve System.

Banking Act of 1933

(Glass-Steagall) creates

Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation (FDIC) and separates

banking and securities industries.

1782 1791 1811 1816 1832 1863 1913 1933

extremely lax in many states, banks regularly failed due to fraud or lack of sufficient

bank capital; their banknotes became worthless.

To eliminate the abuses of the state-chartered banks (called state banks), the

National Bank Act of 1863 (and subsequent amendments to it) created a new banking

system of federally chartered banks (called national banks), supervised by the

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, a department of the U.S. Treasury. This legislation

was originally intended to dry up sources of funds to state banks by imposing

a prohibitive tax on their banknotes while leaving the banknotes of the federally

chartered banks untaxed. The state banks cleverly escaped extinction by acquiring

funds through deposits. As a result, today the United States has a dual banking system

in which banks supervised by the federal government and banks supervised by

the states operate side by side.

Central banking did not reappear in this country until the Federal Reserve System

(the Fed) was created in 1913 to promote an even safer banking system. All national

banks were required to become members of the Federal Reserve System and became

subject to a new set of regulations issued by the Fed. State banks could choose (but

were not required) to become members of the system, and most did not because of

the high costs of membership stemming from the Fed’s regulations.

During the Great Depression years 1930–1933, some 9,000 bank failures wiped

out the savings of many depositors at commercial banks. To prevent future depositor

losses from such failures, banking legislation in 1933 established the Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which provided federal insurance on bank deposits.

Member banks of the Federal Reserve System were required to purchase FDIC insurance

for their depositors, and non–Federal Reserve commercial banks could choose

to buy this insurance (almost all of them did). The purchase of FDIC insurance made

banks subject to another set of regulations imposed by the FDIC.

Because investment banking activities of the commercial banks were blamed for

many bank failures, provisions in the banking legislation in 1933 (also known as the

Glass-Steagall Act) prohibited commercial banks from underwriting or dealing in corporate

securities (though allowing them to sell new issues of government securities)

and limited banks to the purchase of debt securities approved by the bank regulatory

agencies. Likewise, it prohibited investment banks from engaging in commercial

banking activities. In effect, the Glass-Steagall Act separated the activities of commercial

banks from those of the securities industry.

Under the conditions of the Glass-Steagall Act, which was repealed in 1999, commercial

banks had to sell off their investment banking operations. The First National Bank

of Boston, for example, spun off its investment banking operations into the First Boston

Corporation, now part of one of the most important investment banking firms in America,

Credit Suisse First Boston. Investment banking firms typically discontinued their deposit

business, although J. P. Morgan discontinued its investment banking business and reorganized

as a commercial bank; however, some senior officers of J. P. Morgan went on to

organize Morgan Stanley, another one of the largest investment banking firms today.

Commercial bank regulation in the United States has developed into a crazy quilt of

multiple regulatory agencies with overlapping jurisdictions. The Office of the Comptroller

of the Currency has the primary supervisory responsibility for the 2,100 national

banks that own more than half of the assets in the commercial banking system. The

Federal Reserve and the state banking authorities have joint primary responsibility for

the 1,200 state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System. The Fed also

Multiple

Regulatory

Agencies

C H A P T E R 1 0 Banking Industry: Structure and Competition 231

www.fdic.gov/bank/index.htm

The FDIC gathers data about

individual financial institutions

and the banking industry.

has regulatory responsibility over companies that own one or more banks (called

bank holding companies) and secondary responsibility for the national banks. The

FDIC and the state banking authorities jointly supervise the 5,800 state banks that

have FDIC insurance but are not members of the Federal Reserve System. The state

banking authorities have sole jurisdiction over the fewer than 500 state banks without

FDIC insurance. (Such banks hold less than 0.2% of the deposits in the commercial

banking system.)

If you find the U.S. bank regulatory system confusing, imagine how confusing it

is for the banks, which have to deal with multiple regulatory agencies. Several proposals

have been raised by the U.S. Treasury to rectify this situation by centralizing

the regulation of all depository institutions under one independent agency. However,

none of these proposals has been successful in Congress, and whether there will be

regulatory consolidation in the future is highly uncertain.

Financial Innovation and the Evolution of the Banking Industry

To understand how the banking industry has evolved over time, we must first understand

the process of financial innovation, which has transformed the entire financial

system. Like other industries, the financial industry is in business to earn profits by

selling its products. If a soap company perceives that there is a need in the marketplace

for a laundry detergent with fabric softener, it develops a product to fit the need.

Similarly, to maximize their profits, financial institutions develop new products to satisfy

their own needs as well as those of their customers; in other words, innovation—

which can be extremely beneficial to the economy—is driven by the desire to get (or

stay) rich. This view of the innovation process leads to the following simple analysis:

A change in the financial environment will stimulate a search by financial institutions

for innovations that are likely to be profitable.

Starting in the 1960s, individuals and financial institutions operating in financial

markets were confronted with drastic changes in the economic environment: Inflation

and interest rates climbed sharply and became harder to predict, a situation that

changed demand conditions in financial markets. The rapid advance in computer

technology changed supply conditions. In addition, financial regulations became

more burdensome. Financial institutions found that many of the old ways of doing

business were no longer profitable; the financial services and products they had been

offering to the public were not selling. Many financial intermediaries found that they

were no longer able to acquire funds with their traditional financial instruments, and

without these funds they would soon be out of business. To survive in the new economic

environment, financial institutions had to research and develop new products

and services that would meet customer needs and prove profitable, a process referred

to as financial engineering. In their case, necessity was the mother of innovation.

Our discussion of why financial innovation occurs suggests that there are three

basic types of financial innovation: responses to changes in demand conditions,

responses to changes in supply conditions, and avoidance of regulations. Now that we

have a framework for understanding why financial institutions produce innovations,

let’s look at examples of how financial institutions in their search for profits have produced

financial innovations of the three basic types.

232 PART I I I Financial Institutions

The most significant change in the economic environment that altered the demand

for financial products in recent years has been the dramatic increase in the volatility

of interest rates. In the 1950s, the interest rate on three-month Treasury bills

fluctuated between 1.0% and 3.5%; in the 1970s, it fluctuated between 4.0% and

11.5%; in the 1980s, it ranged from 5% to over 15%. Large fluctuations in interest

rates lead to substantial capital gains or losses and greater uncertainty about

returns on investments. Recall that the risk that is related to the uncertainty about

interest-rate movements and returns is called interest-rate risk, and high volatility

of interest rates, such as we saw in the 1970s and 1980s, leads to a higher level of

interest-rate risk.

We would expect the increase in interest-rate risk to increase the demand for

financial products and services that could reduce that risk. This change in the

economic environment would thus stimulate a search for profitable innovations by

financial institutions that meet this new demand and would spur the creation of new

financial instruments that help lower interest-rate risk. Two examples of financial

innovations that appeared in the 1970s confirm this prediction: the development of

adjustable-rate mortgages and financial derivations.

Adjustable-Rate Mortgages. Like other investors, financial institutions find that lending

is more attractive if interest-rate risk is lower. They would not want to make a

mortgage loan at a 10% interest rate and two months later find that they could obtain

12% in interest on the same mortgage. To reduce interest-rate risk, in 1975 savings

and loans in California began to issue adjustable-rate mortgages; that is, mortgage

loans on which the interest rate changes when a market interest rate (usually the

Treasury bill rate) changes. Initially, an adjustable-rate mortgage might have a 5%

interest rate. In six months, this interest rate might increase or decrease by the amount

of the increase or decrease in, say, the six-month Treasury bill rate, and the mortgage

payment would change. Because adjustable-rate mortgages allow mortgage-issuing

institutions to earn higher interest rates on mortgages when rates rise, profits are kept

higher during these periods.

This attractive feature of adjustable-rate mortgages has encouraged mortgageissuing

institutions to issue adjustable-rate mortgages with lower initial interest rates

than on conventional fixed-rate mortgages, making them popular with many households.

However, because the mortgage payment on a variable-rate mortgage can

increase, many households continue to prefer fixed-rate mortgages. Hence both types

of mortgages are widespread.

Financial Derivatives. Given the greater demand for the reduction of interest-rate

risk, commodity exchanges such as the Chicago Board of Trade recognized that if they

could develop a product that would help investors and financial institutions to protect

themselves from, or hedge, interest-rate risk, then they could make profits by

selling this new instrument. Futures contracts, in which the seller agrees to provide

a certain standardized commodity to the buyer on a specific future date at an agreedon

price, had been around for a long time. Officials at the Chicago Board of Trade realized

that if they created futures contracts in financial instruments, which are called

financial derivatives because their payoffs are linked to previously issued securities,

they could be used to hedge risk. Thus in 1975, financial derivatives were born. We

will study financial derivatives later in the book, in Chapter 13.

Responses to

Changes in

Demand

Conditions:

Interest Rate

Volatility

C H A P T E R 1 0 Banking Industry: Structure and Competition 233

The most important source of the changes in supply conditions that stimulate financial

innovation has been the improvement in computer and telecommunications technology.

This technology, called information technology, has had two effects. First, it has

lowered the cost of processing financial transactions, making it profitable for financial

institutions to create new financial products and services for the public. Second, it has

made it easier for investors to acquire information, thereby making it easier for firms

to issue securities. The rapid developments in information technology have resulted

in many new financial products and services that we examine here.

Bank Credit and Debit Cards. Credit cards have been around since well before World

War II. Many individual stores (Sears, Macy’s, Goldwater’s) institutionalized charge

accounts by providing customers with credit cards that allowed them to make purchases

at these stores without cash. Nationwide credit cards were not established until

after World War II, when Diners Club developed one to be used in restaurants all over

the country (and abroad). Similar credit card programs were started by American

Express and Carte Blanche, but because of the high cost of operating these programs,

cards were issued only to selected persons and businesses that could afford expensive

purchases.

A firm issuing credit cards earns income from loans it makes to credit card holders

and from payments made by stores on credit card purchases (a percentage of the

purchase price, say 5%). A credit card program’s costs arise from loan defaults, stolen

cards, and the expense involved in processing credit card transactions.

Seeing the success of Diners Club, American Express, and Carte Blanche, bankers

wanted to share in the profitable credit card business. Several commercial banks

attempted to expand the credit card business to a wider market in the 1950s, but the

cost per transaction of running these programs was so high that their early attempts

failed.

In the late 1960s, improved computer technology, which lowered the transaction

costs for providing credit card services, made it more likely that bank credit card programs

would be profitable. The banks tried to enter this business again, and this time

their efforts led to the creation of two successful bank credit card programs:

BankAmericard (originally started by the Bank of America but now an independent

organization called Visa) and MasterCharge (now MasterCard, run by the Interbank

Card Association). These programs have become phenomenally successful; more than

200 million of their cards are in use. Indeed, bank credit cards have been so profitable

that nonfinancial institutions such as Sears (which launched the Discover card), General

Motors, and AT&T have also entered the credit card business. Consumers have benefited

because credit cards are more widely accepted than checks to pay for purchases

(particularly abroad), and they allow consumers to take out loans more easily.

The success of bank credit cards has led these institutions to come up with a new

financial innovation, debit cards. Debit cards often look just like credit cards and can

be used to make purchases in an identical fashion. However, in contrast to credit

cards, which extend the purchaser a loan that does not have to be paid off immediately,

a debit card purchase is immediately deducted from the card holder’s bank

account. Debit cards depend even more on low costs of processing transactions, since

their profits are generated entirely from the fees paid by merchants on debit card purchases

at their stores. Debit cards have grown increasingly popular in recent years.

Electronic Banking. The wonders of modern computer technology have also enabled

banks to lower the cost of bank transactions by having the customer interact with an

Responses to

Changes in

Supply

Conditions:

Information

Technology

234 PART I I I Financial Institutions

electronic banking (e-banking) facility rather than with a human being. One important

form of an e-banking facility is the automated teller machine (ATM), an electronic

machine that allows customers to get cash, make deposits, transfer funds from

one account to another, and check balances. The ATM has the advantage that it does

not have to be paid overtime and never sleeps, thus being available for use 24 hours

a day. Not only does this result in cheaper transactions for the bank, but it also provides

more convenience for the customer. Furthermore, because of their low cost,

ATMs can be put at locations other than a bank or its branches, further increasing customer

convenience. The low cost of ATMs has meant that they have sprung up everywhere

and now number over 250,000 in the United States alone. Furthermore, it is

now as easy to get foreign currency from an ATM when you are traveling in Europe

as it is to get cash from your local bank. In addition, transactions with ATMs are so

much cheaper for the bank than ones conducted with human tellers that some banks

charge customers less if they use the ATM than if they use a human teller.

With the drop in the cost of telecommunications, banks have developed another

financial innovation, home banking. It is now cost-effective for banks to set up an electronic

banking facility in which the bank’s customer is linked up with the bank’s computer

to carry out transactions by using either a telephone or a personal computer.

Now a bank’s customers can conduct many of their bank transactions without ever

leaving the comfort of home. The advantage for the customer is the convenience of

home banking, while banks find that the cost of transactions is substantially less than

having the customer come to the bank. The success of ATMs and home banking has

led to another innovation, the automated banking machine (ABM), which combines

in one location an ATM, an Internet connection to the bank’s web site, and a telephone

link to customer service.

With the decline in the price of personal computers and their increasing presence

in the home, we have seen a further innovation in the home banking area, the appearance

of a new type of banking institution, the virtual bank, a bank that has no physical

location but rather exists only in cyberspace. In 1995, Security First Network

Bank, based in Atlanta but now owned by Royal Bank of Canada, became the first virtual

bank, planning to offer an array of banking services on the Internet—accepting

checking account and savings deposits, selling certificates of deposits, issuing ATM

cards, providing bill-paying facilities, and so on. The virtual bank thus takes home

banking one step further, enabling the customer to have a full set of banking services

at home 24 hours a day. In 1996, Bank of America and Wells Fargo entered the virtual

banking market, to be followed by many others, with Bank of America now being

the largest Internet bank in the United States. Will virtual banking be the predominant

form of banking in the future (see Box 1)?

Junk Bonds. Before the advent of computers and advanced telecommunications, it

was difficult to acquire information about the financial situation of firms that might

want to sell securities. Because of the difficulty in screening out bad from good credit

risks, the only firms that were able to sell bonds were very well established corporations

that had high credit ratings.1 Before the 1980s, then, only corporations that could

issue bonds with ratings of Baa or above could raise funds by selling newly issued

bonds. Some firms that had fallen on bad times, so-called fallen angels, had previously

C H A P T E R 1 0 Banking Industry: Structure and Competition 235

1The discussion of adverse selection problems in Chapter 8 provides a more detailed analysis of why only wellestablished

firms with high credit ratings were able to sell securities.

issued long-term corporate bonds that now had ratings that had fallen below Baa,

bonds that were pejoratively dubbed “junk bonds.”

With the improvement in information technology in the 1970s, it became easier

for investors to screen out bad from good credit risks, thus making it more likely that

they would buy long-term debt securities from less well known corporations with

lower credit ratings. With this change in supply conditions, we would expect that

some smart individual would pioneer the concept of selling new public issues of junk

bonds, not for fallen angels but for companies that had not yet achieved investmentgrade

status. This is exactly what Michael Milken of Drexel Burnham, an investment

banking firm, started to do in 1977. Junk bonds became an important factor in the

corporate bond market, with the amount outstanding exceeding $200 billion by the

late 1980s. Although there was a sharp slowdown in activity in the junk bond market

after Milken was indicted for securities law violations in 1989, it heated up again

in the 1990s.

Commercial Paper Market. Commercial paper is a short-term debt security issued by

large banks and corporations. The commercial paper market has undergone tremendous

growth since 1970, when there was $33 billion outstanding, to over $1.3 trillion

outstanding at the end of 2002. Indeed, commercial paper has been one of the

fastest-growing money market instruments.

236 PART I I I Financial Institutions

Will “Clicks” Dominate “Bricks” in the Banking Industry?

With the advent of virtual banks (“clicks”) and the

convenience they provide, a key question is whether

they will become the primary form in which banks

do their business, eliminating the need for physical

bank branches (“bricks”) as the main delivery mechanism

for banking services. Indeed, will stand-alone

Internet banks be the wave of the future?

The answer seems to be no. Internet-only banks

such as Wingspan (owned by Bank One), First-e

(Dublin-based), and Egg (a British Internet-only bank

owned by Prudential) have had disappointing revenue

growth and profits. The result is that pure

online banking has not been the success that proponents

had hoped for. Why has Internet banking been

a disappointment?

There have been several strikes against Internet

banking. First, bank depositors want to know that

their savings are secure, and so are reluctant to put

their money into new institutions without a long track

record. Second, customers worry about the security of

their online transactions and whether their transactions

will truly be kept private. Traditional banks are

viewed as being more secure and trustworthy in terms

of releasing private information. Third, customers may

prefer services provided by physical branches. For

example, banking customers seem to prefer to purchase

long-term savings products face-to-face. Fourth,

Internet banking has run into technical problems—

server crashes, slow connections over phone lines,

mistakes in conducting transactions—that will probably

diminish over time as technology improves.

The wave of the future thus does not appear to be

pure Internet banks. Instead it looks like “clicks and

bricks” will be the predominant form of banking, in

which online banking is used to complement the

services provided by traditional banks. Nonetheless,

the delivery of banking services is undergoing massive

changes, with more and more banking services

delivered over the Internet and the number of physical

bank branches likely to decline in the future.

Box 1: E-Finance

Improvements in information technology also help provide an explanation for the

rapid rise of the commercial paper market. We have seen that the improvement in

information technology made it easier for investors to screen out bad from good credit

risks, thus making it easier for corporations to issue debt securities. Not only did this

make it easier for corporations to issue long-term debt securities as in the junk bond

market, but it also meant that they could raise funds by issuing short-term debt securities

like commercial paper more easily. Many corporations that used to do their

short-term borrowing from banks now frequently raise short-term funds in the commercial

paper market instead.

The development of money market mutual funds has been another factor in the

rapid growth in the commercial paper market. Because money market mutual funds

need to hold liquid, high-quality, short-term assets such as commercial paper, the

growth of assets in these funds to around $2.1 trillion has created a ready market in

commercial paper. The growth of pension and other large funds that invest in commercial

paper has also stimulated the growth of this market.

Securitization. An important example of a financial innovation arising from improvements

in both transaction and information technology is securitization, one of the most

important financial innovations in the past two decades. Securitization is the process

of transforming otherwise illiquid financial assets (such as residential mortgages, auto

loans, and credit card receivables), which have typically been the bread and butter of

banking institutions, into marketable capital market securities. As we have seen,

improvements in the ability to acquire information have made it easier to sell marketable

capital market securities. In addition, with low transaction costs because of

improvements in computer technology, financial institutions find that they can cheaply

bundle together a portfolio of loans (such as mortgages) with varying small denominations

(often less than $100,000), collect the interest and principal payments on the

mortgages in the bundle, and then “pass them through” (pay them out) to third parties.

By dividing the portfolio of loans into standardized amounts, the financial institution

can then sell the claims to these interest and principal payments to third parties

as securities. The standardized amounts of these securitized loans make them liquid

securities, and the fact that they are made up of a bundle of loans helps diversify risk,

making them desirable. The financial institution selling the securitized loans makes a

profit by servicing the loans (collecting the interest and principal payments and paying

them out) and charging a fee to the third party for this service.

The process of financial innovation we have discussed so far is much like innovation

in other areas of the economy: It occurs in response to changes in demand and supply

conditions. However, because the financial industry is more heavily regulated

than other industries, government regulation is a much greater spur to innovation in

this industry. Government regulation leads to financial innovation by creating incentives

for firms to skirt regulations that restrict their ability to earn profits. Edward

Kane, an economist at Boston College, describes this process of avoiding regulations

as “loophole mining.” The economic analysis of innovation suggests that when the

economic environment changes such that regulatory constraints are so burdensome

that large profits can be made by avoiding them, loophole mining and innovation are

more likely to occur.

Because banking is one of the most heavily regulated industries in America, loophole

mining is especially likely to occur. The rise in inflation and interest rates from

Avoidance of

Existing

Regulations

C H A P T E R 1 0 Banking Industry: Structure and Competition 237

the late 1960s to 1980 made the regulatory constraints imposed on this industry even

more burdensome, leading to financial innovation.

Two sets of regulations have seriously restricted the ability of banks to make profits:

reserve requirements that force banks to keep a certain fraction of their deposits

as reserves (vault cash and deposits in the Federal Reserve System) and restrictions on

the interest rates that can be paid on deposits. For the following reasons, these regulations

have been major forces behind financial innovation.

1. Reserve requirements. The key to understanding why reserve requirements led

to financial innovation is to recognize that they act, in effect, as a tax on deposits.

Because the Fed does not pay interest on reserves, the opportunity cost of holding

them is the interest that a bank could otherwise earn by lending the reserves out. For

each dollar of deposits, reserve requirements therefore impose a cost on the bank

equal to the interest rate, i, that could be earned if the reserves could be lent out times

the fraction of deposits required as reserves, r. The cost of i r imposed on the bank

is just like a tax on bank deposits of i r.

It is a great tradition to avoid taxes if possible, and banks also play this game. Just

as taxpayers look for loopholes to lower their tax bills, banks seek to increase their

profits by mining loopholes and by producing financial innovations that allow them

to escape the tax on deposits imposed by reserve requirements.

2. Restrictions on interest paid on deposits. Until 1980, legislation prohibited banks

in most states from paying interest on checking account deposits, and through

Regulation Q, the Fed set maximum limits on the interest rate that could be paid on

time deposits. To this day, banks are not allowed to pay interest on corporate checking

accounts. The desire to avoid these deposit rate ceilings also led to financial

innovations.

If market interest rates rose above the maximum rates that banks paid on time

deposits under Regulation Q, depositors withdrew funds from banks to put them into

higher-yielding securities. This loss of deposits from the banking system restricted the

amount of funds that banks could lend (called disintermediation) and thus limited

bank profits. Banks had an incentive to get around deposit rate ceilings, because by

so doing, they could acquire more funds to make loans and earn higher profits.

We can now look at how the desire to avoid restrictions on interest payments and

the tax effect of reserve requirements led to two important financial innovations.

Money Market Mutual Funds. Money market mutual funds issue shares that are

redeemable at a fixed price (usually $1) by writing checks. For example, if you buy

5,000 shares for $5,000, the money market fund uses these funds to invest in shortterm

money market securities (Treasury bills, certificates of deposit, commercial

paper) that provide you with interest payments. In addition, you are able to write

checks up to the $5,000 held as shares in the money market fund. Although money

market fund shares effectively function as checking account deposits that earn interest,

they are not legally deposits and so are not subject to reserve requirements or prohibitions

on interest payments. For this reason, they can pay higher interest rates than

deposits at banks.

The first money market mutual fund was created by two Wall Street mavericks,

Bruce Bent and Henry Brown, in 1971. However, the low market interest rates from

1971 to 1977 (which were just slightly above Regulation Q ceilings of 5.25 to 5.5%)

kept them from being particularly advantageous relative to bank deposits. In early

1978, the situation changed rapidly as market interest rates began to climb over 10%,

238 PART I I I Financial Institutions

well above the 5.5% maximum interest rates payable on savings accounts and time

deposits under Regulation Q. In 1977, money market mutual funds had assets under

$4 billion; in 1978, their assets climbed to close to $10 billion; in 1979, to over $40

billion; and in 1982, to $230 billion. Currently, their assets are around $2 trillion. To

say the least, money market mutual funds have been a successful financial innovation,

which is exactly what we would have predicted to occur in the late 1970s and early

1980s when interest rates soared beyond Regulation Q ceilings.

Sweep Accounts. Another innovation that enables banks to avoid the “tax” from reserve

requirements is the sweep account. In this arrangement, any balances above a certain

amount in a corporation’s checking account at the end of a business day are “swept out”

of the account and invested in overnight securities that pay the corporation interest.

Because the “swept out” funds are no longer classified as checkable deposits, they are

not subject to reserve requirements and thus are not “taxed.” They also have the advantage

that they allow banks in effect to pay interest on these corporate checking accounts,

which otherwise is not allowed under existing regulations. Because sweep accounts have

become so popular, they have lowered the amount of required reserves to the degree

that most banking institutions do not find reserve requirements binding: In other

words, they voluntarily hold more reserves than they are required to.

The financial innovation of sweep accounts is particularly interesting because it

was stimulated not only by the desire to avoid a costly regulation, but also by a change

in supply conditions: in this case, information technology. Without low-cost computers

to process inexpensively the additional transactions required by these accounts,

this innovation would not have been profitable and therefore would not have been

developed. Technological factors often combine with other incentives, such as the

desire to get around a regulation, to produce innovation.

The traditional financial intermediation role of banking has been to make long-term

loans and to fund them by issuing short-term deposits, a process of asset transformation

commonly referred to as “borrowing short and lending long.” Here we examine

how financial innovations have created a more competitive environment for the banking

industry, causing the industry to change dramatically, with its traditional banking

business going into decline.

In the United States, the importance of commercial banks as a source of funds to

nonfinancial borrowers has shrunk dramatically. As we can see in Figure 2, in 1974,

commercial banks provided close to 40% of these funds; by 2002, their market share

was down to below 30%. The decline in market share for thrift institutions has been

even more precipitous: from more than 20% in the late 1970s to 6% today. Another

way of viewing the declining role of banking in traditional financial intermediation is

to look at the size of banks’ balance sheet assets relative to those of other financial

intermediaries (see Table 1 in Chapter 12, page 289). Commercial banks’ share of

total financial intermediary assets has fallen from about 40% in the 1960–1980 period

to 30% by the end of 2002. Similarly, the share of total financial intermediary assets

held by thrift institutions has declined even more from the 20% level of the

1960–1980 period to about 5% by 2002.

Clearly, the traditional financial intermediation role of banking, whereby banks

make loans that are funded with deposits, is no longer as important in our financial

system. However, the decline in the market share of banks in total lending and total

financial intermediary assets does not necessarily indicate that the banking industry is

Financial

Innovation and

the Decline of

Traditional

Banking

C H A P T E R 1 0 Banking Industry: Structure and Competition 239

www.financialservicefacts.org

/international/INT-1.htm

Learn about the number of

employees and the current

profitability of commercial

banks and saving institutions.

in decline. There is no evidence of a declining trend in bank profitability. However,

overall bank profitability is not a good indicator of the profitability of traditional banking,

because it includes an increasing amount of income from nontraditional offbalance-

sheet activities, discussed in Chapter 9. Noninterest income derived from

off-balance-sheet activities, as a share of total banking income, increased from around

7% in 1980 to more than 45% of total bank income today. Given that the overall profitability

of banks has not risen, the increase in income from off-balance-sheet activities

implies that the profitability of traditional banking business has declined. This decline

in profitability then explains why banks have been reducing their traditional business.

To understand why traditional banking business has declined in both size and profitability,

we need to look at how the financial innovations described earlier have caused

banks to suffer declines in their cost advantages in acquiring funds, that is, on the liabilities

side of their balance sheet, while at the same time they have lost income advantages

on the assets side of their balance sheet. The simultaneous decline of cost and

income advantages has resulted in reduced profitability of traditional banking and an

effort by banks to leave this business and engage in new and more profitable activities.

Decline in Cost Advantages in Acquiring Funds (Liabilities). Until 1980, banks were subject

to deposit rate ceilings that restricted them from paying any interest on checkable

deposits and (under Regulation Q) limited them to paying a maximum interest rate

of a little over 5% on time deposits. Until the 1960s, these restrictions worked to the

240 PART I I I Financial Institutions

FIGURE 2 Bank Share of Total Nonfinancial Borrowing, 1960–2002

Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts; Federal Reserve Bulletin.

% of

Total Credit

Advanced

Commercial Banks

Thrifts

0

10

20

30

40

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

banks’ advantage because their major source of funds (over 60%) was checkable

deposits, and the zero interest cost on these deposits meant that the banks had a very

low cost of funds. Unfortunately, this cost advantage for banks did not last. The rise

in inflation from the late 1960s on led to higher interest rates, which made investors

more sensitive to yield differentials on different assets. The result was the so-called

disintermediation process, in which people began to take their money out of banks,

with their low interest rates on both checkable and time deposits, and began to seek

out higher-yielding investments. Also, as we have seen, at the same time, attempts to

get around deposit rate ceilings and reserve requirements led to the financial innovation

of money market mutual funds, which put the banks at an even further disadvantage

because depositors could now obtain checking account–like services while

earning high interest on their money market mutual fund accounts. One manifestation

of these changes in the financial system was that the low-cost source of funds,

checkable deposits, declined dramatically in importance for banks, falling from over

60% of bank liabilities to below 10% today.

The growing difficulty for banks in raising funds led to their supporting legislation

in the 1980s that eliminated Regulation Q ceilings on time deposit interest rates

and allowed checkable deposit accounts that paid interest. Although these changes in

regulation helped make banks more competitive in their quest for funds, it also meant

that their cost of acquiring funds had risen substantially, thereby reducing their earlier

cost advantage over other financial institutions.

Decline in Income Advantages on Uses of Funds (Assets). The loss of cost advantages on

the liabilities side of the balance sheet for American banks is one reason that they have

become less competitive, but they have also been hit by a decline in income advantages

on the assets side from the financial innovations we discussed earlier—junk

bonds, securitization, and the rise of the commercial paper market.

We have seen that improvements in information technology have made it easier

for firms to issue securities directly to the public. This has meant that instead of going

to banks to finance short-term credit needs, many of the banks’ best business customers

now find it cheaper to go instead to the commercial paper market for funds.

The loss of this competitive advantage for banks is evident in the fact that before

1970, nonfinancial commercial paper equaled less than 5% of commercial and industrial

bank loans, whereas the figure has risen to 16% today. In addition, this growth

in the commercial paper market has allowed finance companies, which depend primarily

on commercial paper to acquire funds, to expand their operations at the

expense of banks. Finance companies, which lend to many of the same businesses

that borrow from banks, have increased their market share relative to banks: Before

1980, finance company loans to business equaled about 30% of commercial and

industrial bank loans; currently, they are over 45%.

The rise of the junk bond market has also eaten into banks’ loan business.

Improvements in information technology have made it easier for corporations to sell

their bonds to the public directly, thereby bypassing banks. Although Fortune 500

companies started taking this route in the 1970s, now lower-quality corporate borrowers

are using banks less often because they have access to the junk bond market.

We have also seen that improvements in computer technology have led to securitization,

whereby illiquid financial assets such as bank loans and mortgages are

transformed into marketable securities. Computers enable other financial institutions

to originate loans because they can now accurately evaluate credit risk with statistical

C H A P T E R 1 0 Banking Industry: Structure and Competition 241

methods, while computers have lowered transaction costs, making it possible to bundle

these loans and sell them as securities. When default risk can be easily evaluated

with computers, banks no longer have an advantage in making loans. Without their

former advantages, banks have lost loan business to other financial institutions even

though the banks themselves are involved in the process of securitization. Securitization

has been a particular problem for mortgage-issuing institutions such as S&Ls, because

most residential mortgages are now securitized.

Banks’ Responses. In any industry, a decline in profitability usually results in exit

from the industry (often due to widespread bankruptcies) and a shrinkage of market

share. This occurred in the banking industry in the United States during the 1980s

via consolidations and bank failures (discussed in the next chapter).

In an attempt to survive and maintain adequate profit levels, many U.S. banks

face two alternatives. First, they can attempt to maintain their traditional lending

activity by expanding into new and riskier areas of lending. For example, U.S. banks

increased their risk taking by placing a greater percentage of their total funds in commercial

real estate loans, traditionally a riskier type of loan. In addition, they increased

lending for corporate takeovers and leveraged buyouts, which are highly leveraged

transaction loans. The decline in the profitability of banks’ traditional business may

thus have helped lead to the crisis in banking in the 1980s and early 1990s that we

discuss in the next chapter.

The second way banks have sought to maintain former profit levels is to pursue

new off-balance-sheet activities that are more profitable. U.S. commercial banks did

this during the early 1980s, more than doubling the share of their income coming

from off-balance-sheet, noninterest-income activities. This strategy, however, has generated

concerns about what activities are proper for banks and whether nontraditional

activities might be riskier, and thus result in excessive risk-taking by banks.

The decline of banks’ traditional business has thus meant that the banking industry

has been driven to seek out new lines of business. This could be beneficial because

by so doing, banks can keep vibrant and healthy. Indeed, bank profitability has been

high in recent years, and nontraditional, off-balance-sheet activities have been playing

an important role in the resurgence of bank profits. However, there is a danger

that the new directions in banking could lead to increased risk taking, and thus the

decline in traditional banking requires regulators to be more vigilant. It also poses

new challenges for bank regulators, who, as we will see in Chapter 11, must now be

far more concerned about banks’ off-balance-sheet activities.

Decline of Traditional Banking in Other Industrialized Countries. Forces similar to those

in the United States have been leading to the decline of traditional banking in other

industrialized countries. The loss of banks’ monopoly power over depositors has

occurred outside the United States as well. Financial innovation and deregulation are

occurring worldwide and have created attractive alternatives for both depositors and

borrowers. In Japan, for example, deregulation has opened a wide array of new financial

instruments to the public, causing a disintermediation process similar to that in

the United States. In European countries, innovations have steadily eroded the barriers

that have traditionally protected banks from competition.

In other countries, banks have also faced increased competition from the expansion

of securities markets. Both financial deregulation and fundamental economic

242 PART I I I Financial Institutions

forces in other countries have improved the availability of information in securities

markets, making it easier and less costly for firms to finance their activities by issuing

securities rather than going to banks. Further, even in countries where securities markets

have not grown, banks have still lost loan business because their best corporate

customers have had increasing access to foreign and offshore capital markets, such as

the Eurobond market. In smaller economies, like Australia, which still do not have

well-developed corporate bond or commercial paper markets, banks have lost loan

business to international securities markets. In addition, the same forces that drove the

securitization process in the United States are at work in other countries and will

undercut the profitability of traditional banking in these countries as well. The United

States is not unique in seeing its banks face a more difficult competitive environment.

Thus, although the decline of traditional banking has occurred earlier in the United

States than in other countries, the same forces are causing a decline in traditional

banking abroad.

Structure of the U.S. Commercial Banking Industry

There are approximately 8,000 commercial banks in the United States, far more than

in any other country in the world. As Table 1 indicates, we have an extraordinary

number of small banks. Ten percent of the banks have less than $25 million in assets.

Far more typical is the size distribution in Canada or the United Kingdom, where five

or fewer banks dominate the industry. In contrast, the ten largest commercial banks

in the United States (listed in Table 2) together hold just 58% of the assets in their

industry.

Most industries in the United States have far fewer firms than the commercial

banking industry; typically, large firms tend to dominate these industries to a greater

extent than in the commercial banking industry. (Consider the computer software

C H A P T E R 1 0 Banking Industry: Structure and Competition 243

Number Share of Share of

Assets of Banks Banks (%) Assets Held (%)

Less than $25 million 796 10.0 0.2

$25–$50 million 1,421 17.9 0.8

$50–$100 million 2,068 26.1 2.2

$100–$500 million 2,868 36.2 8.6

$500 million–$1 billion 381 4.8 3.7

$1–$10 billion 319 4.0 13.2

More than $10 billion 80 1.0 71.3

Total 7,933 100.0 100.0

Source: www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/statistics/0209/allstru.html.

Table 1 Size Distribution of Insured Commercial Banks, September 30, 2002

www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical

/statistics/index.html

Visit this web site to gather

statistics on the banking

industry.

industry, which is dominated by Microsoft, or the automobile industry, which is dominated

by General Motors, Ford, Daimler-Chrysler, Toyota, and Honda.) Does the large

number of banks in the commercial banking industry and the absence of a few dominant

firms suggest that commercial banking is more competitive than other industries?

The presence of so many commercial banks in the United States actually reflects past

regulations that restricted the ability of these financial institutions to open branches

(additional offices for the conduct of banking operations). Each state had its own regulations

on the type and number of branches that a bank could open. Regulations on

both coasts, for example, tended to allow banks to open branches throughout a state; in

the middle part of the country, regulations on branching were more restrictive. The

McFadden Act of 1927, which was designed to put national banks and state banks on

an equal footing (and the Douglas Amendment of 1956, which closed a loophole in the

McFadden Act) effectively prohibited banks from branching across state lines and forced

all national banks to conform to the branching regulations in the state of their location.

The McFadden Act and state branching regulations constituted strong anticompetitive

forces in the commercial banking industry, allowing many small banks to stay

in existence, because larger banks were prevented from opening a branch nearby. If

competition is beneficial to society, why have regulations restricting branching arisen

in America? The simplest explanation is that the American public has historically been

hostile to large banks. States with the most restrictive branching regulations were typically

ones in which populist antibank sentiment was strongest in the nineteenth cen-

Restrictions on

Branching

244 PART I I I Financial Institutions

Assets Share of All Commercial

Bank ($ millions) Bank Assets (%)

1. Citibank, National Association, New York 1,057,657 15.19

2. JP Morgan Chase, New York 712,508 10.23

3. Bank of America, National Association,

Charlotte, N.C. 619,921 8.90

4. Wachovia National Bank, Charlotte, N.C. 319,853 4.59

5. Wells Fargo, National Association,

San Francisco 311,509 4.47

6. Bank One, National Association, Chicago 262,947 3.77

7. Taunus Corporation, New York 235,867 3.39

8. Fleet National Bank, Providence, R.I. 192,032 2.76

9. ABN Amro, North America, Chicago 174,451 2.50

10. US Bancorp, Minneapolis, Minnesota 164,745 2.36

Total 4,051,490 58.16

Source: www.infoplease.com/pia/A0763206.html.

Table 2 Ten Largest U.S. Banks, February 2003

tury. (These states usually had large farming populations whose relations with banks

periodically became tempestuous when banks would foreclose on farmers who couldn’t

pay their debts.) The legacy of nineteenth-century politics was a banking system with

restrictive branching regulations and hence an inordinate number of small banks.

However, as we will see later in this chapter, branching restrictions have been eliminated,

and we are heading toward nationwide banking.

An important feature of the U.S. banking industry is that competition can be repressed

by regulation but not completely quashed. As we saw earlier in this chapter, the existence

of restrictive regulation stimulates financial innovations that get around these

regulations in the banks’ search for profits. Regulations restricting branching have stimulated

similar economic forces and have promoted the development of two financial

innovations: bank holding companies and automated teller machines.

Bank Holding Companies. A holding company is a corporation that owns several different

companies. This form of corporate ownership has important advantages for

banks. It has allowed them to circumvent restrictive branching regulations, because the

holding company can own a controlling interest in several banks even if branching is

not permitted. Furthermore, a bank holding company can engage in other activities

related to banking, such as the provision of investment advice, data processing and

transmission services, leasing, credit card services, and servicing of loans in other states.

The growth of the bank holding companies has been dramatic over the past three

decades. Today bank holding companies own almost all large banks, and over 90% of

all commercial bank deposits are held in banks owned by holding companies.

Automated Teller Machines. Another financial innovation that avoided the restrictions

on branching is the automated teller machine (ATM). Banks realized that if they did

not own or rent the ATM, but instead let it be owned by someone else and paid for

each transaction with a fee, the ATM would probably not be considered a branch of

the bank and thus would not be subject to branching regulations. This is exactly what

the regulatory agencies and courts in most states concluded. Because they enable

banks to widen their markets, a number of these shared facilities (such as Cirrus and

NYCE) have been established nationwide. Furthermore, even when an ATM is owned

by a bank, states typically have special provisions that allow wider establishment of

ATMs than is permissible for traditional “brick and mortar” branches.

As we saw earlier in this chapter, avoiding regulation was not the only reason for

the development of the ATM. The advent of cheaper computer and telecommunications

technology enabled banks to provide ATMs at low cost, making them a

profitable innovation. This example further illustrates that technological factors often

combine with incentives such as the desire to avoid restrictive regulations like branching

restrictions to produce financial innovation.

Bank Consolidation and Nationwide Banking

As we can see in Figure 3, after a remarkable period of stability from 1934 to the mid-

1980s, the number of commercial banks began to fall dramatically. Why has this sudden

decline taken place?

Response to

Branching

Restrictions

C H A P T E R 1 0 Banking Industry: Structure and Competition 245

The banking industry hit some hard times in the 1980s and early 1990s, with

bank failures running at a rate of over 100 per year from 1985 to 1992 (more on this

later in the chapter and in Chapter 11). But bank failures are only part of the story. In

the years 1985–1992, the number of banks declined by 3,000—more than double the

number of failures. And in the period 1992–2002, when the banking industry

returned to health, the number of commercial banks declined by a little over 4,100,

less than 5% of which were bank failures, and most of these were of small banks. Thus

we see that bank failures played an important, though not predominant, role in the

decline in the number of banks in the 1985–1992 period and an almost negligible

role in the decline in the number of banks since then.

So what explains the rest of the story? The answer is bank consolidation. Banks

have been merging to create larger entities or have been buying up other banks.

This gives rise to a new question: Why has bank consolidation been taking place in

recent years?

As we have seen, loophole mining by banks has reduced the effectiveness of

branching restrictions, with the result that many states have recognized that it would

be in their best interest if they allowed ownership of banks across state lines. The result

has been the formation of reciprocal regional compacts in which banks in one state are

allowed to own banks in other states in the region. In 1975, Maine enacted the first

interstate banking legislation that allowed out-of-state bank holding companies to purchase

banks in that state. In 1982, Massachusetts enacted a regional compact with

other New England states to allow interstate banking, and many other regional com-

246 PART I I I Financial Institutions

FIGURE 3 Number of Insured Commercial Banks in the United States, 1934–2002

Source: www2.fdic.gov/qbp/qbpSelect.asp?menuitem=STAT.

1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2000 2005

0

2,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

Number

of Banks

4,000

pacts were adopted thereafter until by the early 1990s, almost all states allowed some

form of interstate banking.

With the barriers to interstate banking breaking down in the early 1980s, banks

recognized that they could gain the benefits of diversification because they would

now be able to make loans in many states rather than just one. This gave them the

advantage that if one state’s economy was weak, another in which they operated might

be strong, thus decreasing the likelihood that loans in different states would default

at the same time. In addition, allowing banks to own banks in other states meant that

they could take advantage of economies of scale by increasing their size through outof-

state acquisition of banks or by merging with banks in other states. Mergers and

acquisitions explain the first phase of banking consolidation, which has played such

an important role in the decline in the number of banks since 1985. Another result

of the loosening of restrictions on interstate branching is the development of a new

class of bank, the so-called superregional banks, bank holding companies that have

begun to rival the money center banks in size but whose headquarters are not in one

of the money center cities (New York, Chicago, and San Francisco). Examples of these

superregional banks are Bank of America of Charlotte, North Carolina, and Banc One

of Columbus, Ohio.

Not surprisingly, the advent of the Web and improved computer technology is

another factor driving bank consolidation. Economies of scale have increased, because

large upfront investments are required to set up many information technology platforms

for financial institutions (see Box 2). To take advantage of these economies of

scale, banks have needed to get bigger, and this development has led to additional

C H A P T E R 1 0 Banking Industry: Structure and Competition 247

Information Technology and Bank Consolidation

Achieving low costs in banking requires huge investments

in information technology. In turn, such enormous

investments require a business line of very large

scale. This has been particularly true in the credit

card business in recent years, in which huge technology

investments have been made to provide customers

with convenient web sites and to develop

better systems to handle processing and risk analysis

for both credit and fraud risk. The result has been

substantial consolidation: As recently as 1995, the

top five banking institutions issuing credit cards held

less than 40% of total credit card debt, while today

this number is above 60%.

Information technology has also spurred increasing

consolidation of the bank custody business. Banks

hold the actual certificate for investors when they purchase

a stock or bond and provide data on the value of

these securities and how much risk an investor is facing.

Because this business is also computer-intensive, it

also requires very large-scale investments in computer

technology in order for the bank to offer these services

at competitive rates. The percentage of assets at the top

ten custody banks has therefore risen from 40% in

1990 to more than 90% today.

The increasing importance of e-finance, in which

the computer is playing a more central role in delivering

financial services, is bringing tremendous

changes to the structure of the banking industry.

Although banks are more than willing to offer a full

range of products to their customers, they no longer

find it profitable to produce all of them. Instead, they

are contracting out the business, a practice that will

lead to further consolidation of technology-intensive

banking businesses in the future.

Box 2: E-Finance

consolidation. Information technology has also been increasing economies of scope,

the ability to use one resource to provide many different products and services. For

example, details about the quality and creditworthiness of firms not only inform decisions

about whether to make loans to them, but also can be useful in determining at

what price their shares should trade. Similarly, once you have marketed one financial

product to an investor, you probably know how to market another. Business people

describe economies of scope by saying that there are “synergies” between different

lines of business, and information technology is making these synergies more likely.

The result is that consolidation is taking place not only to make financial institutions

bigger, but also to increase the combination of products and services they can provide.

This consolidation has had two consequences. First, different types of financial

intermediaries are encroaching on each other’s territory, making them more alike.

Second, consolidation has led to the development of what the Federal Reserve has

named large, complex, banking organizations (LCBOs). This development has

been facilitated by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall restrictions on combinations of

banking and other financial service industries discussed in the next section.

Banking consolidation has been given further stimulus by the passage in 1994 of the

Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act. This legislation expands

the regional compacts to the entire nation and overturns the McFadden Act and

Douglas Amendment’s prohibition of interstate banking. Not only does this act allow

bank holding companies to acquire banks in any other state, notwithstanding any

state laws to the contrary, but bank holding companies can merge the banks they own

into one bank with branches in different states. States also have the option of opting

out of interstate branching, a choice only Texas has made.

The Riegle-Neal Act finally establishes the basis for a true nationwide banking

system. Although interstate banking was accomplished previously by out-of-state

purchase of banks by bank holding companies, up until 1994 interstate branching

was virtually nonexistent, because very few states had enacted interstate branching

legislation. Allowing banks to conduct interstate banking through branching is especially

important, because many bankers feel that economies of scale cannot be fully

exploited through the bank holding company structure, but only through branching

networks in which all of the bank’s operations are fully coordinated.

Nationwide banks are now emerging. With the merger in 1998 of Bank of

America and NationsBank, which created the first bank with branches on both coasts,

consolidation in the banking industry is leading to banking organizations with operations

in almost all of the fifty states.

With true nationwide banking in the U.S. becoming a reality, the benefits of bank consolidation

for the banking industry have increased substantially, thus driving the next

phase of mergers and acquisitions and accelerating the decline in the number of commercial

banks. With great changes occurring in the structure of this industry, the

question naturally arises: What will the industry look like in ten years?

One view is that the industry will become more like that in many other countries

(see Box 3) and we will end up with only a couple of hundred banks. A more

extreme view is that the industry will look like that of Canada or the United

Kingdom, with a few large banks dominating the industry. Research on this question,

however, comes up with a different answer. The structure of the U.S. banking industry

will still be unique, but not to the degree it once was. Most experts predict that

What Will the

Structure of the

U.S. Banking

Industry Look Like

in the Future?

The Riegle-Neal

Interstate

Banking and

Branching

Efficiency

Act of 1994

248 PART I I I Financial Institutions

the consolidation surge will settle down as the U.S. banking industry approaches several

thousand, rather than several hundred, banks.2

Banking consolidation will result not only in a smaller number of banks, but as

the mergers between Chase Manhattan Bank and Chemical Bank and between Bank

of America and NationsBank suggest, a shift in assets from smaller banks to larger

banks as well. Within ten years, the share of bank assets in banks with less than $100

million in assets is expected to halve, while the amount at the so-called megabanks,

those with over $100 billion in assets, is expected to more than double. Indeed, some

analysts have predicted that we won’t have long to wait before the first trillion-dollar

bank emerges in the United States.

Advocates of nationwide banking believe that it will produce more efficient banks

and a healthier banking system less prone to bank failures. However, critics of bank

consolidation fear that it will eliminate small banks, referred to as community banks,

and that this will result in less lending to small businesses. In addition, they worry

that a few banks will come to dominate the industry, making the banking business

less competitive.

Most economists are skeptical of these criticisms of bank consolidation. As we

have seen, research indicates that even after bank consolidation is completed, the

United States will still have plenty of banks. The banking industry will thus remain

highly competitive, probably even more so than now considering that banks that have

been protected from competition from out-of-state banks will now have to compete

with them vigorously to stay in business.

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